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Introduction
The University in a Global Age
1.
In the context of the present book, we are taking as a point of 
departure a number of loosely interrelated assumptions. First, higher 
education has been largely publicly-funded in its traditional 
European forms and its period of greatest growth coincided with the 
development of the post-war welfare state. Second, we are currently 
witnessing the growing significance of knowledge production, 
acquisition, dissemination and application in the emergent 
knowledge-based societies and economies on the one hand -  and the 
still mostly traditional role of European higher education systems in 
the (shrinking, being restructured, retrenched etc) public sector on the 
other. Third, we are witnessing the pressures of global forces on both 
national policies with respect to the welfare state and on national 
budgets accompanied by the ideas (and ideals) of the “minimalist” -  
or, more recently, “effective”, “intelligent” etc -  state with smaller 
social duties than we were used to in the West under post-war 
welfare systems. Fourth, we are witnessing more general attempts at 
a reformulation of the post-war social contract which gave rise to the 
welfare state as we know it (with public higher education as we know 
it). Given all these assumptions, and many other accompanying 
factors, what is the future of our universities? What is going to 
happen to their uniqueness in society, culture, politics, and the 
economy? What is going to happen to the traditional idea (although in
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many different forms) of the university in the new world we are 
entering?
One of the central theses of the present book is that it is not 
satisfactory to discuss the institution of the university solely or mostly 
in the context of (national or comparative) higher education studies. 
The picture of the contemporary dynamics surrounding the in­
stitution and, especially, its future in increasingly knowledge-based 
and market-driven societies and economies, can no longer be 
discussed solely in traditional, relatively self-enclosed disciplinary 
contexts. Consequently, the university here is seen from a variety of 
perspectives and through the lenses of a wide range of disciplines 
(political economy, sociology, political sciences, philosophy etc). We 
begin from the fact that the nation-state has for a period of almost two 
hundred years forged links with the modern institution of the 
university as the provider of national consciousness and national 
culture, as well as the social and national glue for emergent European 
nation-states (Chapter 3); and begin from the fact that the welfare 
state has contributed to an unprecedented growth in public higher 
education and the unprecedented educational attainments of 
individuals, social groups, and nations, especially in the post-war 
period (Chapters 4 and 5). There are many issues that need 
consideration: the transformation in the ideals of the state and its 
social responsibilities in a period of global capitalism; the trans­
formation of the public sector in general, including the reforms in 
pensions, health care and educational services; the gradual decline of 
the traditional “Humboldtian” idea of the university; the changing 
relations between state and market forces in providing different 
public services, including higher education; the collapse of the 
“communist” alternative following the peaceful revolutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe in 1989 and its ideological influence on the future 
of global capitalism; the emergent new (both European and 
transnational) discourses on higher education and its reforms -  
especially the convergence of new discourses on the institution of the 
university as exemplified in recent years by such different players as 
the European Commission, the World Bank and the OECD; the 
European integration of higher education and research as a challenge
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to the traditional models of higher education in Europe (with the 
Bologna process increasingly seen as following the logic of the 
“Lisbon strategy” for the reform of the European economy, welfare 
and education by 2010); the emergent “knowledge societies” with 
their direct needs to be catered for by educational institutions; and 
finally, the direct and indirect influence of the widely felt 
(culturally, politically, technologically and economically) effects of 
globalization.
The accompanying questions are the following: under the pressures 
of globalization, is there an increasing primacy of the market over the 
state as one of the main societal steering mechanisms? As educational 
policies in a European welfare-state context used to view higher 
education as a mostly public (or social) good, and as this view justified 
an ever increasing or at least good funding for national higher 
education and research and development systems -  does the emergent 
redefinition of higher education as a private good (or individual good) 
favor a smaller funding engagement on the part of the state?1 Or maybe 
the view of higher education as a private good is balanced by the 
increased need for higher education in knowledge-based societies, so 
that from the perspective of “social capital” it allows universities to 
continue to rely solely or mostly on public funds for their functioning? 
There is a clear paradox here: higher education is seen as more 
important than ever before in terms of the competitiveness between 
nations, but though the importance of “knowledge” in our societies is 
greater than ever, at the same time, along with the pressures to reform 
current welfare state systems, the capacity of national governments to 
finance higher education is considerably weaker than in previous 
decades, and may tend to be even smaller in the future. National 
governments have little room for maneuver in allocating parts of the 
budget to different sectors, not to mention the growing problems of
1 It is also interesting to bear in mind a distinction drawn recently by Per Nyborg 
in “Higher Education as a Public Good and a Public Responsibility” between the 
notion of public good and that of public responsibility with respect to higher education. 
He argues that it may be more relevant to explore the implications of the public 
responsibility for higher education than to focus solely on the concept of the public 
good (Nyborg 2003: 355-356).
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efficient tax collection in the new global economy.2 Given the emphasis 
on the importance of knowledge production and dissemination in the 
emergent “knowledge societies”, somehow paradoxically, and some­
how unexpectedly, higher education has found itself -  along with other 
welfare services, but after health care provisions and national pension 
systems -  part of the reforms in public sectors worldwide. The tension 
between the general attitude of governments and populations 
(education perceived as perhaps the primary asset of the individual) on 
the one hand and the inability or unwillingness of the very same 
governments to maintain current levels of funding for it, not to 
mention the raising of the level of public funding for higher education 
and research in public universities -  is as strong as never before.3
Consequently, what can be clearly seen is the convergence of 
educational policies across the world in which higher education is 
often no longer viewed as something special or unique but as a direct, 
increasingly measurable factor for developing new knowledge-based 
economies. Global economic constraints, felt the world over, clearly 
limit the policy choices of national governments (including policy 
choices in education4) and considerably reduce their room for
2 Vito Tanzi in his “Taxation and the Future of Social Protection” evokes the image 
of fiscal termites and claims that globalization may effect the existing welfare states 
most directly through its effect on tax systems: “while the fiscal house is still standing 
and looks solid, one can visualize many fiscal termites that are busily gnawing at its 
foundations” (Tanzi 2001: 192).
3 One of the most lucid expressions of the disenchantment of academia today is 
Zygmunt Bauman’s sad remark that “the burden of occupational training is shifting 
gradually yet steadily away from the universities, reflected everywhere in the waning 
willingness of the state to subsidize them from the public purse. One is inclined to 
suspect that if the intake of universities is not yet falling sharply, it is to a large extent 
due to their unanticipated and bargained-for role as a temporary shelter in a society 
afflicted by structural unemployment; a device allowing the newcomers to postpone 
for a few years the moment of truth that arrives when the harsh realities of the labour 
market need be faced” (Bauman 2001: 131).
4 Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education, a recent 
major policy paper on higher education published by the World Bank, gives certain 
general recommendations for funding the sector: “While there is no magic number 
defining the ‘correct’ proportion of resources to be devoted to tertiary education, 
certain guidelines can be applied ... Looking at the experience of OECD countries that
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maneuver. What is increasingly evident on a global scale is “the 
market perspective” when thinking about public services, in the 
aforementioned health care, pension and education sectors; along 
with the perspective of the “freedom of choice”, especially appealing 
in societies with larger and more affluent middle classes.5 In another 
context, the institution of the university is playing a significant role in 
the processes relating to the emergence of common European higher 
education and research spaces. What is clear, though, is that in neither 
of them is the university seen in the traditional way we know from the 
debates prior to the advent of globalization, the speeding up of the 
process of European integration and the passage from industrial and 
service societies to postindustrial, global, knowledge and information 
societies (see Kwiek 2000a). The institution, in general, has already 
found it legitimate, useful and necessary to evolve together with the 
radical transformations of the social setting in which it is functioning, 
as discussed in Chapter 6.
have emphasized the role of education in supporting economic growth and social 
cohesion, it would seem that an appropriate range for the overall level of investment 
in education as a share of GDP would be between 4 and 6 percent. Expenditures on 
tertiary education would then generally represent between 15 and 20 percent of public 
education expenditures” (World Bank 2002: 82).
5 As Stein Kuhnle argues in his paper on the “Survival of the European Welfare 
State” about the declining relative role of the state in the coming decades, “more wealth 
in society and higher incomes for a large part, for a large majority, of the population in a 
country give greater meaning to the concept ‘freedom of choice’ ...: greater individual 
economic resources make ‘exit’ from an organization possible, and greater individual 
resources make it more likely that possible alternative providers will arise as a reaction 
to subjectively felt poor quality, or declining quality of services, or unmet demand, in -  
in this case -  the public state welfare system” (Kuhnle 1999). High income and personal 
wealth mean freedom of choice, and the future choice will increasingly be between 
public and private providers of welfare services. In affluent societies, consumers develop 
diversified needs and, the argument goes, seek market substitutes for the public 
provision of goods. Consequently, “more space for market and ‘third sector’ solutions 
will be opened”. What does it mean in the long run? Kuhnle expects that more mixed 
welfare provision may give new generations a new experience, thus slowly reducing 
their expectations towards the welfare state and public services: “younger generations 
will grow accustomed to finding non-public solutions, and most likely, more frequently, 
also solutions outside the nation state” (Kuhnle 1999: 6-7). Consequently, to generalize 
the point, we may expect less state welfare accompanied by more market welfare.
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All the above contexts seem crucial to the present author. 
Basically, each of them deserves a separate monograph as the scope of 
the problems is enormous and the number of reports and publications 
(as well as the scope of the accompanying public debates) is huge. 
The idea of the present book, though, is rather an attempt to briefly 
sketch an overview of possible future studies, to try to analyze the 
interconnections between the major contexts described above, and to 
see how they may work together. Consequently, a book intended to 
have as its topic the university in a global age, inevitably turns out to 
be a book about our new, radically changing world, with its changing 
society, economy, politics and culture.6 Current and future 
transformations of the university are seen from the perspective of 
current and future transformations of the state.
Chapter 1 analyzes the location of the institution of the university 
“between the state and the market” through the following points: the 
impact of market forces on the university’s functions and missions; 
the unique character of current changes to higher education systems; 
the relationship between globalization processes and the growing 
competition in the public sector generally; and, finally, the 
interdependence of ongoing thinking about the state (and in some 
places reforming the state) and ongoing thinking about the university 
(and in some places reforming the university). The point of departure 
of the chapter is that the university in its modern research form has 
traditionally, and especially in Europe, been in very close relations 
with the state and in relatively distant relations with the market. 
Now, as state/market relations are changing with the advent of 
globalization, the university is located in a different landscape in 
which the state is generally becoming weaker, and the market is 
becoming stronger. Consequently, the university, traditionally a very 
important part of the public sector, is coming under public scrutiny 
and its social and cultural missions are being increasingly challenged. 
The present author argues that market forces in higher education are
6 As Geoffrey Garrett put it in “The Causes of Globalization”, “there is little 
disagreement these days that globalization is changing the world, rapidly, radically, 
and in ways that may be profoundly disequilibrating” (Garrett 2000a: 1).
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powerful new forces and that they often come as a result of the 
powerful pressures of globalization, especially on the institution of 
the state; also, they will be increasingly present in higher education 
for a variety of political, economic, and cultural reasons, though they 
may be of different strengths in different parts of the world. 
Globalization theories and practices are changing traditional relations 
between the state and the market: the state is increasingly seen as 
merely a “regulator” or “catalyst” for entrepreneurial activities. 
Globalization processes and fierce international economic competition 
have brought back to the world agenda the issue of the role of the 
state in the contemporary world. To sum up, rethinking the 
university today is inseparable from rethinking the state: firstly, the 
modern research university was put at the disposal of the nation-state 
by its German philosophical founders, as shown in Chapter 2, 
changes to the state affect the university, as detailed in Chapter 3; 
and, secondly, the university is traditionally a vast consumer of 
public revenues within the Keynesian model of welfare states as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Both the nation-state and the welfare state are 
now under new global pressures -  which has an indirect impact on 
the university’s future.
Chapter 2 revisits the philosophical origins of the modern 
university and its classical idea as born in the nineteenth-century 
Germany through Wilhelm von Humboldt, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 
Friedrich Schleiermacher and Friedrich W.J. Schelling (as embodied in 
the University of Berlin), and takes as its point of departure two 
different criticisms from twentieth-century philosophy: those of Karl 
Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas. The foundations of the so-called 
Humboldtian model of the university are discussed through such 
basic points as the notions of Bildung and “knowledge for its own 
sake” (Humboldt); the rebirth of the German nation through 
education (Fichte); the relationship between the state and the 
university and the notion of academic freedom (Schleiermacher); and 
the role of philosophy and historical/philosophical heroes in the 
history of nations (Schelling). There are certainly several parallel 
readings of the historical coincidence which propelled German 
philosophers to engage in conceptualizing the new research-centered
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university, but the historical, sociological and philosophical narrative 
of the coterminous birth of the modern institution of the university and 
the emergence o f the nation-state seems very much convincing. 
Assuming the narrative gets the picture right, the state during a large 
part of the nineteenth century wanted the university to serve the dual 
purpose of national knowledge production and the strengthening of 
national loyalties (a theme which is developed separately in Chapter 3). 
More generally, there are three main principles of the modern 
university to be found in the founding fathers of the University of 
Berlin: the unity of research and teaching, the protection of academic 
freedom, and the central importance of the faculty of philosophy. The 
three principles are developed, to varying degrees, in Schelling, 
Fichte, Schleiermacher and Humboldt. Together, the three principles 
have guided the modern institution of the university through the 19th 
century to the 20th century. The modern university as seen in this 
chapter was put at the disposal of the emergent nation-state, with all 
its consequences for the power/knowledge relationship. As the role 
of the nation-state in the global economy is changing, so may be the 
relationship between the university and the nation-state today.
In connection with discussions on the changing role of higher 
education and the changing social mission of the modern university, 
the two crucial dimensions of the state in transition are its relation to 
the welfare state on one hand and its relation to the nation-state on 
the other. Both dimensions of the state are closely linked to higher 
education, especially to its elite segment, the institution of the 
university: which has been mostly state-funded as part of the well- 
developed post-war Keynesian welfare state apparatus, and which 
has been closely (or very closely) related to the modern construct of 
the nation-state.
These ideas are dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4 with the theme of the 
modern contract between the nation-state and the university being 
developed in Chapter 3, while in Chapter 4 the possible impact of 
current reformulations of the welfare state on the institution of the 
university is discussed. Chapter 3 analyzes the university/nation-state 
relationship through the following sections: the new role of the nation­
state in an emergent global order; the historical pact between the
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modern university and the modern state; the three camps of social 
thinkers with respect to the impact of globalization on the nation-state; 
and the relationship between globalization and the public sector, 
higher education included. The present author assumes that it is crucial 
to see not only the historical relationships between the university and 
the nation-state but also the current impact of globalization on the 
institution of the state; consequently, we discuss the current rethinking 
of the nation-state in the context of globalization. Once the major 
directions in rethinking the nation-state today are established, we will 
be able to see the possible long-term consequences for education of 
such new accounts of the nation-state. The three camps with respect to 
the issue of the present and the future of the nation-state include those 
who pronounce its demise, those who maintain that generally nothing 
substantial has changed in recent decades, and those who see the 
transformation of the nation-state as fundamental (but not deadly to it). 
The authors discussed include e.g. Jean-Marie Guehenno, Kenichi 
Ohmae, Martin Albrow, Robert B. Reich and Susan Strange (and 
provisionally Ulrich Beck and Zygmunt Bauman, discussed separately 
in Chapter 5) representing the globalists; Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson, Linda Weiss, Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache, Stephen D. 
Krasner, and John Gray representing the skeptics; and, finally, 
Anthony Giddens, Saskia Sassen, Manuel Castells, Jan Aart Scholte, 
James N. Rosenau, David Held (with Anthony McGrew, David 
Goldblatt, and Jonathan Perraton) representing the moderates.
Chapter 4 analyzes the university/welfare state relationship through 
the following sections: debates on the future of higher education in the 
context of the debates on the future of the welfare state; current thinking 
about the future of the welfare state; the current pressures for the 
retrenchment of the welfare state (in affluent democracies); and two 
contrasting positions taken with respect to the impact of globalization 
upon the welfare state: globalization as the fundamental factor behind 
the retreat of the welfare state and globalization as a significant but not 
critical factor. The chapter begins with a section putting the debate on 
the future of the university in the context of the much wider debate on 
the future of the public sector (and state intervention in, or provision of, 
traditionally public services). The present author argues that there
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seems to be no major disagreement about the future of the (European) 
welfare state in its current postwar form: its foundations, for a variety of 
internal and external reasons and due to a variety of international and 
domestic pressures, need to be renegotiated today. Major differences are 
based on different explanations about what has been happening to the 
European welfare state since the mid-1970s until now, about different 
varieties of restructuring in different European countries, and different 
degrees of emphasis concerning the scope of welfare state downsizing 
in particular countries in the future. In more general terms, the most 
interesting issue is the differing options with regard to the role of 
globalization in redefining the model of the welfare state that are 
possible today. Globalization and the welfare state is the issue that 
most sharply divides current researchers on welfare issues and the 
future of the welfare state is crucial for the future of the institution of 
the (public) university today. The present author argues that the 
social phenomena of greatest interest to him in the present book -  
such as the recommodification of society, the desocialization of the 
economy, the denationalization of both societies and economies, the 
deterritorialization and despatialization of economic activities, the 
changing distribution of risks in society, the growing 
individualization, the growing market orientation in thinking about 
the state and public services, the disempowerment of the nation-state, 
the globalization and transnationalization of welfare spending 
patterns, the detraditionalization of nationhood and citizenship -  all 
influence the way welfare issues are perceived, how problems are 
seen as problems and how solutions accepted as solutions. And these 
processes are at least intensified by globalization. The book goes on to 
argue that what we can see as the current situation of the welfare 
state, and how we can see the issue, is largely framed by the 
processes, phenomena and interpretations that globalization has 
already brought about.
Chapter 5 discusses the nexus of globalization, the future of the 
welfare state and the future of democracy, as seen by three leading 
European social scientists: Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, and 
Zygmunt Bauman. They view the issue from a wider perspective and 
provide additional arguments, through their rethinking of the welfare
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state, for the present author’s point that the transformation of public 
higher education on a global scale is unavoidable. Habermas, Beck and 
Bauman, despite coming from different philosophical and sociological 
traditions, agree on one point about the future of the welfare state in 
Europe: the transformations we are currently witnessing are 
irreversible, we are passing into a new age with respect to the balance 
between the economic and the social. With respect to welfare futures, 
the emergence of Habermas’ “postnational constellation” carries 
similar message as the emergence of Beck’s “second, postnational 
modernity” and Bauman’s “liquid modernity”: the traditional postwar 
Keynesian welfare state, with its powerful “nation-state” component, is 
doomed, and for the three thinkers the culprit behind the end of this 
social project in Europe is globalization, in its theories and its practices. 
None of them focuses on the internal developments of the European 
welfare state (like changing demographics, including the aging of 
Western societies; shifts in familial structures; the burden of past 
entitlements within the inter-generational contract between the old and 
the young, the working and the unemployed etc); they clearly link the 
new geography of social risks and uncertainties with the advent of -  
mainly economic -  globalization.
Chapter 6 discusses the future of the university in the context of 
new European educational and research policies: a pan-European 
project for the integration of higher education and the emergence of 
the so-called European Research Area. Consequently, the present 
author focus his attention on such points as the emergence of the 
“Europe of Knowledge” and the revitalization of the project for 
European integration through education; the evolution in European 
higher education policies over the last decade; the redefinition of the 
roles and missions of the university in the Bologna Process; and a 
new powerful EU discourse on the fresh tasks for the institution of 
the university. The book argues that the recent EU discourse leaves no 
doubts about the direction of changes in the social and economic roles 
of the institution of the university in emergent “knowledge societies”. 
In the new global order, universities are striving to maintain their 
traditionally pivotal role in society. The role of universities as engines 
of economic growth, contributors to economic competitiveness and
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suppliers of well-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven 
economy is being widely acknowledged -  which is undoubtedly a 
radical reformulation of the traditional social roles of the university. 
The university in a European context seems to be entering a new era of 
its development. The main reasons for the transformations include the 
globalization pressures on nation-states and its public services, the 
strengthening of the project for a “common Europe” through new 
education and research spaces, the end of the “Golden age” of the 
Keynesian welfare state as we have known it, and the emergence of 
knowledge-based societies and knowledge-driven economies. The 
foundations of the European knowledge society (and knowledge- 
economy) are constructed around such pivotal notions as 
“knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, “education” and “training”. 
Education, and especially “lifelong learning”, becomes a new 
discursive space in which European dreams of common citizenship 
are currently being located. A new “knowledge-based Europe” is 
becoming individualized (individual learners rather than citizens of 
nation-states) and the construction of a new educational space can 
contribute to forging a new sense of European identity.
2.
The new world we are approaching assumes different names in 
different formulations and the social, cultural, and economic processes 
in question are debated in the multiple vocabularies of the social and 
economic sciences: for some theorists, the processes of the last two 
decades or so are referred to as “postmodernity” (Jean-François 
Lyotard and Zygmunt Bauman, though Bauman has recently favored 
the term “liquid modernity”), for others as “the second modernity” 
(Ulrich Beck), “reflexive modernization” (Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens, Scott Lash), “glocalization” (Roland Robertson) or “global 
age” (Malcolm Waters); still other descriptions include the “network 
society” (Manuel Castells), the “knowledge and information society” 
(Peter Drucker) or, on more philosophical grounds, the “postnational 
constellation” (Jürgen Habermas). For almost all of these analyses,
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globalization as widely understood is of primary importance. As a 
leading German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, vividly describes current 
transformations: “a new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a 
new kind of global order, a new kind of society and a new kind of 
personal life are coming into being, all of which differ from earlier 
phases of social development” (Beck 1999a: 2).7
In this new global order, universities are striving for a new place as 
they are increasingly unable to maintain their traditional roles and tasks. 
As Zygmunt Bauman put it in his essay on “Universities: Old, New, and 
Different”, the once evident functions of the universities are far from 
obvious today: “The principles which in the past seemed to legitimize 
beyond doubt the centrality of the universities are no more universally 
accepted, if not dismissed as obsolete or even retrospectively 
condemned” (Bauman 1997b: 49). Both the official discourses on the 
common European space in higher education and in research as well as a 
large part of the accompanying academic debates on the subject 
increasingly acknowledge that the current role of universities should be 
that of engines of economic growth for countries and regions, 
contributors to the economic competitiveness of nations, or suppliers of 
highly-qualified and well-trained workers for the new knowledge- 
driven economy (which is far from the traditional account of the role of 
the university in society). Without many discussions about principles 
(such as those accompanying the emergence of the Humboldtian model 
of the university at the beginning of the 19th century or such as the major 
20th century debates about the “idea” of the university as discussed in 
Chapter 2), the university in its European context seems to be about to 
enter willy-nilly a new era of its development (see Kwiek 2003e).
I would like to refer now briefly to Ulrich Beck’s account of 
globalization where it means above all one thing: “denationalization -  
that is, the erosion of the national state, but also its possible 
transformation into a transnational state” (Beck 2000a: 14). For the
7 Martin Carnoy describes the impact of globalization, new information 
technologies and innovations in a similar vein: “a revolution in the organization of 
work, the production of goods and services, relations among nations, and even local 
culture. No community is immune from the effects of this revolution. It is changing the 
very fundamentals o f  human relations and social life” (Carnoy 1999: 14, emphasis mine).
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purposes of our study regarding the impact of globalization on 
educational policies and the modern institution of the university in the 
context of the transformations of the state, this characterization is crucial:
If the traditional model of the national state is to have any chance of survival 
at all in the new power structure of world market plus transnational actors 
and movements, the globalization process will have to become the criterion o f  
national politics in every domain (in economics, law, military affairs, and so on 
(Beck 2000a: 15, emphasis mine).
I would add, following Beck’s logic, that there is no reason to believe 
that globalization processes will not be present in elaborating national 
politics in the area of higher education as well. It is this logic which 
requires globalization be taken into account when discussing social 
domains that seem connected with the modern institution of the 
university and I am doing this in the subsequent chapters of the 
present book; the idea is found in another formulation from Beck’s 
The Brave New World o f Work:
But the central scientific and political problem of the second modernity is 
that societies must respond to such [globalization-related] changes at all 
levels at once. In the end, therefore, it is illusory to debate the future o f  work 
without also discussing the future o f  the nation-state, the welfare-state and so on 
(Beck 2000b: 18, emphasis mine).
The present book has been underpinned by a similar logic. 
Consequently, in my view, it is equally illusory to debate the future of 
(public) higher education, especially (public) universities, without 
discussing the complex issue of current transformations of the welfare 
state, the nation-state and the public sector resulting (mostly but not 
exclusively) from current globalization pressures. The public 
university is increasingly viewed as merely part of the public sector 
and its traditional claims to social (and consequently economic and 
political) uniqueness are increasingly falling on deaf ears. Reforms of 
the public sector are underway worldwide, and the university has 
probably no real choice but to participate in them. Current debates 
about the future of the university are more central to public policy 
and wider public discussions than ever before. It is hardly possible to 
see the transformations to the institution of the university without
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seeing the transformations to the social fabric in which it has been 
embedded. The modern university, the product of (Beck’s first, 
national) modernity, is under the very same pressures as other 
modern institutions and social arrangements.
It is interesting to evoke here Anthony Giddens’ notion of “shell 
institutions”. As he argues, with no reference to the institution of the 
university whatsoever,
Everywhere we look, w e see institutions that appear the same as they used to be 
from  the outside, and carry the same names, but inside have become quite 
different. We continue to talk of the nation, the family, work, tradition, 
nature, as if they were all the same as in the past. They are not. The outer 
shell remains, but inside they have changed -  and this is happening not only 
in the US, Britain, or France, but almost everywhere. They are what I call 
“shell institutions”. They are institutions that have become inadequate to the 
tasks they are called upon to perform (Giddens 1999: 18).8
One side of this issue is what tasks the institution of the modern 
university was called upon to perform at the time of its creation (the 
mission of the modern university as seen through the lenses of 
German philosophers, Chapter 2); the other side of the issue is 
whether the tasks the university is called upon to perform today -  in a 
global age -  are different or not; and if yes, are these tasks slightly or 
vastly different? In more general terms, can the traditional “idea of 
the university” (as evoked explicitly by the German Idealists of the 
beginning of the 19th century, but later on by Cardinal Newman, 
Ortega y Gasset, Karl Jaspers and Jürgen Habermas) become trans­
formed so that the university is not a “shell institution” today?9
8 Speaking of the “shell institution” of work -  as Martin Carnoy (echoed by Ulrich 
Beck in his The Brave New World o f  Work) argues in his excellent Globalization and 
Educational Reform, “a job may not mean the same thing in the future as it does today. 
... Workers are gradually being defined socially less by a particular long-term job they 
hold than by the knowledge they have acquired by studying and working. This 
knowledge ‘portfolio’ allows them to move across firms and even across types of work, 
as jobs get redefined”; jobs become permanently temporary (Carnoy 1999: 33). In this 
context, the role of (highly differentiated) higher education in bridging the social gap 
between the “knowledge-rich” and the “knowledge-poor” is fundamental.
9 It is interesting to evoke here Manuel Castells’ similar idea from The Power o f  
Identity, the third part of his trilogy on the information age, according to which the
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There is a fundamental difference between viewing the university 
as properly fulfilling its modern social obligations and performing the 
modern tasks with which it had been burdened from its inception 
(and consequently not seeing the university as a “shell institution” in 
the sense Giddens uses the term); and viewing the university today as 
actually a new institution, with new social obligations performing 
new tasks. The difference is not only theoretical but also substantially 
practical: are Western European societies satisfied with our (mostly) 
state-funded educational institutions? The way we view the task of 
the university today determines our normative stance towards it. The 
university may continue to perfectly fulfill its modern duties and fail as 
an institution in the new world; it may also perfectly fulfill its new 
duties and (at the same time!) fail in fulfilling its modern obligations. 
The key issue is, consequently, what do societies want from the 
institution today? Is the modern mission of the university in its 
classical German formulation over, in theory and in practice? Or, 
maybe, although in theory the university still maintains its traditional 
inherited ways of viewing its own social and cultural role, in practice 
it is already a new institution (increasingly corporate, entrepreneurial, 
managerial, enterprising, privatized etc), to differing degrees in 
various parts of the globe? Is it possible that in the case of the 
university it “appears the same from the outside”, “carries the same 
name”, but “inside” it is already “quite different”, to refer to Giddens 
again? If yes, which is probably the case in many instances, is it good 
for the institution and good for society? Or perhaps it is good for 
society and bad for the institution and its faculty, increasingly referred 
to as merely “knowledge workers”?
At what point of its evolution does the university cease to be a 
university? To what extent, under current circumstances, are we 
willing to conflate the old and the new senses of the term (our
institutions and organizations of civil society (constructed around the democratic state 
and around the social contract between capital and labor) have become “empty 
shells”, unable to relate to human lives and social values. As he pessimistically 
concludes, “in this end of millennium, the king and the queen, the state and the civil 
society, are both naked, and their children-citizens are wandering around a variety of 
foster homes” (Castells 1998: 355).
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perception of the fully for-profit, Web-based University of Phoenix as 
a university being a practical question)?10 Or, in other words, are we 
still looking for a new regulative idea for the institution of the 
university (like the grand ideas such as reason in Kant, Bildung or 
culture in Schleiermacher and von Humboldt) or are we merely 
inventing new, more managerial, ways for its organization? Is it 
possible to revisit the “idea of the university” in any other than a 
historical way? To what extent is the university still a (nation-) state 
arm invented by philosophical minds for the time of closed 
economies and sovereign and territorial national states -  and to what 
extent is it already a business unit operating in an increasingly 
corporate-like manner in a time of open economies11 and post­
national “managerial”, “residual” states?12 Was Jean-François Lyotard
10 I am not as strict as Bill Readings in The University in Ruins who states that “the 
University is no longer Humboldt’s, and that means it is no longer the University. The 
Germans not only founded a University and gave it a mission; they also made the 
University into the decisive instance of intellectual activity. All of this is in the process 
of changing: intellectual activity and the culture it revived are being replaced by the 
pursuit of excellence and performance indicators” (Readings 1996: 55). As historical 
studies of the institution show, the term is very flexible indeed. We may be saying 
farewell to a certain form  of the university, the German-inspired, nation-state oriented, 
welfare-state supported University we have become familiar with. But we have been 
familiar with so many other features of the world around us which are not with us 
anymore. It is, of course, hard to realize that the University is also a specifically 
historically-rooted institution, born in particular places, for particular purposes. We 
may be saying goodbye only to a modern university, not to (Reading’ s) the university. 
It may make the transition easier. In a similar vein, Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. 
Rosow in their book on the nation-state and global order comment on the historical 
uniqueness of the nation-state: “the modern, territorial state is a unique historical 
creation of relatively recent vintage. It is not eternal, and no form of it is universal” 
(Opello and Rosow 1999: 225).
11 But let us remember that economies are never entirely open or entirely closed. 
As Martin Wolf in his paper on “Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?” argues, 
opening economies requires governments to loosen three distinct types of economic 
controls: on capital flows, on goods and services and on people (Wolf 2001: 184). The 
control of the flow of people is still quite tight.
12 The “residual state” model is described by Philip Cerny as the one in which the 
major default option for governments is the “denationalized economic policy” posture: 
“competing with each other, similarly situated, capitalist countries in providing a
Introduction: The University in a Global Age 25
right (already in 1979 in his Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge) when he suggested “the knell of the age of the Professor” 
and concluded that “the University [is] nearing what may be its end” 
(Lyotard 1984: 53, xxv). In larger terms, we certainly mean here the 
issue of the vitality of a certain political, social, cultural and 
philosophical project (called simply the “Modern Project” by Jürgen 
Habermas) in the current global setting, and -  together with it -  the 
vitality of a certain product of this project, the modern university. 
Lyotard in his postmodern views has no hesitations about the future 
of both of them, the project and the institution, on purely 
philosophical grounds: they are merely obsolete.13 In more open 
sociological and educational terms the issue of the “idea” of the 
university, following its outliving of “modern” forms, is still open.
Let us be very cautious, at the same time, when discussing the 
relationship between the university and the state under global 
pressures. In different parts of the world the university-state 
relationship has traditionally had different forms; its current 
transformations, consequently, may go in different directions, despite 
the influence of powerful homogenizing factors. As Nicholas C. 
Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres remind us, from a historical 
perspective,
There is no single way in which these institutions are associated, and no single way 
in which they will be affected by the conditions o f  globalization. Economically, the 
pressures of externally imposed austerity conditions (for example, as a 
condition of IMF loans) may lead to savage reductions in expenditures on 
education; in  other contexts, the desire for increased economic 
competitiveness and productivity may lead to increased expenditures on 
education (Burbules and Torres 2000: 16, emphasis mine).14
friendly policy environment for transnational capital irrespective of ownership or 
origin” (quoted in Ruggie 1997: 8).
13 See especially Lyotard as read by Bill Readings in The University in Ruins (1996) 
and in a variety of papers included in an excellent book edited by Michael Peters a 
decade ago, Education and the Postmodern Conditions (1995), with papers by e.g. Peters 
and Readings.
14 This is exactly the way Saskia Sassen in her “Globalization or Denationalization?” 
-  describing the processes of what she termed the “partial denationalization of specific 
components of national states” -  urges us to think about the relationships between
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Thus we need to be very cautious in our analyses and very 
provisional in our conclusions; we need to keep stressing which parts 
of the globe give supporting evidence to the ideas discussed here, 
which might give supporting evidence in the future, and which might 
provide counter-examples. It is interesting to note that in those 
countries having a similar position of education vis-à-vis the state, 
and those standing at a roughly similar level of economic 
development, national debates about the transformations of the 
welfare state (and the restructuring of the public sector) seem to be 
playing to the same tune (European postcommunist transition 
countries seem to follow quite closely the global patterns of reforming 
higher education and the public sector in general, already discussed 
but actually not really implemented in the major Western EU 
countries).
3.
Now let us focus briefly on the nation-state and the modern 
university, or on the historical pact between these two modern 
institutions. We have to depart slightly from Guy Neave’s ground­
breaking readings of the relationship between the Humboldtian 
university and the nation-state (as presented in recent years e.g. in 
such papers as “The European Dimension in Higher Education: An 
Excursion into the Modern Use of Historical Analogues” or 
“Universities’ Responsibility to Society: An Historical Exploration of 
an Enduring Issue”, Neave 2001b, 2000a). While Neave in his papers 
stresses that aspect of the Humboldtian -  and German Idealists’ 
generally -  idea of the university in which “culture, science and 
learning existed over and above the state” and in which “the 
responsibility of the university was to act as the highest expression of 
cultural unity” (Neave 2001b: 25, emphases mine), the present author, 
in the context of his presentation of the German idea of the university
globalization and the state. There is an “enormous variability across countries in terms of 
the incorporation/ negotiation/ resistance of globalization, since these are partly shaped 
by the specifics, both de facto and de jure of each country” (Sassen 2003a: 15).
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in Chapter 2, would like to stress the national aspect of Bildung and the 
role of the university as conceived by the German thinkers in the 
production of national consciousness, providing the national glue to 
keep citizens together, fostering national loyalty and not only 
supporting nationhood in cultural terms but also the nation-state in 
political terms.
Consequently, I would like to weaken the sharp opposition 
presented by Neave between the Napoleonic model of the university 
and the political unity of the nation on the one hand, and the German 
model of the university and the cultural unity of the nation on the 
other hand. The opposition is clearly there, but the political aspect of 
the Humboldtian reforms to the German university, fully 
complementary with the ideal of the “pursuit of truth”, should be 
emphasized as well. The political motif was present in German 
thinking about the idea of the university from Kant to Humboldt (and 
reached perhaps its full-blown shape in Martin Heidegger’s Rectorial 
Address pronounced at Freiburg in 1933 and in his attempts to use the 
modern university and his philosophy-inspired reforms of it directly 
for the political purposes of the new Germany15). Speaking of French 
and German models of the university, Neave claims that
Each in their particular manner enshrined a national mission, but w ith this 
difference: in Prussia, cultural unity was not coterminous with the state. ... In 
France, the doctrine of the republic, one and indivisible, brought both Nation 
and State together by administrative means (Neave 2001b: 25-26).
In the context of our detailed readings not only of Wilhelm von 
Humboldt but also Friedrich Schleiermacher, Johann Gottlieb Fichte 
and Friedrich W.J. Schelling, we are inclined to stress the combination 
of cultural and political motifs in their formulations of the idea of the 
university rather than (following Neave) their merely cultural ones; 
perhaps even the political cum cultural motif. The classical German
15 I am in full agreement with Gerard Delanty (in Challenging Knowledge. The 
University in the Knowledge Society) who reminds us that Heidegger’s conception of the 
modern university “only took to the extreme the nineteenth-century and post­
Enlightenment notion of the university as the protector of national culture. The 
destiny of the university was linked to the destiny of the state” (Delanty 2001: 42).
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notion of Bildung (culture) from that period, and from the writings of 
these philosophers, to a varying degree depending on the exact 
historical moment and a given author, is certainly very strongly 
politicized. It refers to the cultivation of the self and of the individual 
but also to the cultivation of the individual as a nation-state citizen. I am 
in agreement here with the late Bill Readings who emphasizes in The 
University in Ruins that German Idealists
Assign a more explicitly political role to the structure determined by Kant [in his 
The Conflict o f  the Faculties], and they do this by replacing the notion of reason 
with that of culture [i.e. Bildung]. Like reason, culture serves a particularly 
unifying function for the University. ... Humboldt’s project for the foundation of 
the University of Berlin is decisive for the centering of the University around the 
idea of culture, which ties the University to the nation-state. That this should 
happen in Germany is, of course, implicit with the emergence of German 
nationhood. Under the rubric of culture, the University is assigned the dual task 
of research and teaching, respectively the production and inculcation o f  national self­
knowledge. As such, it becomes the institution charged with watching over the 
spiritual life o f  the people o f  the rational state, reconciling ethnic tradition and statist 
rationality (Readings 1996: 15, emphases mine).
Consequently, following Readings rather than Neave on this 
point, this book does not draw the distinction between what was the 
political unity of the nation and what was the cultural unity of the 
nation (in their relationship to the institution of the university) as 
sharply as Neave does and seeks to soften this distinction 
considerably. In the present author’s view, the national component in 
the German idea of the university, and the role assigned to the 
German nation in the writings of German philosophers accompanying 
the emergence of the University of Berlin, were considerable.
The tension between “the pursuit of truth” and “public 
responsibility” in the evolution of the modern university, Neave 
stresses, has been very clear in German writings on Academia. The 
dichotomy is clearly present in the founding fathers of the German 
university as well. There is a clear tension between thinking about 
science and the community of scholars and students: truth and 
universality on the one hand; and the national consciousness, 
nationhood, the state and academic responsibilities to them on the
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other. The immediate reason to rethink the institution of the 
university, as the theme is developed in Chapter 2, was political: the 
defeat by the French on the battlefield. It was clearly Fichte who was 
the most nation-oriented in his ideas about the university, and it is no 
accident that it was Fichte’s thinking that influenced Heidegger’s 
ideas on the university most, slightly more than hundred years later.
Increasingly, at the beginning of the 19th century, culture in the 
sense of Bildung became mixed with political motivations and 
aspirations, focused around the notion of the German national state. It 
is interesting to note that in a global age, both (cultural and political) 
motifs have been put under enormous pressure. Forging national 
identity, serving as a repository of the nation’s historical, scientific or 
literary achievements, as well as inculcating national consciousness 
and loyalty to fellow-citizens of the nation-state do not seem to serve 
as the rationale for the existence of the institution of the university 
any more; but also the production of a “disciplined and reliable 
workforce” is not fulfilling the demands of the new global economy16 
which requires workers with the capacity to learn quickly and to 
work in teams in reliable and creative ways, as Raymond A. Morrow 
and Carlos Alberto Torres emphasize (Morrow and Torres 2000: 33). 
At the same time, the disinterested pursuit of truth by curiosity- 
driven scholars in the traditional sense of the term is no longer 
accepted as a raison d'etre for the institution either, as shown in 
Chapter 6 on the emergence of common European higher education 
policies and on the ideals of the European Research Area. 
Consequently, no matter whether we focus more on the cultural unity 
of the nation or on the political unity of the nation as the two distinct 
driving forces behind the development of the modern university, both 
motifs seem to be dead and gone in the current increasingly post­
national and global conditions. Neither serving truth, nor serving the 
nation (and the nation-state) can be the guiding principles for the 
functioning of the institution today, and neither of them are even 
mentioned in current debates at a global or European level (it is
16 Following Martin Carnoy, by global economy (as distinct from world economy), 
I understand “one whose strategic, core activities ... function on a planetary scale in 
real time” (Carnoy 1999: 13).
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sufficient to read the communications of the European Commission 
about the role of the university and research and development 
activities in knowledge-based societies or World Bank’s and OECD’s 
views on the future role of the university which are underpinning the 
reforms of higher education in most transition and developing 
countries today, see European Commission 2003b, World Bank 2002, 
OECD 1998).17 As David Held and his colleagues put it recently,
Few areas o f  social life escape the reach o f  processes o f  globalization. These 
processes are reflected in all social domains from the cultural through the 
economic, the political, the legal, the military and the environmental. 
Globalization is best understood as a multifaceted or differentiated social 
phenomenon. It cannot be conceived as a singular condition but instead 
refers to patterns of growing global interconnectedness within all the key 
domains of social activity (Held et al. 1999: 27, emphasis mine).
And higher education seems to be no exception here.
The rise of the nation-state in Europe went together with the 
incorporation of the university into the “coordinating ambit” of the 
state, both
as a symbol and a repository of national identity, as an instrument for the 
preservation of the nation’s culture and through the unification of that 
culture as a manifestation of a country’s claim  to a place amongst the nations 
-  the cultural equivalent of today’s more restricted concern with economic 
competitiveness (Neave 2001b: 26).
The move towards the “nationalization” of the university was strong 
and the process of linking the university to the national state 
continued throughout the 19th century (as one commentator
17 For international organizations, “globalization” has become a key concept “with 
which to interpret the enormous economic, political and cultural changes that 
characterize human society at the beginning of the 21st century” (Henry et al. 2001: 19). 
It does not change its heuristic usefulness but it does serve as a point of reference in 
discussions between academics and policymakers. There are certainly other broad 
descriptions which could be used equally well such as, say, post-Fordism, 
postindustrialism, informationalism, post-nationalism, late modernity, “post-work 
society”, or “risk society” rather than “work society”, and “knowledge society” rather 
than “industry and service society” etc but it looks like the term globalization in its 
current wide usage may capture them all.
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remarked, “the universalization of the nation-state went hand in hand 
with the ‘nationalization’ of culture”, Axtmann 2004: 260). The social 
purpose, missions and roles of the university in the emergent national 
state were redefined anew. Emergent higher education systems were 
clearly national systems, with their own national priorities and 
distinctive patterns of validation and certification of knowledge and 
education. Civil service in the nation-state was closely linked with 
national universities and at the same time scholars (especially full 
professors) -  in some countries -  gained the status of public servants. 
The “nationalization” of higher education was inseparable from the 
“nationalization” of scholars: the introduction of the civil service 
status for senior academics served also “to impress firmly upon the 
consciousness of academia its role as an emanation of the national 
wisdom and genius, creativity and interest” (Neave 2001b: 30).
The process of the “nationalization” of the university so vividly 
described by Neave seems to have come to a close right now, together 
with the advent of globalization. I am in full agreement with the three 
implications of globalization for the institution of the university 
which Neave draws. First, globalization brings to a close the process 
of the incorporation of the university into the service of the state; 
second, globalization redefines the place of the university in society -  
from “an instrument for political integration” to “part of the 
‘productive process’”, a driver of economic integration between 
nations; and third, it is the corporation that becomes “the basic 
organizational paradigm” for the university (Neave 2000b: 16-17) or 
“society’s central referential institution” (Neave 2001b: 48).
To rephrase it -  the processes of globalization seem to disentangle 
the university from the state, turn the university potentially into a major 
player in global economic competition and increasingly impose on it 
corporate models of organization. Consequently, the social mission of 
the university is under scrutiny and such processes as privatization, 
deregulation and accountability in higher education appear to be 
moving the university “without the slightest shadow of a doubt towards 
a new definition of its responsibilities” (Neave 2000b: 23). The possible 
new future contract between society and the university may include 
points directly related to the academic profession -  whose current status,
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social perception, working and employment conditions are already 
under scrutiny. The direction of these changes can already be imagined 
from numerous studies of the academic profession from a global 
perspective; hopefully, they can still be renegotiated.18
4.
The first scholar to have focused attention on the close link between the 
modern university, the state and global economic transformations was 
the late Bill Readings in The University in Ruins, almost a decade ago 
(1996).19 He almost never used the word “globalization” but referred to 
the more culturally-loaded notion of “Americanization”; he also never 
used the words “welfare state” or “knowledge society” or “knowledge- 
based economy”, nor ever developed the theme of the modern university 
as part of the public sector and an important segment of modern welfare 
regimes. His vision of the university and of globalization/ 
Americanization, as many commentators noted, was overstated, 
oversimplified and exaggerated20; but at the same time, even in
18 As the first sentence of a recent synopsis report in a book on the attractiveness 
of the academic workplace in Europe puts it, “in many countries the career patterns 
and employment conditions of academic staff as well as the attractiveness of the 
academic workplace for the coming generation are of major concern. The concern 
about the attractiveness points both to the career perspectives of those working in 
higher education compared to other societal sectors where highly qualified work is 
demanded and to the recruitment of younger graduates for an academic career” 
(Enders and de Weert 2004: 11). Which echoes Philip Altbach’s general conclusion 
from a global project on the academic profession that “the conditions of academic 
work have deteriorated everywhere” (Altbach 2002a: 3). For Poland, see Kwiek’s 
contributions to both projects and both books (Kwiek 2004c and 2003b). See also 
annual reports on the economic status of the profession published by the American 
Association of University Professors (e.g. AAUP 2002).
19 The book was preceded by his two complementary papers, “For a Hetero- 
nomous Cultural Politics: The University, Culture, and the State” (published in The 
Oxford Literary Review in 1993), and “The University Without Culture?” published in 
New Literary History in 1995 (Readings 1993, 1995).
20 See especially David Harvey in “University, Inc.” (1998), J. Hillis Miller in 
“Studying Literature in the Transnational University” (1996), Dominick LaCapra in
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exaggerated forms, it may have hit the mark when discussing the 
university’s possible future trajectories.21 As a philosopher and student 
of culture, he was somewhat aware of global transformations in finance 
and production, of the liberalization of trade and the opening of national 
economies, of the convergence of global thinking about the state and its 
future roles -  but never articulated these ideas more than in passing. His 
thesis of the emergence of the posthistorical university o f excellence that is 
replacing the traditional modern German university o f culture is strong 
but overstated in a characteristically postmodern manner.
The present author is unable to accept the thesis about the overall 
passage from one type of university to the other; although partly 
convincing, especially with respect to Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Readings’ picture does not mention the increasing heterogeneity of 
the higher education sector, including the heterogeneity of 
universities’ missions.22 As Gerard Delanty suggests in his Challenging 
Knowledge. The University in the Knowledge Society, Readings’ 
postmodern position has little to offer -  presents no alternative 
scenario (Delanty 2001: 6).23 Many others became involved in studies
“The University in Ruins?” (1998) and L.M. Findlay in “Runes of Marx and the 
University in Ruins” (1997). There is also a special issue of the University o f  Toronto 
Quarterly devoted to The University in Ruins: Responses to Bill Readings (1997, vol. 66, 
no. 4) and a special issue of Surfaces on Readings (1996, vol. VI, issue 204).
21 One of his commentators cautions us that the book “might be conceived, at 
best, as a narrative of potentially heuristically value rather than as a full-scale 
historical investigation into the development of the University as an institution 
devoted to the dissemination and preservation of national culture. Readings admits 
that his work appears inadequate when it is judged as an empirical study...” 
(Varadharajan 1997: 622).
22 The appeal of presenting all-encompassing pictures is sometimes hard to resist; 
we need to try to suppress our homogenizing tendencies as the matter is radically 
heterogeneous, and the points of departure, the forces of change, and the possible 
points of arrival may turn out to be fully incompatible with one another, especially 
along the differences between developed/ developing countries, as well as Anglo- 
Saxon/EU and old EU/new EU countries, major EU welfare state models/neoliberal 
welfare state model, the center/the peripheries etc.
23 Gerard Delanty’s criticism of Readings goes along the following lines: 
“Readings’ thesis is largely a counterthesis, a critique of the prevailing order and does 
not offer anything of substance for those seeking an alternative institutional 
embodiment” (Delanty 2001: 140).
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on the corporatization, marketization and commodification of the 
university; studies of managerialism in the public sector, including 
higher education, as well as in studies of the academic profession, not 
to mention studies of the changing role of the state under global 
pressures, all mostly unknown to a wider audience in the first half of 
the 1990s when Readings was completing his book. There is one point 
which I want to focus on from his book though. It is his stubborn 
linking of the modern university to the emergent German nation­
state, and the current delinking of the institution from the state. 
Readings argues that
[T]he University is becoming a different kind of institution, one that is no 
longer linked to the destiny of the nation-state by virtue of its role as 
producer, protector, and inculcator of an idea of national culture. The process 
of economic globalization brings w ith it the relative decline of the nation­
state as the prime instance of the reproduction of capital around the world 
(Readings 1996: 3).
Without the details of the evidence provided today by political 
economists, political scientists, and students of globalization and of 
the welfare state, Readings -  somehow intuitively -  makes his point: 
the modern university has outlived itself, it is no longer functioning 
as an “ideological arm” of the nation-state (Readings 1996: 11. 
Personally, I cannot accept such a strong formulation of the role of a 
modern university). He views culture as a symbolic and political 
counterpart to the project of the nation-state:24
The nation-state and the modern notion of culture arose together, and they 
are ceasing to be essential to an increasingly transnational economy. This 
shift has major implications for the University, which has historically been 
the primary institution of national culture in the modern nation-state 
(Readings 1996: 12).
The role of the nation-state through the global circulation of capital is 
changing, and so may be the role of the university. It does not have to
24 Political nationalism was complemented by the “nationalization of culture”, 
cultural achievements became claimed for “nations”, culture became “nationalized” 
and “territorialized”, as Roland Axtmann argues in his recent “The State of the State: 
the Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation” (2004: 260).
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-  although it may want to -  safeguard and propagate national culture, 
does not have to train citizen subjects of the nation-state, does not 
have to watch over the spiritual life of the people, produce and 
inculcate national self-knowledge, or provide the social glue 
necessary to keep the citizens of the nation-state together.25 Its 
traditional cultural and political mission of being closely related to the 
political project of the nation-state is clearly over, Readings argues. 
The decline of the nation-state changes the mission of the university:
that mission used to be the production of national subjects under the guise of 
research into and inculcation of culture, culture that has been thought, since 
Humboldt, in terms inseparable from national identity. The strong idea of 
culture arises with the nation-state, and we now face its disappearance as the 
locus of social meaning (Readings 1996: 89-90).
What Readings merely suggested about the transformations of 
citizenship and national consciousness (as a necessary social glue) 
under globalization pressures, gains new significance today. He never 
mentioned neoliberal ideas of reforming the public sector, or 
“downsizing” and “rightsizing” of the state, or retrenchment of the 
welfare state, and never discussed policies for the restructuring of 
higher education institutions and the global convergence of education 
and research and development policies along the lines suggested by 
the emergent notions of the “knowledge society” and the “knowledge 
economy”. But in terms of painting a larger picture of ongoing 
transformations of the institution of the university, and through 
reformulating his ideas into new discourses and new areas of 
intellectual inquiry, we can still learn a lot from him, I suppose -  
although in a different (pre-globalization, so to speak) vocabulary.26
25 Traditionally, as Andy Green reminds us, through national education systems 
(not only, or exclusively, higher education systems), nation-states “fashioned 
disciplined workers and loyal recruits, created and celebrated national languages and 
literatures, popularized national histories and myths of origin, disseminated national 
laws, customs and social mores, and generally explained the ways of the state to the 
people and the duties of the people to the state” (Green 1997: 134).
26 Let me cite him one more time in extenso to recall the guiding idea of his 
memorable book: “since the nation-state is no longer the primary instance of the 
reproduction of global capitals, ‘culture’ -  as the symbolic and political counterpart to
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To say what Readings did not have a chance to say: globalization 
exerts enormous pressures on both the functioning of public sectors, 
as well as the very thinking about their functioning; at the same time, 
higher education clearly loses, with a different speed in different 
countries and regions, its unique character as part of the public 
sector;27 it has to compete with other segments of the sector for 
(generally shrinking) public funds. The competition is fierce and its 
results cannot be predicted; in this zero-sum game the other 
competitors for public funds are primary and secondary education, 
pension schemes for the aged, health care, low income and 
unemployment entitlements and benefits, prisons, the police, the 
military etc; so to an extent, the result of the competition depends also 
on the social perception of what higher education is about today, how 
it serves society and how it should be funded;28 it depends also on the
the project of integration pursued by the nation-state -  has lost its purchase.... The 
University no longer has to safeguard and propagate national culture, because the 
nation-state is no longer the major site at which capital reproduces itself. Hence, the 
idea of national culture no longer functions as an external referent toward which all of 
the efforts of research and teaching are directed.” (Readings 1996: 12-13). Readings 
focuses mostly on the cultural dimension of current transformations of the institution of 
the university, at the expense of their more political and economic dimensions, brought 
about by e.g. the restructuring of the public sector and the retrenchment of the welfare 
state and new accounts of the role of the state operating under globalization pressures. 
Readings seems to have written his book from inside the traditional paradigm and 
clearly his point of departure was the (modern, Idealist, Humboldtian etc) idea of the 
uniqueness of the university.
27 It has especially been phenomena like “new managerialism” implemented 
throughout Anglo-Saxon countries across the entire public sector that has had such a 
substantial impact on higher education. I have to agree with Miriam Henry and 
colleagues in their book on the OECD, globalization and higher education policy when 
they argue that “education systems have lost their sui generis character. Organisation, 
structures and basic practices look similar in education, health, welfare and other 
public sector bureaucracies” (Henry et al. 2001: 33).
28 Education today is seen as a direct and measurable factor in “growing” the new 
knowledge-based economy. It brings concrete benefits to concrete individuals. As 
Miriam Henry and colleagues argue, that “from this it follows, therefore, that individuals 
should bear a substantial proportion of the cost of their own education. Educational 
governance is no longer held to be the business of state-funded centralised educational 
bureaucracies alone. Rather it is a partnership between a number of stakeholders. The
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answer to the question of which benefits it is able to provide for the 
individual -  public or private, individual and collective etc, and 
which are viewed as more significant today.29 Consequently, the link 
between the public sector and the institution of the university is as 
strong as never before -  but all public sector institutions have been 
under fire (or under scrutiny, in more neutral parlance) in most but 
especially in Anglo-Saxon advanced economies in recent years.30
Globalization seems to be changing the roles of the nation-state 
(except for the position taken by those in the skeptics’ camp, as 
discussed in Chapter 3): the nation state is gradually losing its power 
as a direct economic player and at the same time it is losing a 
significant part of its legitimacy as it appears not to be willing, or not 
to be able, to provide the welfare services seen as the very foundation 
of the postwar welfare state (which is developed in Chapter 5). 
Nation-states seem to prefer not to use the financial maneuvering 
space still left to them, even if they could be much more pro-active 
than reactive with respect to the impact of globalization on public 
services, including higher education.31 As William Melody argues,
upshot of the new policy consensus has fundamentally altered both the nature and the 
understanding o f educational purposes. It has significantly changed the parameters of 
educational policy making” (Henry et al. 2001: 61, emphasis mine).
29 Current reformulations of the social tasks of the welfare state are happening at a 
time when the traditional responsibilities of the state are under revision -  as Harold A. 
Hovey rightly stresses, “certain activities now viewed as part of baselines could be 
defined as outside the traditional responsibilities of government” (Hovey 1999: 60). 
Higher education has to compete successfully with other socially attractive forms of 
state spending.
30 As Miriam Henry et al. put it, “within the global economic framework, education 
is now regarded as the policy key to the future prosperity of nations. ... Earlier 
educational policy wisdom viewed education as a social good which justified increased 
funding. Redefining education as an individual good justified introducing the principle 
of ‘user pays’ in education. ... Though education is now deemed more important than ever for 
the competitive advantage o f  nations, the commitment and capacity o f governments to fund it 
have weakened considerably” (Henry et al. 2001: 30-31, emphasis mine).
31 Most of the transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe over the last 
decade invested ever-decreasing amounts of public funds in higher education and 
research and development, either in relative or in absolute terms, despite differing 
speeds of economic growth between them and year on year. Even though the end-
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rising government deficits and declining average real incomes have forced 
governments to assess critically the performance and resource claims of 
virtually all institutions associated with the welfare state. As a major public 
institution, the university has been asked to justify its public service 
performance, its demands for public resources, and the efficiency of its 
management of these resources. For most universities this was the first time 
they had been asked for a comprehensive accounting as public institutions 
(Melody 1998: 75).
Universities were mostly not able to respond to requests for more 
accountability. They have mostly attempted to justify themselves in 
terms of the traditional Humboldtian notion of the university as 
discussed in Chapter 2: academic freedom and institutional 
autonomy, disinterested and curiosity-driven research, the idea of a 
unique social institution founded on the basis of the community of 
students and scholars etc. But in essence, as Melody argues, the 
replies universities gave in response to a general request for the 
justification of their social role boiled down to the following: the 
university should not be held accountable by anyone other than itself. 
Consequently, the university’s arguments have been viewed by the 
government and business (the providers of funding) as self-serving.
The present book is an invitation to an intellectual journey; the 
author cherishes the hope that for many readers, in many places, it 
might provide new grounds for revisiting the idea of the university in 
(sometimes surprisingly) new contexts.
product -  disastrous levels of public funding for higher education and university 
research and development -  is not to be attributed to the impact of globalization, it can 
clearly be attributed to the general neo-liberal mood of politics in these times of 
transformation. It is interesting to refer here to the idea promoted recently by Zsuzsa 
Ferge who wrote on the pre-accession reports required by the European Commission 
from EU candidate countries. She observed that “social policy institutions and processes 
are paid attention to by the Reports mainly if they are likely to affect the budget, or the 
economy more broadly. ... The main concerns with social protection are financial 
stability, the (too high) level of public expenditures, and the (slow) deregulation of 
prices. The main instruments to assure economic growth and financial stability are 
budget stringency and the privatization of assets or services, including former public 
services” (Ferge 2000: 9). The general mood is certainly not that of the European Social 
Model -  it is much closer to the neo-liberal moods associated with Anglo-Saxon and 
(some) Latin American countries.
C h a pter  1
The University Between the State 
and the Market
1.1. T h e  C h an gin g  R o les  o f  H igh er Edu cation : 
th e  Im p act o f  M ark et Forces 
on  Its F u n ctio n s and  M iss io n s
The university in its modern research form has traditionally been in 
very close relations with the state and in relatively distant relations 
with the market. Now, as state/market relations are changing with 
the advent of globalization, the university is unexpectedly located in a 
different landscape in which the state is generally -  with notable 
exceptions -  becoming weaker, and the market is becoming stronger. 
The university, traditionally a very important part of the public 
sector, is coming under public scrutiny and its social and cultural 
missions are being increasingly challenged.1
1 As Hans N. Weiler in “States, Markets and University Funding” described the 
process of the emergence of market forces in higher education: “there is a new game 
being played in European higher education. ... Whatever it is called, it certainly is 
different from the old game, which always looked a little like a state-owned version of 
‘Monopoly’. ... Wherever the new game being played is, there are the same three 
players involved: the university, the state, and the market. And that is what makes it 
new, because the old game was a pretty simple, straightforward and rather boring 
affair that was essentially limited to two players: the university and the state” (Weiler 
2001: 5). As he notes, for Europe, the interesting question may not be so much “why 
the market has recently moved into such a prominent position in the debate about 
higher education, but why it took so long” (Weiler 2001: 5, emphasis mine).
48 Chapter 1. The University Between the State and the Market
The most visible transformations in higher education today are 
occurring in those countries which promote globalization most 
actively and make full use of its opportunities (like most Anglophone 
countries, including the USA and the UK), and in those countries 
which are most strongly affected by its theories and practices 
(generally, the transition and developing countries). Higher education 
systems in the old EU-15 countries still remain relatively intact, but in 
the medium- and long-term they will also be transformed; perhaps 
even along similar lines (major transformation processes in European 
higher education -  at an EU-level labeled as the “Bologna Process” -  
refer to globalization only indirectly, but many commentators view 
this aspect of the Europeanization project, especially as seen in the 
context of the wider Lisbon Strategy of 2000, as actually a response to 
globalization). While the balance of state and market forces still 
remains relatively stable in the EU-15 countries, on a global scale 
market forces are certainly gaining predominance over state forces in 
very general terms.2 In the long run, if the ideals of liberal democracy 
prevail, combined probably with more neoliberal conceptions of 
society and government along with more market-oriented ideals of 
the global economy, the EU may be forced to accommodate itself to at 
least the major general global trends if it is going to reach the goal 
described in the Lisbon strategy in 2000: to make the European Union 
by 2010 “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world, capable of economic growth with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion”, and stay there. The social-
2 I am not here returning to Burton Clark’s classic analysis of the forces of 
coordination in higher education systems; considering his “triangle of coordination” (the 
state, the academic oligarchy, and the market), two decades old, from a current 
perspective, the role of the “academic oligarchy” in most Anglophone, Western 
European and Central European transition countries is severely limited (see the section 
on “State, Market, and Oligarchy” in Clark 1984: 137-145; see also Guy Neave’s paper 
“On Preparing for Markets: Trends in Higher Education in Western Europe 1988-1990”, 
Neave 1990). On “neo-liberalism” wining against “neo-Humboldtianism” and 
dominating the discourse on higher education reforms in selected transition countries, 
see Neave’s introduction to Real-Time Systems. Reflections on Higher Education in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, “On the Return from Babylon: A Long Voyage 
Around History, Ideology and Systems Change” (File and Goedegebuure 2003: 15-37).
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democratic ideals of a widely developed welfare state with its social 
services, including generally state-supported higher education, will 
probably have to be combined with strong market incentives, as in 
other major parts of the public sector (see Bowles and Wagman 2001). 
As opposed to the EU-15 countries, public higher education 
institutions in most transition countries are already forced to operate 
in highly competitive, market-oriented surroundings, with the 
number of private higher education providers sky-rocketing and the 
number of students enrolled in the private sector reaching (in some 
countries) a level of 30 per cent.3 Apparently, in higher education (but 
not in research and development), the market forces in operation are 
already much stronger in the transition countries than in most EU-15 
countries. Also, the reforms about to be introduced in several 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe are more market-oriented 
than any reforms attempted in EU countries in general so far, except 
for the United Kingdom.4
3 On a more global scale, the share of enrollment in private higher education 
differs considerably between countries and regions: while in the majority of Western 
European countries over 95 per cent of students attend public institutions, private 
higher education is most dominant in Asia -  in the Philippines, Japan, South Korea 
and Indonesia -  with a share of almost 80 per cent; followed by such Latin American 
countries such as Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia where the majority of students also 
attend the private sector. Western European countries such as Belgium and the 
Netherlands with a share of over 60 percent, followed by Portugal with over 25 per 
cent are, so far, exceptions to the general rule (World Bank 1994: 35; Lee 1999; see also 
Altbach and Selvaratnam 2002). As Philip G. Altbach remarked in an excellent 
collection of essays he edited on the private sector, Private Prometheus: Private Higher 
Education and Development in the 21st Century, “the global summary of private higher 
education development shows national and regional variations. It also indicates 
explosive expansion. Private postsecondary education is a significant force almost 
everywhere, and it is a growing phenomenon where it has not previously been in the 
mainstream. ... The role played by private higher education -  which is able quickly to 
adapt to changing market conditions, students interests, and the needs of the economy 
-  is bound to grow” (Altbach 1999b: 5, emphasis mine).
4 As Harry de Boer and Leo Goedegebuure rightly argue, we would need a very 
high level of abstraction to be able to say that comparable developments are taking 
place in Western and Central/Eastern Europe. The surface similarity includes the 
overall shift towards a reduction of state influence, and increase of institutional 
autonomy, and an increased reliance on the market. But these developments in
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It is important to emphasize that global public spending on 
education tops one trillion dollars annually: it is a huge business, and 
thus potentially a huge “market”. Together with the global spread of 
the neoliberal market economy and the gradual marketization of higher 
education (outside of Continental Europe though -  and at least from a 
global comparative perspective), the number of for-profit institutions, 
for-profit branches of non-profit institutions, virtual institutions, 
corporate universities and IT certifications centers is growing rapidly, 
bringing about a revolution in social conceptions about what higher 
education might be and how might it possibly function.
In the last half a century, despite an immense growth in 
enrollments, that is moving towards massification and near­
universalization, public higher education remained relatively stable 
from a qualitative point of view and its fundamental structure 
remained unchanged. No major changes occurred that were as 
revolutionary as the changes we might be beginning to witness. What 
we are seeing in different parts of the world today is probably only 
the very beginning of these transformations though. The forces of 
change worldwide are similar and they are pushing higher education 
systems into more market-oriented and more competitive arenas (and 
certainly towards less state regulation).5 As Frank Newman put it,
essence are “quite different”. The difference is between “gradual system change” and 
“abrupt change” (or between “evolution” and “revolution”) in the two parts of Europe. 
The issue of the time-frame in which transformations are taking place is one thing, but 
another is the “deep psychological impact of radical political change. The four 
countries [the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia] version of ‘reinventing 
government’ was driven by an almost complete loss of faith, at least in the immediate 
period following the system changes, in the virtues of the role of government. Such an 
explicit rejection of the role of government has not been the case in Western Europe” 
(de Boer and Goedegebuure 2003: 227). Let us add that because of the 
mythicization/fetishization of the idea of the “market”, “the market” is one of the most 
fundamental categories in post-1989 countries of Central and Eastern Europe; it was a 
key word in all the major social, political and economic discussions of the last decade. 
“The market”, especially at the outset of the transformation, was virtually non­
debatable and inherently positive.
5 Both the forces affecting higher education and the patterns of responses to them 
are similar worldwide. As D. Bruce Johnstone argued about the patterns of responses, 
in the 1990s there was a remarkably consistent worldwide reform agenda -  there were
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“every student now has multiple and differing choices. Every college 
and university faces new competitors” (Newman 2001: 4). The choices 
go far beyond traditional universities, and the competitors are no 
longer merely other universities. For centuries, “the market” had no 
major influence on higher education (and perhaps the only country 
close to the “market” extreme of Burton Clark’s “triangle” at the 
beginning of the 1980s was the USA). The majority of modern 
universities in the world were created by the state and were 
subsidized by the state. Over the last 200 years, most students in 
Europe attended public institutions and most faculty members 
worked in public institutions (within all major models of the 
university which served as “templates” for other parts of the world, 
be it the Napoleonic, the Humboldtian, or the American and British 
models). Today market forces in higher education are on the rise 
worldwide: while the form and pace of this transformation are 
different in different parts of the world, this change is of a global 
nature. It is important to note that the market is already powerfully 
influencing both higher education and research and development:
any discussion about whether the market should be “allowed” to influence 
higher education’s future fails to understand that these changes are already 
happening, regardless of the ambivalence such transformation engenders. It is 
pointless for higher education leaders to spend time handwringing or 
strategizing about halting or reversing this trend (“Privileges...” 2001: 9, 
emphasis mine).
“similar patterns in countries with dissimilar political-economic systems and higher 
education traditions, and at extremely dissimilar stages of industrial and technological 
development” (Johnstone 1998a: 2). And as Frank Newman and Lara K. Couturier 
phrased it about the forces in operation in their report to “The Observatory on 
Borderless Higher Education”: the unexpected revelation of their “Futures Project” is 
that “the forces affecting higher education around the world are strikingly similar” (and 
the four important areas of similarity they indicate are expanding enrolments; the 
growth of new competitors, virtual education and consortia; the global activity of 
many educational institutions; and the tendency for policy makers to use market 
forces as levers for change in higher education, Newman and Couturier 2002: 5, 
emphasis mine). These are more or less direct forces; the present book focuses much 
more on the indirect pressures on the institution of the university -  especially through 
the transformations of the state (welfare state, nation-state, and the recent 
revitalization of the European Union project).
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The issue is not whether or not to introduce market forces into 
higher education; it is rather how to tame or civilize the most 
unrestrained forms of them so that some “thoughtful” or “mature” or 
“responsible” (Frank Newman) higher education market can be 
created. These market forces are powerful new forces, never seen in 
higher education before. And they often come as part and parcel of a 
much wider neoliberal agenda, as a result of the powerful pressures 
of globalization, especially on the institution of the state (and as a part 
of reforming the public sector generally). No matter whether we 
understand them or not, support them or not, these market forces will 
be increasingly present in higher education, for a variety of political, 
economic, and cultural reasons (undoubtedly different in different 
parts of the world, just to give an example of the EU-15 and new EU 
member states). In short, what may be expected in the near future is 
more market, less regulation: the state’s role in higher education will 
increasingly be getting weaker as the march of higher education 
towards the market (and away from the state) continues. These 
market forces may be of different strengths in different parts of the 
world, but they are not easy to stop.6
Traditionally, before market forces came into prominence, higher 
education in general, and the university in particular, were “special” 
places with teaching, research and their social service as the core of 
their mission. In more philosophical terms, the Enlightenment and 
then the German Idealist and Romantic ideal of education was 
Bildung, cultivation, or culture, i.e. producing responsible,
6 A huge controversy arose that touched on the issue of the free import and export 
of educational services within the GATS and WTO protocols: the definition of services 
covered by GATS excludes services provided under government authority and 
without commercial purpose so education could theoretically remain outside the 
scope of the Agreement; this is not the case, though, as the vast majority of countries 
have mixed systems, in which the private sector plays some role and competes with the 
public sector in higher education; so the WTO is considering a number of proposals 
ensuring that free trade in higher education will be subject to the complex rules and 
legal arrangements of the WTO protocols and free of most restrictions (see Altbach 
2001; Education International 2000) -  which puts all “local” (national) higher 
education systems in a new position and potentially opens them to international 
“markets” (see Robertson 2003a, 2003b).
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autonomous and mature individuals -  with a strong emphasis on the 
national aspect of Bildung; i.e. inculcating nation-state consciousness 
and national aspirations, producing citizens of emerging nation­
states, the issue that will be discussed in Chapter 3 (see also Readings 
1996 and Green 1997). With the advent of market forces into the 
higher education arena, and into our social world generally (which 
leads to what Pierre Bourdieu called the tyranny o f the market in 
Bourdieu 1998b, see also 1998a), we less and less often speak of 
students as citizens of particular nation-states, and more and more 
often speak of them as “clients” of educational institutions, be they 
public or private.7 In increasingly prevalent market-oriented 
phraseology, often used by international and global organizations, 
education becomes a commodity, a mostly private and individual 
good, rather than mostly a public and collective good as it used to be 
in the past.8 The overall bleak picture might be the one D. Bruce
7 To give an example, the OECD’s Redefining Tertiary Education assumes a clearly 
“client” perspective in discussing the future of the university. Its perspective towards 
universities is taken “not so much from the standpoint of their own self-formations, 
their traditions, culture and inner workings but insofar as they address and meet the needs 
o f clients. ... [T]he client perspective ... is on the one hand consistent with demand- 
driven policies and structures in our societies and, on the other, emphatic that there 
are new needs to meet as we move towards universal tertiary education” (OECD 1998: 
15-16, emphasis mine). See also Baldwin and James 2000.
8 The potential benefits from higher education can be viewed as private and public 
(and both can be either economic or social). Private economic benefits include higher 
salaries, better employment, higher savings, improved working conditions and 
personal and professional mobility. Public economic benefits include greater 
productivity, national and regional development, reduced reliance on government 
financial support, increased consumption, and increased potential for transformations 
from low-skilled industrial to knowledge-based economies. Private social benefits 
include improved quality of life for self and children, better decision-making, 
improved personal status, increased educational opportunities, healthier lifestyle and 
higher life expectancy -  while public social benefits include nation building and 
development of leadership, democratic participation, increased consensus, a 
perception that society is based on fairness and opportunity for all citizens, social 
mobility, greater social cohesion and reduced crime rates, improved health and 
improved basic and secondary education (see World Bank 2002: 81, based on a report 
Reaping the Benefits: Defining the Public and Private Value o f  Going to College, Institute for 
Higher Education Policy, 1998). As the report reminds us, “what are the benefits of
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Johnstone (the director of the Center for Comparative and Global 
Studies in Education at SUNY Buffalo) painted in his paper on 
“Higher Education Under Conditions of Transition to a Market 
Economy”, describing the common challenges higher education 
systems face today:
public priorities are changing throughout the world. While there is no reason 
that higher education should necessarily, over time, lose in the competition 
for governmental resources, it would appear that expenditures for 
elementary and secondary education, economic infrastructure, health and 
welfare, and perhaps even for environmental restoration are emerging as 
higher priority objects for governmental spending in most countries 
(Johnstone 1999: 1).
The late Frank Newman, the chairman of the American “Futures 
Project: Policy for Higher Education in a Changing World” (based at 
Brown University) has distinguished between three attributes 
essential for preserving higher education’s role as servant to the 
needs of society: (1) socializing students to their role in society, (2) 
providing all citizens with social mobility, and (3) upholding the 
university as the home of disinterested scholarship and unfettered 
debate (Newman 2000b: 3). Thinking about the social functions of the 
university in a global age, the three attributes are of primary 
importance. At the same time, the social functions of new providers of 
higher education can be measured against this pattern to see the 
difference. Thus the first function of the university, the socialization 
of young people to their roles in society, can be divided into three 
types: socialization to the community, socialization to intellectual life, 
and socialization to the profession (Newman 2000b: 4). Socialization 
to the community means preparation for civic engagement or 
democratic participation -  preparation for participation in the 
community as citizens of a democracy. It is not clear whether new for­
going to college? This is one of the most important questions that has been posed 
about societal and governmental investment for much of the post-World War II 
period. ... Growing public scrutiny of higher education, combined with limited or 
reduced government spending, has focused increased attention on the benefits of 
higher education, both from an individual and a societal standpoint” (Washington DC: 
IHEP 1998: 5).
Chapter 1. The University Between the State and the Market 55
profit providers and the virtual institutions see this type of 
socialization as their central responsibility. Additionally, as 
traditional universities are becoming increasingly market-oriented 
and are running an increasing number of for-profit activities 
(including also the privatization and outsourcing of its services -  see 
Wertz 2000), they may play down the role of activities not directly 
related to workforce skills. Especially if the higher education setting 
becomes highly competitive. The second type of student socialization, 
socialization to intellectual life, consists of introducing students to 
intellectual concepts and giving them the ability to think critically 
(philosophy, history, literature etc). As new providers are focused on 
a much simpler view of intellectual skills, primarily aimed at 
preparing students for success in the workplace, there may be a 
danger that this type of social function will atrophy. Finally, the third 
type of student socialization, socialization to the profession, may well 
also be in danger from the wave of new providers: it is hard to 
imagine socialization to the profession of a lawyer, or a teacher, in the 
virtual setting of online courses.
The second function of the university in Newman’s typology is 
encouraging social mobility. Higher education plays a key role in 
determining the opportunities for upward mobility; “today, more than 
ever before, it is access to higher education that determines who 
participates fully in society” (Newman 2000b: 10). Here there does not 
seem to be a big difference between the traditional and new providers, 
except for the prestige additionally received from the best from among 
the former, and still unavailable from the latter. Finally, the third 
function of the university, providing a safe place for disinterested 
scholarship and unfettered debate, seems endangered in new providers 
where developing civic debate and objective research are often absent. 
At the same time, as Janice Newson and Howard Buchbinder 
formulated it in the title of their excellent book, increasingly, “The 
university means business” (Newson and Buchbinder 1988). We are 
entering an era of “academic capitalism” (Slaughter and Leslie 1997) in 
which the troubling aspects are “Leasing the ivory tower” and “The 
corporate takeover of academia” (Soley 1995), to refer to another book 
title; thus the “entrepreneurial university” (Clark 1998) and the
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“enterprising university” (Williams 2003; see also Currie 2002) are 
increasingly discussed. Market forces formulate the behavior of the 
new providers and, which is perhaps even more important and 
potentially threatening, increasingly reformulate the missions of 
traditional higher education institutions. The changes we are witnessing 
may be far-reaching and long-lasting: market forces may come to 
replace state forces (to varying degrees) as the driving forces for higher 
education as well as research and development activities. It is still 
unclear how the competition between public and private institutions 
will influence the core mission of higher education generally. Newman 
remarks in this context that
as the new competitors get stronger, many traditional institutions will feel 
compelled to emulate their narrow focus and compromise their historic 
functions. Will the academy drift toward the mean, toward a universe of 
relative sameness, or will the growing competition expand the array of 
differing alternatives, creating institutions more skilled at serving students 
with different needs and at different times in their lives? (Newman 2000: 15).
To sum up this section: the social, political, cultural, and economic 
world is changing, but so are the people and their institutions. The 
institution of the university, and higher education more generally, is 
subject to powerful influences from all sides and by all stakeholders: 
the state, the students, the faculty, and industry. Stakeholders may 
increasingly have different needs from those they traditionally had 
(as is obvious in the case of the state and industry, but also in the case 
of students who are living in the highly competitive, postnational and 
postmodern world) and institutions may be compelled to transform 
themselves. The market (which is here a general construct) cannot be 
ignored as it is reshaping our lives as humans, citizens, and finally as 
students/faculty. Never before has the institution of the university 
been attacked so strongly by so many, for so long; never before has it 
been perceived by so many in so many places all over the world as a 
failure.9 It is difficult to believe that as an institution, it will remain
9 To give an example from a recent European Commission communication on The 
Role o f  Universities in the Europe o f Knowledge, universities face an imperative need to 
“adapt and adjust” to a series of profound changes and they have to increase and
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intact. It is certainly better to steer higher education institutions from 
the inside towards transformation rather than to let them drift and see 
them changed by others.
For the time being, the most appealing scenario for the future 
developments of the institution of the university and of research and 
development activities in the transition countries seems to be scenario 
no. 1 in the Scenarios Europe 2010. Five Possible Futures for Europe (by 
Gilles Bertrand, Anna Michalski, and Lucio R. Pench) -  called simply 
“Triumphant Markets”.10 The majority of the current developments 
analyzed in various parts of the present book fit into the general 
framework provided by this scenario -  rather than by the remaining 
four. Bullet points for this scenario would be e.g. an increasing 
mismatch between welfare states and the demands of the economy; 
Europe won over to liberalism by American success; reductions in 
unemployment benefits and labor legislation and the creation of a 
two-tier job market (accompanied by reductions in unemployment); 
reductions in public expenditure, the privatization of social services 
and the downsizing of the state; value for money in public 
expenditure but longer-term public investment neglected; a good 
macroeconomic situation in Europe, with rapid growth in small
diversify their income in the face of worsening underfunding. The criticism goes to the 
very core mission of the institution: “after remaining a comparatively isolated universe for 
a long period, both in relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding 
guaranteed and a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European 
universities have gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling 
into question the role or the nature o f  what they should be contributing to society” (EC 2003b: 
22, emphasis mine). Thus the fundamental question about European universities 
today is the following: “Can the European universities, as they are and are organised 
now, hope in the future to retain their place, in society and in the world?” (EC 2003b: 
22, emphasis in original). It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole 
communication: the universities in Europe -  as they are and as they are organized 
today -  will not be able to retain their place. See Chapter 6 on the changing EU 
discourse about the future of the university.
10 The reason is twofold: firstly, the present author cannot escape his Central and 
East European experiences as a public policy analyst and, secondly, his background 
knowledge of higher education and research policy issues goes together with, and is 
strongly influenced by, political economy, political sciences, sociology, globalization 
studies, comparative higher education studies and, last but not least, philosophy.
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businesses and increasing openness to the international environment; 
an almost unanimous consensus in favor of free trade; the EU’s 
agricultural and regional policies revised downwards; a rapid 
increase in social and regional inequalities both globally and 
domestically; individualistic and fragmented societies, mainly 
concerned with the short term etc (Bertrand et al. 1999: 13-20).11
1.2. W h a t Is N ew  in  th e  T ran sfo rm atio n s 
o f  H igh er E d u cation  Today?
Higher education institutions’ traditional relations with the state are 
changing and the main forces of change in these relations are 
globalization-related, as discussed throughout the present book. This 
change is happening on a global scale, the patterns of transformations 
are very similar indeed, even though national and regional 
differences do exist. Although new EU member states still feel these 
globalization pressures differently from the EU-15 countries (with 
globally, outside the EU-15 but especially in Anglophone countries, 
these forces being more powerful), higher education there is likely to 
be strongly affected by these globalization-related processes soon, or 
has already been affected by them -  mainly through the indirect impact 
of the ongoing transformations to the state. As already stated, the effects 
of globalization are to a large extent indirect, via the transformations 
of the state, as will be shown in Chapter 4 on the welfare state. I am in 
full agreement here with Roger Dale in “Specifying Globalization 
Effects on National Policy: a Focus on the Mechanisms” who argues 
that while states have retained their formal territorial sovereignty 
more or less intact, they have all, to a greater or lesser degree, lost 
some of their capacity
11 A fundamentally opposite scenario to Triumphant Markets -  modeled on the 
USA -  is the one called Shared Responsibilities in which the guiding idea is that the new 
technologies will fulfill their promises only if social standards are maintained. This 
scenario offers the brightest opportunities for the new EU countries as Europeans 
converge around the shared values of confidence, solidarity, and responsibility rather 
than competition (see Bertrand et al. 1999: 29-36).
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to make national policy independently. Globalization does then create 
broadly similar patterns of challenge for states that shape their possible 
responses in similar ways. Absolutely central to arguments about the effect of 
globalization on public services like education is that those effects are largely 
indirect; that is to say, they are mediated through the effect of globalization 
on the discretion and direction of nation states (Dale 1999: 2, emphasis mine).
Higher education worldwide is much less a unique part of the 
public sector than it used to be: either in political declarations, or in 
public perceptions, or, finally, in practical terms (financing and 
governance).12 Higher education systems in transition countries are 
affected right now by the local post-1989 transformations as well as 
by the deeper and longer-lasting global transformations.13 At the 
same time the changing global setting for higher education 
institutions in the EU make it an urgent necessity to rethink the place, 
role and tasks of the university vis-à-vis global trends in higher 
education; this issue being discussed in Chapter 6 in connection with 
the construction of the new “Europe of Knowledge” through new and 
distinctive EU-level educational and research and development 
policies. The changing relations between education, the market and 
the state today (with complex, varied and unpredictable effects) may 
not leave higher education intact in an age of globalization. At the 
same time there is no single way in which both the state and the
12 It has especially been “new managerialism” (New Public Management), 
implemented throughout Anglo-Saxon countries across the entire public sector, that 
has had a substantial impact on higher education (see in this context papers by Peters 
et al. on Foucault, neoliberalism and self-management, 2000, and by Drummond, 2003, 
as well as a book on Foucault and Education edited by Stephen J. Ball, 1990). I have to 
agree with Miriam Henry and colleagues in their book on the OECD, globalization 
and higher education policy when they argue that “education systems have lost their 
sui generis character. Organisation, structures and basic practices look similar in 
education, health, welfare and other public sector bureaucracies” (Henry et al. 2001: 
33). This issue will be discussed in more detail in a section on reforming the public 
sector in Chapter 3.
13 For a comprehensive view of a decade of transformations to higher education in 
CEE countries, see the excellent book by Voldemar Tomusk, The Blinding Darkness o f  
the Enlightenment. Towards the Understanding o f  Post State-Socialist Higher Education in 
Eastern Europe, 2000. See also his recent collection of essays, The Open World and Closed 
Societies. Essays on Higher Education Policies “in Transition” (New York: Palgrave 2004).
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university may be affected. In the most general terms, as the OECD’s 
Redefining Tertiary Education argued,
A historic shift seems to be taking place under the pressure of the external 
environment. While some institutions will retain a quite distinct identity with 
long-established forms of internal definition and control, others have become 
much more open to influences from the wider society (OECD 1998: 16).
The transformation of higher education -  both in terms of teaching 
and research -  seems inevitable, as the forces behind these changes are 
global in nature (hence the appearance of the Bologna process in higher 
education and of the Copenhagen-Brugges process in vocational 
education in Europe, as well as the need for the construction of a 
European Research Area). The forces of change are similar, although 
their current influence varies from country to country, and from region 
to region; the forces that are driving the transformation of higher 
education are old ones (the governmental and public pressure for 
transparency and accountability, the governmental focus on costs, 
effectiveness, productivity, and quality assurance, etc) and new ones 
(competition; new, mainly for-profit providers of higher education; the 
rapid advancement of technology and the application of ICT in both 
teaching and learning; changing social demands for renewable skills in 
a global age, etc).14 In a European setting, the new forces of change in 
higher education would also include the increasing internationalization 
of higher education research and teaching (including the predominance 
of English in these times of the Internet and electronic communication) 
and globalization seen, among other important aspects, through the 
declining role of the nation-state in the global economic and cultural 
setting as discussed in Chapter 3, a renewed and critical focus on the 
services of the welfare state as discussed in Chapter 4, and the 
corporate/business culture/attitude invading the academic world 
today in an increasingly competitive and market-oriented global 
environment. Mass higher education may no longer be a dominant
14 On the distinction between the old and new forces driving the changes in 
higher education, see especially various papers written at the end of the 1990s and at 
the beginning of the 2000s by the late Frank Newman (Newman 1999b, 1999c, 2000a, 
2001).
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goal of states and governments as it has already been achieved as a 
goal in many of them: there are many other, competing, social needs 
today though. And even in the context of “knowledge-based societies” 
and “knowledge-based economies”, the knowledge in question may 
not exactly be knowledge as currently produced and disseminated by 
traditional public universities, as is testified to in a European setting by 
the documents about the future of the institution prepared for 
discussion by the European Commission over the last five years or so. 
The emergent European educational and research space, as shown in 
Chapter 6, has become a significant component of the “revitalization” 
of the Europeanization project. The foundations of the European 
knowledge society (and knowledge economy) are related to such 
notions as “knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, “education” and 
“training”. Education (and especially “lifelong learning”) has become a 
new discursive space into which European dreams of common 
European citizenship are currently being invested -  so the role of 
universities is seen as being bound to change.
The point being made here is that the most powerful forces to affect 
higher education are the new ones, not the old ones with which 
European higher education research and policy, on both a national and 
European level, seem to be predominantly concerned. Older forces 
result from several decades of steady growth in higher education 
institutions, to the point of the near-universalization of higher 
education; the new forces, by contrast, come from the new political, 
economic and social world around us (postmodern, global, postCold- 
War, postnational etc), possibly bringing about a revolution in higher 
education of an unprecedented scale and nature. Both kinds of forces 
are important, but the new forces seem to be underestimated 
(especially in the context of the debates surrounding the emergence of 
the European Higher Education Area; by contrast, the challenge of 
globalization is crucial to understanding both the EU Lisbon strategy, 
including the part related to education and training sectors, and the 
emergent European Research Area). The author is in full agreement 
with Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. Leslie, the authors of Academic 
Capitalism. Politics, Policies, and the Entrepreneurial University, when they 
argue that
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the changes taking place currently are as great as the changes in academic 
labor which occurred during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. ... 
[T]he globalization of political economics at the end of the twentieth century 
is destabilizing patterns of university professional work developed over the 
past hundred years,
and conclude:
higher education as an institution and faculty as its labor force face change 
unprecedented in this century (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 1).
Higher education is being asked to adapt to new societal needs, to 
be more responsive to the world around it, to be more market-, 
performance-, and student-oriented; to be more cost-effective and 
accountable to its stakeholders; as well as competitive with other 
providers, including new non-traditional and for-profit providers. 
Traditional institutions of higher education seem challenged -  and 
under assault -  all over the world by new teaching and research 
institutions that claim to do the same job better, cheaper and with no 
public money involved: such new providers, responding to the huge 
social demand for new skills so conveniently delivered, include for- 
profit educational firms, for-profit arms of traditional non-profit 
universities (such as eCornell, NYUonline, Virtual Temple -  as arms 
of Cornell University, New York University, and Temple University), 
virtual institutions, franchising institutions, corporate universities, etc 
(and their extensive use of new technologies).15 The basic traditional 
structure of higher education seems unable to cope with the growing 
and unprecedented workforce requirements in the West, especially in 
America. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not 
prepared for these global challenges at all.
It is certainly not enough to understand today that reformed 
institutions are definitely needed, in different countries to different 
degrees; the point is to see why they need to be changed, and why we 
need to take into account the issues of the state, the public services it 
provides, and the market setting in which they are bound to operate.
15 See Newman’s The New Competitive Arena: Market Forces Invade the Academy 
(2001) and his “Briefing on For-Profit Higher Education”. On the impact of technology 
on education, see also (Foster 2001 and Slaughter, Kittay et al. 2001).
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It is increasingly difficult to understand the transformations in higher 
education today without understanding the transformations of the 
social world today, including transformations to the state and 
citizenship. And as one of the most striking features of the new world 
order is its increasingly global nature, neither policy makers nor 
policy-scholars in higher education can ignore the far-reaching (and 
still undefined) social, economic, political and cultural impact of 
globalization through ongoing transformations of the state on the 
traditional educational business.
In analyzing the changing social, political and economic context of 
the functioning of higher education in Central and Eastern Europe, 
both a local (post-1989) context and a global one should be kept in 
mind.16 Following more than a decade of various attempts at reforms 
the issue has become increasingly important as, on the one hand in 
many transition countries the system is on the verge of collapse, and 
on the other hand there is an increasing political, economic and social 
pressure to rethink globally the very foundations of higher education 
in contemporary societies (see Kwiek 2001b). The final result of the
16 If we juxtapose two trends in the old EU-15 and new EU countries generally: 
changing enrollment rates and changes in spending on education (direct public 
expenditure vs. private expenditure on education), the picture becomes clearer. If we 
take into consideration the years 1990-1995, there is apparently only a single country 
in the European Union and EU accession countries -  namely France -  in which public 
expenditure grew faster than private expenditure (with a 1990 index of 100, the 
growth in 1995 was about 120/109 in France but 117/215 in Denmark, 80/139 in 
Hungary, 102/110 in the Netherlands, 135/138 in Ireland, and 119/126 in Spain; 
globally it was 117/165 in Australia and 115/146 in Canada (see OECD 1999: 86). At 
the same time enrollments grew dramatically: with a 1990 index of 100, the growth in
1996 was about 244 for Portugal, 181 for the United Kingdom, 150 for Ireland, 141 for 
Sweden, 130 for Finland, 120 for Austria, 121 for Denmark and 110 for the Netherlands 
(OECD 1999: 92). Thinking of Central Europe, the growth in enrollments was also 
dramatic: gross rates in percent for the 18-22 age group increased between 1989 and
1997 as follows -  the Czech Republic from 12.7 to 17.3, Hungary from 13.9 to 23.8, 
Poland from 11.6 to 20.6, and Slovakia from 13.2 to 17.6 (World Bank 2000a: 122). To 
sum up, both in the old EU-15 and in European transition countries the number of 
students increased and was accompanied by an increase in private expenditure. 
Thinking of longer demographic trends and the aging of society in both parts of 
Europe though, the point of natural saturation is not far away.
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current tensions will inevitably be the introduction of new legal 
contexts for the functioning of higher education and an 
implementation of new higher education (as well as research and 
development) policies. The impact of these transformations is likely to 
be severe, considering the role higher education currently plays in 
European transition countries and that which knowledge generally is 
likely to play in emergent “knowledge-based societies”.17 It is 
important to move back and forth between the two contexts. Public 
policy analysts today often recommend for CEE countries, as well as 
for developing countries globally, some form of privatization in 
public higher education. Privatization is understood as a gradual 
process in which higher education leaves the public sector of purely 
state-supported services and moves toward greater self-sustainability. 
The degree of privatization suggested varies, however.
Although I am not developing the theme here, let us just remind 
ourselves of the definition of privatization with reference to higher 
education given by D. Bruce Johnstone, and make a short comment 
that what he means by privatization is much larger than what I 
understand by the term: he means by it corporatization,
managerialism, marketization, and more generally the wider aspects 
of the impact of globalization on higher education. His definition
17 How are we to measure the transition to knowledge-based economies? The EU 
Key Figures 2003-2004. Towards a European Research Area. Science, Technology and 
Innovation suggests two composite indicators: one referred to investment in the 
knowledge-based economy, and the other referred to performance in knowledge-based 
economies. The former involves such sub-composite indicators as e. g. total research 
and development expenditure per capita, number of researchers per capita, new 
science and technology PhDs per capita, total education spending per capita, lifelong 
learning, and e-government; the latter involves GDP per hours worked, European an 
US patents per capita, scientific publications per capita, e-commerce, and schooling 
success rate (EC 2003d: 9-10). In all sub-composite indicators save a few (e.g. the 
number of PhDs), Europe is lagging behind the US. New EU member countries, in 
turn, are lagging behind the old EU-15 average both in terms of investment and 
performance composite indicators, with the interesting exception of a very high level 
of well-educated people: 80% of the population aged 25-64 finished upper secondary 
education, compared with the EU-15 average of 65% (and Southern EU-15 members in 
the range of 20-50%).
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vividly describes current trends and covers them with one very broad 
definition. Johnstone states that
privatization in reference to higher education refers to a process or tendency 
of colleges and universities (both public and private) taking on characteristics 
of, or operational norms associated with, private enterprises. Although the 
term is not a precise one (any more than the distinction between a “public” 
and a “private” college or university), privatization connotes a greater 
orientation to the students as a consumer, including the concept of the college 
education as a “product”; attention to image, competitor institutions and 
“market niches”; pricing and the enhancement of net earned revenue; and 
aggressive marketing. Privatization also suggests the adoption of management 
practices associated with private business, such as contracting out, or 
“outsourcing” ... aggressive labor relations and minimization of payroll 
expenditures, decisive decision-making and “top down” management, 
widespread use of audits and accountability measures, and an insistence that 
each unit (department or academic program) contribute to profitability, or at 
least to the organization’s particular metric of “success” (Johnstone 2000c: 1).
My use of the term is much smaller in scope and closer to the World 
Bank’s use: privatization means private financing, private management, 
private ownership, or any combination of the three. While on a global 
scale and in general, phase I of privatization includes enterprises; phase 
II telecoms, airports, electricity, water, and roads; phase III, of the 
greatest interest to us here, includes the three social services: pensions, 
healthcare, and education (Torres and Mathur 1996).18 The issue is 
currently of little concern to the affluent EU-15 countries, but it certainly 
is an issue in developing countries, especially in Latin America. The 
extent to which the “third wave of privatization” is an option in CEE 
countries, including new EU member states, is currently difficult to 
predict as their economic and social situation is difficult to predict, but it 
is certainly not entirely out of the question. It is better to bear in mind 
current global changes and current global trends, even though they 
might never reach Europe in their full forms.19
18 On the nuanced position of the World Bank in general, and its tertiary 
education sector in particular, see the section on the public sector in Chapter 3.
19 Gerver Torres and Sarita Mathur in “The Third Wave of Privatization. 
Privatization of Social Sectors in Developing Countries” describe the three phases of
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In the new social and political environment introduced by 
globalization theories and practices, it is not only the World Bank, the 
OECD and the IMF, from among global organizations (see e.g. OECD 
1998, 2002; World Bank 1994, 1997, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002; for local 
interventions, see e.g. World Bank/EIB 2004) that are extremely 
interested in stimulating new visions of higher education on a global 
scale; the World Trade Organization (WTO) has also become 
concerned with the unrestricted import and export of higher 
education within a set of complex rules in the WTO protocols.20 The
privatization, with the last pertaining to educational services, in the following manner: 
“in recent years an increasing number of developing countries have undertaken 
privatization programs as a key component of their efforts to restructure and 
modernize their economies. Economic sectors and operations that for decades had 
been reserved for the state are now being rapidly opened to the private sector. ... The 
first stages of privatization concentrated on commercial companies operating in 
competitive markets. ... Private sector participation in infrastructure sectors, initially 
thought to be almost impossible given the complex regulatory issues involved, has 
today gained popular support in most developing countries. The range of activities 
encompasses telecommunications, electricity, airports, railways, roads, and water 
supply. Chronic fiscal constraints in developing countries, coupled with the visible 
positive results of privatization, have led to the emergence of a third wave of 
privatization -  private management, financing, and investment in the social sectors, 
such as education, health, and social insurance” (Torres and Mathur 1996: 2). The 
choices faced by the EU-15 and the European transition countries seem different, 
though.
20 Susan L. Robertson suggested recently in “WTO/GATS and the Global 
Education Services Industry” that “there is clearly a great deal at stake, and it is 
critically important that a wider ranging debate takes place in a range of communities, 
including the academy, about what GATS means for national education systems, of 
whether these developments are desirable or not and for whom, and what might be 
done to, slow down, halt or even reverse decisions that have already been made. So 
what is the WTO, what is GATS, and what does including education in GATS mean 
for particular countries and their education systems? Whose interests are promoted by 
the WTO, and what is the consequence for education systems of redefining education, 
not as a public service regulated by the state, but as an industry regulated by the rules 
of global trade?” (Robertson 2003a: 260). See also papers by Jane Kelsey (“Legal 
Fetishism and the Contradictions of the GATS”) and by Mark Ginsburg et al. 
(“Privatisation, Domestic Marketisation, and International Commercialisation of 
Higher Education: vulnerabilities and opportunities for Chile and Romania within the 
framework of WTO/ GATS”) in the same volume of Globalisation, Societies, and
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issue in the long run is especially vital for poorer and developing 
countries, including some European transition countries. As Philip G. 
Altbach observes in his article in International Higher Education,
with the growing commercialization of higher education, the values of the 
marketplace have intruded onto the campus. One of the main factors is the 
change in society’s attitude toward higher education -  which is now seen as a 
‘private good’ benefiting those who study or do research. In this view, it 
seems justified that the users should pay for this service as they would for 
any other service. The provision of knowledge becomes just another 
commercial transaction. The main provider of public funds, the state, is 
increasingly unwilling or unable to provide the resources needed for an 
expanding higher education sector. Universities and other postsecondary 
institutions are expected to generate more of their funding. They have had to 
think more like businesses and less like educational institutions.
This attitude, clearly favored by global organizations, is summarized 
by Altbach in the following conclusion: “in this context a logical 
development is the privatization of public universities -  the selling of 
knowledge products, partnering with corporations, as well as 
increases in students fees” (Altbach 2001: 3). These issues remain 
crucial in the context of changing EU educational policies, which are 
discussed in Chapter 6.
1.3. G lo b a liz a tio n , C om p etitio n , 
and  P u b lic  Scru tin y
Scenarios differ but in an increasingly competitive world, public 
higher education is already under increasing public scrutiny as part 
of the social services financed by the state. Consequently, the world 
of higher education may never be the same, even if globalization is 
merely a buzzword. Different aspects of globalization will 
increasingly be the political and economic reality that the new EU 
countries will have to cope with. It will not go away, it has come
Education (Vol. 1, No. 3, Nov. 2003). For further commentaries, see the whole section 
on globalization and education in De Groof, Lauwers, and Dondelinger, eds. 2003.
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and will stay.21 Public finances, including the maintenance of public 
services, will come under increasing scrutiny, following the 
pressures (mainly economic) of globalization and the reform of the 
welfare state worldwide, with significant consequences for the 
public sector.22 Due to their difficult economic situation, CEE 
countries may be affected much more strongly than the EU-15 
countries in terms of downsizing the state and reducing welfare 
state privileges, including services traditionally provided within 
national higher education systems for free. Although I would 
certainly not expect what World Bank analysts call the “third wave 
of privatization” in the EU-15 countries in the short term, this 
direction of change in the foundations of the welfare state is not 
entirely excluded in new EU member states in the future.23
21 As Jan Sadlak rightly remarks, without reference to Central Europe, “the frank 
acknowledgment that globalization has become a permanent feature of our social, 
economic and cultural space is essential in order to take advantage of what it can offer 
as well as to avoid the perils it may involve” (Sadlak 1998: 106).
22 I am in full agreement with D. Bruce Johnstone’s idea that restructuring public 
higher education institutions is exceptionally difficult -  as the faculty “have additional 
means with which to resists threats of radical change and job loss: the idea o f  the 
university as a proper and necessary bastion of continuity and tradition” (Johnstone 
1998a: 19, emphasis mine). At the same time, though, while public universities resist 
change, “they are not immune to the loss of large amounts of public revenue”. 
Consequently, the struggle for transforming universities might be seen as the struggle 
between the idea (of the university) and its increasingly imperfect embodiments (due to 
permanent financial distress). It does not necessarily have to be seen that way, though; 
and the best arguments against viewing the university through (various versions of) 
its idealistic notions is provided by Jürgen Habermas in “The Idea of the University: 
Learning Processes”. In one sentence, “organizations no longer embody ideas”, as 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Habermas 2001b).
23 Poland, with pension schemes (three-pillars rather than pay-as-you-go systems) 
and healthcare already partly privatized, plus higher education systems currently 
being reformed, is a good example of at least a general indication of this trend. As a 
recent World Bank/European Investment Bank’s report on Tertiary Education in Poland 
argues, “financing higher education primarily through taxation makes poorer 
members of the community contribute very inequitably to the education of children 
from rich families. ... [A]ll full-time and part-time beneficiaries of tertiary education 
should contribute to cost proportionally to the expected social and private benefits” 
(World Bank/EIB 2004: 37).
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What may be expected is that the idea of the uniqueness of higher 
education in general, and of the university in particular, may be 
gradually rejected, or at least seriously redefined. The process can 
already be clearly seen within the Bologna Process for the integration 
of European higher education on the one hand and in the 
construction of a European Research Area on the other. The emergent 
EU educational and research and development policies -  under 
construction within the wider Lisbon Strategy -  are increasingly 
incompatible with the traditional modern idea of the university. As 
Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres put it recently with 
respect to national educational policies,
the broader economic effects of globalization tend to force national 
educational policies into a neo-liberal framework that emphasizes lower 
taxes; shrinking the state sector and “doing more with less”; promoting 
market approaches to school choice (particularly vouchers); rational 
management of school organizations; performance assessment (testing); and 
deregulation in  order to encourage new providers (including on-line 
providers) of educational services (Burbules and Torres 2000: 20).
Thus current re-invention schemes for higher education in 
transition countries should be accompanied by new concep­
tualizations and activities in the academy itself, otherwise necessary -  
and unavoidable -  changes will in all probability be imposed from the 
outside anyway. That is where critical thinking is needed. The world 
is radically changing today and there are no indications that higher 
education institutions might be spared the consequences; in all 
probability, they will be changing radically too. The academy must 
start thinking about its future, drawing on its vast human resources. 
Currently, draft laws and discussions about reforms (as well as the 
Bologna Process, to refer to the EU level) are being neglected by the 
academic community at large, or seem to be. It would be useful to 
realize that “things will never be the same”, but also to attempt to 
envisage how they could actually be.
The possible decline of the nation-state -  even seen as only giving 
some terrain of power to new transnational political and economic 
players -  is strictly connected with the violent globalization processes, 
which, consequently, may lead to the redefinition of such
70 Chapter 1. The University Between the State and the Market
fundamental notions as democracy, citizenship, freedom, and politics, 
as will be discussed in Chapter 5. But it may also lead to the 
redefinition of the social role of the university. In the situation 
generated by the emergence of a global market, a global economy, the 
gradual “withdrawal” of the state and the decomposition of the 
welfare state, constant deliberation is needed about any new 
relationship between the state and the university in a global age. It is 
important not to look at higher education issues in isolation from 
what is going on nowadays in the public sector and in the institution 
of the state.24 These changes do, and will, influence thinking about 
higher education futures. It is no use keeping on referring to the 
rights gained by the university in modernity (i.e. to the rights gained 
in a time of national states, maintained across vast parts of Europe 
within the Humboldtian model of the University and within the 
postwar Keynesian welfare state model), as modernity, 
philosophically speaking, may no longer be with us and we may be 
entering (some sort of ) global age. Redefined states may have rather 
different obligations, rather different powers; the state worldwide 
right now is looking for its own place in the new global order, and 
traditional public higher education issues might seem to be of lower 
importance compared with other social needs (in the worst case 
scenario), especially if the American idea that higher education is an 
increasingly private good becomes more widely accepted.
The three main global factors contributing to the transformation of 
higher education of interest to me here can be put under three 
separate categories: first, the decline of the crucial role of the nation­
state in the current social and economic development of nations, with 
its vision of higher education as a national treasure contributing to 
national consciousness and national cohesion; second, the 
reformulation of the functions of the traditional Keynesian welfare- 
state, including a revised scope for public sector activities to be 
funded by the state; and third, the invasion of economic
24 Unfortunately, as Arthur Levine (President of Teachers College at Columbia 
University) put it, “public trust in government has declined in recent years. The result 
is declining confidence in the nonprofit sector and rising confidence in the for-profit 
sector” (Levine 2000: 3).
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rationality/corporate culture in the whole public sector, not only in 
higher education, worldwide (with the notable exception of some EU- 
15 countries). Regionally, the emergence of the new EU educational 
and research and development policies needs to be mentioned, as 
discussed in Chapter 6.
Thus, firstly, globalization can be viewed through the theoretical 
and practical questioning of the relevance/importance of the nation­
state in the contemporary world. Secondly, globalization can be viewed 
through the dismantling of the welfare state (resulting in a worldwide 
public sector reform -  a reformulation of the responsibilities of the state 
in the public sector in general; we will be dealing with these processes 
in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). And, finally, globalization can also be viewed 
through the lens of economic rationality and the rule of the ideology of 
the market: the primacy of the economy to politics, the public good, 
and collective/ social interests. Thus, in the third aspect of 
“globalization”, we have a neoliberal, market ideology accompanied by 
an array of practices drawn directly from the world of business and 
applied to other domains of social life -  in the particular case of interest 
to us here, to higher education.25 And in this third sense of 
globalization, the model for the functioning of the university in a global 
age would be a business-like, corporate model, with such dominating 
traits as bureaucratization, marketization, entrepreneurialization, 
corporatization etc. As Janice Newson observes discussing corporate- 
university linkages, today
the new, emerging image of the university is a business corporation rather
than a public social institution. ... The university is responding to its
problems by adopting corporate strategies on a larger and larger scale ...
25 I agree with Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto Torres’ diagnosis and 
suggestions for future research; as they argue in their introduction to Globalization and 
Education. Critical Perspectives: “In educational terms, there is a growing understanding 
that the neo-liberal version of globalization, particularly as implemented (and 
ideologically defended) by bilateral, multilateral, and international organizations, is 
reflected in an educational agenda that privileges, if not directly imposes, particular 
policies for evaluation, financing, assessment, standards, teacher training, curriculum, 
instruction, and testing. In the face of such pressures, more study is needed about local 
responses to defend public education against the introduction of pure market 
mechanisms” (Burbules and Torres 2000: 15).
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[and] becomes the mirror of its corporate partners (Newson 1998: 495; see 
also Bostock 1997; Deem 2001; Etzkowitz et al. 2001; Vogel and Kaghan 2001).
It is not the same state any more -  and therefore, among many 
other reasons, it will not be the same higher education (see Newman 
1999a and Slaughter and Leslie 1997). According to D. Bruce 
Johnstone who authored a World Bank Report on higher education 
for UNESCO in 1998,
the reform agenda ... is oriented to the market rather than to public 
ownership or to governmental planning and regulation. Underlying the market 
orientation o f  tertiary education is the ascendance, almost worldwide, o f  market 
capitalism and the principles o f  neo-liberal economics (Johnstone 1998: 4, emphasis 
mine).
We might argue that higher education worldwide, and especially 
in the transition countries, will be more successful in its struggles to 
gain a share of shrinking public revenues than e.g. healthcare 
providers or pension schemes, or more successful than correction 
institutions/ prisons, environmental protection, primary and sec­
ondary education, care for the aged etc. But more than ten years of 
reforms to higher education in CEE countries, generally, do not 
support the thesis of exceptional treatment (including preferential 
financing) for higher education; to the contrary (see Scott 2000). 
The system of public higher education is on the verge of collapse in 
some parts of Central, and especially of Eastern Europe, as few 
system-level reforms were introduced, if any. I would not expect 
the transition countries to be able to “swim against the (global) tide” 
in reforming higher education as part of reforming their public 
sectors, and I would expect the consequences for higher education 
(as well as other traditional public services of the welfare state) to be 
much more deeply felt there than in the EU-15 countries, even now 
after Enlargement.
The European transition countries are not unique in having 
problems with reforming their higher education systems. These are 
global problems and global solutions are being sought by global 
organizations which never had much interest in higher education as 
such before. Besides, the following additional factors determine a new
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situation for higher education: new technologies; new student bodies 
(increasingly diversified ages, returning and working students, 
lifelong learning ideal); new higher education providers such as for- 
profit, corporate universities, virtual universities, mixed (tradi­
tional/ virtual) providers; new -  increasingly global -  student 
expectations; an increasingly competitive, market-oriented, success- 
hungry social environment; and others (see Newman 2000a).26
Following the idea that higher education may no longer be a 
unique part of the public sector in Central and Eastern Europe, we 
should ask who the competitors to public higher education 
institutions are. The competitors are of a twofold nature: they are 
firstly, direct, the newcomers in the field of higher education and 
secondly, indirect, other public institutions and public services 
provided by the state today. Other educational providers are, for 
instance, private national institutions, private foreign institutions, 
national and foreign corporate certification centers, national and 
foreign virtual education providers and mixed education providers. 
Most probably, in an increasingly market-oriented social 
environment, prospective students (and their families) will be 
increasingly market-oriented as well. The question arises, to what 
extent the European Union is becoming a market-oriented social 
environment: the direction may be not to follow  current global ideals.27 
The second group of competitors are other public institutions and 
public services such as, for instance, primary and secondary 
education, pensions and care for the aged, basic healthcare, social 
insurance, law and order institutions, prison systems, public 
administration etc (see Hovey 1999).
26 Let us just mention here such major for-profit players in the USA as Apollo 
Group, Inc. (with 126 campuses in 34 states with 68,000 students) and DeVry Inc. (with 
45 campuses in 9 states and with 48,000 students). As to corporate universities, let us 
mention by way of example American Express Quality University, Apple University, 
Dell University, Disney University, General Motors University, Hamburger University 
(McDonald’s Corporation), Land Rover University, Motorola University and Xerox 
Document University (Newman 2001: 19-21).
27 It is useful to see in this context The Social Situation in the European Union 2001, 
published by Eurostat 2001.
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Something which also supports the thesis of public higher 
education coming under severe scrutiny soon is the fact that all 
(public and private) institutions are being forced to change today, 
including governmental agencies, the corporate world, the 
institutions of civil society and the core institutions of the public 
sector. In the most general terms, this is the end of a stable world 
governed by modern traditions, and in this context the inherited 
prestige of higher education in general, and of the institution of the 
university in particular, is unlikely to help in resisting the changes 
(see Scott 1999). This increasing public scrutiny is also the final 
consequence of higher education’s enlightening mission: the public is 
able to judge their higher education institutions (the awareness of 
higher education institutions’ performance has become widespread, 
accompanying the massification of the system). As Anette Gibbs 
remarks in her “Changing Government Roles Relative to Higher 
Education”, referring to the American experience,
this eroding public confidence is not necessarily about the importance of higher 
education but rather about the operation of and functioning of colleges and 
universities. ... With other pressing issues to address, governmental legislative 
and executive officials therefore appear willing to treat public higher education as 
an expenditure rather than an investment in the future. Such a  philosophical and 
politically pragmatic approach by either state or national government means 
that colleges and universities could become drastically different organizations 
from the institutions of today (Gibbs 2000, emphasis mine).
The problems faced by Central European higher education 
systems are not exactly -  and not distinctly -  Central European 
problems; they may be reinforced by local issues, but the main 
structure of the transformations going on is common to large parts of 
the world. The changes in higher education go hand in hand with 
changes in the public sector generally, and the issue of the 
massification of higher education -  and hence rapidly growing costs 
and a generally declining level of education -  is global. The 
traditional nation-state-oriented and welfare-state-supported research 
university is most probably beyond reach (and, more importantly, not 
of interest to the state) in most parts of the world today. It certainly 
has some chance of survival in the relatively unchanged conditions of
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the affluent countries of the old European Union, even though the 
pressures resulting from the Lisbon strategy and, more generally, 
from the new conceptualizations of the role of the university in 
“knowledge-based economies” are increasingly being felt; however, 
the chances for Central and Eastern Europe are much smaller, and for 
developing countries in general, it will be very difficult indeed to 
avoid current global trends towards marketization, corporatization 
and perhaps privatization of large parts of (especially graduate and 
postgraduate) public higher education.28 And let us clarify what we 
mean by corporatization: following Janice Newson, corporatization is 
a trend in university development which,
encapsulates at least two related yet distinct aspects of the university’s 
changing relationship to the private corporate sector. One aspect concerns 
new kinds of contractual relationships in which some level of financial 
support to a university program or research project is exchanged for an 
opportunity for corporate donors to exercise influence over and/or benefit, 
from specific research and/or educational activities. ... The second aspect of 
corporatization concerns the adoption by universities of the modus operandi, 
criteria, and objectives of private sector corporations (Newson 1998: 108).
So one aspect of corporatization of the university leads to 
producing knowledge leading to the development of “marketable 
products under patent or license agreements with a corporate 
partner”; the other in turn may lead to situations in which “the 
university becomes undifferentiated from a business corporation 
engaged in the delivery of educational and research ‘products’ ” 
(Newson 1998: 108). Both aspects29 may have tremendous effects on 
the relationship between the university and the state.
28 As Zygmunt Bauman describes the “crisis” of the university: “with virtually all 
orthodox grounds and justifications of their once elevated position either gone or 
considerably weakened, universities (at least in developed and affluent countries; in 
the ‘modernising’ countries they may still play the traditional role of the factories of 
missing educated elites) face the need to re-think and articulate anew their role in a world 
that has no use for their traditional services and sets new rules for the game of prestige 
and influence” (Bauman 1997: 51, emphasis mine).
29 Observed in Canada for over a decade by Janice Newson and Howard 
Buchbinder, see Newson and Buchbinder 1988; Newson 1994; and Newson 1998.
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1.4. R eform s to H igher E d u cation  and  the State
The models provided globally for reforming higher education are 
divergent: but the very world we are living in is in the making. The 
exact features of the global world we are entering are still unknown; 
hence the nature of higher education in the future is equally 
unknown. There are a number of persuasive visions of the future, but 
their usefulness depends on what path the reforms to the state will 
take, globally, on its functions, role and tasks in a “post-welfare” 
society (see Tomlinson 2001). The state in its new global surroundings 
may be forced to shift its priorities, and state-supported (sometimes 
almost fully) higher education systems in their current forms may not 
be among them. The new forms, as labeled jointly in Europe by the 
European Commission as the “Education and Training 2010” agenda, 
and as directed towards reaching the “Europe of Knowledge”, may be 
based on different -  probably much more market-oriented -  models 
of state/university social contracts, as discussed in Chapter 6. The 
redefinition of the state’s responsibilities in a deregulated globalized 
world may be a very painful process, not only for higher education, 
but for the recipients of a large part of the traditionally based public 
sector services as well.
The fundamental issue is whether the state, in times of harsh 
global economic competition, is able (and perhaps even more so, is 
willing) to finance public higher education institutions at the levels 
known from the fully-fledged post-war Keynesian era -  in the light of 
its unavoidable universalization and the constantly rising costs of 
advanced research activities. In the most general terms, the issue 
might boil down to the following: is higher education still viewed as a 
public good or is it increasingly seen as a private commodity, and 
how successfully can higher education compete with other publicly- 
funded services today.30 Although it is always theoretically possible
30 As Harold A. Hovey put it penetratingly in his “State Spending for Higher 
Education in the Next Decade. The Battle to Sustain Current Support”, “the underlying 
question about spending will be whether, at the margin, higher education spending is 
contributing more than spending at the margin in other programs” (Hovey 1999: 17). 
Current reformulations of the social tasks of the welfare state is such a moment in which
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that the transition countries will dramatically increase their support 
for higher education, it seems very unlikely indeed.31
Globalization theories and practices are changing traditional 
relations between the state and the market: the state, along neoliberal 
lines, is increasingly seen as merely a “regulator” or “catalyst” for 
entrepreneurial activities. Thus globalization processes and fierce 
international competition have brought back to the world agenda the 
issue of the role of the state in the contemporary world: as the World 
Bank publication The State in a Changing World put it in its opening 
paragraph:
Around the globe, the state is in the spotlight. Far-reaching developments in 
the global economy have us revisiting basic questions about government: 
what its role should be, what it can and cannot do, and how best to do it 
(World Bank 1997: 1).
Thus to highlight this point again -  rethinking the university today is 
inseparable from rethinking the state: firstly, the modern research
the traditional responsibilities of the state are under revision -  as Hovey rightly stresses, 
“certain activities now viewed as part of baselines could be defined as outside the 
traditional responsibilities of government” (Hovey 1999: 60). Higher education has to 
compete successfully with other socially attractive forms of state spending.
31 Strangely enough, opposition to reforming public higher education seem to come 
from all stakeholders. Free higher education guaranteed by the constitutions of certain 
Central and East European countries is still a hot political issue. For the faculty, the status 
quo is preferable for it is known; reforms and their consequences are unknown i.e. 
potentially threatening. Let me mention in this context what a World Bank report on higher 
education (commissioned for the UNESCO World Congress on Higher Education in Paris, 
1998) said about the faculty as a problem today: “radical change, or restructuring, of an 
institution of higher education, means either fewer and/ or different faculty, professional 
staff, and support workers. This means lay-offs, forced early retirements, or major 
retraining and reassignment, as in: the closure of inefficient or ineffective institutions; the 
merger of quality institutions that merely lack a critical mass of operations to make them 
cost-effective, and the radical alteration of the mission and production functions of an 
institution -  which means radically altering who the faculty are, how they behave, the way they 
are organized, and the way they work and are compensated” (Johnstone 1998, emphasis mine). 
No wonder the faculty might be afraid. However, it is necessary to keep in mind the 
importance of the academic profession; as Philip G. Altbach notes, “the heart of the 
contemporary university is the academic profession. No reform or institutional transformation 
is possible without the commitment o f the professoriate” (Altbach 1998: 262, emphasis mine).
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university was put at the disposal of the nation-state by its German 
philosophical founders, as shown in Chapter 2 and, secondly, the 
university is traditionally a vast consumer of public revenues within 
the Keynesian model of welfare states, as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Generally, the state is increasingly seen in a global context as a 
“facilitator”, “regulator”, “partner”, and “catalyst” rather than a direct 
provider of growth or of social services. What this means is a 
redefinition of the state’s responsibilities towards society and high 
selectivity for the activities supported by public funds. “Choosing 
what to do and what not to do is critical”, as the above World Bank 
publication phrases it -  and in this context hard times may be ahead 
for public higher education worldwide. The OECD’s Redefining 
Tertiary Education speaks of a “fundamental shift” and a “new 
paradigm” of tertiary education for all, as well as about a “historic 
shift” and a “cultural change” taking place right now (OECD 1998: 3, 
37, 20). The market is growing stronger in domains which were 
dominated in the past by the state. Market forces are bringing about 
economic rationality and a corporate culture, accompanied by an array of 
practices drawn directly from the world of business. What is 
appearing on the horizon as an option is the (American) ideal of 
“excellence in education” (Bill Readings’ “university of excellence” 
instead of “university of culture”) and the university as a 
bureaucratically-governed and consumer-oriented corporation, along 
with a generally increasing hostility to the traditional ideals of 
academic freedom and the autonomy of academic institutions.32
1.5. C on clu sion s
Consequently, it is of vital importance nowadays to be able to keep a 
careful balance between looking backward and looking forward, 
between taking the past (the modern idea of the university) and 
taking the future as points of reference in discussing the condition of
32 As this line of thinking is sometimes formulated, “the only thing that higher 
education has to do, it seems, is sell its goods and services in the marketplace like 
other businesses...” (Leslie and Fretwell 1996: 31).
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the university. It is important not to be merely retro-active, past- 
oriented. We are in a period of history in which the traditional, 
philosophy-inspired, nation-state-oriented and welfare-state-
supported, modern university (for a variety of reasons and to 
different degrees in different countries and regions) is no longer 
culturally, socially and economically accepted in a blind, no- 
questions-asked manner. The future of the whole of higher education, 
not only the university, is taking shape right before our eyes today, 
and it is the task of the academic community not only to analyze these 
transformations, but in addition also to influence them as much as 
possible.
Ch a p t e r  2
The Idea of the University Revisited 
(the German Context)
2.1. D o  O rg an ization s S t i l l  E m bod y Id eas?
(K arl Jasp ers vs. Jü rg en  H aberm as)
Even though the present book is future-oriented, a brief discussion of 
the modern German idea of the university seems necessary. In this 
chapter the delicate relationship between the university and the 
nation-state in particular is discussed, the coterminous emergence of 
two modern products. The way the modern university was born 
strongly influenced its relationship with the state. Without a clear 
vision of this relationship at the point of the inception of this specific 
power/knowledge nexus, it would be much more difficult to see the 
difference today when the place of the nation-state in the economy, 
the concept of nationhood and the role of the nation in culture are 
different under global pressures. Our narrative about the modern 
university and the modern state needs a historical background which 
is briefly sketched in this chapter.
Historically speaking, the status of the institution of the university 
in Germany at the turn of the 19th century when the new idea of the 
university was about to be born was very questionable. Universities 
were seen at the time as “sites of rote disputation inhabited largely by 
pedants” and intellectuals regarded universities with “disdain”, as 
Daniel Fallon describes them in his book on The German University.
During the eighteenth century, universities were increasingly described as 
“medieval”, a term that had a clear pejorative connotation. A phrase often
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used at the time described the universities as “atrophied in a trade-guild 
mentality”. It was widely believed within universities that knowledge was 
fixed within closed systems and the only task of the university was to 
transmit what was known to students, usually by reading aloud from old 
texts (Fallon 1980: 5-6).
Fallon goes as far as to claim that one of the lesser contributions 
Wilhelm von Humboldt made was the retention of the name 
university itself, as universities were in such disrepute among 
intellectuals that the Prussian reformers who sought a new institution 
in Berlin avoided the very word “university” in their essays (Fallon 
1980: 30).1 Also Bjorn Wittrock, the author of an excellent paper on 
“The Modern University: the Three Transformations” argues that 
radical German philosophy helped resurrect the notion of a university 
at a time when the university in Europe had been “more threatened 
than perhaps at any time before or afterwards” (Wittrock 1993: 314).2
Karl Jaspers in his classic book on The Idea o f the University 
returned to the Humboldtian notion of the university, drawing from 
the same intellectual sources in thinking about the institution as
1 I am thinking of the titles of some classic German books and lectures of interest 
to us here, indeed Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote on the one hand “Antrag auf 
Errichtung der Universität Berlin” but on the other “Über die innere und äussere 
Organisation der höheren wissentschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin”. While Fichte 
published Deducirter Plan einer zu Berlin zu errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt, 
Schleiermacher wrote Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschen Sinn, nebst 
einem Anhang über eine neu zu errichtende. Schelling published his Vorlesungen über die 
Methode des akademischen Studiums, Fichte his Über das Wesen des Gelehrten, und seine 
Erscheinungen im Gebiete der Freiheit and finally Kant his Der Streit der Fakultäten, of 
minor interest to us here. In general, the titles confirm the prevalent ambivalence 
towards the very term “university” at the time.
2 Timothy Bahti in his “Histories of the University: Kant and Humboldt” describes 
the situation of the German universities of the period in the following way: “the 
eighteenth [century] had been a lowpoint for German universities: unruly students, 
dropping enrollments, little apparent correlation between subjects taught and post­
university positions available, financial marginality, etc. At this very time, the last 
decade of the eighteenth century, there was talk of abolishing the university; its place 
could be taken by the already existing academies of science and by new, practical 
vocational schools (Hochschulen). And yet in 1810, the University of Berlin was 
founded” (Bahti 1987: 438).
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Hans-Georg Gadamer (in Truth and Method) and Helmuth Schelsky 
(in Solitude and Freedom i.e. Einsamkeit und Freiheit: Idee und Gestalt der 
deutschen Universität und Ihren Reformen). Jürgen Habermas, on the 
other hand, in such texts as “The University in a Democracy: 
Democratization of the University” (a lecture given at the Free 
University of Berlin in 1967 which reopened the German debate on 
the social role of the institution) and “The Idea of the University: 
Learning Processes” (a lecture given in Heidelberg in 1986) stood 
more in the Kantian tradition of the university as a site of critique 
(Delanty 2001: 64). It is very interesting to put Jasper’s book in the 
double context of the original idea of the university born at the turn of 
the 18th century and its radical questioning performed by Habermas 
as part of the new German debate on reforming higher education.
Jaspers’ book was based on an address given at the University of 
Heidelberg in 1945, “The Renewal of the University”, which was based 
in turn on his book The Idea o f the University (originally published in 
1923 and reprinted in 1946). It referred to the basic assumption 
originating from the German founding fathers of the university that the 
institution of the university rests on a foundational idea. To put it in a 
nutshell, Habermas’ main line of criticism is that “organizations no 
longer embody ideas” (Habermas 1989: 102). Jaspers and Habermas 
stand on two opposite sides and no reconciliation between them is 
possible; paradoxically, Habermas, in his discussion of the university, 
is much closer to the postmodern position of Jean-François Lyotard (in 
his The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge of 1979) than to the 
classical German tradition in viewing the institution (see Roberts 1998). 
There does not seem to be any direct debate between Habermas and 
Lyotard about the university, even though they were engaged over the 
years in exchanges about many other topics. It is interesting to note the 
parallelisms in Lyotard’s critique of Wilhelm von Humboldt and the 
German Idealists in general and Habermas’ critique of Jaspers in his 
classic book.3
3 See especially the section “Narratives of the Legitimation of Knowledge” in The 
Postmodern Condition (Lyotard 1984: 31-37). For Lyotard (already in the 1960s) on the 
university, students, and faculty, see his Political Writings (Lyotard 1993: 33-83).
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Jaspers, following the ideas expressed at the time of the founding 
of the University of Berlin, believes in the post-war (first, and then 
second world war) renewal of the university on the basis of its idea -  
he believes in preserving the German university through a rebirth of 
its foundational “idea”. As Habermas comments on this line of 
thinking in his paper on “The Idea of the University: Learning 
Processes” (included in The New Conservatism), its “premises derive 
from the implicit sociology of German Idealism. Institutions are forms 
of objective spirit. An institution remains capable of functioning only 
as long as it embodies in living form the idea inherent in it” 
(Habermas 1989: 101). Indeed, in Jaspers, there is a strong Platonic 
dualism between the idea and its embodiment, the essence of the 
university and its earthly occurrence, the idea of the institution of the 
university and its living form. In thinking about what the university 
is, it is impossible to forget what it should be. Consequently, students 
and professors ought to “assimilate the idea of the university” and be 
“permeated by the idea of the university as part of a way of life” 
(Jaspers 1959: 75, 68). As Jaspers put it in an edition of the book 
commented on by Habermas, “only someone who carries the idea of 
the university in himself can think and act appropriately on behalf of 
the university” (Habermas 1989: 101). Both students and professors 
become guardians of the idea of the university, checking whether the 
institution is performing according to its ideal, serving the purposes it 
was meant to serve, and functioning properly i.e. in the way 
inherently present in its very idea. Habermas, following Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, finds communication crucial to the self­
understanding of the university:
The ingenious thing about the old idea of the university was that it was 
supposed to be grounded in something more stable: the permanently 
differentiated scientific process itself. But if science can no longer be used to 
anchor ideas in this way, because the multiplicity of the disciplines no longer 
leaves room for the totalizing power of either an all-encompassing 
philosophical fundamental science or even a reflective form of material 
critique of science and scholarship that would emerge from disciplines 
themselves, on what could an integrative self-understanding of the 
corporative body of the university be based? (Habermas 1989:124).
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The institution may be successful in living up to the idea, or it 
may fail. The idea can never be “perfectly realized” though. Therefore 
“a permanent state of tension” exists at the university between the 
idea and the reality (Jaspers 1959: 70). The quality of the university is 
measurable against its ideal:
The university exists only to the extent that it is institutionalized. The idea 
becomes concrete in the institution. The extent to which it does this determines 
the quality of the university. Stripped of its ideals the university loses all 
value (Jaspers 1959: 70).
According to Jaspers, the university is the only place where by 
concession of state and society “a given epoch may cultivate the 
clearest possible self-awareness. People are allowed to congregate 
here for the sole purpose of seeking truth” (Jaspers 1959: 1). Following 
the German ideal of “knowledge for its own sake”, an academic’s role 
is to pursue truth “unconditionally and for its own sake” (Jaspers 
1959: 1).4 The university derives its autonomy from the imperishable 
idea of academic freedom. The idea of truth figures prominently 
throughout the book, defining the purpose of the university (“seeking 
truth”), defining research as its foremost concern (“because truth is 
accessible to systematic search”) and defining the unique character of 
scholars (those “who have committed their lives to the search for 
truth”). Referring to Plato, one can say that human beings are beings
4 Leszek Kołakowski in his address “What Are Universities For?” hits the mark 
when he links the university with the foundations of our culture: “it is, in fact, 
impossible to prove that every taxpayer derives visible and tangible advantages from 
the fact that someone knows the Hittite language and the layout of Japanese gardens. 
The question to be posed should be that which is more general: why should we have a 
culture that does not serve technological progress nor increase material well-being? 
The only answer to that question is: in order to let mankind be that which it has 
always been. If culture means luxury then this is perhaps because mankind itself is a 
luxury of Nature” (Kołakowski 1997: 29-30). Somewhat in a similar vein, parallel 
questions could be posed with respect to philosophy itself, and the answer could go 
along the same lines. The Lyotardian criterion of “performativity” is increasingly 
applied to both university teaching and research, including philosophical teaching 
and research. In his formulation, “research sectors that are unable to argue that they 
contribute even indirectly to the optimalization of the system’s performance are 
abandoned by the flow of capital and doomed to senescence” (Lyotard 1984: 47).
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wishing to know5; the will to know determines human beings and 
separates them from animals. Consequently, the university is an 
institution
Uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and transmission of
truth in scientific terms (Jaspers 1959: 3).
Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Humboldt, Hegel and other 
German thinkers from the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th 
century, felt the need to discuss the idea of the university from a 
radically new perspective. The new concepts from Jasper’s definition 
referred to above are the following: “uniting people” for the sake of 
science (students and professors working together, rather than 
professors working merely for students), “professionally dedicated” 
staff (rather than dedicated in an “amateurish” way characteristic of
5 In the Platonic tradition of Western philosophy, the essence of being human is 
knowing, or as Richard Rorty put it in his magisterial Philosophy and the Mirror o f Nature, 
“man’s essence is to be a knower of essences” (Rorty 1980: 366). You shall not know, i.e. 
you are not allowed to take fruit from the tree of knowledge, the Hebraic tradition says; 
by contrast, you shall know, the Greeks told us in their legacy. The philosophical 
equation of “humanity” and “knowing” gave birth to the priority of epistemologically- 
centered thinking in philosophy, for the knowledge in question had to be more and 
more strict, methodical, and indubitable. Greek philosophical thought determined that 
for over two thousand years knowledge became privileged. Rorty argued that “in every 
sufficiently reflective culture, there are those who single out some area, one set of 
practices, and see it as the paradigm human activity. ... In the mainstream of the Western 
philosophical tradition, this paradigm has been knowing -  possessing justified true 
beliefs, or, better yet, beliefs so intrinsically persuasive as to make justification 
unnecessary” (Rorty 1980: 366, emphasis mine). Our view of Plato would be radically 
different if we accepted the account of ancient Greek philosophy provided by Pierre 
Hadot, the French historian of philosophy in which it was a “spiritual exercise”. Key 
words dominating his analyses are “self-improvement”, “self-realization”, “self­
modification”, “therapy”, “healing one’s soul”, “transformation of one’s personality” and 
“conversion”. Ancient philosophy viewed from the perspective of a spiritual exercise is 
seen not as a theoretical construct involving a search for truth but as a method of 
shaping one’s own life and ones own vision of the world, as an attempt to transform 
one’s personality. Michel Foucault in his writings on the “aesthetics of existence” was 
deeply influenced by Hadot’ s interpretations. Certainly, the most famous “anti­
Platonist” in this anti-epistemological context for philosophy was Friedrich Nietzsche. 
See Kwiek 1996 and Hadot 2002.
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the institutions of the Enlightenment), “the quest and transmission” of 
truth (rather than merely transmission to students, i.e. instruction 
becomes accompanied by research) and its pursuit “in scientific 
terms” (originally referred to the German ideal of Wissenschaft). So 
almost all the components of this definition contrast the new concept 
of the university with the old one. The scholar, in a Platonic manner 
in which truth, beauty and goodness are united, becomes a special 
sort of person: he must “dedicate himself to truth as a human being, 
not just a specialist”, so what is required of him is the “serious 
commitment of the whole man” (Jaspers 1959: 3). Also the aim of 
instruction and research is the “formation of the whole man”, 
“education in the broadest sense of the term” (Jaspers 1959: 3). The 
German ideal of Bildung which lay at the foundation of the projects 
for the university of Berlin and was fundamental to all German 
thinkers of the time, retains its force in Jaspers a century and a half 
later.6
It is interesting to follow the theme of academic freedom, 
institutional autonomy, and the relationships between the institution 
of the university, society and the state in Jasper’s presentation. 
According to Habermas, Humboldt and Schleiermacher connected 
two notions with the idea of the university: the first was how to 
institutionalize modern science and scholarship (released of the 
tutelage of religion and the church) “without their autonomy being 
threatened by the state or the influence of bourgeois society”; the 
second was “why it is in the interest of the state itself to guarantee the 
university the external form of an internally unlimited freedom” 
(Habermas 1989: 108-109). The solution Humboldt and Schleier­
macher found was a state-organized autonomy; science and scholarship
6 The German ideology of Bildung goes back to German discussions about the 
“Enlightenment” in both Immanuel Kant’s and Moses Mendelssohn’ famous writings 
on the subject, as well as to Kant’s On Teaching and his The Conflict o f  the Faculties. As 
Sven-Eric Liedman argues in his paper on the notion of Bildung, it was probably 
Johann Gottfried Herder in his journal Account o f  My Travels who was the first to use 
Bildung to denote the education of man and mankind generally. The institution that 
appeared to have had the biggest potential for encouraging the spread of Bildung was 
the modern university (see Liedman 1993: 77ff).
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shielded both from political intervention and societal imperatives, 
and the university as a place where “the moral culture, indeed the 
whole spiritual life o f the nation would come to be concentrated” 
(Habermas 1989: 109, emphasis mine). The two notions merged to 
form the idea of the modern university. Consequently, which is of 
crucial interest to us in the context of the present book, the university 
held an “affirmative” relationship with the state. As Gerard Delanty 
comments on the relationship in his Challenging Knowledge. The 
University in the Knowledge Society,
The university needs the state to guarantee its autonomy. In return for this 
autonomy the university will provide the state with a moral and spiritual basis, 
becoming in effect a substitute for the Church (Delanty 2001: 33, emphasis 
mine).
Habermas in his lecture about “The University in a Democracy” 
claims that the task of the university is “to provide a political 
education by shaping a political consciousness among its students” 
and complains from a historical perspective that “for too long the 
consciousness that took shape at German universities was apolitical” 
(Habermas quoted in Delanty 2001: 65). This was the price that the 
university had to pay for the state’s authorization of its freedom, its 
consequent “abstention from politics” (Habermas 1989: 113). At the 
same time, in his view, the idea of the university presented by 
Jaspers’ predecessors was “daring and impossible”:
One does not realize just how daring and impossible the idea o f  the university 
defined in these famous founding documents was until one realizes the 
conditions that would have to be fulfilled for such a science to be 
institutionalized -  a science that is to make possible and ensure, solely on the 
basis of its internal structure, the unity of research and teaching, the unity of 
the scientific and scholarly disciplines, the unity of science and scholarship 
with general education, and the unity of science and scholarship with 
enlightenment (Habermas 1989: 111).
Delanty states that “though universities were always important 
sites of intellectual resistance to power, the institution was primarily 
designed to serve the national state with technically useful knowledge and 
the preservation and reproduction o f national cultural traditions” (Delanty
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2001: 2, emphasis mine). Does the state need useful knowledge and 
national cultural traditions today as much as it used to in the era of 
competing nation-states, one may wonder? How do the two 
dimensions relate to the contemporary institution of the state in a 
globalizing era? The answer is complicated, and needs to be nuanced. 
Traditionally, the knowledge in question was knowledge for the state 
apparatus and its personnel: state officials and administrators, 
engineers, teachers, lawyers etc. Cultural traditions (in Germany 
embodied in the idea of Bildung), on the other hand, were crucial for 
the development of emergent nation- states. Both basic assumptions 
are being questioned today though. Delanty goes on to argue that 
“the university formed a pact with the state: in return for autonomy it 
would furnish the state with its cognitive requirements. The great 
social movements of modernity ... had little to do with the ivory 
tower of the academy and its posture of splendid isolation” (Delanty 
2001:2, emphasis mine). But this historical pact is slowly beginning to 
“unravel” today, as the state is no longer “the sole guardian of 
knowledge production” (Delanty 2001: 4). There are certainly several 
interrelated dimensions to the unraveling of the pact between the 
university and the state; the emergence of new knowledge producers 
and the consequent shifting patterns in financing knowledge 
production is one of them, others are the massification of higher 
education in advanced countries which has questioned the direct link 
between higher education and the state’s need of it, and the changing 
relations between the state and public services. The state is retreating 
from being the provider to merely being regulator and is no longer the 
sole funding body for knowledge production. This development 
“fundamentally alters” the historical pact between knowledge and the 
state worked out in the late 17th century when state control over the 
production of knowledge was institutionalized in the university and 
the royal academies (Delanty 2001: 103). Wittrock described the social 
processes of the time as the search for
A new political order to address the social and cultural questions. The solution, 
arrived at gradually, was the notion o f  a modern nation-state. Higher education 
institutions greatly benefited from  this solution. They were given access to much 
greater resources than had previously been the case; and for almost a century,
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it largely seemed as if the knowledge explosion and occupational 
specialisation were but two different aspects of one and the same pervasive 
process of modernization (Wittrock 1993: 344, emphases mine).
Not surprisingly, from the perspective of academia, the state’s role 
was to assure that sufficient resources were channeled to universities 
so that a society was provided “with a steady stream of competent 
personnel” (Wittrock 1993: 344).
Jaspers in his account of the relationships between the university 
and the state follows closely the classical German ideal of the 
university but is much more realistic. Habermas considers both the 
German Idealists’ and Jaspers’ views of the social, political, and 
cultural role of the university to be oversimplifications:
When the classical German university was born, the Prussian reformers 
sketched an image of the university that suggests an oversimplified 
connection between scientific and scholarly learning processes and forms of 
life in modern societies. Taking the perspective of an idealist philosophy of 
reconciliation, they attributed to the university a power of totalization that 
necessarily overburdened this institution from the beginning (Habermas 
1989: 108).
The enthusiasm of his predecessors is gone in Jaspers though; the belief 
in the healing social and political powers of the university, most vividly 
expressed in Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation of 1808 (“it is 
education alone that can save us from all the ills that oppress us”, the 
state “will soon have no other big expenditures to make” and there will 
be a gradually decreasing need for armies, prisons, and reformatories 
based on the introduction of the new national German education, etc), 
is gone too. In Jaspers, the university and the state are closely 
interrelated but the influence of the state on the university is 
overriding; there are no traces of dreams (Platonic in origin) of 
philosophers-kings, scholars who would be leading the leaders of the 
nation, that were still present in his predecessors. As Jaspers expresses 
the essence of the relationship between the university and the state:
The university exists through the good graces of the body politic. Its 
existence is dependent on political considerations. It can only live where and 
as the state desires. The state makes the university’s existence possible and 
protects it (Jaspers 1959: 121).
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It is only the good will of the state and society in letting the institution 
function by funding it, meaning the modalities of its functioning are 
clearly determined by the state. The university “can only live where 
and as the state desires”, which brings in a dimension which was largely 
absent in the philosophical discussions about the University of Berlin. 
Thus while the founding fathers believed the relationship had a much 
more reciprocal nature, imagining the renewal and rebirth of the 
German state and German nation (and even of the human race in 
some formulations, like in Fichte and Schelling when the notion of 
Bildung was transformed to refer also to humanity) through the 
medium of the new university, Jaspers is much more moderate in his 
conception of the university. The institution in his formulation 
basically serves the state and the nation and is fully dependent on 
their good will to keep funding it. The balance of power is certainly 
different, even though in general Jaspers follows his classical German 
predecessors very closely in many other aspects. The university does 
not exist as a place of “knowledge for its own sake”; the university, 
rather, “owes its existence to society, which desires that somewhere 
within its confines pure, independent, unbiased research be carried 
on. Society wants the university because it feels that the pure service 
of truth somewhere within its orbit serves it own interests” (Jaspers 
1959: 121). The difference is crucial, even though the formulation may 
sound misleading: it is society that finds “knowledge for its own 
sake” useful, and serving its own interests; in the declarations of his 
predecessors, it was actually the very ideal that was most important, 
not its usefulness for society or for the state.
The relationships between the university and the state are no 
longer metaphysical, and even when they are good, they can never be 
taken for granted; they are tense. They are strongly determined by 
time and place, that is, by historical contingencies. To put it in a 
nutshell, the university exists in the way it is allowed to exist, and is 
transformed as the state and society -  and evolving social and 
political needs -  are transformed. Despite the idea of the university, 
its living forms or earthly embodiments may differ considerably 
according to varying political and social influences. As Jaspers 
conveys the idea, “society provides the university with legal and
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material support ... Thus the university is continuously serving the needs 
of state and society, and bound to change as society and the professions 
change” (Jaspers 1959: 122, emphasis mine). The changes in 
“educational outlook” parallel the changes “which a nation undergoes 
in the course of its history” (Jaspers 1959: 48). Consequently, Jaspers 
goes as far as to characterize education as “the manner by which these 
social bodies [church, class, nation etc -  MK] perpetuate themselves 
from generation to generation. Hence education becomes transformed 
when there are social revolutions” (Jaspers 1959: 48). It is interesting 
to note in Jaspers a peculiar mixture of strong philosophical beliefs 
and strong assumptions taken directly from the sociology of 
knowledge, which in some passages bring him close to Max Weber, 
Karl Mannheim or Pierre Bourdieu. While his German predecessors 
referred largely to the philosophical idea of the university, Jaspers, 
especially in defining the relations of the university with the state, is 
much more a student of contemporary political sciences than of the 
German philosophical classics.
There is an ever-present historical conflict between the idea of the 
university (derived from philosophy) and the actual changing 
demands of society and the state, Jaspers claims. The university is 
being influenced by political and sociological factors. But “behind its 
many changing forms looms the timeless ideal of intellectual insight 
which is supposed to be realized here, yet which is in permanent 
danger of being lost” (Jaspers 1959: 123). It is not possible to find such 
realistic/pessimistic passages in any of the founding fathers of the 
German university. What never occurred to them before was obvious 
to Jaspers after one hundred and fifty years in the history of the 
modern university and of its relationships with the state: “the 
relations between state and university are almost always tense, often 
marked by an open conflict. ... For without the state the university is 
helpless” (Jaspers 1959: 124). The last sentence would have most 
probably been unthinkable to them.
The difference could be expressed in the following way: Jaspers’ 
predecessors emphatically believed in the regeneration of the German 
nation through the new idea of the university; Jaspers, by contrast, 
believed merely in the renewal of the university on the basis of its
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classical idea. The scope of their intent is radically different: the 
former meant huge social transformations in which the university, 
and education more generally, was supposed to be a leading force; 
the latter, in turn, wanted to transform the university itself, hardly 
ever expressing the desire to transform the social or political world 
around him, be it the German nation or humanity, by the medium of 
the institution. After a century and a half, it became obvious that in 
the relationships between the university and the state, there would be 
periods of fruitful cooperation and periods in which “the 
philosophical ideal suffers utter defeat”, and the history of the 
university would be an “alteration of periods of sterility with periods 
of vitality” (Jaspers 1959: 123). Jaspers’ realism/ pessimism is further 
testified to by such statements as e.g. “while the university can never 
become ‘a state within a state’ in the full sense of the word, the 
converse, its degradation to the rank of a public institution bereft of 
all individuality, is quite conceivable” (Jaspers 1959: 124).7
It is interesting to note Jaspers’ clear dismissal of the possibility 
that the state does not want to help realize the idea of the university 
(Jaspers 1959: 124). Perhaps what was inconceivable to Jaspers half a 
century ago is becoming more and more probable today, and in this 
context Jaspers’ point sounds fundamental. What is the attitude of the 
state to the (German) idea of the university, as developed by its 
German founding fathers, and as glossed over by subsequent 
philosophers, sociologists and thinkers from John Henry Newman to 
Max Weber, Martin Heidegger, Ortega y Gasset, Karl Jaspers, Jürgen
7 See the current discussions of the university as part of the public sector, and the 
university’s relative loss of its (social, political and economic) uniqueness, in Chapter 
3. To recall again a brief quotation about the impact of “new managerialism” on higher 
education: “indeed, by implementing it right across the entire public sector, education 
systems have lost their sui generis character. Organisation, structures and basic 
practices look similar in education, health, welfare and other public sector 
bureaucracies” (Henry et al. 2001: 33). Or in the slightly different formulation of Susan 
Robertson and Roger Dale, the basic element of neo-liberal governance that impacted 
on education was that it became “mainstreamed”: “the whole public sector was to be 
administered and managed according to the same principles, with no exceptions or 
concessions to be made in respect of ‘sectoral special pleading’” (Robertson and Dale 
2003: 8-9).
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Habermas, Jaroslav Pelikan, Martha C. Nussbaum and the whole 
bunch of recent postmodern critics of the modern university, from 
Jean-François Lyotard to Jacques Derrida to Bill Readings?8 The state 
and society evolve, and based on Jaspers own assumptions, so should 
the university evolve. In Jaspers’ account though, the worldly 
embodiments of the university still bear a direct relation to its ideal, 
to an almost Platonic Idea of the university; it was inconceivable to 
Jaspers that the worldly embodiments of the university could diverge 
from the ideal too far and consequently could begin to lose contact 
with the idea of the university. Habermas in this context criticized 
both Jaspers and his predecessors.
The state in Jaspers is the “ubiquitous overseer of the university’s 
corporate independence”. The university, in turn, “confidently 
accepts state supervision so long as this does not conflict with the 
cause of truth” (Jaspers 1959: 125). It is incompatible with the idea of 
the university that the state demands “any more direct services from 
the university than to supply professionally trained people” (Jaspers 
1959: 127). The role of the state in education in Jaspers’ account may 
be downplayed with reference to the past, but overestimated with 
reference to the present though. Jaspers argues that the state has a 
direct stake in education because it wants “civil servants, doctors, 
ministers, engineers, chemists and the like” (Jaspers 1959: 127).
There are certainly several parallel readings of the historical 
coincidence which caused German philosophers to engage in 
conceptualizing the new research-centered university, and certainly
8 The following works have been of interest to me, even though they have in 
general not found their way into the present book (mostly for the reason that the book 
is forward-looking, rather than historically-oriented, except for the present chapter 
and a few sections in other chapters; or due to its focus on the future of the German- 
inspired version of the university, rather than on its American, heavily transformed, 
counterparts): Newman’s The Idea o f  the University, Max Weber’s On Universities. The 
Power o f  the State and the Dignity o f  the Academic Calling in Imperial Germany, Martin 
Heidegger’s “Rectorial Address”, Ortega y Gasset’s Mission o f the University, Jaroslav 
Pelikan’s The Idea o f  the University. A Reexamination, Martha C. Nussbaum’s Cultivating 
Humanity. A Classical Defense o f  Reform in Liberal Education, Lyotard’s The Postmodern 
Condition, and Derrida’s “Mochlos; as well as the Conflict of the Faculties” and “The 
Principle of Reason: The University in the Eyes of Its Pupils”.
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some of them may be a “retrospective construction” (Rothblatt and 
Wittrock 1993: 117), but the historical, sociological and philosophical 
narrative of the coterminous birth of the modern institution of the 
university and the emergence of the nation-state seems very much 
convincing. Assuming the narrative gets the picture right, the state 
during a large part of the nineteenth century wanted the university to 
serve the dual purpose of national knowledge production and the 
strengthening of national loyalties (a theme which is developed 
separately in Chapter 3). As Björn Wittrock argues in his essay “The 
Modern University: The Three Transformations”,
The emergence of the modern university is by and large a phenomenon of 
the late nineteenth century. It is only in this period that universities are 
resurrected as primary knowledge-producing institutions and that the idea of 
a research-oriented university becomes predominant. It is only too obvious 
that this institutional process is intimately linked to another one, namely the 
rise of the modern nation-state, whether in newly formed politics on the 
European continent, such as Italy or Germany, or through the reform of older 
state organizations, such as France or the United States of Am erica (Wittrock 
1993: 305).
So the university may have been much more useful to the state than 
Jaspers actually assumes in his thinking (and which is testified to by 
the philosophical writings which provided the underpinning of the 
institution in its “Humboldtian” version, discussed later in this 
chapter). At the same time though, thinking about the present, the 
state no longer “wants” engineers, doctors, chemists etc, even though 
it “wants” ministers and civil servants. In higher education that has 
achieved a massive, if not universal, reach, the state is increasingly 
becoming one of the less important stakeholders in academia, 
especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. The whole concept of education 
as a “public good” as opposed to a “private good”, as well as the 
changing role of the state in the social production of competent “civil 
servants, doctors, ministers, engineers, chemists and the like” comes 
to the fore. Again, to return to Wittrock’s arguments, “far from being 
detached from the basic societal and political transformations of the 
modern era, universities form part and parcel of the very same 
process which manifests itself in the emergence of an industrial
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economic order and the nation-state as the most typical and most 
important form of political organisation” (Wittrock 1993: 305).
Jaspers, at least declaratively, maintains the role of philosophy at 
the university accorded to it by German Idealists and Romantics.9 As 
Habermas puts it, “the reformers attributed to philosophy a unifying 
power with regard to what we now call cultural tradition, socialization, 
and social integration” and “philosophy presents itself as a reflexive 
form of culture as a whole” (Habermas 1989: 110, 119). Jaspers argues 
along the same lines as his predecessors and presents philosophy as a 
guardian of both culture and the idea of the university. The 
philosophical faculty, that is more or less the faculty of arts and 
sciences, enjoys a “unique position” at the university; from the 
viewpoint of research, it “by itself comprises the whole university” 
(Jaspers 1959: 87), and without the uniqueness and unity of the 
philosophical faculty, the university becomes “an aggregate, an 
intellectual department store” (Jaspers 1959: 88).10 Certainly his belief in 
the emancipatory and culture-producing powers of philosophy is 
much smaller than originally presented by his predecessors, but 
nevertheless it is still relatively strong. The attitude of his predecessors 
is vividly described by Habermas in the following passage:
By grasping its age in thought, as Hegel was to say, philosophy was to 
replace the integrative social force of religion w ith the reconciling force of 
reason. Thus Fichte could see the university, which merely institutionalized a 
science of this kind, as the birthplace of an emancipated society of the future, 
even as the locus of the education of the nation (Habermas 1989: 111).
9 The uniqueness of the modern German university was its reliance on philosophy; 
as one commentator put it, “the Berlin type of university was unique because the 
research mission added to the official duties of the professor. But it was also unique 
because, just as Kant once proposed, it made the philosophy faculty central. It was 
most of all there that the student received Bildung, and it was also there that research 
had its natural home. Remarkable, too, was the crucial role allotted to philosophy 
itself. The spirit of philosophy was intended to imbue all branches of the university; 
the universality and unity of the university were to be guaranteed by philosophical 
research and the philosophical training of students” (Liedman 1993: 82).
10 As Sheldon Rothblatt comments in his The Modern University and Its Discontents, 
“the disciplinary crown of the German idea of a university was philosophy (and 
philology, as incorporated into the faculty organizational structure of the Continental 
university). Philosophy was the means for unifying the disciplines” (Rothblatt 1997: 22).
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While John Henry Newman saw teaching as the university’s main 
concern,11 both for the German Idealists and Romantics, as well as 
Jaspers following in their footsteps, the essence of the university was 
in its unity o f teaching and research.12 The very first sentence of Jaspers’ 
book states clearly that a university is: “a community of scholars and 
students engaged in the task of seeking truth” (Jaspers 1959: 1). The 
university is the place “where truth is sought unconditionally in all its 
forms. All forms of research must serve truth” (Jaspers 1959: 63).13 As
11 Newman wrote a program for a proposed new Roman Catholic university in 
Ireland -  the famous The Idea o f a University (or rather The Idea o f  a University Defined 
and Illustrated: I. In Nine Discourses Delivered to the Catholics in Dublin, 1852, and II. In 
Occasional Lectures and Essays Addressed to the Members o f  the Catholic University, 1858) 
-  and in the first sentence of his “Preface” he states his positions clearly: the function 
of the university is teaching (or the dissemination of knowledge). The university in this 
view is “a place of teaching universal knowledge. This implies that its object is, on the 
one hand, intellectual, not moral; and, on the other, that it is the diffusion and 
extension of knowledge rather than the advancement [of knowledge]. If its object were 
scientific and philosophical discovery, I do not see why a University should have 
students; if religious training, I do not see how it can be the seat of literature and 
science. Such is a University in its essence, and independently of its relation to the 
Church. But, practically speaking, it cannot fulfill its object duly, such as I have 
described it, without the Church’s assistance; or, to use the theological term, the 
Church is necessary for its integrity” (Newman 1996: 3). For excellent historical 
commentaries on the Newmanian version of the university, see the contributions to a 
recent new edition of Newman’s lectures, especially Frank M. Turner, “Newman’s 
University and Ours” and Sara Castro-Klaren, “The Paradox of Se lf’ (Newman 1996). 
A major part of Sheldon Rothblatt’ s The Modern University and Its Discontents is 
focused on Newman’s legacy (Rothblatt 1997). For a thorough rereading of Newman 
in a current American context, see especially Jaroslav Pelikan in his The Idea o f  a 
University. A Reexamination who is interested mostly, if not exclusively, in Newman; as 
Pelikan puts it explicitly, “throughout this volume I am engaged in an ongoing 
dialogue with one book”, i.e. Newman’s (Pelikan 1992: x).
12 Jürgen Habermas links the origins of this view of “scientific process as a 
narcissistically self-enclosed circular process of teaching and research” to the philosophy of 
German Idealism that required this unity by its very nature (Habermas 1989: 110).
13 Or as Kazimierz Twardowski, a famous pre-war Polish philosopher, describes 
an academic in his “The Majesty of the University”: “a university teacher is first of all a 
servant of objective truth, its representative and herald vis-à-vis the young people and 
society at large. It is an extremely honorouble service, but it is demanding as well... 
He who decides to serve under the banner of science must renounce all that which 
might turn him away from the path indicated by it” (Twardowski 1997: 13-14).
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Sven-Eric Liedman argues in his paper on the notion of Bildung, 
“Berlin was the first university in the world where research and not 
only instruction was regarded as a primary duty of its professors” 
(Liedman 1993 : 82). The place of research is fundamental to the 
university and it determines the relations between students and 
professors: “the university itself exists for research, fulfills its meaning 
through research. The student is the scholar and scientist-to-be” (Jaspers 
1959: 54, emphasis mine).14 Certainly, in an age of widespread higher 
education, the latter assumption no longer holds with respect to 
students in general, although it might still be tenable with PhD 
students in those higher education systems in which they are 
students.
Despite the fundamental role accorded to research, Jaspers defines 
the core activities of the university in the following manner:
Three things are required at a university: professional training, education of a
whole man, research. For the university is simultaneously a professional
school, a cultural center and a research institute (Jaspers 1959: 40).
The institutions ought not to choose between the three because in the 
idea of the university they are “indissolubly united”. He goes on to 
argue that “one cannot cut off one from the others without destroying 
the intellectual substance of the university. ... All three are factors of a 
living whole. By isolating them, the spirit of the university perishes” 
(Jaspers 1959: 40-41). Research is related to human beings’ will to 
know: “within the life of the university teachers and students are 
driven by a single motive, man’s basic quest for knowledge” (Jaspers 
1959: 41). A good teacher must be a good researcher, this is a constant 
motive throughout the book: teaching needs the substance “which
14 Ortega y Gasset in his Mission o f  the University comments on the issue of 
students and scientists thus: “whether we like it or not, science excludes the ordinary 
man. It involves a calling most infrequent, and remote from the ordinary run by the 
human species. The scientist is the monk of modern times. To pretend that the normal 
student is a scientist, is at once a ridiculous pretension . But furthermore it is not 
desirable, even under ideal circumstances, that the ordinary man should be a scientist” 
(Gasset 1944: 75-76). In a similar vein, Max Weber in 1919 gave a lecture at the 
University of Munich about “science as a vocation” and the academic “calling”, the 
famous “Wissenschaft als Beruf” (Weber 1944: 54-62).
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only research can give”.15 Therefore the combination of teaching and 
research is “the lofty and inalienable basic principle of the university” 
(Jaspers 1959: 45). Jaspers’ figure of the professor is fully consistent 
with the professor in the German ideal of the university and echoes 
traditional German formulations: “only he who himself does research 
can really teach. Others only pass on a set of pedagogically arranged 
facts. The university is not a high school but a higher institution of 
learning” (Jaspers 1959: 45).
After Jaspers, there seem to be no major attempts to redefine the 
role and tasks of the institution of the university along the lines 
suggested by the classical German idea of the university. Let us go 
back now to Jaspers’ and Habermas’ predecessors and the historical 
and intellectual circumstances in which the so-called Humboldtian 
idea of the university was born.
2.2. O n  B ild u n g , K n ow led ge fo r its  O w n  S ak e , 
and th e  O rig in s  o f  the G erm an  Id ea o f  the U n iversity  
(W ilh e lm  von  H u m boldt)
Hermann Rohrs claims in his study on the Classical German Concept of 
the University and Its Influence on Higher Education in the United States 
that the philosophy of the German universities was dictated by the 
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. The most significant fruit of this 
new identity -  the classical German concept of the university -  
“defined the mission of scholarship as the quest for truth within the 
framework of methodically organised research”. The new university 
was guided by the spirit of the search for truth, with the involvement of 
the students as partners and collaborators in the research process 
(Rohrs 1995: 12-13).16 In more historical terms, he goes on to argue that
15 Jerzy Kmita asks a number of important questions about the role of (Florian 
Znaniecki’s) “creative man of knowledge” in university teaching. His answer is clearly 
Rortyan: he or she is needed by “the culture of Liberalism”, not only in academic 
teaching (Kmita 1997: 189).
16 As J.A.G. Thompson argues in her The Modern Idea o f  the University, “when 
educational reformers imported the German research model in the late 1800s, with its
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After Halle (which was in fact the Prussian reformed university) had been 
assigned to the newly established kingdom of Westphalia by Napoleon after 
the war of 1806-1807, the need for modern foundation arose simultaneously 
with the plan for internal reform with a well-developed nucleus of scholarship, 
which would be able to provide guidance and security together. Compensation 
fo r  material loss by an intellectual revival which would be able, through deepening 
of learning and an awakening of the moral sense, to fortify Prussia’s authority 
in the world, was the objective, selected in the bitterest need; it’s a part of the 
comprehensive reform of the state under Stein, a reform which gives this 
period its continual fascination as a model fo r  the renewal o f  the state by the 
power o f  thinking (Rohrs 1995: 17-18, emphases mine).
Lenore O’Boyle in her paper on “Learning for Its Own Sake: The 
German University as Nineteenth-Century Model” describes in general 
terms the role of the new German idea of knowledge for its own sake, 
and states that in the 19th century the German university was the most 
admired institution of higher education in the Western world:
Much of this admiration arose from the widespread assumption that 
Germany’s universities exemplified the ideal of pure learning, the 
disinterested pursuit of truth, knowledge for its own sake. German 
contemporaries saw the university in these terms, contemporary observers 
elsewhere agreed, and modern historians have accepted the statement of 
purpose. Yet one may wonder why such phrases, relatively new ones in 
Germany, where eighteenth-century thinking had moved in the direction of 
utilitarianism in higher education, were so easily accepted there or 
elsewhere. Neither their exact meaning nor their practical implications were 
clear, and even a  cursory examination should have revealed their 
ambiguities. “Knowledge for its own sake” raised questions about the over­
all place of teaching in the university, and particularly about the interest of 
the state in furthering the universities as schools for future government 
officials and clerics. What was the connection w ith the ideal of Bildung, or 
general culture, the full development of a man’s capacities? And how to 
explain that in practice the aim became increasingly identified with an 
imperative of research and publication (O’Boyle 1983: 3-4).
emphasis on the technical aspects of scholarship and exact research, they failed to 
import the idealistic philosophy that lay behind the German investigative methods: 
their search for underlying spiritual unities, and the German concept of Wissenschaft, 
where investigation must proceed in a broad, deep, contemplative context” 
(Thompson 1984: 25).
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How are we to explain these developments? O’Boyle provides an 
explanation on the grounds of the sociology of knowledge. The ideal 
of “knowledge for its own sake”, derived from the German Idealists 
and Romantics in the context of the emergence of the conceptual 
grounds for the University of Berlin, was to serve to legitimize the 
creation of a new profession for the representatives of the lower 
middle class, for whom the opportunities for upwards social mobility 
were scarce. Gradually, university teaching became a full-time 
occupation, professors became salaried university clerks and they 
could devote all their energies to teaching and doing research at the 
university. They began forming their own organizations and journals 
and building their communities of inquiry; they saw each other as 
peers and wrote with each other in mind; they judged each other in 
terms of “intellectual merit” rather than social background or 
personal factors. Members of the emergent academic profession came 
to use universities to build up their “power to certify competence and 
thus control their own succession” (O’Boyle 1983: 6).17 Through the 
system of selection of their own successors18, university professors 
gained the power of imposing their judgments in areas vital to those
17 How different it is today, in the age of the “network society”. As Zygmunt 
Bauman stresses, “it was the opening of the information superhighway that revealed, 
in retrospect, just how much the claimed, and yet more the genuine, authority of the 
teachers used to rest on their collectively exercised, exclusive control over the sources o f  
knowledge and the no-appeal-allowed policing o f  all roads leading to such sources. It has also 
shown to what extent that authority depended on the unshared right of the teachers to 
shape the ‘logic of learning’ -  the time sequence in which various bits and pieces of 
knowledge can and need be ingested and digested. With those once exclusive 
properties now deregulated, privatized, floated on the publicity stock exchange and 
for grabs, the claim of academia to be the only and the natural seat for those ‘ in 
pursuit of higher learning’ sounds increasingly hollow to the ears of everybody except 
those who voice it” (Bauman 2001: 130-131, emphasis mine).
18 To recall here Karl Jaspers, and Jürgen Habermas’ criticism of his model of the 
university: “the student is the scholar and scientist-to-be” (Jaspers 1959: 54) and 
“professors are to train their own successors. The future researcher is the sole goal for 
the sake of which a university composed of teaching scholars takes on the tasks of 
instruction” (Habermas 1989: 111). Certainly these assumptions no longer hold, except 
for top PhDs in some top academic institutions.
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seeking careers. O’Boyle emphasizes the voluntary nature of the 
transformation processes when she argues that:
The acceptance of the new academic profession in Germany was made 
evident in the public’s willingness to confer money, autonomy, and status. 
Professors were not rich, but they had security and resources sufficient for a 
bourgeois existence. Their rights of academic self-government were 
considerable if not unlimited, as was their ability to define what students 
must study. Status increased abundantly throughout the century; professors 
secured a ranking system that paralleled their titles with those of the 
government bureaucracy (O’Boyle 1983: 8).
The above processes seem to be slowly coming to an end today 
(though to varying degrees in different systems of higher education 
and in different parts of the world, with major differences to be born 
in mind between e.g. developed and developing countries, Anglo­
Saxon and Continental European countries, European and European 
transition countries, including new EU Member states etc).
Let us briefly compare the research results of current studies on 
the academic profession to the processes mentioned above by 
O’Boyle. In the most general terms (and without getting into the 
statistical details and public policy directions accepted by various 
governments with respect to higher education), a willingness to 
confer “money, autonomy, and status” has been gradually declining 
over the last two decades or so. In many countries in which until 
fairly recently a “bourgeois existence” for academics -  that is basically 
an upper middle class way of life -  has been the norm rather than the 
exception, the gap between the academic profession and other 
professionals is growing wider. The academic profession, again in the 
most general terms, is comparatively losing ground all over the world 
to all those whom Robert B. Reich aptly called “symbolic analysts” 
(Reich 1992). Academic self-governance is widely threatened as 
traditional forms of collegiality are being replaced by new managerial 
styles of running universities (more and more often with chief human 
resources officers, chief planning officers and chief executive officers, 
increasingly mirroring business structures rather than the structures 
of public sector institutions; with deans no more being elected etc (see 
especially Currie and Newson 1998; on managerialism, and Michel
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Foucault, see Peters et al. 2000). The ability of universities to define by 
themselves what students must learn is also considerably weakened, 
together with the increasing standardization of university curricula 
(and possibly with the “Europeanization” of university curricula in 
the European Union, a recent example of which has been provided by 
the “Tuning Project” financed by the European Commission, and by 
envisaging new pan-European accreditation schemes and agencies in 
the future).19 The link in status and salaries between government 
officials and the professoriate was also lost long ago in numerous 
countries. Consequently, O ’Boyle’s description of the emergent 
German academic profession in the 19th century, still somehow 
relevant for a major part of the 20th, does not correspond anymore to 
the actual current situation in many parts of the world and in many 
institutions. As Philip G. Altbach reported recently, “the traditional 
ideal, and self-concept, of the professor is no longer valid for the 
academic profession as a whole. Diversification of institutions has 
meant diversification of the professoriate as well” (Altbach 2000: 3).20
19 One of the dangers for European universities in following (blindly) the lines of 
the Europeanization of higher education is that their traditional diversity may be lost. 
As Zygmunt Bauman stressed well before the Bologna declaration was signed, “it is 
the good luck of the universities that despite all the efforts of the self-proclaimed 
saviours, know-betters and well-wishers to prove the contrary, they are not comparable, 
not measurable by the same yardstick and -  most important o f all -  not speaking in unison. 
Only such universities have something of value to offer to the multivocal world of 
uncoordinated needs, self-procreating possibilities and self-multiplying choices. In the 
world in which no one can anticipate the kind of expertise that may be needed 
tomorrow, the dialogues that may need mediation, and the beliefs that may need 
interpretation ..., here the recognition of many and varied ways to, and many and 
varied canons of, higher learning is the condition sine qua non of the university system 
capable of rising to the postmodern challenge” (Bauman 1997b: 25, emphasis mine). 
On the current state of accreditation in particular European countries and on ideas for 
pan-European accreditation schemes, see the excellent recent book ed. by Stefanie 
Schwarz and Don F. Westerheijden, Accreditation and Evaluation in the European Higher 
Education Area (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004).
20 Thinking of current worldwide trends, it is most useful to refer to research 
studies conducted by Philip G. Altbach and the participants of his recent international 
collaborative research projects (in the case of EU countries, parallel projects were run by 
Jürgen Enders). The trends in higher education affecting the academic profession include 
massification, accountability, privatization and marketization (Altbach 2002a: 2). On the
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Both the “golden age” of the university and the “golden standard” of 
the professor seem to be endangered today.
According to the German model, O’Boyle argues, the professor 
existed “to write scholarly books and to train successors”. Or, as 
Gerard Delanty put it, “the professors constructed themselves as the 
representatives of the nation and in this way made themselves 
indispensable to the state for whom they were the ‘interpreters’ of the 
nation” (Delanty 2001: 34, emphasis mine). The major question 
O’Boyle asks is why did the new ideal of the university, and the 
corresponding model of its professor, succeed in Germany? Why 
were professors permitted by society to go on working at the 
university in the way they were working? Her answer is that the new 
type of university and its teaching was “politically useful, personally 
congenial, and economically and socially justifiable” in terms of 
German needs (O’Boyle 1983: 12).
Even though I fully agree that the reason for the emergence of the 
modern institution of the university in Germany, as well as the new 
relationships between the university and the state, was political, I will 
be providing an alternative explanation to what she claims to be the 
real reason: to divert the intellectual and cultural elites from a serious 
concern with political thought. I am much more inclined to attribute 
the development of the modern university in the from known to us as 
the “Humboldtian” university to the needs of the rising nation-state, and 
to argue along the lines sketched out by Björn Wittrock in his 
influential “The Modern University: The Three Transformations” 
(1993), Gerard Delanty’s Challenging Knowledge. The University in the 
Knowledge Society (2001), Bill Readings’ The University in Ruins (1996), 
Andy Green’s Education, Globalization, and the Nation-State (1997), 
Jürgen Enders’ “Higher Education, Internationalisation, and the 
Nation-State: Recent Developments and Challenges to Governance 
Theory” (2002) and many others. To recall the memorable expression 
here again, “universities form part and parcel of the very same 
process which manifests itself in the emergence of an industrial 
economic order and the nation state as the most typical and most
academic profession, see also Boyer, Altbach and Whitelaw 1994; Altbach 2000; 
Enders 2000; and Enders and de Weert 2004.
104 Chapter 2. The Idea of the University Revisited
important form of political organisation” (Wittrock 1993: 305). There 
is certainly no single narrative (or “history”) of the rise (and possibly 
fall) of the modern university; there are certainly competing 
narratives based on competing historical, political, cultural, social and 
economic accounts. From a historical perspective, it is possible to 
claim that only those which are the most convincing will survive; to 
survive, they need powerful arguments, with small details fitting into 
larger pictures, and compelling visions of the past and the future. The 
present book, taken as a whole, attempts to enter the battlefield of 
interpretations and provide new and interesting insights presenting a 
larger picture for both the scholarly and general reader.
There are three main principles of the modern university to be 
found in German thinkers, the founding fathers of the University of 
Berlin. The first principle is the unity of research and teaching (die 
Einheit von Forschung und Lehre); the second is the protection of 
academic freedom: the freedom to teach (Lehrfreiheit) and the freedom 
to learn (Lernfreiheit); and the third is the central importance of the 
faculty of philosophy (the faculty of Arts and Sciences in modern 
terminology) (see Fallon 1980: 28ff.; Rohrs 1995: 24ff.). The three 
principles are developed, to varying degrees, in Schelling, Fichte, 
Schleiermacher and Humboldt.21 Together, the three principles have 
guided the modern institution of the university through the 19th 
century to the 20th century, and possibly beyond. To what extent these 
principles are being questioned today, by whom and in what 
segments of the diversified systems of higher education is a different 
issue. Very briefly, and without the necessary nuancing of the answer, 
the principle of the unity of teaching and research still guides the 
functioning of our universities, but not so much our higher education 
sector in general22; academic freedom is under severe attack in both
21 By contrast, Cardinal Newman’s idea of the university did not refer to the 
German notions of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit. As Sheldon Rothblatt remarked about 
Newman’s university, “since teaching was the function of a university, it was 
important to teach the right things” (Rothblatt 1997: 14).
22 It was Ortega y Gasset who argued strongly against the unity of teaching and 
research and questioned the Humboldtian unity of the two activities; he claimed that 
“the teaching of the professions and the search for truth must be separated. They must
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developed and developing countries23, from a variety of directions, 
including threats from the state and business sectors, perhaps 
especially from transnational corporations in selected areas; and the 
third principle, the centrality of philosophy to the functioning of the 
university, seems to be the most endangered, if not already 
abandoned, both in theory and in practice.24
Jürgen Habermas claims in his lecture on “The Idea of the 
University: Learning Processes” that Humboldt and Schleiermacher 
connect two notions with the idea of the university. The first is related 
to the question of how modern science and scholarship (Wissenschaft) 
can be institutionalized without losing their autonomy either to the 
state or bourgeois society. The second is related to their will to 
explain why it is in the interest of the state itself to guarantee the 
university an external form with an internally unlimited freedom.25
be clearly distinguished one from the other, both in the minds of the professors and in 
the minds of the students. ... As a general principle, the normal student is not an 
apprentice to science. ... Why do we persist in expecting the impossible?” (Gasset 
1944: 76-77).
23 The dialectic of centers and peripheries has recently been analyzed by Philip G. 
Altbach (2002). He remarks that “the fact that academics in developing countries 
function in a world of peripherality and, to varying degrees, dependency, is central to 
understanding the nature of academic work and the role of universities. While the 
professoriate everywhere is increasingly part of a global academic community, the 
wealthier and better-developed university systems of the North have more autonomy 
and resources with which to support independent teaching and research. Thus, while 
academe worldwide is increasingly affected by the power and influence of the largest 
academic systems, and especially those that use English, the developing countries are 
at the bottom in a world system of unequal academic relationships. By its nature, 
scholarly work in the 21st century is interdependent; the developing countries are 
importers o f  knowledge, and have little i f  anything to offer in return” (Altbach 2002b: 5, 
emphasis mine).
24 Perhaps it is interesting to note that both current philosophy and philosophers 
do not seem to be inclined to return to the issue of the future of the university (not to 
mention: the future of the idea o f  the university). It is very rare indeed to see 
philosophers discussing the issue more than in passing (exceptions include e.g. 
Habermas and also Martha Nussbaum in Cultivating Humanity).
25 Kazimierz Twardowski when receiving his honorary doctorate at the University 
of Poznań (the present author’s home university) in 1932, argued that “the 
opportunity to perform the task specific to the University is conditioned by its absolute
106 Chapter 2. The Idea of the University Revisited
They found the solution to the first problem in a “state-organized 
autonomy of science and scholarship that would shield institutions of 
higher learning from both political intervention and societal 
imperative” (Habermas 1989: 109). The two notions merged to form 
the idea of the university and they explain some of the most striking 
features of the German university tradition:
They make comprehensible (1) the affirmative relationship of university 
scholarship, which thinks itself apolitical, to the state, (2) the defensive 
relationship of the university to professional practice, especially to educational 
requirements that could jeopardize the principle of the unity of teaching and 
research; and (3) the central position of the philosophical faculty within the 
university and the emphatic significance attributed to science and scholarship 
for culture and society as a whole. ... Thus the idea of the university produced 
on the one hand an emphasis on the autonomy of science and scholarship ... 
This autonomy, of course, was to be made use of only in “solitude and 
freedom”, at a distance from bourgeois society and the political public sphere. 
From the idea of the university there also comes, on the other hand, the general 
culture-shaping power of science in which the totality of the lifeworld was to 
be concentrated in reflexive form (Habermas 1989: 109).
Both notions mentioned here by Habermas are found in Humboldt, 
Schleiermacher, Fichte and Schelling, in different versions and with 
different intensity. Regarding Humboldt’s two main texts on the 
university, both are very practical and relatively short. One is “Antrag 
auf Errichtung der Universität Berlin“ (“Proposal for the
Establishment of the University of Berlin“) written in 1809 to King 
Frederick William III and the other is “Über die innere und äussere 
Organisation der höheren wissenschaftlichen Anstalten in Berlin“ 
(“On Internal and External Organization of Higher Scientific 
Establishments in Berlin”) written in 1810 (one could also add to this 
list a third and minor text, “The Education Program for Königsberg
spiritual independence. ... But those who fund and maintain Universities would totally 
misunderstand the University if they wished to restrict its work in any way 
whatsoever by making reservations in advance against some of its results and 
indicating what results would be desirable. ... For scientific research can develop and 
bring its work to fruition only if it is completely free and not threatened in any 
manner” (Twardowski 1997: 11-12).
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and Lithuania”, written in 1809). It is an interesting historical fact that 
Wilhelm von Humboldt spent a mere 16 months in the Prussian 
Ministry and actually did not take part in the German discussions 
about the institution of the university which had started before the 
end of the 18th century and lasted until the opening of the University 
of Berlin in 1810. As Daniel Fallon expressed his reservations,
The tribute lavished on Humboldt is so extravagantly adulatory that the 
contemporary observer is led to believe that he not only devoted his life to 
the university but also created the institution alone from whole cloth. ... 
[T]here is little to suggest that he did much more than synthesize and bring 
to fruition, through competent management within the government 
bureaucracy, an idea developed in large measure by others (Fallon 1980: 11).
Nevertheless, for a few generations, academe has been discussing the 
“Humboldtian” university, as well as the “Humboldtian” idea and 
ideal of the institution, rarely mentioning the names of Kant, 
Schelling, Schleiermacher, Fichte and others. The answer given by 
Fallon lies in the intersection of two historical circumstances. First, 
Humboldt was a “clear-thinking intellectual with practical 
government expertise”; second, the Zeitgeist gave rise to “the 
possibility for an individual person, one could say a hero, to unify 
and resolve authoritatively the tension generated by various 
passionately held ideas of similar intent but very different detail” 
(Fallon 1980: 14). It is a very Hegelian explanation but seems to fit the 
age perfectly: at some point, following Hegel’s teachings, an 
individual develops a world-historical dimension and it is the spirit 
(or Geist) that makes him a hero (Hegel strongly believed he was such 
a hero in intellectual matters himself, being complemented in political 
matters by Napoleon; and a century and a half later, one of the 
greatest Hegelians of all time, Alexandre Kojeve, in his famous 
Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, believed himself to be an 
intellectual hero, with Stalin as a complementary figure in politics26). 
Whatever explanation we present, the facts are there: the
26 I have written a book on the relations between philosophy and politics, and 
intellectuals and politics, in the Hegel-inspired intellectual climate of post-war France 
(see Kwiek 1998a).
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“Humboldtian” -  rather than any other -  university has been a 
constant point of reference for university reformers in major parts of 
Continental Europe for two centuries now.
In Humboldt’s “Proposal for the Establishment of the University 
of Berlin” there are several interesting motives to be highlighted here: 
the clear link between the university and the state, the will to retain 
the name “university” for the new institution (in contrast to many 
other proposals from the period in which the word was avoided as 
carefully as possible), and the issue of university funding. The timing 
was not favorable for founding a university, Humboldt argued, 
considering “recent unfortunate events”, and the plan proposed by 
the Education Section of the Ministry should perhaps be based on an 
assumption of “calmer and happier times” (Humboldt 1989: 233). The 
city of Berlin is the only location the King and the Prussian 
government should think of: “The institution which is focused on 
everything that university science and arts is composed of cannot be 
located in any other place than next to the seat of the government” 
(Humboldt 1989: 235). The new institution should be called the 
“university” and should “include everything that the notion of the 
university carries with itself” (Humboldt 1989: 235). Finally, the 
“fundamental task of its administration will always be the following: 
to keep trying to gradually ... lead to the situation in which the whole 
of education will no longer be a burden on the coffers of His Majesty” 
(Humboldt 1989: 237).
The text “On Internal and External Organization of Higher 
Scientific Establishments in Berlin” is much more substantial and we 
are going to focus more on this official memorandum here. At the 
university (and we shall stick to this word rather than to “higher 
scientific establishment”, following both Humboldt’s original intent 
expressed in the text briefly discussed in the preceding paragraph 
and the actual point of departure for the whole process: the 
University of Berlin) “everything that is occurring in the spiritual 
culture o f a nation comes together” (Humboldt 1979: 321, emphasis 
mine). Universities are destined to “develop science and scholarship 
in the deepest and widest sense of the terms and transmit it not as an 
intention but as material intentionally prepared for internal and
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moral education” (Humboldt 1979: 321). Science is a never-fully- 
solved problem and therefore it is still in progress; consequently, one 
can think of the notion of research as suggested by Humboldt as a 
never-ending story. As Humboldt formulates the point,
In the internal organization of higher scientific establishments, everything is 
based on the principle that science should be treated as something not 
discovered and something that can never be fu lly  discovered and as such science 
should be permanently sought (Humboldt 1979: 323, emphasis mine).
Following the emergence of research as a core activity, Humboldt 
suggests a new relationship between the professor and the student 
(still retained in Jaspers’ idea of the university a century and a half 
later): “the relationship between the teacher and the student becomes 
something different than before. The former is not destined for the 
latter but both exist for science” (Humboldt 1979: 322). The 
fundamental principle of the new university becomes “knowledge for 
its own sake”: “when the principle of knowledge for its own sake 
becomes dominant, there will be no need to worry about anything 
else” (Humboldt 1979: 324). What the higher education establishment 
in Berlin was supposed to provide was the “moral education of the 
nation” and its “spiritual and moral formation” (Humboldt 1979: 321). 
Its guiding principles -  recalled by the title of Helmuth Schelsky’s 
book -  are solitude and freedom (Einsamkeit and Freiheit). The role of 
the state is, first, to make higher education institutions function 
smoothly and, second, make sure that they do not cease operation, 
keeping a clear and constant division of labor between them and high 
schools and keeping in mind that the state “rather disturbs when it 
intrudes” in the functioning of higher education institutions 
(Humboldt 1979: 322). The main role of the state, apart from 
providing funding, is to make the right selection of men for university 
posts and to give them full freedom to act. Consequently, as he 
formulated the overriding principle in founding the university in 
Berlin, “the crux of the matter is the selection of men to be placed in 
activity” (Humboldt 1979: 324). Humboldt does not seem to be 
concerned with the details of the functioning of the university. He 
links the university to the state; as Fallon observes, there is little
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evidence that Humboldt ever seriously questioned that the state had a 
“natural responsibility to provide education for the people on all 
levels, including a sound university. Humboldt’s position on this 
matter was essentially that of the leading intellects of classical Greece, 
such as Plato” (Fallon 1980: 21-22). His idealistic conception is to 
support the state in the following manner:
Everything depends upon holding to the principle of considering knowledge 
a something not yet found, never completely to be discovered, and searching 
relentlessly for it as such. As soon as one ceases actually to seek knowledge 
or imagines that it does not have to be pulled from the depths of the intellect, 
but rather can be arranged in some exhaustive array through meticulous 
collection, then everything is irretrievably and forever lost. It is lost for 
knowledge, which disappears when this is continued for very long so that 
even language is left standing like an empty casing; and it is lost for the state. 
This is because knowledge alone, which comes from and can be planted in 
the depths of the spirit, also transforms character; and for the state, just as for 
humanity, facts and discourse matter less than character and behaviour 
(Humboldt quoted in Fallon 1980: 25; Humboldt 1979: 323).
So while the university was to humanize the state, the state had an 
obligation to control the nature of the university (and in this respect 
Humboldt appears as a “wise paternalist” (Fallon 1980: 25).27 He 
states that “the naming of university professors must be held 
exclusively as the prerogative of the state. ... [T]he nature o f the 
university is too closely tied to the vital interests o f the state” (Humboldt
27 The assumed link between knowledge-acquisition and moral refinement, or 
between knowledge and Bildung, was strong in the idea of the modern university. As 
Zygmunt Bauman states, “science -  so it was believed -  was a most potent humanizing 
factor; so was aesthetic discernment, and culture in general; culture ennobles the 
human person and pacifies human societies. After the scientifically-assisted horrors of 
the twentieth century this faith seems laughably, perhaps even criminally, naive. 
Rather than entrusting ourselves gratefully to the care of knowledge-carriers, we are 
inclined to watch their hands with suspicion and fear. The new apprehension found 
its spectacular expression in Michel Foucault’s exceedingly popular hypothesis of the 
intimate link between the development of scientific discourse and the tightening of all­
penetrating surveillance and control; rather than bring praised for promoting 
enlightenment, techno-science was charged with responsibility for the new, refined 
version of constraint and dependency” (Bauman 1997a: 50).
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quoted in Fallon 1980: 25; Humboldt 1979: 328, emphasis mine). As 
Frederick Gregory comments on the relationships between the 
university and the state, “according to Humboldt the duty of the state 
was to be restricted mainly to providing money and to ensuring 
freedom to professors in their work” (Gregory 1989: 30)
David Sorkin in his ground-breaking paper about Humboldt and 
the theory and practice of Bildung highlights the political dimension 
of the plans to establish the University of Berlin:
With the Prussian state at the mercy of Napoleon, new weapons had to be forged  
to continue the struggle. Humboldt advocated a decisive commitment to 
science and learning which would win back for Prussia some of her lost 
prestige at home and abroad. While the university would thus serve a 
political goal, Humboldt endeavored to guarantee its freedom from state 
interference by arguing that state interference was necessarily deleterious 
(Sorkin 1983: 65).
Humboldt’s variant of the conception of self-formation (Bildung) 
developed in 1809-1810 has been considered the doctrine that 
“legitimized the alliance of the intelligentsia and the state through the 
university” (Sorkin 1983: 56).28 In Limits o f State Action (1791-92), 
Humboldt formulated the first condition for Bildung: the freedom of 
the individual. But, according to Sorkin’s analysis, he had not been 
able until 1809-1810 to find a way to satisfy the second condition for 
self-formation: the social bonds enabling the free interchange of 
individuals: “In 1809-1810, Humboldt found the means to satisfy the 
second condition of Bildung. He endeavored to establish the 
educational system itself, with the University of Berlin at its pinnacle, 
as the institutional setting in which the free exchange of varied 
personalities can occur. This resolution depended upon Humboldt’s 
new conception of the nation” (Sorkin 1983: 61). The resolution of the 
theoretical problem lay in a single practical move: “his reform of the 
Prussian educational system aspired to return control of education to 
the nation” (Sorkin 1983: 61). The theoretical problem posed in Limits
28 For a different reading of Bildung, depriving it of its civic (not to mention, 
national) dimension, see Andrew Valls’ paper on “Self-Development and the Liberal 
State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm von Humboldt” (Valls 1999).
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of State Acton was solved when Humboldt brought together the 
discovery of the nation and the reform of educational institutions.
The whole concept of Bildung had been evolving in the decades 
preceding the founding of the University of Berlin: since Goethe’s 
Wilhelm Meister, and Schiller’s On the Aesthetic Education of Man where 
the notion was aestheticized from the revival of Hellenic culture 
onwards. Bildung, emerging with neo-humanism, became “Protestant 
Germany’s secular and social ideal” (Sorkin 1983: 69). It evolved in 
philosophers, reaching its patriotic and political extreme in Fichte’s 
famous Addresses to the German Nation of 1808. As Wittrock observes, 
Bildung
[R]eflected broad efforts to come to terms w ith a period of fundamental 
change. The University of Berlin was the institutionalised form  o f  Bildung, and 
together they represented an attempt to recreate and reinvigorate national 
culture after the traumas of military defeat and political disruption. Bildung 
therefore was ... a re-created national culture in a reformed polity (Wittrock 
1993: 317).
The tensions between the individual and the state were clear in all 
the writings about the university of the period. Education was 
increasingly seen as a middle ground between the two and 
consequently the very notion of Bildung became transformed to 
varying degrees in different thinkers.29 The university of Berlin 
became a model for the renewal o f the state by the power o f thinking (Rohrs 
1995: 18). Although Humboldt opposed the strong movement for 
national political education (whose patron was Fichte) and rejected it
29 As Jean-François Lyotard argued in The Postmodern Condition about the 
emergent new relationships between the suppliers and users of knowledge and 
knowledge itself: “the old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable 
from the training (Bildung) of minds, or even of individuals, is becoming obsolete and 
will become ever more so. The relationship of the suppliers and users of knowledge to 
the knowledge they supply and use is now tending, and will increasingly tend, to 
assume the form already taken by the relationship of commodity producers and consumers 
to the commodities they produce and consume -  that is, the form of value. Knowledge is and 
will be produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed in order to be valorized in 
a new production: in both cases, the goal is exchange. Knowledge ceases to be an end 
in itself, it loses its ‘use-value’” (Lyotard 1984: 4-5, emphases mine).
Chapter 2. The Idea of the University Revisited 113
in his conception of the university, his opposition to Fichte led him to 
suppress the civic conception of Bildung (see Sorkin 1983: 70ff.). So it 
is a paradox of history that out of two fundamentally opposed 
notions of self-cultivation, Humboldt’s and Fichte’s, even though 
Humboldt had already applied his own notion to the idea of the 
university by the 1820s, “Bildung ... became the first servant of the 
Prussian state” and Humboldt’s educational reform in the end 
became the basis for what Sorkin called “the capitulation of the 
intelligentsia to the state”.
Sheldon Rothblatt and Bjorn Wittrock are therefore certainly right 
when they describe the current apolitical undertones of the 
Humboldtian tradition: “We can, nevertheless, fully appreciate how 
an educational philosophy and theory of self-fulfillment could in time 
lead away from politics and the responsibilities o f active citizenship to 
become a Humboldtian tradition’ of intellectual freedom embodied in 
research, especially when research was of direct and practical interest 
to the State” (Rothblatt and Wittrock 1993: 12). The university, over 
the course of time, ended up totally bereft of any social 
transformative force and lost all the emancipatory power maintained 
for it in the German writings of the period. The relations between the 
new university and the state are clear in Humboldt’s memorandum: 
as Daniel Fallon comments on the issue, “Although a liberal on record 
as a critic of the authoritarian state, Humboldt wedded the University 
of Berlin in close and unbreakable union to the State of Prussia” 
(Fallon 1980: 19). This relationship seems to have been paradigmatic 
for the period marking a historical contract binding the state and the 
university in the modern age.30
30 The influence of Humboldt’s ideas on the traditional relations between the state 
and the university has been tremendous. A recent example can be provided by the 
general attitude of the state and the public towards the private sector in higher 
education in German-speaking countries. As Daniel Fallon comments on this, “to the 
present day there have never been any private universities in Germany and the 
presence of successful private universities elsewhere in the world, particularly in the 
United States, has often raised the question of their complete absence in Germany. The 
fact that Humboldt ... gave the notion no serious thought is of more than passing 
interest”. And he goes on to say that Humboldt’s lack of sympathy for a private
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2.3. T h e  R e b irth  o f th e  G erm an  N ation  T h ro u g h  E d u cation  
(Jo h an n  G o ttlie b  Fichte)
I would like to focus now briefly on two works by Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte: his lectures on “The Vocation of the Scholar” (translated into 
English as The Purpose o f Higher Education) and his Addresses to the 
German Nation. Fichte advocated a much more radical organization of 
the university, compared to Friedrich Schleiermacher in his Occasional 
Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense. Fichte’s lectures on the 
vocation of the scholar were given at the University of Jena in 1794 
and his Addresses to the German Nation were delivered at the Academy 
of Sciences building in Berlin, before crowded audiences, during the 
winter of 1807-1808. He elaborated a detailed plan for the proposed 
university in Berlin and was appointed its professor and then Rector. 
In Fichte, the political and social role of the university, and that of 
scholars, was one of the highest among German advocates of 
university reforms. The vocation of a scholar, clearly a hero of a 
Hegelian type, is “the supervision of the real progress of humanity in 
general, and the constant support of this progress” (Fichte 1988: 54). 
“The scholar is to supervise the progress of all professions, to further 
them: could that be done without progressing oneself?”. The scholar 
is “the teacher of humanity” and “the educator of humanity” (Fichte 
1988: 56, 58, 58). Following a long line of thinking in philosophy in 
which the philosopher himself or herself gives the example 
(exemplum, beginning with Socrates and later on extending through 
Kant, Nietzsche and Foucault31), Fichte states that
university stemmed most likely from “his basic conception of the state as a natural 
part of society, a conception probably little different from that of most of his 
colleagues” (Fallon 1980: 22, 24). In more general terms, the role of private higher 
education in Europe is totally neglected in current debates on, and documents related to, 
the process of the integration of higher education in Europe -  which is discussed briefly 
in Chapter 6 and separately in Kwiek 2005e and 2006. The difference between the major 
higher education systems of Continental Europe (with Germany and France in the 
lead), and several Central European systems (especially Poland, Romania and Estonia) 
with large and still increasing enrollments in private institutions, is important.
31 See my paper on “Kant, Nietzsche, Foucault. On Giving an Example in 
Philosophy” in Kwiek 1998c. On Nietzsche and education, see Allen and Axiotis 1998.
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The ultimate purpose of every human being, as well as of society as a whole, 
and thus of all the work that scholars do on behalf of society, is the moral 
ennoblement of the entire human being. It is the duty of the scholar to always 
keep this ultimate purpose in mind, and to aim at this goal, no matter what 
he or she does for society. Nobody, however, can successfully work toward 
moral improvement without being a good person himself or herself. W e teach 
not only through words, we also teach, much more intensively, through our example 
(Fichte 1988: 59, emphasis mine).
Consequently, the scholar must be morally “the most outstanding 
human being of his or her time” and must represent “the highest 
possible education of the then current age” (Fichte 1988: 60). Fichte’s 
understanding of his own role in history follows the same lines when 
he states about himself that
my labors, too, will influence the course of future generations, the world 
history of nations that is to come. I am  called upon to give testimony of the 
truth. ... I am  a Priest of Truth; I am at her service. I have committed myself 
to act on her behalf, to take risks for her, and to suffer (Fichte 1988: 60).
Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation were a clear appeal for a 
spiritual regeneration of the German people through education 
following the defeat at Jena in 1806 (especially through the methods 
of the Swiss educator and reformer, J. Heinrich Pestalozzi, see Soetard 
1994). Trying to reconcile the primacy of the moral individual with 
the primacy of the state, Fichte constructed “a platonic educational 
structure that transformed Bildung into mere pedagogy with a pre­
determined patriotic content”, as David Sorkin claims. Fichte’s ideas, 
Sorkin goes on to argue, were not those of an isolated individual: “he 
represented the theoretical tip of an iceberg, a middle-class movement 
for national education” (Sorkin 1983: 70). Napoleon’s defeat of Prussia 
gave the movement a unified purpose: the defeat of the French (Fichte 
wanted education to “wipe from our memory the shame that has been 
done to the German name before our eyes”, Fichte 1979a: 194). 
Consequently, national education became political and patriotic 
education. Bildung32 itself was subordinated to patriotism and
32 In David Sorkin’s words, “Bildung was created by philosophers and belletrists 
who aestheticised religious and philosophical notions under the aegis of the Hellenic
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political training: “Bildung in Fichte’s hands was a political 
instrument with a determinate content and preordained goal” (Sorkin 
1983: 71). His views need to be discussed as standing in opposition to 
those of Humboldt who rejected the movement for national political 
education (especially through the prism of Greek history in his 1807 
essay on the “Decline and Fall of the Greek Free States”). As a result 
of his opposition to the Fichtean movement for national education, 
Humboldt, as already mentioned, suppressed the civic conception of 
Bildung to avoid similarities with the Bildung of national political 
education.* 33 As Hermann Rohrs argues, against the background of the 
French revolution, two antithetical strands of thought need to be 
remembered here: the philosophy of the Enlightenment against 
German idealism and the neo-humanist philosophy of education. The
revival. It emerged with neo-humanism in the 1790s and became Protestant 
Germany’s secular social ideal” (Sorkin 1983: 66). Lenore O’Boyle argues regarding 
academics that “deep involvement in classical studies and the preoccupation with 
Bildung reinforced the assumption that the learned formed a kind of aristocracy of 
intellect. Men of the ancient world were accepted as the embodiment of the classical 
ideal. They had developed all the capacities natural to man. ... This hope of a 
satisfying human fulfillment answered a deep need of German society, where the 
pressures of provincial bürgerlich existence were acutely felt” (O’Boyle 1983: 9).
33 It is important to remember that Fichte’s views on the question of state 
intervention in education evolved dramatically from earlier works such as “The 
Vocation of the Scholar” (1790s) through Reden an die deutsche Nation (1807/8) to 
their final form in his political theory of Die Staatslehre (1813). This evolution, in the 
most general terms, went from wishing the state to keep away from education as 
much as possible, confining the state’s action in education to the narrowest limits, 
to a resolution of the problem of creating the perfect state by educating perfect 
men through national and state education. As George H. Turnbull argued long ago 
in “The Changes in Fichte’s Attitude Toward State Intervention in Education”, “this 
education, if given to the citizens, will make a nation; for it produces the stable 
and certain spirit which is the only possible foundation of a well-organized state 
-  the spirit which includes that love of fatherland from which spring of themselves the 
courageous defender of his country and the peaceful and honest citizen. The 
community in which this education takes place, being self-supporting and 
independent, will make the pupil realize that he is indebted to it ab so lu tely .” 
(Turnbull 1925: 238). Turnbull stresses that it is doubtful whether the views of any 
other thinker on the question of the relations between the state and education have 
gone through such a profound change.
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discussions about higher education were on how to provide 
university studies with a basis detached from the narrowly vocational 
and utilitarian arguments of the Enlightenment:
To speak generally: the fascination of the classical idea of the university lies in 
the fact that in spite of its striving for intellectual concentration and profundity 
it is so close to real life that it combines professional and civic elements with a 
striving for (self-)education and religious certainty. The formation of the state 
and the personality, together with civic responsibility, are not in conflict, but 
rather in a relationship in which they expand and complement each other. To 
this extent the classical idea of the university shows quite modern features of 
significance for the future. The “further creation of the world” is for Fichte the 
task of scholarship within the university (Rohrs 1995: 17).
Fichte describes the unique historical circumstances in which 
Addresses were delivered in an elevated, emotional way: “it is the 
general aim of these addresses to bring courage and hope to the 
suffering, to proclaim joy in the midst of deep sorrow, to lead us 
gently and softly through the hour of deep affliction. This age is to me 
as a shadow that stands weeping over its own corpse, from which it 
has been driven forth by a host of diseases, unable to tear its gaze 
from the form so beloved of old, and trying in despair every means to 
enter again the home of pestilence” (Fichte 1979a: 17-18). Clearly 
referring to the political situation, he says briefly: “the present is no 
longer ours. ... [T]he hope of a better future is the only atmosphere in 
which we can still breathe” (Fichte 1979a: 193-194). Also “the dawn of 
the new world is already past its breaking” (Fichte 1979a: 18). This is 
no different from what F.W.J. Schelling says in his Vorlesungen uber die 
Methode des akademischen Studiums of 1803 (translated into English as 
On University Studies):
An epoch such as our own is surely bound to give birth to a new world. 
Those who do not actively contribute to its emergence will inevitably be 
forgotten. The noble task of shaping the future devolves upon the fresh, 
unspoiled energies of youth (Schelling 1966: 7-8).
The rhetoric of newness, uniqueness, and the feeling of a new world 
approaching, is very powerful in Fichte’s work (and it was no 
accident that in 1933 in his Rektoratsrede Martin Heidegger referred
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clearly to the Fichte from Addresses34, see Sluga 1993). The role Fichte 
ascribes to education, and as we shall see in a moment, especially to 
higher education, is enormous; if German states are not to be 
completely destroyed from the surface of the world, another “place of 
refuge” must be found -  and this is exactly the role of education. Not 
surprisingly, education turns out to be “the only possible means of 
saving German independence” and “education alone can save us from 
the barbarism and relapse into savagery that is otherwise bound to 
overwhelm us” (Fichte 1979a: 154, 195). As Hans Kohn remarked over 
fifty years ago, “of all the German intellectual spokesmen for 
nationalism in the Napoleonic age none was more eager to lead and 
mould his people and the world according to his will than Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte” (Kohn 1949: 319). Fichte did not view Napoleon in the 
way Hegel or Goethe did, as the embodiment of reason (“reason on 
horseback”, as Hegel vividly described him in his Phenomenology of 
Spirit). Prussia’s defeat meant the destruction of true Kultur, of the 
spiritual mission of mankind.35
34 Thinking of Fichte and Heidegger: it was Hans Sluga in his excellent book about 
Martin Heidegger’s involvement in Nazi politics in 1933 (Heidegger’s Crisis. Philosophy and 
Politics in Nazi Germany, 1993) who asked why Heidegger turned to Fichte in his 
Rektoratsrede when he was assuming the post of the rector of the University of Freiburg and 
gave the following answer: “Fichte saw himself as living at a moment of historical decision, 
at a unique turning point in human history”. The Nazis “focused on Fichte, Nietzsche ... 
who shared their sense that the times had gone astray and that a radical reordering was 
imminent’. In the winter of 1807 Fichte delivered his Addresses to the German Nation under 
political conditions that the Nazis could consider like their own (Sluga 1993: 30-31). 
Parallels were seen between Fichte, the defeat of Prussia by Napoleon and the lost battle of 
Jena; and the Nazis, the defeat in the First World War and the shame of the Treaty of 
Versailles. The model for Heidegger’s Rektoratsrede were Fichte’s Addresses. As Sluga 
argues, “Heidegger's use of the themes of crisis, nation, leadership, and order derived, in 
fact, directly from Fichte’s Addresses. It was Fichte who put this fourfold thematic together 
and made it its own bridge for crossing from philosophical speculation to political 
engagement. . My point is . that Fichte was the first philosopher for whom these four 
conjoined notions had both a philosophical and a political meaning, and that he could 
bequeath it to later German philosophers” (Sluga 1993: 32). In one of my books I have 
devoted a whole chapter to Heidegger and the German university in the context of French 
and American discussions (known as l’affaire Heidegger) (Kwiek 1998a: 172-233).
35 The origins of the German university are related to historical events and to discursive 
changes: the University of Berlin was born out of the discourses of German philosophy and
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In Addresses, Fichte was passionate, emotional and quite unlike the 
rational disciple of Kant:
Under the stress of the times and of his own emotions, the rational 
philosopher, the disciple of Kant, rejected the power of reasoned argument; 
the intellectual challenged the dignity of words and speech; the power of 
individual sentiment seemed to him a sufficient foundation for truth (Kohn 
1949: 333).
He had no clear vision about the political future of Germany 
though. All he knew with certainty, and believed in passionately, 
was that only a German national education system could bring 
power back to the German nation. Education was supposed to 
provide a solution but only long-term though; in the short-term his 
recommendation for Germany was to be united and independent 
from alien influences. As Fichte stated about the German nation in 
his eighth address, “it must here be obvious at once that only the 
German -  the original man, who has not become dead in an 
arbitrary organization -  really is a person and is entitled to count as 
one, and that he alone is capable of real and rational love for his 
nation” (Fichte 1979a: 130). Why the Germans only? The Germans 
owed this position to the fact that they could understand Fichte’s 
philosophy. Only the acceptance of true philosophy -  i.e. of Fichte’s 
philosophy -  could save the nation, if not the European continent, 
from the flood of barbarity. Germans as people owe their identity to 
the uniqueness of the German language; and it is the uniqueness of 
the German language that Fichte invokes to prove the uniqueness of 
the people who speak it, which, as one commentator put it, is a 
“strangely sublime tautology” (Martyn 1997: 311).
In his Addresses, written in an antiquarian, Lutheran style (on their 
style, see again Martyn 1997), he proposes a “total change of the 
existing system of education” which would be “the sole means of 
preserving the existence of the German nation” (Fichte 1979a: 13). The 
existing system in Fichte’s view was “blind and impotent”, the old 
system was at best able “to train some part of man”, while the new
may be treated as a discursive event, as Adam Schnitzer argues in his “A History of 
Translation: Schleiermacher, Plato, and the University of Berlin” (2000: 66ff).
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system of education “must train man himself” (Fichte 1979a: 14-15). 
What is at stake is not “popular” education, but “real German 
national” education -  as well as “the moulding of the race by means 
of the new education” (Fichte 1979a: 15, 24); what he means is “the 
fundamental reconstruction of the nation” through new education 
and “the salvation of the German nation”, as well as a “complete 
regeneration of the human race” (Fichte 1979a: 17, 156). The remedy 
for the “preservation” of the German nation is “an absolutely new 
system of German national education, such as has never existed in 
any other nation” (Fichte 1979a: 19). The mistake of the old system of 
education is its reliance upon the free will of the pupil; the new 
system, by contrast, must completely destroy “freedom of will in the 
soil which it undertakes to cultivate”. Consequently, it is Fichte’s firm 
view that all education aims at producing a “stable, settled and 
steadfast character, which no longer is developing, but is, and cannot 
be other than it is” (Fichte 1979a: 20). Education for manhood (but 
also for nationhood) is a “reliable and deliberate art” (Fichte 1979a: 
22). The background ideas are put straightforwardly:
If you want to influence him [the pupil] at all, you must do more than merely 
talk to him; you must fashion him, and fashion him  in such a way that he 
simply cannot will otherwise than you wish him to will. ... The new 
education must produce this stable and unhesitating will according to a  sure 
and infallible rule. It must itself inevitably create the necessity at which it 
aims (Fichte 1979a: 21).
The present problem, to sum up, is simply to “preserve the 
existence and continuance of what is German” (Fichte 1979a: 152). But 
who ought to carry out the plans presented by Fichte? Fichte’s answer 
is unmistakable: “it is the State ... to which we shall first of all have to 
turn our expectant gaze” (Fichte 1979a: 187). The costs of national 
education are high but proper education will, with the passage of 
time, make other expenses unnecessary: there will be no need for an 
army, a reduced need for prisons and no longer any need for 
reformatories (which will “vanish entirely”, Fichte 1979a: 191). 
Education alone “can save us from all the ills that oppress us”, Fichte 
claims (Fichte 1979a: 193). He believes strongly in the emancipatory 
power of philosophy, especially his own philosophy, and the power
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of national education. He presented his practical ideas about the 
future university in his “Deducirter Plan einer zu Berlin zu 
errichtenden höheren Lehranstalt”, written in 1807 (see Fichte 1979b). 
Humboldt’s task was to make a choice between the radical proposal 
of a new organization for higher learning proposed by Fichte and 
Schleiermacher’s more traditional project for a university’s 
organization presented in Occasional Thoughts on Universities in the 
German Sense. Humboldt’s choice clearly favored Schleiermacher over 
Fichte, even though it was Fichte who became the first rector of the 
University of Berlin.
2.4. T h e  S ta te , th e  U n iversity , and A cad em ic Freedom  
(F ried rich  S ch le ierm ach er)
The committee drafting the provisional statutes for the University of 
Berlin had already asked Schleiermacher in 1808 to prepare the final 
drafts of these statutes and he used his earlier essay Occasional 
Thoughts on Universities in the German Sense for this purpose. The final 
permanent statutes were only approved in 1817. As Daniel Fallon 
observed in 1980, Schleiermacher’s model university structure 
became the “basic organizational pattern for all German universities 
up to the present time. This form of administrative organization ... 
leaves a substantial controlling share of academic administration 
exclusively to the state through its Ministry of Culture” (Fallon 1980: 
36). Schleiermacher held strong views about science and scholarship 
as a communal effort; based on his philosophical assumptions, about 
the role of communication in attaining knowledge, and about the role 
of the state in education and the relationships between the state and 
the university. He claimed that science “must be a communal effort 
(ein gemeinschaftliches Werk) to which each contributes a share, so that 
for its purpose each is dependent on all the rest and can by oneself 
possess only an isolated fragment and that very incompletely” 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 2). As far as the fundamental notion of 
“communication” is concerned, he stressed that communication is the 
primary law governing every effort to attain knowledge, and “nature
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itself has quite clearly enunciated this law in the impossibility of 
scientifically producing anything exclusively without language” 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 3). Finally, as far as the state is concerned, he 
saw its close links to the university:
Yet the more extensive such institutions become the more they require 
means, organs of various kinds, the entitlement of those involved to associate 
even as such with others in a solid legal fashion. These goals can be attained 
only through the state, to which is thus issued the charge of recognizing, 
suffering and protecting as a  moral person, as we are wont to say, those who 
have joined with others for the sake of science. ... Still, if the evidence were 
not so obvious, anyone might have doubts about whether, in viewing the 
precise connection of all scientific endeavors in a  given cultural period, those 
that have arisen within a  certain state would really wish voluntarily to 
divorce themselves from the rest and attach themselves so tightly to the state, 
which is actually alien to them. To be sure, there is also no lack o f  striking 
opposition on the part o f  the scientific association against such a tight connection to 
the state (Schleiermacher 1991: 4, emphasis mine).
Schleiermacher provides one of the clearest pictures of the mutual 
dependence of the state and the university. The state needs information 
that is provided by the sciences. The state presupposes that all this 
information must be “grounded in science” and that only through 
science can it be reached. Therefore the state “takes on institutions 
which it would have had to establish if they were not already to be 
found; ... However, the state works only for itself, historically it is 
chiefly self-seeking through and through; thus it tends not to offer 
support to science except on its own terms, within its own boundaries” 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 6). To describe the nature of the relationships 
between the state and the university, he refers to the Platonic tradition 
of philosophers-kings from Republic (Schleiermacher was the translator 
of the entire corpus of Plato into German):
The state customarily has quite a  different view from that of scholars 
regarding the way scientific institutions must be ordered and led, since 
scholars enter into closer association for the sake of science itself. Certainly 
the two aspects would be in accord if the state truly wanted to give currency, 
in the full sense, to the demands of a  wise old head: if not to the first demand 
that those who know shall govern, then to the second that those who govern 
shall know (Schleiermacher 1991: 8).
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The state seems to prefer “real” information rather than (phi­
losophical) speculation (“scientific activities that preponderantly 
relate to the unity and common form of knowing”). Consequently, 
members of the scientific community will always strive to work 
towards independence from the state by trying to remove their 
association from the coercion and direction of the state and to 
enhance their own influence upon the state. “Wherever possible they 
infuse within the state a more worthy and scientific mode of thinking. 
Where this is not possible they at least seek increasingly to obtain 
trust and respect” (Schleiermacher 1991: 8). Schleiermacher describes 
how the university as an institution comes between the other two: the 
school and the academy. Schools are occupied with “information”; 
academies, in contrast, presuppose that their members already 
possess all the qualities necessary in cultivating science. The 
university’s role is to provide “the idea of knowledge, the highest 
consciousness of reason” (Schleiermacher 1991: 17). The idea is shared 
among academics in academies but it does not emerge out of nothing: 
it is the essence of the university to breed the scientific (philosophical) 
spirit in young people:
Herein lies the essence of the university. This breeding and education is its 
charge, whereby it forms a transition between the time when the young are 
first influenced for science through a grounding in basic information, 
through authentic learning, and the time when adults in the mature power 
and abundance of scientific life inquire on their own so as to expand or 
improve the domain of knowledge (Schleiermacher 1991: 16).
Thus the “business of the university” according to Schleiermacher is 
the following:
To awaken the idea of science in the more noble youths, who are already 
supplied with many kinds of information, to aid the idea’s holding sway 
over them in the area of knowledge to which each chooses to be especially 
devoted, so that it will become second nature for them to contemplate 
everything from the viewpoint of science, to perceive nothing for itself alone 
but only in terms of the scientific connections most relevant to it, and in a 
broad, cohesive manner bringing it into continual relation to the unity and 
totality of knowledge, so that they learn to become conscious of the basic 
laws of science in every thought process and precisely in this way gradually
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develop in themselves the capacity to investigate, to contrive and to give 
account (Schleiermacher 1991: 16).
The university is not to assemble more information, or assemble it on 
a higher level. What is to be presented at the university is the “totality 
of knowledge” (Schleiermacher 1991: 17). In academies, philosophy 
(or “speculation”), concerned with the “unity and interconnectedness 
of all knowledge” and with “the very nature of coming to know”, lies 
in the background. It is not possible, in Schleiermacher’s view, to 
cultivate any branch of science without a philosophical36 (or 
“speculative”) spirit:
the two cohere in such a way that an individual who has not cultivated a 
definite philosophical mode of thinking will likewise not produce 
scientifically and originally anything that is either noteworthy or sound. ... 
Accordingly, the reason philosophy is put way in the background within the 
academies is that if the sciences are, in academic fashion, to be furthered as a 
common effort, then everything o f  a purely philosophical nature must already have 
been settled so that almost nothing is left to b e  said on the subject (Schleiermacher 
1991: 18, emphasis mine).
So academies would not be capable of existing without universities 
concerned with resolving fundamental, philosophical issues first.
Philosophical instruction, as in the other German projects of the 
time discussed in the present chapter, is the basis of all that is to be 
carried on at the university. But transcendental philosophy is not 
enough: “real” knowledge is needed, and therefore both more 
advanced information and other information that was not included in 
the school curricula is provided at the university. As a result, the 
university is both a “post-school” and a “pre-academia”. But as in 
other German founding fathers of the university, “the scientific spirit 
is awakened by philosophical instruction” (Schleiermacher 1991: 19). 
For the purposes of awakening the scientific spirit in young people 
formal speculation alone will not suffice but must be embedded in
36 As Lyotard describes the structure of the Humboldtian university and the 
resulting ban on interdisciplinarity: “each science has its own place in a system 
crowned by speculation. Any encroachment of one science into another’s field can 
only create confusion, ‘noise’ in the system. Collaboration can only take place on the 
level of speculation, in the heads of the philosophers” (Lyotard 1984: 52).
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“’real’ knowing”. The university “has to embrace all knowing” and 
“must express its natural internal relation to knowing as a whole” 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 24). Not surprisingly at the university 
everything begins with philosophy, but mathematics, geography, 
natural philosophy and natural history are crucial too 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 28).
Schleiermacher claims that the traditional division of the 
university into four faculties -  the theological, legal, medical, and 
philosophical -  gives universities a “grotesque” appearance. The 
“authentic university” is contained “solely in the philosophical 
faculty”. The three others are specialized schools which the state has 
either founded or placed under its protection (Schleiermacher 1991: 
34). The three “positive” faculties have been passing on information. 
The theological faculty has been formed for the church; medical 
schools have been necessary to take care of the human body, and the 
legal faculty was formed to assist in building up the state. The faculty 
of philosophy instead
[R]epresents what the scientific union by itself would have established as a 
university. The other three, in contrast, represent what has arisen on account 
of a distinctly different kind of need, in face of which the purely scientific 
direction has an external and subordinate status. The order that they observe 
among themselves clearly indicates the dominating relation of the state even 
in public scientific institutions. More accurately viewed, moreover, it 
displays in part the historical precedence of the church before the state, in 
part the ancient and laudable habit of putting the soul before the body 
(Schleiermacher 1991: 35).
But it was not scholars who established the university; anything is 
possible but only in the future: “if a university ever arises through a 
free uniting of scholars, then what is now conjoined in the 
philosophical faculty will naturally find the first place, and the 
institutes that state and church will wish to join to the philosophical 
faculty will take places subordinate to it. So long as this does not 
occur, it would be best for this faculty to separate from the others in 
that it sits in last place” (Schleiermacher 1991: 36). But no matter what 
the formal place of the philosophical faculty is, it is still actually the 
first: “the first, and in fact the head of all the others because all
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members of the university must be rooted in it, no matter to which 
faculty they belong” (Schleiermacher 1991: 36). At the outset, all 
students should be students of philosophy -  and they should not 
be permitted to study anything else in the first year of their academic 
studies. Similarly, all academics should be rooted in the philosophical 
faculty.
Now let us refer briefly to a few practical points relating to the 
functioning of the university; in current vocabulary, these would be 
interdisciplinarity, tuition fees, student stipends, academic 
appointments, and accountability. Schleiermacher praises inter­
disciplinarity when he considers the question why an academic 
should not be allowed “to enter the territory of another faculty once 
in a while”. His answer to the question in practical terms is that once 
one has been allowed to teach, “one must be allowed to exercise the 
talent in whatever area one chooses” (Schleiermacher 1991: 38). Fees, 
in the historical version of the time as student lecture fees, are most 
welcome and natural: “certainly the circumstance of having one’s 
instruction paid for has never damaged the respect in which a 
teacher is held by the students .... Nor can it have seemed degrading 
to the teacher, since it also diminishes the feeling of one’s 
dependence on the state” (Schleiermacher 1991: 40). As far as 
stipends are concerned, the state should never distribute “benefits 
and inducements” but only “rewards and recognitions of 
distinction”. This is the only way to avoid humiliations and 
discriminations (Schleiermacher 1991: 42). As far as staffing policies 
are concerned, Schleiermacher is not willing to grant the right to 
appoint university professors to universities and presents a very 
vivid -  and severe -  picture of the profession:
Probably no one wants to let it [the university] make every selection by itself. 
As a group, the universities are so notorious for a spirit of petty intrigue that 
with such an arrangement no doubt anyone will fear the most harmful effects 
of party strife, of aroused passions in literary feuds and of personal 
favoritism (Schleiermacher 1991: 45).
As far as the faculty of philosophy is concerned, its description is not 
any better: “the universities are themselves constantly the battle­
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ground where the strife among the systems is carried on most 
vociferously and at times to the point of annihilation, so that if the 
decisions were left up to them the most vehement agitations would 
have to be feared” (Schleiermacher 1991: 45). The modern notion of 
accountability is questioned in Schleiermacher’s essay when he states 
that the state may demand an accounting of “property and benefits” 
and require that these be managed by experts recognized by the state 
but “everything else is guardianship”. The more mature science gets, 
the less guardianship will be necessary.
The notion of “academic freedom” is as strong in Schleiermacher 
as in other thinkers discussed here. The complementary figures of 
Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit, freedom to teach and freedom to learn, 
can be traced in all of them, providing the basis for the modern idea 
of the university. These concepts were clearly stated for the first time 
at the time of the founding of the University of Halle in 1694. 
Humboldt’s contribution was to make clear that the protection of the 
university was essential, even if viewed in terms of the interests of the 
state (Fallon 1980: 29). As Herman Röhrs analyzes the concept of 
“academic freedom” in the context of other underlying assumptions 
regarding the modern university,
Academic freedom  is not a passport to a life of privilege, free from  social 
controls and responsibilities. The freedom  from  econom ic privation and 
cramping civic duties is by no means intended as a class-privilege but as a 
guarantee of the preconditions for a life devoted to scholarship. ... The 
independence of the university, academ ic freedom, the unity of research 
and teaching, together w ith the general education w hich supports them, 
are all expanding com ponents of the classical idea of the university which 
must be com bined in order to make possible that interior discipline and 
w hich make up the essence of the republic of learning in the sense intended 
by the idealist philosophy. If one of the com ponents is broken off, the 
whole proves to be incapable of functioning. Academic freedom  implies 
responsible citizens of Academe, capable of judgm ent, or at least such as 
develop, under the influence of the freedom  of academ ic studies, the 
measure of responsible independence w hich must be the counterpart of 
freedom  if a productive equilibrium  is to be attained. If it is to succeed, it 
must have the scholar as its model; but it must not have regim entation 
(Röhrs 1995: 26).
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The freedom to learn in Schleiermacher is far-reaching, and 
academic freedom with respect to students is discussed in detail. 
From a contemporary perspective, the differences are enormous, and 
the level of freedom postulated by Schleiermacher seems unattainable 
today. Clearly, the ideas professed by Schleiermacher belong to the 
period when modern paternalistic views of education were becoming 
prevalent. What he calls “freedom of students” means that students
are not subject to compulsion o f  any kind; never will they be forced in any direction, 
and nothing is closed to them. No one orders them to attend this or that course 
session; no one can reproach them i f  they neglect or omit to do their work. There is no 
control over any of their efforts save what they themselves may give over to a 
teacher. They know what will be required of them when they leave the 
university and what kind of examinations they will then face; but with what 
zeal they intend to work towards this goal at any given time, and how 
uniformly or not they distribute it remains completely up to them. Care is taken 
that they do not lack in aids and resources for going ever deeper into their 
studies; but even though notice may be taken of how well or poorly they make 
use of these, at least they are not held directly accountable to anyone. In this way they 
therefore have full freedom to give way to indolence or worthless diversions, 
and instead of showing a  commendable industry they can irresponsibly waste the 
finest time o f  their life (Schleiermacher 1991: 50, emphases mine).
The purpose of the university is that students should be able to 
know, not to learn. Memory is not to be crammed but, instead, “a 
whole life is to be awakened”, “a higher spirit, the truly scientific 
spirit”. No coercion is possible -  an atmosphere “supportive of a 
complete freedom of spirit” is necessary (Schleiermacher 1991: 5). 
“Even the slightest sign of coercion -  any conscious influence of an 
external authority, however gentle -  is ruinous” (Schleiermacher 1991: 
52). The freedom in question here concerns students’ customs and 
habits, their way of life, the kind of clothes they wear, the language 
they use etc. Students “display a common spirit”, and all this is the 
essence of academic freedom. Student excesses -  called here “small 
discomforts” -  have to be regarded by the inhabitants of academic 
towns as a local evil.
Originally, the tradition of Lernfreiheit was more important than 
that of Lehrfreiheit, and its continual importance is reinforced in
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Schleiermacher’s essay. It was designed to provide students with full 
independence: freedom to study what they wished to study, to move 
between classes, disciplines and universities or to stay away from 
them. It was freedom “to run one’s affairs and live one’s own life. It 
was a reward for graduation, from the Gymnasium or the lycée, into 
adult life”, as the American commentator of both traditions of 
academic freedom remarks (Commager 1963). It was Schleiermacher 
from among the German thinkers of the time who went the furthest in 
giving freedom to students, and who actually favored the former 
tradition to the latter one, in an original manner.37 Over the course of 
time, though, and especially in recent decades, academic freedom 
increasingly came to mean freedom to teach, so that the latter 
tradition became significantly more important. Both in common 
parlance and in higher education studies today, academic freedom 
refers much more, if not exclusively, to academics and their freedom 
to teach and to do research, than to students. This fact testifies how 
much the idea evolved from its German origins over a period of two 
centuries.38
37 What does academic freedom mean for students? Let us quote an American 
voice from the 1960s which seems to follow Schleiermacher’s path very closely: “it 
means freedom from many of the tyrannies which have been carried over from the 
high school into the college and the university: the tyranny of attendance, of courses, 
of classes, of grades, of majors and minors, and of all the rest of the regulations that 
are entirely suitable for high school or preparatory school but have no real place in a 
university. Even in academic circles, where freedom is believed in and discussed a 
great deal, not much is done about these regulations. ... [W]e get more and more 
requirements, more and more courses, more and more prerequisites for this, that, and 
the other. . As long as our graduate schools and our professional schools insist, as 
they commonly do, on courses, grades, and records, the colleges have very little 
freedom in which to experiment. Freedom for undergraduates requires freedom from 
the pressures to conform socially that weigh so heavily on some of them” (Commager 
1963: 365).
38 Philip G. Altbach in his recent paper on “academic freedom” stressed that it 
seems “a simple concept, and in essence it is, but it is also difficult to define. From 
medieval times, academic freedom has meant the freedom of the professor to teach 
without external control in his or her area of expertise, and it has implied the freedom 
of the student to learn. The concept was further defined with the rise of the research- 
oriented Humboldtian university in early 19th century Germany. The Humboldtian
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2.5. P h ilosop h y , E d u cation , and  the H istorica l H ero 
(Fried rich  W .J. Sch e llin g )
Schelling delivered his Vorlesungen über die Methode des akademischen 
Studiums (translated into English as On University Studies) at the 
University of Jena in 1802. As he states in a short “Preface”, “some of 
the ideas expressed may eventually influence the development of our 
universities” (Schelling 1966: 3). The book is often described as the 
best available introduction to Schelling’s thinking as a whole and his 
contemporaries saw it as a popular exposition of his philosophy 
(Preface to Schelling 1966: xvii). Even though Schelling was only 
twenty-seven when he wrote it the book, together with other works 
discussed here, forms the actual “charter of the university in the 
classical sense” (Rohrs 1995: 18) and deserves our highest attention.
As already mentioned, Schelling shared general views about the 
role of philosophy at the university, the relations between the state 
and the university and about the unity of teaching and research with 
Fichte, Schleiermacher and Humboldt. His sentiments about his time 
and his own role in contemporary Germany were closest to those of 
Fichte; as already mentioned, at the beginning of his book he claims 
in a manner close to Fichte, but also to the young Hegel from
concept enshrined the ideas of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit -  freedom to teach and to 
learn. These concepts of academic freedom gave special protection to the professor 
within the classroom and the parameters of the field of expert knowledge of the 
professor. From the beginning, the university was considered a special place, devoted 
to the pursuit and transmission of knowledge. Academe claimed special rights 
precisely because of its calling to pursue truth. The authorities, whether secular or 
ecclesiastical, were expected to permit universities a special degree of autonomy. 
Academic freedom was never absolute, however. ... In the German university of the 
early 19th century, academic freedom was expanded as a concept as research became 
part of the academic mission. The professor was given almost absolute freedom of 
research and expression in classroom and laboratory. But academic freedom did not 
necessarily extend to protection of expression on broader political or social issues. Nor 
was it considered a violation of academic freedom that socialists and other dissenters 
were not eligible for academic appointments” (Altbach 2003: 13). Today, some 
countries assume the narrow Humboldtian definition of academic freedom; in others, 
like the USA, the broader ideal developed mainly by the AAUP (American 
Association of University Professors) at the beginning of the 20th century prevails.
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Phenomenology of Spirit, that “an epoch such as our own is surely 
bound to give birth to a new world. Those who do not actively 
contribute to its emergence will inevitably be forgotten” (Schelling 
1966: 7-8). As the editor of Fichte’s book remarks, “the apocalyptic 
sentiment expressed here is characteristic of Schelling’s philosophy 
which implies a desire to change the world, although Schelling 
himself scarcely ever offers any practical suggestions to achieve this 
metamorphosis. In his writings prophetic utterances about impending 
universal renewal occur constantly” (Editorial notes to Schelling 1966: 
154). Why should a philosopher discuss universities rather than the 
philosophies taught there? Schelling provides the following rationale:
It might seem that a philosopher should confine himself to drawing a picture 
of the body of scientific knowledge and formulating general methodological 
principles, without going into organizational matters or the temporal forms 
of our institution. However, I hope to show that these form s are not arbitrary, 
that they reflect the spirit o f  the modern world, and that they make it possible for 
the disparate elements of modern culture to interpenetrate (Schelling 1966: 
17, emphasis mine).
Schelling wonders whether it is proper to make philosophical 
demands on the universities “when everyone knows that they are 
instruments of the state and must be what the state intended them to 
be” (Schelling 1966: 22). The state is able to do whatever it wishes 
with the universities, Schelling claims -  it can “suppress” them, or 
transform into “industrial training schools”. But the point is that the 
state at the same time “cannot intend the universities to be real 
scientific institutions without desiring to further the life of ideas and 
the freest scientific development” (Schelling 1966: 23). The 
relationships between the universities and the state are delicate; 
Schelling further developed his views in the form of a digression in a 
note:
The usual view of the universities is that they should produce servants of the 
state, perfect instruments for its purposes. But surely, such instruments 
should be formed by science. Thus, to achieve such an aim through education, 
science is required. But science ceases to be science the moment it is degraded 
to a mere means, rather than furthered for its own sake. It is certainly not 
furthered for its own sake when, for instance, ideas are rejected on the
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grounds that they are of no use in ordinary life, have no practical application, 
are unrelated to experience (Schelling 1966: 23).
Universities should “further culture in the universal sense”, apart 
from serving as nurseries for knowledge (Schelling 1966: 28). They 
need, apart from the voluntary support of the state in its own interest, 
“no further regulations than those rooted in the Idea itself. Wisdom and 
prudence here agree: it is necessary only to do what the Idea of a 
scientific institution prescribes in order to make the constitution of a 
university perfect”. Not surprisingly, Schelling’s conclusion is that 
“universities can have only an absolute purpose -  beyond that they 
have none” (Schelling 1966: 29, emphasis mine).
Let us make now a short digression and focus on the issue of the 
role of the philosopher as cultural educator in periods of great 
historical transformations. The social role some German thinkers at 
the turn of the 19th century assumed and presented as universal 
deserve our attention, especially in the case of Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel.39 The way they viewed their philosophies, and their roles in 
changing (German and universal) history, has found much more 
radical imitators in the 20th century, mostly in pre-war Germany and 
post-war France. Consequently, bloody revolutions, freedom- 
depriving totalitarianisms, and the naked violence of the brave new 
worlds of the 20th century, have overshadowed philosophical
39 Thinking of Fichte, let us recall what Hans Sluga claimed in his book on Martin 
Heidegger: “Fichte concluded that he himself was occupying a pivotal place in world 
history. ... He convinced himself, finally, that his own philosophy could be compared 
in its world-historical meaning only with the four Gospels and that his own role was 
similar to Christ’s” (Sluga 1993: 36, emphasis mine). Fichte appealed to the Nazis 
because of his nationalism, his elevation of Germanness to a metaphysical essence and 
his concern with the well-being of the whole nation. “Of even more significance to 
them, however -  Sluga goes on to argue -  was probably the fact that Fichte saw 
himself as living at a moment of historical decision, at a unique turning point in 
human history. . It was natural . that German philosophers should turn back to 
Fichte in their search for historical models. As they stood up to declare their allegiance 
to the Nazis, they found in Fichte’s Addresses a template. This was true even of 
philosophers who otherwise held no particular allegiance to German idealism, who 
identified themselves instead with the thinkers of the later epoch of German 
philosophy. Heidegger was one of these” (Sluga 1993: 31).
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modernity and pushed some 19th century ideas to extremes. Current 
questions about the role of philosophy and philosophers in history 
stretch from Plato with his notion of “philosophers-kings” to Martin 
Heidegger with his notion of Führung, coined during the period of his 
involvement with Nazism and his ideas for using the German 
university as the basis for a new world-historical revolution (like the 
post-war French leftist intellectuals). What I have in mind is the 
conviction often shared in the 20th century, but also traced in the 
German texts discussed here, that in moments of breakthrough in 
history, moments of historical shifts, philosophers and philosophy have 
to play some specific and decisive role, as if philosophers have to answer 
history’s call. If they are not up to a particular task or do not treat the 
historical moment seriously, civilization would face catastrophe. 
Whenever the philosopher feels a higher need for action, a desire to 
be actively involved in changing his surrounding world, to accelerate 
historical events and to guide the leaders of society (“to lead the 
leaders”, as Martin Heidegger put it in 1933), he himself risks falling 
into the trap of philosophy/politics. And the first moment at which, I 
suppose, an alarm should go off, and which in the 20th century 
nevertheless it often failed to do so, is the suddenly appearing 
conviction that one is taking part in unusual events, is living in a 
critical moment, in which the scales of history can go either way. A 
widespread world crisis, the absolute uniqueness of the moment, 
begets extreme modes of behavior;40 clocks start to measure out a new 
time. After the revolution, the philosopher can argue, there will be a 
“brave new world” that will legitimize the present suffering. Until 
then, the revolutionary cause requires of him immediate decisions, as 
does every unique moment in human history. It requires of him 
“constructive” thinking and acting, it requires his engagement. Yet, 
such participation ought to have been refused outright. The passage
40 I am thinking of Heidegger here, or the young Paul de Man in war-torn 
Belgium, but the edges of my consciousness are reinforced by Hegelian reflections on 
the French Jacobeans and their terror and the interpretations of e. g. Charles Taylor (in 
Hegel and Modern Society) or Joachim Ritter (in Hegel and the French Revolution. Essays 
on the “Philosophy o f  Right”), see Taylor 1979 and Ritter 1982. On the de Man “affair” in 
a French philosophical context, see Kwiek 1998a.
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of time has confirmed that those intellectual exiles were right who did 
not believe in some sort of mission for themselves during these 
junctures of history (and in our context, Karl Jaspers stands in sharp 
opposition to Martin Heidegger, and it is the different political and 
existential choices that they made that provided the impetus for 
Jaspers’ reworking of his pre-war lectures about the university into 
The Idea o f the University in the post-war form discussed in this 
chapter).
It may be, as Michel Foucault suggests, that one needs to have 
great humility to acknowledge that perhaps our time is not the only 
one when everything begins and ends anew. Perhaps Hegel was right 
when he said that peaceful times are “blank pages in history”. 
Perhaps it is natural that a faster pace of events imposes a faster pace 
of reflection, that revolutionary times require revolutionary thinking, 
during which temptation can often prove irresistible. However, such 
a “heroic” vision of the world and of the philosopher appeared in 
philosophy no earlier than Fichte, Schelling and especially, in fuller 
form, Hegel (and in the aftermath of the French Revolution in 
general). It was in Phenomenology that he acknowledged that history 
was at a turning point: “it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth­
time and a period of transition to a new era.” Likewise, one can find 
in Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo the same belief of participating in great 
politics and great changes; in a great crisis and of Nietzsche’s own 
role -  individual and philosophical -  to be played in it; in setting the 
clock to a new time. It is, I suppose, an intellectual structure common 
to much of German philosophical thought, where one can easily find 
such passages in The Communist Manifesto or Marx’ most famous 
thesis on Feuerbach (according to which changing the world is better 
than merely interpreting it, or Die Philosophen haben die Welt nur 
verschieden interpretiert; es kommt aber draufen, sie zu verandern). Current 
philosophy seems to be perfectly aware of the dangers outlined above 
because it has learnt the lesson of extremes from the modern odyssey 
of culture, in which a leading role was played precisely by 
philosophy. Although the extreme forms of the beliefs described 
above did not appear in the German philosophers discussed here in 
the context of the classical German idea of the university, their softer
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versions with respect to their own role as philosophers in history and 
to the role of the university in transforming both Germans and 
humanity as such can be clearly seen.41 Because no social and political 
excesses followed, in contrast to the 20th century, the history of the 
19th century ideas and institutions analyzed here “marks one of the 
few instances in which a philosophical anthropology formed the 
explicit basis of a successful program for social change”, as Carla R. 
Thomas remarked (Thomas 1973: 219).
2.6. C on clu sion s
In discussing current and future missions and roles of the institution 
of the university, it is necessary to take a closer look at its 
foundational idea born in 19th century Germany. But at the same time, 
after almost two hundred years, it is conceivable that in many places, 
for a variety of internal and external reasons, what we call the 
“Humboldtian” tradition of the university is no longer being 
followed. The university is a specific, historically-rooted institution,
41 I have discussed in detail Martin Heidegger’s views on the university expressed 
in 1933 in his published writings -  and actions taken -  after the Nazis had won the 
elections and took power in Germany, and beyond (see Kwiek 1998a). The analysis of 
Heidegger’ s vision of the role of the university in transforming society, nation, and 
possibly humanity -  as well as his own role in leading politicians to national renewal 
and national regeneration through his philosophy -  goes well beyond the scope of the 
present book but certainly deserves our highest attention. It is no accident that Allan 
Bloom’s major points of reference in his criticism of the American university in The 
Closing o f  the American Mind are Plato’s Socrates and Heidegger’s “Rectorial Address”. 
We have a new Germany, Heidegger argued, and we have the university which is 
about to assume new tasks, but for the time being real education takes place in the 
Wissenschaftslager, the knowledge camp -  because the revolution has not reached the 
university yet (In Deutschland ist Revolution, und wir müssen uns fragen: ist Revolution 
auch au f der Universität? Nein). But it is at the Heidegger-inspired, reformed university 
that the education of future state leaders of the new Germany will take place. In 
Heidegger, the university and its ill-famed “academic freedom”, current “research” 
carried out and current “teaching” provided there -  all this had to be transformed 
through a “bitter fight in the spirit of national socialism”. See especially Guido 
Schneeberger’s edition of Heidegger’s works from the period, Nachlese zu Heidegger. 
Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken (Berne 1962).
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proud of its origins and its traditions. In thinking about its future it 
will be constructive to reflect on the evident current tensions between 
traditional modern expectations of the university (on the part of both 
society and the state), and the new expectations intensified by the 
emergence of knowledge-based societies and economies. From the 
perspective of the tensions between old and new tasks, looking back 
at the turning point in its history could turn out to have more than a 
historical dimension. It might happen that we may need to look for 
patterns on how to radically reformulate the roles of the institution 
(for both internal and external reasons -  the evolution of the 
university and the evolution of the societies and economies it is 
serving), and the German philosophy of the period could teach us 
interesting lessons. At the same time it is always possible that what 
we are developing here is merely an alternative scenario -  and that 
such study belongs in the realms of foresight studies...
Ch a p t e r  3
The University and the Nation-State: 
the Impact of Global Pressures
3.1. T h e  N ation -S tate  and the N ew  G lo b a l O rder
Now let us leave for a moment the modern institution of the 
university and its traditional -  already historical -  relationship with 
the state and have a closer look at the nation-state under increasingly 
powerful global pressures.
The processes of globalization seem to be affecting the traditional 
modern institution of the state simultaneously on many levels, from 
regional and subnational to national and supranational (as Anthony 
Giddens remarked, globalization “pulls upwards”, “pushes 
downwards”, and “squeezes sideways”, Giddens 1999: 13).1 For our 
purposes here, in connection with discussions on the changing role of
1 In the most general terms, in thinking about the impact of globalization on 
education, I support the line of Raymond A. Morrow and Carlos Alberto Torres who 
claim that “while taking seriously the claim that these developments do indeed 
represent remarkable changes in the world order and the role of nation-states, we 
have remained skeptical with respect to various claims and projections made in the 
name of globalization. Only with time and more conclusive research will it be possible to 
assess what has been happening and what are the future directions of changes” and 
they add that “the future has not been written and no one can ever claim a definitive 
understanding of the current relationships between globalization, the state, education, 
and social change” (Morrow and Torres 2000: 48, 53). At the same time an acceptance 
of the indefinite character of the future does not mean there is no point in thinking 
about it. One of the possible options in this context could be discussing some future 
scenarios of development, in the full awareness that they may never be realized.
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higher education and the changing social mission of the modern 
university, the two crucial dimensions of the state in transition are its 
relation to the welfare state on one hand and its relation to the nation­
state on the other. Both dimensions of the state are closely linked to 
higher education, especially to its elite segment, the institution of the 
university; which has been mostly state-funded as part of the well- 
developed post-war Keynesian welfare state apparatus, and which 
has been closely (or very closely) related to the modern construct of 
the nation-state. In philosophical terms, this theme has already been 
discussed with respect to German Idealist and Romantic thinkers in 
Chapter 2. But the social and political contract between the nation­
state and the modern version of the university requires further 
analysis. The theme of the modern contract between the nation-state 
and the university will be developed in this chapter, while in Chapter 
4 the possible impact of current reformulations of the welfare state on 
the institution of the university will be discussed.
In the present section we are going to discuss briefly the historical 
roots of the modern nation-state and its connections to higher 
education.2 Let us begin with a quotation from Andy Green which 
excellently captures the point we want to make:
Historically, education has been both parent and child to the developing nation 
state. The national education system as a universal and public institution first 
emerged in post-revolutionary Europe as an instrument o f  state formation. It 
provided a powerful vehicle for the construction and integration of the new 
nation-state and became one of its chief institutional supports. Since then, few 
nations have embarked on independent statehood without recourse to its 
ideological potential;  even the older states, at least in periods of war and crisis,
2 I have no problems with being in full agreement with Manuel Castells when he 
claims that “I have no particular sympathy for modern nation-states that have eagerly 
mobilized their people for reciprocal mass slaughter in the bloodiest century of human 
history -  the twentieth century” (Castells 1997: 303). One of the harshest critics of 
modern nation-states has been Zygmunt Bauman, in Legislators and Interpreters (1987), 
Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) and Life in Fragments. Essays in Postmodern Morality 
(1995). In the latter, he claims: “what we learned in this century is that modernity is 
not only about producing more and travelling faster, getting richer and moving 
around more freely. It is also about -  it has been about -  fast and efficient killing, 
scientifically designed and administered genocide” (Bauman 1995: 193, emphasis mine).
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have continued to view education as a valuable source of national cohesion and 
a key tool for economic development. However, the role o f  the nation-state is now 
changing, and with it the place o f  education (Green 1997: 1, emphases mine).
Especially, let us add, the place of higher education, which is our 
concern here. It is the overall argument of the present book that current 
transformations to the state will not leave the university unaffected, 
and consequently it is heuristically useful to discuss the roles, tasks and 
missions of the university in the context of the current transformations 
of the state. To disregard this context would be a serious analytical 
mistake. Discussing the institution of the university in isolation from 
the far-reaching and substantial social and political processes affecting 
the institution of the state, does not seem satisfactory today.
To begin to disentangle the complicated web of such sociological 
(and philosophical) concepts as the nation, nation-state, and 
nationalism, let us turn to Anthony Giddens’ magisterial The Nation­
State and Violence (1987). By “nationalism”, he means a primarily 
psychological phenomenon, “the affiliation of individuals to a set of 
symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality among the members 
of a political order”; by a “nation”, he means a “collectivity existing 
within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary 
administration, reflexively monitored by the internal state apparatus 
and those of other states”. Finally, which is crucial to our further 
considerations, his definition of the nation-state is as follows:
A nation-state is ... a bordered power-container ... the pre-eminent power­
container of the modern era (Giddens 1987: 116, 120).3
The nation-state, in the course of the 19th century, had become an 
irresistible political form on a global scale.4 Giddens enumerates three 
main types of factors involved in explaining the universal scope of the
3 Or, in a parallel definition Giddens provides, “the nation-state, which exists in a 
complex of other nation-states, is a set of institutional forms of governance 
maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory with demarcated boundaries 
(borders), its rule being sanctioned by law and direct control of the means of internal 
and external violence” (Giddens 1987: 121).
4 The nation-state was “the ideal of the well-ordered, western, modern political 
community”, as Roland Axtmann stated recently (Axtmann 2004: 259).
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nation-state: the combination of industrial and political power, the 
expansion of the administrative power of the state and a series of 
contingent historical events (such as the relative peace in Europe 
following the treaties of 1815, the acceleration of technological 
innovation in weaponry, and the formal recognition of the autonomy 
and “boundedness” of the nation-state, made in the treaties following 
the First World War, Giddens 1987: 155-156). However, what is 
“sovereignty”, and what does a “sovereign state” mean? According to 
a classical Giddens’ formulation:
A sovereign state is a political organization that has the capacity, within a 
delimited territory or territories, to make laws and effectively sanction their 
up-keep; exert a monopoly over the disposal of the means of violence; 
control basic policies relating to the internal political or administrative form 
of government; and dispose of the fruits of a national economy that are the 
basis of its revenue (Giddens 1987: 282).
We will be returning to the definitions of both the nation-state and 
a sovereign state in the course of the present chapter. We can 
provisionally affirm, though, that the social world discussed in the 
disciplines of sociology, the political sciences, political philosophy 
and political economy is less and less related to the above two 
definitions, and we will argue that it is globalization and its practices 
that make the discussions on the classical world of sovereign nation­
states (as defined by e.g. Giddens) increasingly irrelevant to the 
current theoretical concerns of the major part of these disciplines.5 To 
put it simply, the view of current states as “bordered power­
containers” seems to be increasingly untenable both in theory and in 
practice.6 Zygmunt Bauman, in his discussions about the
5 Philip G. Cerny claims in his oft-quoted paper on “Globalization and the Changing 
Logic of Collective Action” that the state today “is being not only eroded but also 
fundamentally transferred within a wider structural context. ... This transformation has 
significant consequences for the logic of collective action. ... [B]y reshaping the structural 
context of rational choice itself, globalization transforms the ways that the basic rules o f the 
game work in politics and international relations.” (Cerny 1995: 596, emphases mine).
6 As Ulrich Beck stresses, “the whole conceptual world of national sovereignty is 
fading away -  a world that includes the taming of capitalism in Europe by the postwar 
welfare state” (Beck 2000b: 17).
Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State 141
relationships between sociology and postmodernity, made an 
excellent point which could certainly be applied to the relationships 
between sociology and a global age (the discussion of the 
relationships between postmodernity and a global age would 
certainly require further analyses7): the model of postmodernity
7 Anglo-Saxon literature on the relationships between postmodernity and the 
global age is very scarce indeed. Anthony R. Welch has tried to combine the two 
themes in his excellent paper on “Globalisation, Post-modernity and the State: 
Comparative Education Facing the Third Millennium (2001). His general conclusion is 
that the supporters of both globalization and postmodern thinkers have contributed to 
a trend towards individualism and a retreat from democratic engagement. The 
common motif for the two lines of thinking in the social sciences and the humanities, 
in Welch’s view, is the assumption of an end to collective social engagement on a 
national level (or as Philip G. Cerny called it with reference to globalization: “the 
changing logic of collective action”, see Cerny 1995). As he argues, “clearly, neither the 
literature on globalization ... nor post-modern interventions, any longer presuppose 
collective forms of social action and engagement at the national level. While one 
principally operates at the global level, the other operates at the level of the individual 
subject. ... Arguably, both theoretical trajectories are linked to developments in late 
capitalism and analyses of the crisis of the state” (Welch 2001: 485). Welch asks an 
interesting question about the parallelism between the “breakdown of integration 
caused by globalization’ s increasing separation of society into winners and losers” and 
the “socially isolating and fragmenting effects of post-modernity”. In a similar vein, 
Andy Green refers to postmodernism as globalization’s “twin” (Green 1997: 170). 
Welch’ s account of postmodern thinking goes roughly along the same lines covered 
by the present author in his numerous publications about Jean-François Lyotard, 
Michel Foucault, and Richard Rorty over the last decade. See especially my books on 
Lyotard and Rorty (1994), Rorty (1996), Foucault (1998c) and French postwar 
philosophy in general, from Georges Bataille and Jean-Paul Sartre to Gilles Deleuze, 
Pierre Klossowski and Michel Foucault (1998a). Some papers about the modern and 
postmodern idea of the intellectual were also gathered together in my recent collection 
of essays, Intellectuals, Power, and Knowledge. Studies in the Philosophy o f  Culture and 
Education (2004a). In the book on French intellectuals (1998a), the whole French post- 
Nietzschean line of social thinking as “textual”, is opposed to the post-Hegelian line 
(as read by Alexandre Kojève in his influential Introduction to the Reading o f  Hegel) 
which was termed “communal”. In this context, it is Richard Rorty’s ideas of 
“solidarity” opposed to “self-creation” and the private/public split in one’s intellectual 
work that is seen as most interesting. It might be interesting to consider the issue of to 
what extent postmodern philosophy was a (Kantian) “sign of history”, referring to the 
wider social, economic and political processes lumped together under the rubric of 
“globalization”.
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“cannot be grounded in the realities of the nation-state, by now 
clearly not a framework large enough to accommodate the decisive 
factors in the conduct of interaction and the dynamics of social life” 
(Bauman 1992: 65). The container theory of society is no longer able to 
explain the complexities of the new world order in which 
intergovernmental agencies, political and economic cartels, economic 
unions, transnational corporations, military alliances etc play an 
increasingly important role and the nation-state is becoming 
“progressively less important” in world organization (Giddens 1987: 
282). It is probably sociology that is most fundamentally related to the 
nation-state with its theories that have traditionally equated society 
with the national state. The territorial state has been the “container” of 
society in all major sociological theories, if not in sociology as such 
(see Beck 2000a).
The importance of the need to revise our theoretical thinking and 
to reorient ourselves conceptually and intellectually to the new 
“global order” has been shown by analysts of globalization from the 
above disciplines (as well as a few others). Ulrich Beck, developing 
his distinction between the first, “national” and the second, “post­
national” modernity in What Is Globalization?, stresses the irrelevance 
of ways of thinking (and ways of acting) based on the premises of the 
former, the premises of the classical era of nation-states as 
conceptualized in traditional sociological studies.8 In practical terms,
8 It is interesting to refer to the traditional apologia for the role of the nation (and, 
in a complementary and unavoidable manner, nationalisms) in apparently post­
national contemporary societies; as vigorously presented by Anthony D. Smith in his 
Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (1995). In a concluding chapter, “In Defence of 
the Nation”, Smith argues that “the nation and nationalism provide the only realistic 
socio-cultural framework for a modern world order. They have no rivals today. National 
identity too remains widely attractive and effective and is felt by many people to 
satisfy their needs for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security and fraternity. ... 
[G]lobal culture seems unable to offer the qualities of collective faith, dignity and hope 
that only a ‘religion surrogate’, with its promise of a territorial culture-community 
across the generations, can provide”. And he goes on to claim that “over and beyond 
any political or economic benefits that ethnic nationalism can confer, it is this promise 
of collective but terrestrial immortality, outfacing death and oblivion, that has helped 
to sustain so many nations and national states in an era of unprecedented social
Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State 143
the consequences of abandoning the power-container view of society 
and the premises of the world organized through sovereign territorial 
nation-states are far-reaching. Let us quote here in extenso Beck’s 
vivid description of the current relationships between national states 
and transnational corporations to see an example of the practical 
implications of the social processes in question:
What is novel and decisive is not that these transnational corporations are 
growing in number and diversity, but that, in the course of globalization, 
they are placed in a position to play o ff  national states against one another. 
Looked at from outside, everything has remained as it w as. Companies 
produce, rationalize, hire and fire, pay taxes, and so on. The crucial point, 
however, is that they no longer do this under rules of the game defined by 
national states, but continue to play the old game while nullifying and 
redefining those rules. It thus only appears to be a question of the old game of 
labour and capital, states and unions. For while one player continues to play 
the game within the framework of the national state, the other is already 
playing within the framework of world society. ... It is as i f  employees, unions
change and to renew so many ethnic minorities that seemed to be doomed in an era of 
technological uniformity and corporate efficiency” (Smith 1995: 159-160, emphasis 
mine). Considering the (still) fundamentally uneven distribution of the benefits and 
the ills of globalization, and the geographical concentration of its impact in selected 
parts of the globe, from a global perspective (without privileging the social and 
economic developments of most affluent parts of the world), Smith may be right. He 
may be right for millions of people from the world unaffected by global pressures but 
may be wrong for millions of others e.g. Europeans, especially in the context of the 
emergent European “post-national” community. The point of view of (Zygmunt 
Bauman’s) “globals” is certainly different from that of “locals” (see Bauman 1998), as 
the lifestyles and loyalties of (Leslie Sklair’s) “transnational capitalist class” differ from 
those of nationally-rooted, immobile, traditional workers (see Sklair 2001). The lack of 
any national rootedness of (Robert B. Reich’s) “symbolic analysts” is a serious threat to 
national cohesion but only in some locations... (see Reich 1992). On more European 
grounds, the danger lies, as Guy Neave argues, in the prospect of a Europe “whose 
common profile is a society divided between those who are mobile, trained to live in a 
world of high salaries, high productivity and equally high precariousness of 
employment -  a new elite whose identity lies wholly in their transnational and 
technical prowess -  and the majority whose lives are passed within the nation, victims 
to the whim of industrial relocation, down-sizing, and social dumping, with mediocre 
salaries, and precariousness as their continued and uncompensated lot”. 
Consequently, the specter is “a Europe of ‘The Two Nations’” (Neave 2001b: 68).
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and government were still playing draughts, while the transnational corporations
had moved on to chess (Beck 2000a: 65, emphases mine).9
Applying the metaphor of playing draughts versus playing chess 
to our educational concerns, we might say that in the philosophy of 
education while we, moderns, are still often discussing the diversity 
of German-inspired social “missions” for our universities, they, 
globals, are incorporating “higher education” under the rubrics of 
“services” to be fully liberalized under the WTO/GATS protocols. 
Without looking at what playing chess might actually mean for 
ourselves as scholars and for our educational institutions, we have 
limited chances of being able to continue playing draughts in the 
context of the transformations of the state and its basic social 
responsibilities. The advent of globalization (and the spread of its 
chess players at all levels of governance10) may bring about the 
erosion of the state as we know it i.e. the traditional nation-state 
described by the sociological container theory of society we have been 
familiar with. The central premise of (Beck’s) national modernity is 
already overturned -  namely, the idea that “we live and act in the 
self-enclosed spaces of national states and their respective national 
societies” (Beck 2000a: 20). In the course of these possible current 
transformations of the state, we need to remember about the 
institution of the modern university born at roughly the same time, as 
an intellectual (and ideological) product of the same modern project, 
following Beck’s argument that “the globalization process will have
to become the criterion of national politics in every domain (in
economics, law, military affairs, and so on)” (Beck 2000a: 15, emphasis 
mine). In every domain, including national higher education policies 
directly affecting our universities, let us add.11 As Guy Neave put it,
9 Or as John Gerard Ruggie phrased it in his “Globalization and the Embedded 
Liberalism Compromise: The End of an Era?”, “existing systems of supervision and 
regulation as well as tax and accounting policies were created for a nation-based 
world economic landscape” (Ruggie 1997: 7).
10 I am using the notion of “governance” instead of “government” to reflect the 
involvement of various players at various levels, which is the current reality.
11 Anthony Giddens in his BBC lectures Runaway World claims that “globalisation 
is restructuring the ways in which we live, and in a very profound manner. ... We live
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the modern university was “the Nation-State university” (Neave 
2001b: 16).12
Modern states developed as nation-states -  political apparatuses, 
“distinct from both ruler and ruled, with supreme jurisdiction over a 
demarcated territorial area, backed by a claim to a monopoly of 
coercive power, and enjoying legitimacy as a result of a minimum 
level of support or loyalty from their citizens”, argues David Held in 
his Democracy and the Global Order (Held 1995: 48). The most 
prominent innovations for the concept of the state include 
territoriality, control of the means of violence, as well as an 
impersonal structure of power and legitimacy. It is only with the 
system of modern states that exact borders have been fixed. Holding a 
monopoly on force and the means of coercion only became possible 
with the breaking down of rival centers of power and authority.13 An 
impersonal structure of power was not possible as long as political 
rights, obligations and duties were tied to religion and traditional 
elites. Finally, human beings as “individuals” and “peoples” had won 
a place as active participants in the new political order. As Held goes 
on to argue,
in a world of transformations, affecting almost every aspect o f what we do. For better or 
worse, we are being propelled into a global order that no one fully understands, but 
which is making its effects felt upon all of us” (Giddens 1999: 4-7, emphasis mine).
12 It was Gerard Delanty who powerfully reminded us recently about the “pact” 
between the modern university and the state: “in return for autonomy, it [university] 
would furnish the state with its cognitive requirements. The great social movements of 
modernity ... had little to do with the ivory tower of the academy and its posture of 
splendid isolation” (Delanty 2001: 2). The historical pact between the two is “slowly 
beginning to unravel” (4). The global process of the retreat of the state from the 
position of provider to that of regulator “fundamentally alters the historical pact 
between knowledge and the state ... which was institutionalized in the new centers of 
knowledge such as the university and the royal academies” (103).
13 As Opello and Rosow argue in The Nation-State and Global Order, constructing 
and defending national borders involved more than physical defenses; “the people 
living within them had to be convinced to accept them and had to be made to identify 
their needs and interests as primarily enclosed within the state’s borders” (Opello and 
Rosow 1999: 226). That was to be achieved, inter alia, through education, including 
later in the 19th century, higher education, as philosophically elaborated by German 
thinkers writing about the institution of the university.
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the loyalty of citizens became something that had to be won by modern 
states: invariably this involved a claim by the state to be legitimate because it 
reflected and/or represented the views and interests of its citizens (Held 
1995: 48-49).
Although Held does not mention the theme, the modern legitimacy of 
the state brings us closer, a century later, to the beginnings of the idea 
of the welfare state. Modern states have certainly won the loyalty of 
their citizens (as well as achieving social and political stability14) when 
they gradually introduced not only political rights, but also social 
benefits; including pension schemes, state-subsidized (if not free) 
higher education and affordable health care.15 Not forgetting the strong 
influence of the Russian 1917 October Revolution and its aftermath, the 
welfare state became a fully-fledged reality throughout the quarter of a
14 The economic price for social and political stability provided by the welfare state 
is certainly a recurring issue. Dani Rodrik seems to hit the mark when he argues in Has 
Globalization Gone Too Far? that “the most serious challenge for the world economy in the 
years ahead lies in making globalization compatible with domestic social and political stability -  
or to put it even more directly, in ensuring that international economic integration does not 
contribute to domestic social disintegration” (Rodrik 1997: 2, all emphases mine).
15 Today, the question is how to reduce state intervention is some areas of the 
welfare state and preserve the public trust -  retain legitimacy. As Daniel Yergin and 
Joseph Stanislaw argue, governments today face a “daunting” challenge: “to figure 
[out] ways to reduce their intervention in some areas, and to retool and refocus their 
intervention in others, while preserving the public trust. It is a challenge of 
imagination. It requires buying into the idea of fundamental global change and taking 
on the task of translating that change into policies that accord with national culture, 
history, and temperament” (Yergin and Stanislaw 2000: 321). As cultures, histories and 
temperaments clearly differ from country to country, the process of the translation of 
global changes into particular national contexts is bound to bring about divergent 
effects in different countries. The idea of a strong global “convergence” for welfare 
state solutions has so far been only theoretical; Bob Jessop argues that there is 
“significant variation” in the search for solutions to the problems of what he terms the 
Keynesian National Welfare State: “it involves neither a unidirectional movement nor 
a multilateral convergence across all national regimes” (Jessop 1999a: 356). Roger Dale 
argues in a similar vein about the effects of globalization on educational policy -  
globalization cannot be reduced to an imposition of the same set of rules of the game 
(the same policy) on all countries as “the nature and impact of globalization effects 
varies enormously across different countries according to their position in the world 
and regional economies” (Dale 1999: 2).
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century following the end of the Second World War. Philip G. Cerny 
analyzing the issue from the point of view of “public goods” argues 
that “expanding national bureaucracies continually took on new social 
and economic tasks, while national capital found that national markets 
(and the national state) provided a congenial and appropriate 
framework around which to organize” (Cerny 1995: 608). Public goods 
were perceived at that time by all interested parties as a national-level 
phenomena and they were of three kinds: regulatory public goods, 
productive/ distributive public goods and, finally, redistributive public 
goods. Regulatory public goods include the establishment and 
protection of private (and public) property rights, a stable currency, the 
standardization of weights and measures, the protection of contracts 
and the adjucation of disputes etc; productive/distributive public 
goods are the full or partial public ownership of certain industries, the 
direct or indirect provision of infrastructure and public services, public 
subsidies etc; and redistributive public goods include health and 
welfare services, employment policies, environmental protection etc. In 
a globalizing world, nation-states have difficulty supplying or fostering 
all of these categories of public goods (Cerny 2001: 608ff.). Higher 
education seems to belong to both the second (public subsidies and 
public services) and the third (welfare services in a broader sense) kind 
of public goods. Globalization has undercut the policy capacity of 
nation-states “in all but a few areas”; the state is seen as “structurally 
inappropriate” for the task of directly providing productive/ 
distributive goods (Cerny 2001: 612, 610). Higher education is not an 
exceptional area here and states’ capacities (in relative terms -  referring 
to the massification of higher education) are becoming increasingly 
limited. At the same time, as Dani Rodrik argues in Has Globalization 
Gone Too Far?, globalization has made it “exceedingly difficult” for 
governments to provide social insurance -  “one of their central 
functions and one that has helped maintain social cohesion and 
domestic political support for ongoing liberalization throughout the 
postwar period”. The hallmark of the postwar social contract was that 
such insurance (as well as other components of the welfare state such 
as access to affordable education or health care) was expected from 
governments in advanced countries (Rodrik 1997: 6).
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Just to signal further developments: the legitimacy of, and loyalty 
towards, modern liberal democratic welfare states is under severe 
stress today and the whole idea of a postwar “social contract” 
between the state and its citizens is widely debated16 (let it suffice to 
mention, from a European standpoint, discussions by Ulrich Beck, 
sociologist; and Jürgen Habermas, philosopher: from an American 
standpoint, let us mention Robert B. Reich and his concept of 
“symbolic analysts” whose loyalties may no longer be so much 
towards their nation states or their fellow citizens17). It has been 
argued that modern states came to be nation-states because they 
triumphed in war, were (relatively) successful economically and won 
legitimacy in the eyes of their populations and other states:
16 As John Gerard Ruggie in his classic paper on “embedded liberalism” describes 
the perceptions of Polanyi and Keynes at the time when the idea of the postwar welfare 
state was being born, “governments [were] assuming much more direct responsibility 
for domestic social security and economic stability ... [D]emands for social protection 
were very nearly universal, coming from all sides of the political spectrum and from all 
ranks of the social hierarchy” (Ruggie 1982: 388). As he goes on to argue, “the task of the 
postwar institutional reconstruction ... [was] to devise a framework which would 
safeguard and even ease the quest for domestic stability without, at the same time, 
triggering the mutually destructive external consequences that had plagued the interwar 
period. This was the essence of the embedded liberalism compromise: unlike the 
economic nationalism of the thirties, it would be multilateral in character; unlike the 
liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated 
upon domestic interventionism” (Ruggie 1982: 398).
17 Mike Bottery in “The End of Citizenship? The Nation-State, Threats to Its 
Legitimacy, and Citizenship Education in the Twenty-first Century” presents a parallel 
picture with respect to the future trajectories of the loyalties and allegiances of the wealthy 
in a globalized world and his views echo those of Zygmunt Bauman writing on the “new 
poor” and on the “globally mobile” contrasted with the “locally tied”. Bottery argues that 
“whether one likes the consequences or not, the possibility of individuals opting out of 
citizenship commitments and relocating to a more attractive state is an increasingly 
possible -  even probable -  one. Were this to happen on a sufficiently large scale, a nation­
state’s ability to demand responsibilities and duties from the remaining population would 
be severely threatened by its inability to deliver its side of any citizenship bargain. Such a 
futuristic scenario of a world made up of competing tax-havens, where the poor live 
either by serving the rich or by scraping a living in walled-off locations of alternating 
anarchy and tyranny, is, to this writer at least, ethically and politically grotesque, but still 
needs serious consideration and rebuttal, for there is sufficient factual detail in this 
scenario to give it a disagreeable credibility” (Bottery 2003: 112).
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They triumphed in war because, as welfare became more extended in scale and 
cost, it was larger national states which were best able to organize and fund 
military power. ... They were economically successful because the rapid 
growth of their markets from the late sixteenth century, and particularly after 
the mid-eighteenth century, sustained the process of capital accumulation: as 
the economic basis of the centralized state expanded, it significantly reduced 
the war-making ability of smaller states (often with fragmented power 
structures) and traditional empires (which depended above all on the coercive 
power for their success). And they gained in legitimacy because, as they 
extended their military, organizational and coordinating activities, they came 
to depend more and more on the active cooperation, collaboration and support 
of other collectivities, especially well-organized civil groups (Held 1995: 71-72).
It is useful to note in passing that in these times of powerful 
globalization processes, and following the end of the Cold War, 
regular wars -  in the classical sense of that term -  between nations of 
the affluent West seem rather improbable today, in contrast to the 
increasing threats of terrorist attacks on a global scale (as Ulrich Beck 
put it in his World Risk Society, “as the bipolar world fades away, we 
are moving from a world of enemies to one of dangers and risks”, 
Beck 1999a: 11); the economic success of (to a large extent, no longer 
national) companies often does not mean economic success for the 
citizens where these companies are headquartered any more (for the 
traditional correlation between “national interests” and “corporate 
interests” no longer holds in a global age); and the success in gaining 
the loyalty of and legitimacy from the citizens of nation-states 
through the services and benefits of the modern welfare state could 
be undermined by its restructuring and retrenchment, as is discussed 
in Chapter 5. Increasingly, there are differences between the 
“national interests” of particular nation-states and their citizens on 
the one hand and the corporate interests (merely economic interests) 
of particular transnational companies on the other, so states are torn 
between purely economic decisions which often undermine their 
traditional legitimacy and purely political decisions which could 
contribute to maintaining their legitimacy. However, globalization18
18 In thinking about globalization, I am inclined to agree with the definitions 
given by David Held and his colleagues in Global Transformations; from an
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has not only changed the scope of economic activities; what has also 
changed are people’s perceptions of social spaces and their 
boundaries.19 Various social interactions so far assumed to be taking 
place inside national borders (such as e.g. family connections, 
participating in voluntary associations, belonging to economic 
communities), are increasingly constitutive of networks of social 
interaction across these same borders. Civil society moves freely across 
and along the territorial borders of states (Opello and Rosow 1999: 
232ff), and so do often the loyalties of citizens of nation-states, which 
in the past had to be catered for by, inter alia, the modern university. 
The control of the state over the economy in a given national territory 
is much reduced. The national identities of millions of migrating 
people (on a global scale) need to be renegotiated, and they often mix 
with other forms of identities (professional, religious, sexual etc) in 
“hybrid” loyalties.20
There is also an increasing awareness of the artificiality, or at least 
of the constructed nature, of nation-state citizenship. As Mike Bottery 
argues, it is only at the present time that “the political body defining 
the terms and boundaries of citizenship is something called ‘the 
nation-state’” (Bottery 2003: 102). Bottery stresses that nation-state
introductory one: “Globalization may be thought of initially as the widening, 
deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of 
contemporary social life”, to a more refined one: “Globalization is a process (or set of 
processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social 
relations and transactions -  assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and 
impact -  generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, 
interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held et al. 1999: 2, 16).
19 Globalization also means a new way of thinking about social and economic 
space and time. It is not only a “time/ space compression”, possible through advances 
in communication and telecommunication, but also what Martin Carnoy calls the 
“reconceptualization of one’s ‘world’” (Carnoy 1999: 19).
20 The State in a Changing World (a World Bank’s “World Development Report 
1997”), describes the situation in the following manner: “the state still defines the 
policies for those within its jurisdiction, but global events and international 
agreements are increasingly affecting its choices. People are now more mobile, more 
educated, and better informed about conditions elsewhere. And involvement in the 
global economy reduces the state’s ability to tax capital, and brings much closer 
financial market scrutiny of monetary and fiscal policies” (World Bank 1997: 12).
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citizenship involves a form of exchange, even if such an exchange is 
rarely fully articulated. In return for a transfer of identification and 
loyalty from the local and regional level to that of the nation-state, 
nation-states have provided its citizens with civil citizenship (the right 
to freedom of speech, rights to justice and the ownership of property), 
political citizenship (the right to be involved in the exercise of political 
power) and social citizenship (the right to healthcare, economic 
security and educational provision) (Bottery 2003: 103ff). What is of 
major interest to us here is the social citizenship. The loyalty of 
citizens of nation-states is closely related to this “bilateral” agreement, 
although never fully codified, between citizens and the state. Should 
the nation-state be threatened, so also will its role as primary 
guarantor of citizenship rights. The social concept of citizenship has 
been under attack since the 1970s and critiques have come from three 
directions: a philosophical aversion to the paternalistic state; a 
pragmatic belief in the declining capacity of the nation state to 
provide social goods (healthcare, social security, education) 
adequately; and a belief in its inferior capability of providing these 
goods in comparison with the market:
All of these bear upon the status and legitimacy of the nation-state, and therefore 
upon the citizenship bargain, for if the state is seen as an essentially malevolent 
entity, needing to be kept as small as possible and having neither the capacity nor 
the capability of providing the goods it has claimed to provide, what right has it 
to demand allegiance, loyalty and duty from the individual? Why should 
individuals provide these when it does so little for them? (Bottery 2003: 105).
The philosophical aspect of this critique of social citizenship (or of 
the welfare state in particular) came from von Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom and Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom. The threat to 
social citizenship under global pressures comes from what C. Lasch has 
recently called the “revolt of the elites”: the wealthy cease to identify 
themselves with any particular nation state. The citizens-consumers 
may opt out of the political life of nation-states and shop around for the 
best low-cost citizenship, in the most profitable or least-taxed locations 
around the globe. Internationally mobile groups may be much less 
willing to cooperate with others in resolving local problems -  as Dani 
Rodrik argues, “owners of internationally mobile factories become
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disengaged from their local communities and disinterested in their 
development and prosperity” if faced locally by both bad economies 
and bad governance (Rodrik 1997: 70). The forces undermining the 
loyalty of citizens of nation-states are varied and also include, apart 
from the critique of social citizenship and consumerism, political 
globalization, economic globalization and the new ideas of “mean and 
lean” states. It is very unclear indeed why -  along with the dismantling 
of the welfare state and the renegotiation of the postwar “social 
contract” between governments, unions and workers; the decline in the 
capacities, capabilities and willingness of nation-states to provide some 
traditionally (sometimes even fully) state-funded welfare services; 
together with many other factors mentioned here -  national loyalty 
should not be decreasing. And if it is decreasing anyway, for some 
structural reasons, why the whole modern paradigm of the close link 
between higher education (civic, national education) and the nation­
state should be as strong as in pre-globalization eras.
The emergent European political order (by the end of the 
seventeenth century) was referred to as the “Westphalian model” (after 
the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, agreed to in Germany after the 
Thirty Years’ War). The emergent conception of international order 
entrenched, for the first time, the principle of territorial sovereignty in 
inter-state affairs (Held 1995: 77). The issue to what extent globalization 
undermines the Westphalian model of international relations today is 
crucial to our concerns: discussions about it go to the very heart of the 
questions about the role of nation-states in the current global order and 
about their sovereignty in exercising national policies of interest to us 
here, especially national educational policies. The model constructed by 
David Held consists of seven generalizations:
1. The world consists of, and is divided by, sovereign states which recognize 
no superior authority.
2. The processes of law-making, the settlement of disputes and law 
enforcement are largely in the hands of individual states.
3. International law is oriented to the establishment of minimal rules of 
coexistence; the creation of enduring relationships among states and 
peoples is an aim, but only to the extent that it allows national political 
objectives to be met.
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4. Responsibility for cross-border wrongful acts is a ‘private matter’ 
concerning only those affected.
5. All states are regarded as equal before the law: legal rules do not take 
account of asymmetries of power.
6. Differences among states are ultimately settled by force; the principle of 
effective power holds sway. Virtually no legal fetters exist to curb the 
resort to force; international legal standards afford minimal protection.
7. The minimization of impediments to state freedom is the ‘collective’ 
priority (Held et al. 1999: 37-38).21
The new order endorsed the right of each state to autonomous and 
independent action. As Held comments, “in this conception, the world 
consists of separate political powers pursuing their own interests, backed 
by diplomatic initiatives and, in the last instance, by their organization of 
coercive power” (Held et al. 1999: 38). The gradual undermining of the 
seven points enumerated by Held means the end of the Westphalian 
model; this is the end of the traditional world order of nation-states and 
the traditional relationships between them. Consequently, he argues, we 
are living in a post-Westphalian order. In his strong formulation of 1995, 
“the modern state ... [is] unable to determine its own fate” (Held 1995: 
92), which was later modified and quantified in a magisterial 
introduction to the globalization debate which he co-authored with his 
colleagues (Held et al. 1999).22 The Westphalian order and the sovereign 
state evolved in a “symbiotic partnership”: rulers recognized each other’s 
sovereignty and, in turn, the consolidation of the Westphalian state 
system reinforced the primacy of the sovereign territorial state (see 
McGrew 1997: 4ff). Since the Second World War the modern nation-state 
has become “the principal type of political rule across the globe”, and it 
has acquired a political form of liberal or representative democracy
21 For Anthony McGrew, the central normative principles of the Westphalian 
order are fourfold: territoriality, sovereignty, autonomy, and legality (1997: 3).
22 Held’s views on the subject have evolved towards being less radical as the 
globalization processes develop. Still in 1991 (in Political Theory Today) he argued along 
strong lines that “the internationalization of production, finance and other economic 
resources is unquestionably eroding the capacity of any individual state to control its 
own economic future. ... Multinational corporations may have a clear national base, 
but their interest is above all in global profitability. Country of origin is of little 
consequence for corporate strategy” (Held; quoted in Burbules and Torres 2000: 9).
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(Held et al. 1999: 46). Globalization, if it is indeed reconstituting the 
nature of sovereign states, has profound implications for modern 
democratic theory and practices which have been constructed upon the 
foundations of the Westphalian order. As Anthony McGrew argued,
For if state sovereignty is no longer conceived as indivisible but shared with 
international agencies; if states no longer have control over their own 
territories; and if territorial and political boundaries are increasingly 
permeable, the core principles o f  liberal democracy -  that is self-governance, the 
demos, consent, representation, and popular sovereignty -  are made distinctly 
problematic (McGrew 1997: 12, emphases mine).
And the sovereignty of the state meant also the sovereignty of 
national educational policies and full state support for nation-state 
oriented universities (from their inception as modern institutions 
bound by a “pact” with modern nation-states). The university used to 
provide the modern nation-state with “a moral and spiritual basis” 
and professors, as Gerard Delanty argues along Humboldtian lines, 
“constructed themselves as the representatives of the nation” (Delanty 
2001: 33, 34).
Andy Green in Education, Globalization and the Nation-State (1997) 
asks a number of succinct questions about the future role of education 
in what he calls a “post-national era”. How distinctive will national 
education systems remain against the pressures for international 
convergence? (Which over the next decade and in a distinctly 
European context, should be complemented with parallel questions 
about European convergence and the harmonization of higher 
education through the Bologna process, as well as the emergence of a 
distinctly European research area, discussed separately in Chapter 6.) 
Does a national education system have a future at all? According to 
some of the radical views he describes (which are derived from the 
logic of both postmodernism and globalization studies), a national 
education system per se is now
defunct, at once irrelevant, anachronistic and impossible. ... Governments can no 
longer use education to promote social cohesion and to transmit national cultures 
and should not attempt to do so. As the national state becomes a marginal force 
in the new world order, so education becomes an individualized consumer good 
delivered in a global market and accessed through satellite and cable links. 
National education ceases to exist (Green 1997: 3).
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I have to agree with his arguments about the changing nature of 
education in the national and “post-national” eras. Even though 
Green does not refer explicitly to the modern ideal of the university, 
nor to its philosophical formulations in the Germany of the beginning 
of the 19th century, he hits the mark. It is exactly this juxtaposition of 
the nation, collectively, using education for citizen-formation, 
consciousness-building and national awareness raising on the one 
hand; with education as the individual, private good for (still 
national) economic competitiveness on the other.23 As C. Peter 
Magrath put it recently, “the individual comes first”.24 The historic 
function of the modern university -  the transmission of national 
cultures, the inculcation of national consciousness in citizens of 
nation-states, forging national citizenship, the formative purpose and 
mission of supporting national ideas and ideals, mainly through the 
humanities and social sciences -  seems up for grabs today. As Green 
vividly describes the process,
[t]he role of a national education system has changed, particularly in the 
older advanced nation states, and governments cannot manage education in 
the old ways. The original function of education systems was to cultivate 
social integration and cohesion, forging new notions of national citizenship 
and identity. ... [E]ducation has particularly lost sight o f  this form ative mission 
and purpose. In the advanced states now ... education is seen primarily as a 
means o f  individual and collective economic advancement. Citizen form ation has
23 This opposition was strongly emphasized by Jean-François Lyotard in his 
(somehow prophetic) The Postmodern Condition when he argued that “in the context of 
delegitimation, universities and the institutions of higher learning are called upon to 
create skills, and no longer ideals. ... The transmission of knowledge is no longer 
designed to train an elite capable of guiding the nation towards its emancipation” 
(Lyotard 1984: 48). In more general terms, Lyotard questions emancipatory ambitions 
for knowledge (and its producer, the “Professor”) in postmodernity. See in this context 
especially Peter Roberts’ paper “Rereading Lyotard: Knowledge, Commodification 
and Higher Education” (1998) and A.T. Nuyen’s book chapter on “Lyotard and Rorty 
on the Role of the Professor” (1995).
24 As he states it explicitly: “if his or her needs are not served, there will be 
political or economic repercussions against providers who do not provide -  who fail 
to serve their customers” (Magrath 2000: 252). Or, in a similar vein, as Martin Wolf 
phrased it crudely, “governments, like other institutions, will be forced to provide 
value to those who pay for their services” (Wolf 2001: 188).
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given way to skills formation, nation-building to national economic competitiveness. 
The public and collective nature of the educational project has been partially 
eclipsed, at least for the moment, by individualist aspirations and norms 
(Green 1997: 4, emphases mine).
We have to remember that national education systems were created as 
part of the state forming process which established the modern nation­
state.25 They were born when states based on absolutistic or monarchical 
rule gave way to the modern nation-state: as Green stresses, the history 
of “national education” is thus very much the history of the “nation state 
in formation” (Green 1997: 131). National education systems contributed 
to the creation of civic loyalties and national identities and became 
guardians for national languages, cultures, literatures and
consciousness. The modern university and the modern nation-state 
went hand in hand, or were parts of the same wide process of 
modernization.26 Consequently, as we claim here, reconfigurations of
25 I am in full agreement with Jürgen Enders who claims that the contemporary 
university “was born of the nation state, not of medieval civilisation, and it was only 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, following the establishment of clear national 
economic interests, that universities acquired their identification with science and 
technology. Their regulatory and funding context was, and still is, national; their 
contribution to national cultures was, and still is, significant; students tended to be, 
and still are, trained to become national functionaries; and universities played, and 
still play, a considerable role in what some have called the military-industrial complex 
of nation states. It is appropriate, therefore, to see current trends as part of a process 
by which national systems of higher education are being challenged by new forces of 
internationalisation” (Enders 2002a: 3).
26 Interesting enough, Michel Foucault, in his brilliant panoramic views of what 
he called the “Classical Age” presented over a period of thirty years, has clearly shown 
the power/knowledge connection as used by the state and its institutions: mental 
hospitals, clinics, prisons, corrective institutions etc. Nevertheless he has never 
focused on the relationships between the modern state and the modern university as 
such. Even though the production of knowledge and the exercise of power were two 
sides of the same process, Foucault never directly referred to modern research 
universities and the German-inspired ideal of the modern researcher in his analyses. 
Let us evoke here his intriguing idea (from a chapter on “Panopticism” in Discipline 
and Punish) that “it is surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, 
forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, 
who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the 
modern instrument of penality? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, 
schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons?” (Foucault 1979: 227-228).
Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State 157
the modern nation-state today are bound to affect the modern 
institution of the university. Green believes in the durability of the 
nation-state and argues that the most economically and culturally 
successful nation-states have carefully deployed centralized state 
education and they should continue to do so (see a review symposium 
on his book in Dimitriadis et al. 1998: 571ff). He can be viewed as a 
strong supporter of government-funded public education.
State-sponsored mass education is, in modernity, the primary 
source of socialization facing the individual as citizen of a nation-state 
(see Spybey 1996). Individuals were given access to “knowledge” and 
the opportunity of becoming “educated” -  “but enablement is 
combined with constraint upon the individual to identify with and 
participate in the state as a national project” (Spybey 1996: 59). 
European nation-states were engaged in authorizing, funding and 
managing education systems, including higher education, to construct 
unified national polities. As Francisco Ramirez and John Boli put it,
individuals were expected to find their primary identification with the 
nation, and it was presumed that state power would be enhanced by the 
universal participation of citizens in national projects (Ramirez and Boli 
quoted in Spybey 1996: 59).
Even though they never explicitly mention Prussia after its defeat by 
the French and the Prussian drive to reform their educational 
institutions at the beginning of the 19th century, the idea that a 
military defeat (or a failure to keep pace with industrial development 
in rival countries) is a factor stimulating the state to turn to (higher) 
education as a means of national revitalization can be referred 
directly to the Humboldtian reforms.
3.2. T h e  N ation -State  and  the M od ern  U n iversity : 
a H istorica l P act b etw een  T w o M od ern  In stitu tio n s
As Guy Neave stressed in his paper on “The European Dimension in 
Higher Education”, “the construction of the Nation-State in Western 
Europe rested on a discourse which turned around its political, cultural 
and historic heritage conceived as uniting the citizens of a given state
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around them. To this, the university was an undissolvable part. Both by 
its teaching and by the research it undertook in the cultural and human 
sciences it challenged, reaffirmed, and reinterpreted the nation’s 
fortune in the past and its right to legitimacy in the present” (Neave 
2001b: 47). Following Neave, it is useful to ask a set of basic questions 
about the relationship between the university and society (for my 
agreements and disagreements with Neave about the German idea of 
the university and the relationships between the university and the 
nation-state, see also a long section in the Introduction). The questions 
have remained fundamentally the same throughout recent centuries; 
what changes from time to time is the answers to them -  which may 
become inadequate or irrelevant. Neave in his discussion of 
“Universities’ Responsibility to Society” presents six fundamental 
questions each society should pose itself with respect to its universities:
How is the “community” to which the university is answerable conceived? 
What is the role of central government in controlling or steering the 
university? What is the place of Academia in the Nation? Is the University an 
institution for stability or change? What purpose does the knowledge 
transmitted and generated by the University play in society’s development? 
Should society -  through government -  determine the type of knowledge 
which should have priority in the University? (Neave 2000b: 4).
These questions were central to the Humboldtian reforms of the 
Prussian universities, to the French reforms of universities at roughly 
the same time (giving rise to the “Napoleonic” model of the 
institution), as well as to the evolution of both British and American 
universities.27 Clearly, in Neave’s view, they are also central to 
universities at the beginning of the 21st century.
27 Bill Readings argues that the university is pressed into the service of the (nation) 
state once the notion of universal reason is replaced by the idea of (national) culture as 
the animating principle of the university. The difference between the developments in 
France and in Germany at the turn of the 19th century is that the French were claiming to 
legitimate the state in terms of universal reason, and hence their education system, while 
placed at the service of national culture, continued to think of its identity in terms of the 
superstition/enlightenment opposition (Readings 1996: 60ff). Germans viewed the new 
university from the perspective of nationhood, German ethnicity, or Germanness. At the 
same time, as Guy Neave stresses, the third variation of State/University relationships -
Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State 159
Let us try now to see how these basic questions can be referred to 
current transformations of the institution under global pressures. The 
community to which universities are answerable today does not have 
to be the nation or the nation-state anymore; increasingly, following 
the American model, it may be the region or the local community -  or 
the globe, for major world-class universities. National literature, 
national history and civic education conceived within a national 
framework are no longer at the center of the university; the university 
seems increasingly answerable to the community of its “clients”: 
students, employers’ associations, and the economy more generally 
(it is Guy Neave who has been recently developing the ideas of the 
“stakeholder society”28). In the most general terms, the role of central 
governments in controlling the university, and in subsidizing its 
operations, is decreasing. The place of Academia in the Nation is 
changing: from a provider of national glue to hold society and its 
citizens together -  to a provider of the skills and competences 
necessary to flourish in emergent knowledge-based societies; as well 
as from the pursuit of knowledge mostly for its own sake (from 
Humboldt’s traditional formulation discussed in Chapter 2) -  to the 
pursuit of constantly redefined and mostly “useful” knowledge. 
Instead of fostering national identity, the university becomes an 
increasingly important part of the (global) production process. The 
university today is conceived of as an institution designed for change 
rather than for stability: it is expected to work on the cutting edge of 
sciences and bring technological innovations to the production 
process. Its links with industry are getting closer and much more 
natural than in the past: research funds are increasingly “strings­
England -  included the university as a “self-governing, property owning corporation” 
and it remained intact over the same period (Neave 2001b: 28).
28 Neave draws a line between the role of universities in the age of nation-states 
and in the emergent stakeholder society in his recent CHEPS inaugural lecture. He 
argues that “the rise of the Stakeholder Society comes as the end to this 19th century 
concordat between Nation State, its representative communities and the university in 
Continental Europe. It reflects a redefinition in the place of the State, sometimes 
alluded to as the shift from ‘State control’ to ‘State surveillance’. And by the same 
token, it involves a redefinition of the community in terms of those interests to which 
the university should be answerable” (Neave 2002c: 12).
160 Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State
attached”, especially in such areas as medicine, biotechnology, 
genetics, computing sciences etc. Knowledge produced by the 
university is increasingly “useful” to the economic development of 
countries and nations, while what counts as useful is having to be 
renegotiated with research-funding state agencies and third parties, 
especially companies. Knowledge produced and transmitted by the 
university no longer serves to maintain national ideals and inculcate 
national consciousness; it is increasingly technical knowledge which 
is independent from the national, linguistic and ideological context in 
which it was produced (the knowledge produced in computing 
sciences is a good example).29 As Neave argues,
it is no longer the humanities or the cultural sciences that have universal 
value. On the contrary, their national or territorial relatedness places them  in 
the position of being specific to the identity, circumstances and condition of a 
particular national or linguistic community (Neave 2001b: 53).30
Finally, as far as the last question from the set presented by 
Neave is concerned, society through its government is increasingly
29 On the relationships between the humanities and the sciences in American 
academia, Ronald Strickland stresses that the final point has been, already for a few 
decades, who pays the bill. Retrospectively, “in elite universities the traditional prestige 
of the humanities began to erode with the expansion of scientific research in the 1950s. 
In actual practice ... humanities were increasingly treated as window-dressing. A 
distinguished humanities program could be an impressive ‘ornament’ and the 
humanities faculty often enjoyed light teaching loads and ample research support, but 
everyone tacitly acknowledged that the sciences were first priority -  the sciences were 
paying the bills” (Strickland 2002: 9). In a similar vein, J. Hillis Miler remembers that it 
is difficult for most humanities professors to accept the fact that their prosperity in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s “was as much a result of the Cold War as was the prosperity of 
aircraft and weapons manufacturers, or as was the space race that put men on the 
moon. Nevertheless, we were part of the military-industrial complex. The expensive 
development of humanities programs was an ancillary part of our need to be best at 
everything in order to defeat the Soviet Union in the cold war” (Miller 1996: 16).
30 This is a common belief among the students of the institution of the university 
today. Bill Readings claims that “the centrality of the traditional humanistic disciplines 
to the life of the University is no longer assured” (Readings 1996: 3), while Miriam 
Henry et al. evoke the marginalization of “non-commercial areas of inquiry and 
research, particularly in the humanities and social sciences” caused by increasing 
levels of privatization and the commodification of tertiary education (Henry et al. 
2001: 169).
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influencing academic priorities and the priority areas of knowledge 
produced by the university: the major influence being through state 
funding mechanisms. But perhaps research areas are being prioritized 
by the market and corporate funding even more, especially in the 
most advanced economies where links between Academia and the 
economy are much stronger than in developing and less-developed 
countries.
The crucial step in the development of European universities for 
our purposes here is what Neave termed the process of their 
“nationalization” -  bringing the university formally into the public 
domain as a national responsibility. With the rise of the nation-state, 
the university was set at the apex of institutions defining national 
identity:
The university was thus subject to the oversight of public administration 
rather than being the object of regalian privilege. ... [T]he university was 
assimilated into a national system of oversight and control exercised through 
legislative enactment, ministerial decree and circular. It opened the way to 
the public financing of universities via the state budget. And, no less 
important, the forging of the nation-state went hand in hand with the 
incorporation of academia into the ranks of state service, thereby placing 
upon it the implicit obligation of service to the national community (Neave 
2001b: 26).
The process of étatisation or “nationalization” of the university started 
long before the appearance of nation-states and was an indirect 
consequence of the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 which gave the ruler 
the right to determine the particular religious obedience of his 
subjects. It changed the nature of super-ordinate authority and the 
mission of the university: in contemporary terms, “super-ordinate 
authority was repatriated or appropriated by the Prince” (Neave 
2001b: 17). According to Neave, the incorporation of the university 
into the service of the territorial state falls into two distinct phases. 
The first ends with the French Revolution, the second begins with the 
reconstruction of the Prussian university by German thinkers. The 
collective identity produced at universities gradually detached itself 
from the person of the ruler and became national identity, with 
loyalty directed to the nation and its history, philosophy, literature,
162 Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State
language and social institutions rather than loyalty directed towards 
the ruler, as in the pre-revolution era. Let us add in passing that from 
this perspective, the decline in states’ sovereignty and the 
diminishing role of their territoriality under the pressures of 
globalization introduces a new dimension to the state-university 
relationship. If the sovereign and territorial state is affected by 
globalization, so is the modern university brought in to serve it over 
the last two hundred years.
The emergence of the Prussian and French (Napoleonic) models of 
the university not only meant a shift from revealed knowledge -  
characteristic of Medieval universities -  to verifiable scientific 
knowledge. These institutions were also illustrating the process of 
“the harnessing of the university to the modernization of society, to 
the modernization of national administration and to ensuring the 
transition of ‘traditional society’ based on ties of family, clan, tribe 
and hereditary influence towards one based on the rule of law, of 
equality before the law and the unifying force of a rational and 
impartial bureaucracy” (Neave 2000b: 5). The Humboldtian reforms 
and their French counterparts are also
a crucial step in the definition o f  the Nation-State itself, by putting in place those 
institutions for upholding national identity, providing the means o f  perpetuating 
particular ‘knowledge traditions’ to which the emergent Nation attaches 
importance as unique expressions of its exceptionalism, and formalizing the 
type of knowledge necessary both for citizenship and for assuming the 
highest administrative responsibilities the Nation may confer (Neave 2000b: 
5, emphases mine).
The emergence of the universities in Berlin and in Paris provided a 
template for the relationship between teaching and research 
(University of Berlin) and between the university and the state 
(Université Imperiale in Paris). They marked the termination of the 
long process for “the final incorporation of the university as a public 
service institution” (Neave 2001b: 25).
The process of the “nationalization” of the university settled the 
issue of what the role and responsibilities of the institution in society 
should be. The emergent nation-state defined the social place of the 
emergent modern university and determined its social
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responsibilities. The nation-state determined the community to which 
the university would be answerable: it was going to be the “national” 
community, the nation. As Neave goes on to argue,
the basic assumption which lay behind the centralized, unitary State turned 
around the notion of the unity and, as far as possible, homogeneity in the 
provision of the services government placed at the disposal of society. ... 
Under such conditions, each university was a public institution, sometimes 
even an institution of S t a t e .  (Neave 2000b: 7).
Certainly, as is discussed in Chapter 4 on the transformations of the 
welfare state, the services and benefits the unitary and homogeneous 
nation-state gradually, and over the passage of time, placed at the 
disposal of society went far beyond education, and included e.g. 
generous healthcare systems and old-age pension schemes. 
Nowadays, as the decomposition of the welfare state in general 
progresses smoothly (and mostly in an unnoticeable manner) in most 
parts of the world, social contracts with regards to these (and possibly 
other) areas of state benefits and state-funded services may have to be 
renegotiated, significantly changing their content. In many respects, 
higher education seems to be an experimental area and a testing 
ground on how to reform the public sector in many countries and for 
many organizations; both healthcare and pensions systems are being 
experimented with as well but on a smaller scale, both in theory and 
in practice.31
31 The biggest empirical evidence for the direction of changes in the transformation 
of the public sector are various “structural adjustment” programs in developing and 
transition countries which require the states taking IMF or World Bank loans to e.g. 
reduce public expenditures, reduce consumer subsidies, eliminate price controls, 
drastically reduce tariffs, charge users for public services and privatize public enterprises 
and social services (see Carnoy 1999: 49; Ferge 2001b). With respect to education, 
structural adjustment policies are linked to globalization to the extent that “all strategies 
of development are now linked to the imperatives of creating stability for foreign capital. In 
other words, given the insurmountable obstacles to raising sufficient capital internally, 
there is no other choice than adapting to policies that systematically undercut the capacity 
of governments to construct educational policies that enhance educational quality or 
seek to develop some degree of national autonomy in the context of research and 
development” (Morrow and Torres 2000: 43, emphases mine). Recipient governments 
are encouraged to adopt policies which Thomas L. Friedman termed (in Lexus and the
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The idea of what constituted “useful knowledge” has already had 
to be renegotiated in the course of the history of the modern 
university. With the advent of the nation-state, useful knowledge 
assumed a new form: it was the type of knowledge which 
“underpinned national cohesion, provided techniques, skills and 
understanding to ensure the administration of public order, health 
and the maintenance of the rule of law”. The university became “the 
prime source of such knowledge and the repository of the Nation’s 
historic, cultural and political memory, the preservation and diffusion 
of which was its paramount task” (Neave 2000b: 12). The production 
of this type of knowledge at the university became its public 
responsibility. At the same time, though, as Neave stresses, there was 
the other obligation of the institution: the second duty, conceived of 
under the influence of German Idealists in the form of the “pursuit of 
truth”. It was disinterested scholarship driven by the curiosity of free 
individuals, scholars searching for truth.
3.3. G lo b a liz a tio n  and th e  N ation -S tate :
T h e  T h ree  C am ps
For our purposes here it is crucial to see not only the historical 
relationships between the university and the nation-state but also the 
current impact of globalization on the institution of the state (and on
Olive Tree) “the Golden Straightjacket”: “To fit into the Golden Straightjacket a country 
must either adopt, or be seen as moving toward, the following golden rules: making the 
private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a low rate of 
inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as 
close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating and lowering tariffs 
on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, getting rid of quotas 
and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries and 
utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency convertible, opening its 
industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign ownership and investment, 
deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic competition as possible, [and] 
eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks as much as possible...” 
(Friedman 2000: 100; see also M. Rodwan Abouharb’s paper on “When the World Bank 
Says Yes: Determinants of Structural Adjustment Lending”, 2003, and a research paper 
by Stephen Coate and Stephen Morris, “Policy Conditionality”, 1996).
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the public sector to which public universities have traditionally 
belonged, to which we will return further in the chapter). The 
changing ideas of the welfare state under globalization pressures are 
discussed in Chapter 4; so for now let us turn to the current 
rethinking of the nation-state in the context of globalization. Once we 
establish the major directions in rethinking the nation-state today, we 
will be able to see the possible long-term consequences for higher 
education in new accounts of the nation-state. To begin with, 
following the classification of David Held and his colleagues from 
their magisterial Global Transformations book, in the debate on 
globalization it is possible to distinguish between three broad schools 
of thought. Held et al. call them the hyperglobalizers, the skeptics and 
the transformationalists (which does not differ substantially from 
Anthony Giddens’ classification into radicals, skeptics and those who 
go outside the economic realm and lean towards viewing 
globalization also in political, cultural and technological terms in 
Runaway World, or from Jan Aart Scholte’s broad classification into 
the globalists, the skeptics and the moderates in Globalization: 
A Critical Introduction; Giddens 1999: 8-10; Scholte 2000: 17-19):
for the hyperglobalizers, such as Ohmae, contemporary globalization defines 
a new era in which peoples everywhere are increasingly subject to the 
disciplines of the global marketplace. By contrast the skeptics, such as Hirst 
and Thompson, argue that globalization is essentially a myth which conceals 
the reality of an international economy increasingly segmented into three 
major regional blocks in which national governments remain very powerful. 
Finally, for the transformationalists, chief among them being Rosenau and 
Giddens, contemporary patterns of globalization are conceived as historically 
unprecedented such that states and societies across the globe are 
experiencing a process of profound change as they try to adapt to a more 
interconnected but highly uncertain world (Held et al. 1999: 2).
We will use these classifications in a much more narrow sense, 
associating the three intellectual camps with the three positions taken 
today with regard to the impact o f globalization on the nation-state and 
referring to them as globalists, skeptics and moderates. The three stances 
will need a reformulation with regard to the issue of the present and 
the future of the nation-state: those who pronounce its demise, those
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who maintain that generally nothing substantial has changed in 
recent decades, and those who see the transformation of the nation­
state as fundamental (but not deadly to it).
From the perspective of the present book, as to the globalists, I am 
referring to Jean-Marie Guehenno (in The End of the Nation-State), 
Kenichi Ohmae (in The End of the Nation-State: the Rise o f Regional 
Economies), Martin Albrow (in The Global Age. State and Society Beyond 
Modernity), Robert B. Reich (in The Work of Nations), and Susan Strange 
(in The Retreat o f the State. The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy); 
as to the skeptics, I am referring to Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson 
(in Globalization in Question. The International Economy and the Possibilities 
of Governance), Linda Weiss (in The Myth of the Powerless State), Robert 
Boyer and Daniel Drache (editors of States Against Markets. The Limits 
of Globalization), Stephen D. Krasner (in “Compromising Westphalia”), 
and John Gray (in False Dawn. The Delusions o f Global Capitalism); finally, 
as to the moderates, I am referring here to Anthony Giddens (in Beyond 
Left and Right plus Runaway World. How Globalisation Is Reshaping Our 
Lives and The Global Third Way Debate), Saskia Sassen (in Losing Control? 
Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization and Globalization and Its 
Discontents), Manuel Castells (in The Information Age. Economy, Society 
and Culture, especially vol. 2, The Power o f Identity), Jan Aart Scholte 
(in Globalization. A Critical Introduction), James N . Rosenau (in 
“Governance in a Globalizing World”), and David Held, Anthony 
McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton (in a number of 
books they wrote or edited separately or together in recent years, 
including their Global Transformations, Held’s Democracy and the Global 
Order, and McGrew’s The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and 
Territorial Democracy). Additionally, I would be also inclined to include 
Zygmunt Bauman (in e.g. Globalization. The Human Consequences) and 
Ulrich Beck (in e.g. What Is Globalization?) among the globalists, but 
discuss both briefly in Chapter 5 on the current transformations of the 
welfare state. 32
32 To complicate things further, we need to remember about the distinction 
between the reality of globalization and the ideological stance towards furthering it, or 
between economic and ideological arguments. As Peter Evans writes in an excellent 
paper on “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization”
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3.3.1. T h e  G lo b a lis ts
Let us try to summarize the position of the globalists. Recent 
historical and political developments, and globalization processes in 
particular, open for them a new epoch in human history, a radically 
new, post-national world order: “a new age” has just taken place and 
consequently we need “a new beginning” in our thinking (Albrow 
1996: 2). The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe brings an end 
to the “age of the nation-states” (and re-opens the issue of the welfare 
state* 33) with the very idea of a nation being perhaps “only an 
ephemeral political form, a European exception”.34 This is no surprise,
(1997), “changes in the global ideological climate are as crucial as new flows of money 
and goods”. He argues that “the effect of a global ideological consensus (sometimes 
aptly labeled the ‘Washington consensus’) on individual states goes well beyond the 
constraints imposed by any structural logic of the international economy. ... The 
economic logic of globalization does not in itself dictate the eclipse [of the state]. While 
globalization does make it harder for states to exercise economic initiative, it also 
increases both the potential returns from effective state action and the costs of 
incompetence. Only when viewed through the particular prism of our current global 
ideological order does globalization logically entail movement toward statelessness. 
This global ideological order grows, in turn, as much out of prejudices and ideologies 
of dominant global actors as out of any logic of interest” (Evans 1997: 63, 73-74). In a 
similar vein, Morrow and Torres stress the need to distinguish clearly between “the 
fiscal crisis of the welfare state (which forces a reduction of expenditures irrespective 
of ideological meanings” and the “presumed pressures of globalization that entail a 
reorganization of the production process and the subordination of education to it” 
(Morrow and Torres 2000: 45).
33 Both Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton agree about the role of communism in 
keeping fully-fledged welfare states alive: Hutton says: “I would say that communism, 
although it failed, did have one good impact; it kept capitalism on its guard -  in a sense 
it kept it aware that it had to have a human face”. Giddens: “[S]ocial democracy and the 
Keynesian welfare state perhaps were only able to develop as they did because of being 
in between American liberal capitalism and Soviet communism. . At least for the 
present time, no one can see any effective alternatives to the combination of a market 
economy and a democratic political system -  even though each of these has great 
deficiencies and limitations” (Hutton and Giddens 2000: 11-13).
34 The (still somehow) unexpected collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc 
should make us avoid strong, conclusive rhetoric. As Robert Keohane reminds us, 
“social scientists viewing the new world order should be humble on two dimensions. 
Our failure to foresee the end of the Cold War should make us diffident about our
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we are entering a “new age” (Guehenno 1995: x, 4, xiii). There will be 
no national economies (products, technologies, corporations or 
industries); consequently, citizens of nation-states are no longer in the 
same economic boat called the “national economy” and they are not 
bound together by the same economic fate (Reich 1992: 3-8). The 
economy becomes “borderless” and what occurs under the influence 
of global forces is the “end of the nation-state”: nation-states appear to 
have been merely a transitional form of organization for managing 
economic affairs (Ohmae 2000: 210). To use Ohmae’s metaphor,
Nation-states are political organisms, and in their economic bloodstreams 
cholesterol steadily builds up. Over time, arteries harden and the organism’s 
vitality decays. ... Thus, in today’s borderless economy, with its rapid cross­
border [flows], there is really only one strategic degree of freedom that 
central governments have to counteract this remorseless buildup of economic 
cholesterol (Ohmae 2000: 211).
Susan Strange stresses the reversal of the “state-market” balance 
of power and claims that “the impersonal forces of world markets ... 
are now more powerful than the states to whom ultimate political 
authority over society and economy is supposed to belong” (Strange 
1996: 4).35 The autonomous nation-state is losing its privileged
ability to predict the future. And the weakness of our knowledge of the conditions for 
constitutional democracy and for peace should make us reluctant to propose radical 
new plans for global democratization or peacekeeping” (Keohane 2000: 120).
35 It is useful to evoke here Karl Polanyi’s idea of “double movement” (two 
principles organizing our societies: the principle of economic liberalism and the 
principle of social protection, or the market opposed to state interventionism), in his 
classic The Great Transformation. The Political and Economic Origins o f  Our Time: “For a 
century the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double movement: the 
market expanded continuously but this movement was met by a countermovement 
checking the expansion in definite directions. Vital though such a countermovement 
was for the protection of society, in the last analysis it was incompatible with the self­
regulation of the market, and thus with the market system itself”. The “double 
movement” means two organizing principles in society: “the one was the principle o f  
economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market, relying on 
the support of the trading classes, and using largely laisse faire and free trade as its 
methods; the other was the principle o f  social protection aiming at the conservation of 
man and nature as well as productive organization, relying on the varying support of 
those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market -  primarily,
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position under political and social change on a “very grand scale”, 
while the pace of this change is “more rapid than human society has 
ever before experienced” (Strange 1996: 86, 4). Zygmunt Bauman 
gives a chapter in his book on globalization the title: “After the 
Nation-State -  What?” and stresses that “no one seems now in control. 
Worse still -  it is not clear what ‘being in control’ could, under the 
circumstances, be like” (Bauman 1998: 58).
Strange and Bauman certainly come from very different traditions 
of thought than most of the others and they are radically different, in 
normative terms, from those globalists who share a neoliberal creed. 
In descriptive terms, though, they sound quite similar indeed 
(incidentally, it would be interesting to see whether the whole idea of 
die postnazionale Konstellation recently presented by Jürgen Habermas 
would be that different from the alarmist tones assumed by both 
Susan Strange and Zygmunt Bauman).36 No matter where they come 
from, they share with neoliberals the conviction that we are currently 
witnessing the end of the world as we know it: the world of the 
nation-state (and also, to a large extent, the world of the traditional 
welfare state, which is discussed separately). The “impersonal” forces 
of the market are much more powerful than the forces of nation­
states; the game between large transnational corporations and small 
nation-states is not being played according to the same rules, to refer 
again to Ulrich Beck’s metaphor of playing draughts by the latter and 
playing chess by the former (and therefore it is a “new power game” 
between “territorially fixed political players and non-territorially 
fixed economic players”, as Beck calls it in The Brave New World of 
Work, Beck 2000b: 2).
It is interesting to see in more detail how the globalists view the 
current and future role(s) of the nation-state in a globalizing world.
but not exclusively, the working and the landed classes -  and using protective 
legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its 
methods” (Polanyi 1957: 130-132). See also Geoffrey Garrett who suggests “peaceful 
coexistence” between interventionist national economic policies and global markets as 
possible today, despite much contemporary rhetoric (Garrett 2000: 302) and Ruggie on 
“embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982 and 1997).
36 Habermas’ views on the future of the welfare state are discussed in Chapter 5.
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Indirectly, through discussing their views on the future of the nation­
state and comparing them with the views of the skeptics and the 
moderates, we may get a continuum of possible answers to the question 
of the future o f nation-state oriented higher education systems. It is hard to 
say which of the two close relations the institution of the modern 
university has, its relationship to the nation-state or its relationship to 
welfare state, will be more important for the future role(s) of the 
institution in the long term. Transformations to both aspects of the 
state, discussed separately here, are long-term processes and right now, 
on more practical grounds, the reformulation of the welfare state seems 
to be affecting universities more immediately and more directly. In the 
future, though, the other dimension of transformations to the state, 
namely, the questioning of the autonomous role o f the nation-state in a global 
setting (its “end”, “hollowing out”, “withering away”, “demise”, 
“decline”, “collapse” etc, in various current formulations) may have 
even greater effects on the university, both in terms of its social 
purpose and missions -  and in terms of future public funding for both 
teaching and research as well.
To recall Susan Strange’s strong thesis in The Retreat o f the State. 
The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy, “the impersonal forces of 
world markets ... are now more powerful than the states two whom 
ultimate political authority over society and the economy is supposed 
to belong” (Strange 1996: 4). The growing diffusion of the authority of 
states to other organizations and associations, local and regional 
bodies, and the decline of state power is accompanied by the growing 
intervention of the state and its agencies in the daily lives of its 
citizens. The arguments of her book are based on three premises. The 
first premise is that politics is not confined to politicians and their 
officials, the second is that power over outcomes is exercised 
impersonally by markets (and unintentionally by those who buy, sell 
and deal in markets), and the third that authority in society is 
“legitimately exercised by agents other than states” (Strange 1996: 13). 
She presents three propositions about the patterns of legitimate 
authority developing in the international political economy. The first 
is that there is a “growing asymmetry” among sovereign states in the 
authority they exercise in society and the economy; the second is that
Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State 171
the authority of all states has been weakened as a result of 
technological and fiscal changes and the emergence of a single global 
market economy. And the third is that some of the fundamental 
responsibilities of the state in a market economy are now not being 
adequately discharged by anyone: there is a vacuum in the 
international political economy which results in what Strange calls a 
hole of “non-authority” or “ungovernance” (Strange 1996: 13-14). 
What Strange had already suggested in her States and Markets. An 
Introduction to International Political Economy (Strange 1988) finds its 
further presentation in The Retreat o f the State; the global shift away 
from (national) states and towards markets. She makes her point with 
respect to the future of nation-states as follows,
No one seriously expects states to disappear, at least not in the foreseeable 
future. ... [T]he progressive integration of the world economy, through 
international production, has shifted the balance of power away from states 
and toward world markets (Strange 1996: 46).
The social and political consequences of this shift of balance are as far- 
reaching as those of the industrial revolution in the past. States 
collectively retreating from their participation in the ownership and 
control over industry, services and trade as part of state policies.37 
This power was not stolen from the government of states by 
transnational corporations or other political and economic 
organizations: “it was handed to them on a plate” (Strange 1996: 45).
Strange stresses that today it is increasingly doubtful that the state 
in general can still claim loyalty from its citizens substantially greater 
than their loyalty to family, to the firm or to their political party 
(“even in some cases to the local football team”). People from stable 
political societies do not expect to have to sacrifice their lives for 
anyone except for their families. In short, the claim that there is a
37 Peter Evans in “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of 
Globalization” argues that currently Anglo-American “ideological prescriptions” have 
been transcribed into “formal rules of the game, to which individual states must 
commit themselves or risk becoming economic pariahs. GATT and the WTO are only 
the most obvious formal manifestations of the doctrine that as far as capital and goods 
are concerned the less individual states behave as economic actors, the better o ff the world will 
be” (Evans 1997: 71, emphasis mine).
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difference of degree between the loyalty to the authority of the state 
and the loyalty to other forms of authority cannot be sustained. 
Consequently, the state
is undergoing a metamorphosis brought on by structural change in world 
society and economy. This metamorphosis means that it can no longer make 
the exceptional claims and demands that it once did. It is becoming ... just 
one more source o f  authority among several, with limited powers and resources 
(Strange 1996: 72-73, emphasis mine).
Together with the gradual decline of the authority of the nation-state, 
and with the new, not so much nation-state oriented loyalties of its 
citizens, in a globalizing world, we are left with what Strange called 
Pinocchio’s problem: the strings that held each of us to the nation­
state made us the puppet of forces we could neither control nor 
influence. Pinocchio’s problem, at the end of the story, when he 
became a real boy, was that he had “no strings to guide him”, he had 
to make up his own mind. Today, similarly, the problem we have is 
Pinocchio’s problem -  about our current allegiances, loyalties and 
identities. There is no guide for us with respect to whose authority to 
respect and whose authority to challenge and why, or how to divide 
our loyalties between our countries, our families and our firms, in the 
absence of a framework of nation-states. We are left, at the end of the 
road, with “our individual consciences” as our only guides (Strange 
1996: 199). Which brings us close not only to Zygmunt Bauman’s 
reflections on globalization, but also to his reflections on our 
“postmodern ethics” and the “ethical paradox of postmodernity”. In 
his account of the historical passage from modernity to 
postmodernity, modernity was an attempt to abolish individual 
responsibility; postmodernity, in contrast, restored to agents the
fullness of moral choice and responsibility while simultaneously depriving 
them of the comfort of universal guidance ... Ethical tasks of individuals 
grow while the socially produced resources to fulfill them shrink. Moral 
responsibility comes together with the loneliness o f  moral choice (Bauman 1992: 
xxii, emphasis mine).
For our purposes here, we can supplement Bauman’s idea by 
referring it not only to the modernity/postmodernity nexus, but to
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that of national/ post-national (global) one as well. We need our own 
individual consciences not only to make moral choices, in the absence 
of well-codified and almost universally accepted modern codes of 
morality, but also to make individual choices about national, familial 
and professional loyalties in a new unstable and still uncodified, 
perhaps uncodifiable, global world.38
38 We come now to the issue of modern philosophy, postmodern philosophy, and 
the global age. The question is to what extent postmodern thought (post-Nietzschean, 
non-foundational, postmetaphysical, interpretive rather than legislative etc, referring 
to various sets of descriptions by various postmodern thinkers) must take into account 
recent social, cultural (and economic) changes brought about by globalization? What 
does globalization mean for postmodern philosophers? What is philosophically more 
significant to society or the state (with some notable geographical exceptions): the 
demise of the cultural and philosophical project of modernity, or the dawn of the global 
age, with its hardly acceptable but omnipresent priority of the economy and market 
over democracy and the state (which is Richard Rorty’s “money” perspective, 
mentioned several times in is recent Achieving Our Country)? Sociology has tried to 
develop a new post-national “framework of reference” through the works of Giddens, 
Bauman and Beck who are afraid of their discipline becoming obsolete and irrelevant 
in an increasingly postnational and globalizing world. What about philosophy? What 
can postmodern philosophy in general do vis-a-vis the social and human challenges of 
globalization? Why, in general, are references to postmodern philosophers and/or 
philosophers of postmodernity (with the notable exception of Zygmunt Bauman), 
especially Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, so distant from the current 
globalization debates? To what extent has postmodernism in philosophy been a 
cultural emanation of wider civilizational processes, and to what extent is the 
postmodern “return to the individual” paralleled by the political “weakening” of the 
nation-state? To some extent Andy Green is right in saying that “globalization” and 
“postmodernism” are “twins” but in his book (1997) he shows no inclination to 
conceptualize the relationships between the two. From among “classic” postmodern 
theorists, it was certainly Lyotard in his prophetic Postmodern Condition of 1980 who 
was the most aware of possible future global transformations. He never returned to 
these areas of research during his next two decades of work, though. It was Lyotard, 
as the first among postmodern theorists to do so, who suggested a strong move 
towards the economy (as opposed to culture) and away from politics, the end of the 
traditional university and its founding German values in a global age, and the political 
significance of emergent transnational corporations. To refer to another example of 
postmodern philosophy: Richard Rorty’s new pragmatism -  Rorty’s excellently 
pessimistic contemplation of a world under globalization testifies to his 
understanding that quite soon some major problems raised in his Achieving Our 
Country (1998) may in fact become obsolete. It is very hard to align his explicit
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Zygmunt Bauman in his Globalization. The Human Consequences 
recalls the significance the collapse of the Communist block in 1989 
had for the spread of globalization and the decline in the role of the 
nation-state. Before 1989, Bauman claims, everything in the world 
“had a meaning” and that meaning emanated from a split between 
the two power blocks. Today, the world “does not look a totality 
anymore; it looks rather like a field of scattered and disparate forces”. 
The result is that no one seems to be “in control”. Globalization in this 
context conveys the idea of “the indeterminate, unruly and self- 
propelled character of world affairs; the absence of a centre, of a 
controling desk, of a board of directors, of a managerial office” 
(Bauman 1998: 58-59).39 What he calls the “new expropriation” of the
pessimism about the future developments in society and the economy related to 
globalization processes with the “hopeful” and “future-oriented” brand of 
philosophizing presented thus far. Somehow Rorty’s “possible world”, reminiscent of 
Orwell’s 1984 and seen as a potentiality of globalization (and developed not so much 
as a “possible world” anymore in inter alia “Globalization, the Politics of Identity, and 
Social Hope” from his Philosophy and Social Hope, 1999) is as gloomy as Foucault’s 
studies of the omnipresence and omnipotence of power from the 1970s. It is useful to 
give an example of Rorty’ s perception of the dark side of globalization here: 
“Globalization is producing a world economy in which an attempt by any one country 
to prevent the immiserization of its workers may result only in depriving them of 
employment. The world economy will soon be owned by a cosmopolitan upper class 
which has no more sense of community with any workers anywhere than the great 
American capitalists of the year 1900 had with the immigrants who manned their 
enterprises ... This frightening economic cosmopolitanism has, as a by-product, an 
agreeable cultural cosmopolitanism ... If the formation of hereditary castes continues 
unimpeded, and if the pressures of globalization create such castes not only in the 
United States but in all the old democracies, we shall end up in an Orwellian world . 
The aim will be to keep the minds of the proles elsewhere -  to keep the bottom 75 per 
cent of Americans and the bottom 95 per cent of the world’ s population busy with 
ethnic and religious hostilities, and with debates about sexual mores. (Rorty 1998: 85­
88). See also my recent paper on Rorty and American intellectuals (2003e).
39 If we were trying to answer the question whether political, economic, and 
cultural globalization is (philosophically) modern or postmodern in Bauman’ s terms, 
the answer would certainly be that globalization is a postmodern phenomenon. There 
are numerous parallel accounts of postmodernity, and the present author was also 
involved in producing them (see especially Kwiek 2004a, 1998a, 1996, 1994), but in 
Bauman’ s vision the advent of postmodernity meant mainly the end of the modern 
era of order. Modernity was powered by a gigantic dream of implementing order in all
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state means that, increasingly, states are no longer expected to 
perform most of their modern functions which provided the raison 
d'etre of the nation state (Bauman 1998: 65) -  which brings us back to 
the changing relationships between the state and higher education on 
the one hand and state-supported research on the other. What brings 
about such far-reaching consequences for the future of the nation­
state is in exempting the economy from political control:
No longer capable of balancing the books while guided solely by the 
politically articulated interests of the population within their realm of 
political sovereignty, the nation-states turn more and more into the executors 
and plenipotentiaries of forces which they have no hope of controling 
politically (Bauman 1998: 65).40
The separation of the economy from politics and the exemption of 
the economy from the regulatory intervention of politics, which was 
dominant for almost three decades of the second half of the 20th 
century under the dominance of the fully-fledged Keynesian welfare 
state model, results in what Bauman calls the “disempowerment of 
politics” as an effective agency. In his gloomy account, globalization 
makes it almost impossible to “re-forge social issues into effective 
collective action” (Bauman 1998: 68-69; see also Cerny’s paper on the 
future prospects for collective action under globalization pressures, 
1995). For Bauman, the future of the nation-state is doomed: the 
remaining question is what, if anything, is going to replace it as the 
primal source of social organization. The whole welfare state 
machinery accompanying it seems to be fatally ill, with no chance of 
recovery.41 While discussing the despatialization of economic
areas of human activities, including attaining knowledge for organizing societies. 
Universalistic attempts to introduce “order” underlay communist and German Nazi­
led revolutions. The dream of well-ordered societies lay at the foundation of the 
attempts to physically liquidate those who e.g. possessed land or those who were not 
racially pure enough... (see Bauman’s Modernity and the Holocaust, 1989). 
Globalization, by contrast, may be an era of a new global disorder, with all the 
accompanying social and political consequences.
40 To put it simply, “states have much less control over what happens 
economically within their territories” (Opello and Rosow 1999: 233).
41 His visions of the future of the welfare state are discussed separately in Chapter 5.
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activities -  freeing decision-making centers from territorial 
constraints, constraints of locality -  he especially stresses the 
unprecedented disconnection of (economic) power from (social) 
obligations: space-free investors in various locations are free to move 
their company, restructure it or close it down at short notice. The 
company is free to move “but the consequences of the move are 
bound to stay. Whoever is free to run away from the locality, is free to 
run away from the consequences” (Bauman 1998 : 8-9). Economic 
power under globalization becomes “bodiless”, “extraterritorial” or 
“non-terrestrial” (Bauman 1998: 19). Bauman’s reflections on a new 
social restratification into increasingly global mobile elites and the 
ever more local rest of our societies go hand in hand with Susan 
Strange’s reflections on national loyalty under globalization 
pressures, Robert B. Reich’s conceptualizations of the new class of 
“symbolic analysts” and Dani Rodrik’s concerns about new social 
dividing lines.42
Robert B. Reich (former adviser to President Bill Clinton) in his 
controversial The Work of Nations also does not see a future for the 
nation-state under current conditions, even though he never uses the 
concept of globalization. The picture he paints sounds fully post­
national (and very much an economic one), that goes against both the 
fundamental assumptions of (until recently) nation-state oriented 
disciplines of knowledge, and common everyday assumptions about 
nation-states and our roles in them. He shakes our common beliefs 
when he describes the world we are living in and the transformations 
it is, and will be, undergoing:
We are living through a transformation that will rearrange the politics and
economics of the coming century. There will be no national products or
technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. There will no
42 Rodrik in his already classic book Has Globalization Gone Too Far? argues that 
globalization is exposing “a deep fault line between groups who have the skills and 
mobility to flourish in global markets and those who either don’t have these 
advantages or perceive the expansion of unregulated markets as inimical to social 
stability and deeply held norms. The result is severe tension between the market and 
social groups such as workers, pensioners, and environmentalists, with governments 
stuck in the middle” (Rodrik 1997: 2).
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longer be national economies, at least as we have come to understand that 
concept. All that will remain rooted within national borders are the people 
who comprise a nation. Each nation’s primary assets will be its citizens’ skills 
and insights (Reich 1992: 3).
The political challenge Reich describes is this slipping the bonds of 
national allegiance and disengagement from their fellow-citizens on 
the part of most mobile elites or (Bauman’s) “globals” The question 
of “we” reappears as a locus of national aspirations: according to 
Reich’s radical (and clearly economically-focused) account of 
American society (but with generalizations possible for other nations 
in advanced parts of the world as well), there is no longer any 
common national “we” to refer to. There is also, as we have stressed 
already a few times, no longer a common boat called the national 
economy -  which was still the assumption in the 1970s. Citizens of the 
nation-state were used to the idea of being bound together by 
participating in and contributing to the benefits of the “national 
economy”. The poorest and the wealthiest and those in between were 
believed to “enjoy the benefits of a national economy that is buoyant, 
and we all suffer the consequences of an economy in the doldrums” 
(Reich 1992: 4). Americans, as much as other nations, are no longer 
rising and falling together, as national economies rise and fall; 
Americans, as much as other nations, are increasingly in smaller 
boats, of which that of traditional routine production services is 
sinking rapidly, that of in-person services is sinking more slowly and 
that of “symbolic analysts” is the only one rising steadily (Reich 1992: 
208). A common economic fate for citizens of nation-states today 
appears to be a myth43. Consequently, there is a need to rethink the
43 The services provided by large segments of the working population can more 
easily -  due to globalization -  be substituted by the services of other people in other 
countries, Rodrik argues. Consequently, globalization, bringing about this 
substitutability, “fundamentally transforms the employment relationship” (Rodrik 
1997: 4, see also Ulrich Beck’s The Brave New World o f  Work). Beck elsewhere provides 
an excellent example of Rodrik’s “substitutability” of services: “It is ten o’clock in the 
evening. At Berlin’ s Tegel airport a slick-friendly voice informs the weary passengers 
that their flight to Hamburg is ready for boarding. But the voice does not come from 
inside the airport, or anywhere near it; the speaker is a women sitting in front of a
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idea of citizenship in a global age: as not only corporations but also 
(some of the most mobile segments of) citizens become increasingly 
disconnected from their nations.44 As Reich put it crudely,
There is no longer any reason for the United States -  or for any other nation -  
to protect, subsidize or otherwise support its corporations above all others. ... 
Neither the profitability of a nation’s corporations nor the success of its 
investors necessarily improve the standard of living of most of the nation’s 
citizens. Corporations and investors now scour the world for profitable 
opportunities. They are becoming disconnected from their home nations 
(Reich 1992: 8).
In this view, the standard of living of citizens of nation-states 
increasingly depends on what they are able to contribute to the global 
economy -  which depends on the worldwide demand for their skills 
and insights. Their competitive position in the world economy is going 
to increasingly depend on the function they are able to perform in it. 
Who is succeeding? Certainly those who “solve, identify, and broker 
new problems”, the symbolic analysts (Reich 1992: 208). In this context, 
the role of the nation-state is immensely reduced to being the provider 
of fair rules for the economic game, of high-quality infrastructure and 
of educational opportunities to develop its citizens’ skills and 
competences to make them competitive in a globalizing world. As Jean­
Marie Guéhenno argues, current transformations to the economy 
“diminishes the value of space and increases the value of men. ... 
Never has competence been as sought after, since it has become the 
object of competition at a global level” (Guéhenno 1995: 9).
For Guéhenno, the powerful economic, social and cultural forces 
(sometimes called globalization in the course of his book The End of
console in California. The reasons are as simple as they are understandable: in 
California, no extra payment has to be made for late working because it is still 
daytime, and indirect labour costs are, in any case, lower than in Germany”... (Beck 
1999b: 25). See also Carnoy, Castells and Benner on the employment practices in 
Silicon Valley (1997).
44 Saskia Sassen introduces in this context the notion of “economic citizenship” 
which belongs to firms and markets and which is located not in individuals but in 
global economic actors. Consequently, the markets emerge as “a sort of global, cross­
border economic electorate” (Sassen 1996: 42).
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the Nation-State) have destroyed the conditions in which nation-states 
were formed. The age of the nation-states is over (Guehenno 1995: x). 
Guehenno stresses the historical dimension of the nation: a nation is 
the locus of a “common history of common misfortunes, and of 
common triumphs”; it is also the locus of a “shared destiny” 
(Guehenno 1995: 4). In Guehenno’s strong formulations, the end of 
the nation and the end of the nation-state carry with them the “death 
of politics”. The relationship of citizens to politics is in competition 
with the infinity of relationships they establish outside of politics. 
Consequently, with the end of the nation-state, politics appears as a 
“secondary activity” (Guehenno 1995: 19). The “national interests” are 
threatened with extinction as politics is increasingly seen as an 
outcome of conflicting private interests which are professionally 
lobbied for. In contrast to the times when the nation-state was the 
principal point of reference, the social contract that preceded any 
outcome of private interests does not hold. As he argues,
if the national collectivity is no longer a given but a choice, individuals no 
longer effectively have the means to base this choice on the same rational 
criteria that guide their actions in the functional management of the national 
interests. N o economic law can replace the territorial and historical basis of 
the nation (Guehenno 1995: 23).
The paradox of the global age is that the populations in general want 
to continue to be recognized as nations but nation-states are no longer 
able to protect their citizens from the uncertainties of the outside 
world: it is as impossible to “control” the world around them as it is 
to “ignore” it (Guehenno 1995: 138ff). In this context, most of the 
forces unleashed by globalization are very hard to control for 
individual countries.
Another example from the globalist school of thought with respect 
to the nation-state is Martin Albrow. From among the globalists 
discussed here, Albrow (and Bauman) are by far the least economy- 
minded (and the least economics based). Albrow sees globalization as 
a “comprehensive social transformation”. In The Global Age. State and 
Society Beyond Modernity he views our time as radically different from 
the past and us as entering a new age. The transition is from one
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epoch to another. Both a sense of “rupture” with the past and the 
experience of “epochal change” characterize people’s consciousness 
(Albrow 1996: 1-2, see also Albrow and Eade 1994). The Modern Age 
is a passing stage in history and ours is the Global Age; the Global 
Age involves the “supplanting” of modernity with globality. In his 
view, the total effect of globalization is a social transformation which 
“threatens the nation-state in a more extensive way than anything 
since the international working-class movement of the 19th century” 
(Albrow 1996: 5). The nation-state project lost its momentum and the 
welfare state has been challenged. The transition to the Global Age 
means for Albrow the emergence of a new political order: so far, 
nation-states have been central to the (philosophical and cultural) 
project of modernity. The crowning achievement of the project was 
“securing the union of state and society” (Albrow 1996: 163). The 
major problem is that together with the advent of globalization, 
society and the nation-state have “pulled apart”. The modern union of 
the two is gone (which Guehenno calls “the death of politics”). 
Albrow is explicit about the fate of the nation-state in the global age: 
“the modern nation-state is neither the only possible form of the state 
nor the crowning political achievement in human history” (Albrow 
1996: 168).
The separation of society from the social relations of the citizens of 
the nation-state and from the nation-state is not complete but it is 
quite advanced. What other globalists describe in terms of 
disappearing national “loyalty”, “allegiance” and “identity”, or 
disappearing social and economic “solidarity” and “community” 
among the citizens of the nation-state, or in terms of a growing sense 
of rupture between the globally mobile and the locally tied, Albrow 
describes in terms of the decreasing “aspirations” and “attention” 
given by the citizens to their nation-state. Consequently, Albrow puts 
forward the idea of the “world state” which represents a new idea of 
the state and arises out of “delinking” the nation from the state 
(Albrow 1996: 173). He introduces such notions as “global citizen­
ship” and “performative citizenship”, as well as global citizens and 
performative citizens, whose links to the modern territorial nation­
state are radically cut. What are the possible future relations between
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the citizen and their state and between nations-states and the global 
state? In the context of the development of the global state, the nation­
state would have to come to terms with a position of “modest 
subsidiarity”. For global citizens, there are not many provisions that 
need to be made for them on the part of their nation-states, and 
nation-states should not be expecting much in return:
it will be reassuring if leaders of the nation-state can guarantee the train
timetable without asking for patriotic pledges in return (Albrow 1996: 183).
Finally, Kenichi Ohmae, one of greatest management gurus at the 
end of the 1980s, claims in The End o f the Nation State: The Rise o f 
Regional Economies that the old world has “fallen apart”. The nation­
state has begun to “crumble” and the older patterns of linkages 
between nations have begun to lose their dominance. Current changes 
are fundamental: nation-states have lost their role as “meaningful 
units of participation in the global economy of today’s borderless 
world”. Nation-states today have much less to contribute to the global 
economy and much less freedom to make contributions; in terms of 
the global economy, they have become “little more than bit actors”. In 
the past, they may have been efficient engines of wealth production 
but in the new world order they have become “remarkably inefficient 
engines of wealth distribution” (Ohmae 2000: 207). They are 
“inescapably vulnerable” to economic choices made elsewhere -  by 
people and institutions over which they have no practical control at 
all. Consequently, the nation-state is increasingly a “nostalgic fiction” 
(Ohmae 2000: 208). The relevance of nation-states as units of 
economic activity is declining, as is its relevance in cultural 
transformations, compared with global transformations in culture: the 
process of convergence is going faster and deeper than we could have 
ever imagined and is affecting our “worldview, mind-set, and even 
thought process” (Ohmae 2000: 210). The nation-state with its current 
mainly distributive functions and its sovereignty is a thing of a past, 
Ohmae has no hesitations about that.
Globalists have also included such famous strong critics of 
globalization as D.C. Korten (in When Corporations Rule the World, 
1995) and Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh (in Global Dreams.
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Imperial Corporations and the New World Order, 1997). Without 
discussing the two books much, let us merely refer to a few major 
points. Both are fully economistic in method and very alarmist in 
tone, with their views being shared by both radical Marxists and 
grassroots activists or promoters of antiglobalist campaigns:
The emerging global order is spearheaded by a few hundred corporate 
giants, many of them bigger than most sovereign nations. ... [T]he balance of 
power in world politics has shifted in recent years from territorially bound 
governments to companies that can roam  the world. As the hopes and 
pretensions of government shrink almost everywhere, these imperial 
corporations are occupying public space and exerting a more profound 
influence over the lives of larger numbers of people (Barnet and Cavanagh 
1997: 14).
Corporations “rule the world”; with their strategic visions, they have 
enough money and the technological means to undermine the 
effectiveness of national governments. They are the first secular 
institutions run by men, Barnet and Cavanagh argue, who think and 
plan “on a global scale”. Leaders of nation-states are no longer able to 
comprehend, much less control, these giants as they are mobile and 
constantly “changing appearances to suit different circumstances”. 
What we are witnessing today is a “tectonic shift”, an “unprecedented 
political and economic happening”. Consequently, the modern 
nation-state looks more and more like an “institution of a bygone era” 
(Barnet and Cavanagh 1997: 13, 20). The world economy is becoming 
increasingly integrated at the same time as the processes of political 
disintegration are accelerating -  hence “there appears to be a direct 
connection between economic integration and political dissolution” 
(Barnet and Cavanagh 1997: 421). The world is facing an 
unprecedented authority crisis as national leaders are losing control 
over economic issues. But what is of crucial interest to us here is the 
state’s ability to carry out its own national policies in the realms of 
welfare and education. Barnet and Cavanagh’s picture is as gloomy 
as it can possibly be:
The most disturbing aspect of this system is that the formidable power and 
mobility of global corporations are undermining the effectiveness o f  national 
governments to carry out essential policies on behalf o f  their people. Leaders of
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nation-states are losing much of the control over their own territory they 
once had. More and more, they must conform to the demands of the outside 
world because the outsiders are already inside the gates. Business enterprises 
that routinely operate across borders are linking far-flung pieces of territory 
into a new world economy that bypasses all sorts of established political 
arrangements and conventions. Tax laws intended for another age, 
traditional ways to control capital flows and interest rates, full-employment 
policies, and old approaches to resource development and environmental 
protection are becoming obsolete, unenforceable, or irrelevant (Barnet and 
Cavanagh 1997: 19, emphases mine).
3.3.2. T h e  S k ep tics
Let us pass on now to the second camp of thinkers who claim that, 
generally, nothing new has happened to the nation-state with the 
advent of globalization. In the most general terms, most of the 
skeptics refer to the statistical data of world flows of trade, 
investment and labor from the 19th century onwards and claim that 
the contemporary levels of economic interdependence are not 
historically unprecedented (or as Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson 
put it, “the level of integration, interdependence, openness, or 
however one wishes to describe it, of national economies in the 
present era is not unprecedented”). Most of them rely on an 
economistic conception of globalization, equating it with an integrated 
global market. They conclude that contemporary globalization is 
exaggerated. In a brief description by Held et al., they consider the 
hyperglobalist thesis as “fundamentally flawed” and “politically 
naïve” since it underestimates the power of national governments to 
regulate international economic activity; they tend to disregard the 
presumption that economic internationalization might lead to the 
emergence of a new, less state-centric world order; and they point to 
the growing centrality of governments in regulating and promoting 
cross-border economic activity. They reject the “myth” that the power 
of national governments or state sovereignty is being currently 
undermined by economic internationalization or global governance 
and argue against the thesis of a convergence of macroeconomic and
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welfare policies across the globe. As Held et al. conclude, “rather than 
the world becoming more interdependent, as the hyperglobalizers 
assume, the skeptics seek to expose the myths which sustain the 
globalization thesis” (see Held et al. 1999: 5-7).
John Gray, a famous British postliberal political philosopher, 
differs considerably from other skeptics with respect to the question 
of the impact of globalization on the nation-state. His theses are not 
economic and his views are not economistic but philosophical. While 
most skeptics discussed in this section argue that globalization is a 
myth, for Gray the integrated global free market is a utopia.45 In False 
Dawn. The Delusions o f Global Capitalism, Gray pronounces the 
“passing of social democracy”, declares Keynesianism a “dead end” 
and views European social democracy as “belong[ing] to the past” 
(Gray 1998: 87, 99, 64). He views a single global free market as a 
“Utopia that can never be realized” and sees it as the Enlightenment 
project of a universal civilization in its “final form” (Gray 1998: 2, 3).46 
He differs from such prominent skeptics as Paul Hirst and Grahame 
Thompson in seeing the European welfare state as finished. For Hirst 
and Thompson in Globalization in Question. The International Economy 
and the Possibilities o f Governance, globalization is a “necessary myth”, 
a “myth suitable for a world without illusions but also one that robs 
us of hope”. In their description, the difference between the 1950s and 
1960s and the times of globalization is about our hopes for the future:
45 Or as Tom Conley in “The State of Globalisation and the Globalisation of the 
State” argues, the shift to economic liberal policies has been both an “economic 
strategy” and a “political project that has aimed to establish market governance and 
reshape public expectations about the role of the state” (Conley 2002: 462).
46 It was Karl Polanyi who, during the Second World War, elaborated for the fist 
time on the utopian nature of self-regulating markets, not accompanied by universally 
available state-provided protection measures: “Our thesis is that the idea of a self­
adjusting market implied a stark utopia. Such an institution could not exist for any 
length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of society; it 
would have physically destroyed man and transformed his surroundings into a 
wilderness. Inevitably, society took measures to protect itself, but whatever measures 
it took impaired the self-regulation of the market, disorganized industrial life, and 
thus endangered society in yet another way. It was this dilemma which forced the 
development of the market systems into a definite groove and finally disrupted the 
social organization based upon it” (Polanyi 1957: 3-4).
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If the widespread consensus of the 1950s and 1960s was that the future 
belonged to a capitalism without losers, securely managed by national 
governments acting in concert, then the later 1980s and 1990s are dominated 
by a consensus based on contrary assumptions, that global markets are 
uncontrollable and that the only way to avoid becoming a loser -  whether a 
nation, firm or individual -  is to be as competitive as possible. The notion of 
an ungovernable world economy is a response to the collapse of expectations 
schooled by Keynesianism and sobered by the failure of monetarism to 
provide an alternative route to broad-based prosperity and stable growth 
(Hirst and Thompson 1996: 6).
Consequently, in their strong formulation, the political impact of 
globalization is the “pathology of over-diminished expectations”. The 
myth of globalization “exaggerates the degree of our helplessness in 
the face of contemporary economic forces” (Hirst and Thompson 
1996: 6). As the forces of globalization are not uncontrollable and not 
ungovernable -  the project of the Western social democracy is still 
viable. This is exactly where John Gray disagrees with them. Hirst 
and Thompson, Gray argues, underestimate the uniqueness of the 
economic conditions of the last two decades, they are “trading in 
illusions” of social democracy being a viable option in the new global 
world order; the acceptance of the radical novelty of current economic 
conditions would spell death to their hopes of a “revamped social 
democracy” (Gray 1998: 67). Criticizing hyperglobalization theories 
(of e.g. Robert B. Reich and Kenitchi Ohmae), Gray argues that, first, 
they represent as inevitable what is highly unlikely, and they conflate 
the end-state favored by the globalization project with its actual 
development: “a borderless world ruled by homeless transnationals is 
a corporate Utopia, not a description of any present or future reality” 
(Gray 1998: 67).47 In Gray’s view, both globalists and skeptics alike 
present an “unreal” picture of the global setting in which states are 
operating (Gray 1998: 70). Nation-states today must now act in a 
world in which “all options are uncertain”, and this uncertainty is 
“radical” and “continuing”. Even the span of options available to 
them is uncertain (Gray 1998: 74-75). The most unmanageable forces
47 In a similar vein, Ulrich Beck finds the final aim of current global changes in 
“the anarchistic market utopia of a minimal state” (Beck 2000a: 3).
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spring from technological innovation and new technologies (even 
Susan Strange thought to remind social scientists about “the neglected 
factor -  technology”, Strange 1996: 7-9).48 A truly global economy is 
being created by the global spread of new technologies, not by the 
spread of free markets (Gray 1998: 194). The “flood of invention” 
which drives the global economy cannot be controlled so that we are 
touched only by its benefits (Gray 1998: 206). What can be observed 
right now is not a competition between actually existing models of 
capitalism:
It is a basic error to think that this is a contest that any of the existing models 
can win. All are being eroded and replaced by new and more volatile types 
of capitalism. The chief result of this new competition is to make the social 
market economies of the postwar period unviable while transforming the 
free-market economies that are its nominal winners (Gray 1998: 79).
In Gray’s dramatic presentation, capitalism, no matter what we do, is 
becoming more and more volatile (“bad capitalism drives out good”, 
or as the title of one of his essays runs: “How Global Free Markets 
Favour the Worst Kinds of Capitalism: a New Gresham’s Law?”). 
Global capital markets make social democracy unviable. Where Gray 
grasps the nettle, as opposed to several skeptics discussed here, is his 
clear realization that we are no longer living in closed economies. And 
social democracy, especially European welfare state regimes, had 
presupposed closed economies. Many of the core policies of social 
democracy, Gray rightly argues, just cannot be sustained in open
48 At the same time, as C. Peter Magrath recalls in “Globalization and its Effects on 
Higher Education Beyond the Nation-State”, “universities generally have been 
ineffective in packaging and distributing their knowledge and information -  in 
exploiting the new information technologies. That is one reason why so many new 
providers of knowledge, such as corporate-run universities, for-profit virtual 
universities, and individual entrepreneurs siphon off and buy the skills of American 
faculty members. Their knowledge and skills are then distributed digitally and 
through television courses and countless multimedia ways of delivering 
information... In this commodity- and consumer-driven market, which still requires 
the knowledge of higher education, it is probable that the traditional role of the faculty 
member will change substantially” (Magrath 2000: 254). Technology seems just 
impossible to resist, and as globalization is a structural change, its technological effects 
on higher education cannot easily be reversed or stopped.
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economies. In open economies, Gray argues, egalitarian principles 
will be rendered unworkable -  by the freedom of capital, including 
“human capital”, to migrate (Gray 1998: 87-89).49 Therefore, under 
current economic conditions, Continental Keynesianism is a “dead 
end” and “Europe-wide social democracy has been removed from the 
agenda of history” (Gray 1998: 98, 99). European social models cannot 
survive in their current forms.50 But also, from a long and broad 
historical perspective, Gray argues, the free market is “a rare short­
lived aberration” and regulated markets are the norm (Gray 1998: 
211). The free market ideology is an expression of the recurring 
utopianism of Western civilization as it embodies Enlightenment 
ideals of a universal civilization. But it is a project which is destined to 
fail (Gray 1998: 234-235).
Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson in Globalization in Question. 
The International Economy and the Possibilities o f Governance stay mostly 
in the realms of economics. They present an argument against the 
idea that the international economy has become or is becoming 
“globalized”. The major problems with globalization they point out 
are that few exponents of globalization have developed a coherent 
concept of the world economy in which supra-national forces are 
decisive; that there is no proof of the emergence of a distinctly
49 Gray understands the point that a “social democratic regime presupposed a 
closed economy. Capital movements were limited by fixed or semi-fixed exchange 
rates. Many of the core policies of social democracy cannot be sustained in open 
economies. ... All social democratic theories of justice (such as John Rawls’ egalitarian 
theory) presuppose a closed economy. ... It is only within a closed system of 
distribution that we can know if the principles of justice dictated by such theories are 
satisfied. More practically, it is only in a closed economy that egalitarian principles can 
be enforced. In open economies they will be rendered unworkable by the freedom of 
capital -  including ‘human capital’ -  to migrate. Social democratic regimes 
presuppose that high levels of public provision could be funded unproblematically 
from general taxation. That proposition no longer holds” (Gray 1998: 89-90).
50 As Zsuzsa Ferge argues in “Welfare and ‘Ill-Fare’ Systems in Central Eastern 
Europe”, the European social model is not even promoted by Western EU countries in 
the new member states: “the essence of the ‘ European model’ . is almost totally 
absent. Compounding this trend is the fact that the European Union does not seem 
particularly keen on enforcing the ‘European model’” (Ferge 2001a: 149).
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“global” economic structure; that there have been earlier periods of 
internationalized trade, capital flows and monetary systems, 
especially before the First World War; that truly global transnational 
corporations are relatively few; and, finally, that the prospects for 
regulation by international cooperation, for the formation of trading 
blocks and for the development of new national strategies that take 
into account internationalization are not exhausted (Hirst and 
Thompson 1996: 196). Leaving purely economic grounds, and 
thinking of the role of the nation-state and its sovereignty today, they 
seem to accept some theses promoted by globalists though:
There is no doubt that the salience and role of nation states has changed 
markedly since the Keynesian era. States are less autonomous, they have less 
exclusive control over the economic and social processes within their 
territories, and they are less able to maintain national distinctiveness and 
cultural homogeneity (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 177).
The claim of nation-states to a monopoly of the means of 
legitimate violence within their territory is no longer definitive of 
their existence. The state has less control over ideas but it remains in 
control of its borders and of the movement of people crossing or not 
allowed to cross them (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 180-181). The 
crucial issue for Hirst and Thompson is what type of international 
economy exists at present or is coming into being. The evidence they 
produce is claimed to confirm that “there is no strong tendency 
toward a globalized economy and that the major advanced nations 
continue to be dominant. If that is so”, they continue to argue, “we 
should ditch the over-fashionable concept of ‘globalization’ and look 
for less politically debilitating models” (Hirst and Thompson 185­
186). Nation-states are no longer governing powers but still may be 
seen as loci from which forms of governance can be “proposed, 
legitimated and monitored”. They are central because of their 
relationship to national territory and its population of nation-state 
citizens. They are, and will remain, central because they are also the 
primary source of law within a given territory. They are sources and 
“essential prerequisites” for the rule of law. While the power of 
nation-states as administrative and policy-making agencies has
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declined, they argue, this does not mean that the law-making and 
constitutional order functions of states will decline in the same 
measure (Hirst and Thompson 1996: 190-192). The state is still the 
constitutional arbitrator and law-maker, and its role as a source of 
international law will increase.
Another skeptic, Linda Weiss in her The Myth of the Powerless State
(1998) makes things clear indeed: “’Globalization’ is a big idea resting 
on slim foundations. ... But big ideas excite. This may partly explain 
why enthusiasm has transcended the evidence” (Weiss 1998: 212). The 
book questions the claims of state powerlessness and instead of state 
retreat suggests state adaptivity. It is based on an idea that the tasks of 
national economic management are not fixed and finite -  but they are 
ever-changing (Weiss 1998: xi). The focus of the book, as is the case 
with that of Hirst and Thompson, is almost purely economic. The 
phenomenon of “state denial” is founded on the conception of a 
globalizing economy integrated by transnational capital and the 
market:
As the twentieth century draws to a close, the notion of a “global” economy,
dominated by stateless corporations and borderless finance, has captured the
imagination of countless commentators (Weiss 1998: 2).
But the dominating notion is just wrong -  the theses presented by 
globalization “enthusiasts” remain largely blind to the variety of state 
responses to the pressures of globalization (internationalization) and 
to both the sources and consequences of such a variety of state 
responses for national prosperity. Passive and ineffectual states are 
supposedly victims of external globalization forces but the reason for 
the dominance of this picture in the Anglo-Saxon social sciences is 
simple: its proponents “daily confront such a reality: that is to say, 
political institutions with weak capacities for domestic adjustment 
strategies” (Weiss 1998: 3). Weiss’ major argument is that there is a 
fundamental difference between state decline and state adaptation (or 
its inability to adapt). The shift in tasks of the nation-state (military 
competition in the 18th century, industrialization from the 19th century 
onwards, and nation-building in the 20th century) did not mean the 
abandoning of the old, but the adding of new functions to the state.
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Consequently, “failure to recognize or acknowledge adaptation has 
led too readily to the conclusion that the nation-state is in decline”. 
Currently, nation-states are believed to be undergoing “the so-called 
challenge of ‘globalization’”. The author finds “little evidence” of 
genuine globalization and generally emphasizes state adaptivity 
instead of its diminution in an increasingly global environment 
(Weiss 1998: 9-13). The book attempts to demonstrate that the core of 
globalization in economic terms, the cross-border flows of products 
and people but first of all money, is hardly unprecedented and does 
not pose novel challenges. Thus the following questions receive 
negative answers in subsequent sections of the chapter on the “limits 
of globalization”: the question of novelty -  “how unprecedented are 
international flows?”, the question of magnitude -  “how big are the 
changes?” and “how ‘transnational’ are multinationals?” (Weiss 1998: 
170-187). The final chapter seeks to show that the powerless state is 
merely a “myth”:
[it] seeks to show that the modern notion of the powerless state, with its 
accompanying reports about the decline of the welfare state and the death of 
industrial policy, is fundamentally misleading (Weiss 1998: 188).
Globalists in her view not only overstate the degree of state 
powerlessness but also overgeneralize it; the state is going to matter 
more rather than less, or, in a word, “the state is dead: long live the 
state”, as the title of Chapter 1 runs.
Robert Boyer, Daniel Drache and most of the contributors to the 
influential book they edited, States Against Markets. The Limits o f 
Globalization (1996) clearly reject the contention that the nation-state is 
in structural decline. As the editors state in the introduction,
the embeddedness of economic institutions is essential for a strong economic 
performance. Hence the nation-state cannot be easily replaced by the market 
for any significant period since it is the only institution society has to 
organize itself, protect the social solidarity of its citizens and safeguard its 
social values which cannot be “traded” like commodities (Boyer and Drache
1996: 13).
Following other skeptics, they claim that globalization is not a totally 
new phenomenon. International forces will continue to influence
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national policy decisions more than ever -  but they will not form a 
“fully fledged alternative system” (Boyer and Drache 1996: 14). Even 
though over the last two decades the economic policy of every 
country seems to have lost most of its autonomy (public spending as 
well as monetary and tax policies being constantly under global 
scrutiny), such a state of affairs is neither desirable nor irreversible. 
While for four decades, no political party “dared question the need 
for market-correcting social programmes to protect their citizens 
against unregulated markets. Today, that is no longer the case” 
(Drache in Boyer and Drache 1996: 34). The global bulldozer is intent 
on building a new world order on the ruins of once-powerful national 
economies. The new state is dubbed “the K-Mart” state by Drache and 
the term is emblematic of the new world of the “causal, part-time low- 
wage, non-unionized service sectors of the economy” (Drache 1996: 
36). But both Drache and Robert Boyer challenge the omnipotence of 
the market, especially as a major co-coordinating mechanism within 
our societies. The state has been (as Karl Polanyi most clearly depicts 
in his The Great Transformation) and still is “the most powerful 
institution to channel and tame the power of markets” (Boyer in 
Boyer and Drache 1996: 108). The market itself is not able to create the 
requisites which could guarantee the state’s long-term efficiency. 
Consequently, Boyer expects (Polanyi’s) second great transformation, 
from pro-market and conservative economic strategies towards state 
interventions, more social solidarity policies and rejuvenated state 
intervention in such domains such as taxation, welfare, innovation 
and education. The impact of globalization on the nation-state is 
expressed through more reliance on the market but it seems clearly 
reversible. The 21st century is going to be the era of nation-states 
in charge of “disciplining and taming the markets” (Boyer 1996: 
109-111).
The general attitude of almost all contributors to the volume (with 
the notable exception of e.g. Ramesh Mishra whose ideas about the 
future of the welfare state are discussed separately in Chapter 4) is 
that globalization theses are exaggerated and the return to (refined) 
Keynesianism is still possible, despite the fact that globalization is 
seriously redefining the role of the nation-state as a manager of the
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national economy. The triumph of von Hayek over his rival Keynes is 
not the case, but we certainly need to reread Polanyi again and again, 
they suggest. Their common view can be summarized in a sentence 
from Boyer and Drache: “what has been done during a decade of 
deregulation can be undone or reversed. After all, markets are 
organized by public intervention and not the reverse” (Boyer and 
Drache 1996: 3).
Stephen D. Krasner in turn, approaches the issue of the impact of 
globalization on the nation-state and the apparent loss of autonomy 
and sovereignty of the latter from a different angle and puts forward 
a thesis that the Westphalian model of the nation-state has never been 
“an accurate description” of what states have actually been in their 
varieties. The Westphalian model has been merely a conventional 
point of reference.51 The thesis in “Compromising Westphalia” runs 
as follows:
The assumption that states are independent rational actors can be misleading 
because it marginalizes many situations in which rulers have, in fact, not 
been autonomous. Moreover, the conclusion that sovereignty is now being 
altered because the principles of W estphalia are being transgressed is 
historically myopic. Breaches of the W estphalian model have been an 
enduring characteristic of the international environment because there is 
nothing to prevent them. ... There has never been some golden age of the 
W estphalian state. The W estphalian model has never been more than a 
reference point or a convention (Krasner 2000: 124).
This means that rulers have in fact always had the option of violating 
the Westphalian principles of political authority, based on territory 
and autonomy. According to Krasner, the claim that the 
contemporary system represents a “basic transformation” of the 
traditional Westphalian state order because sovereignty seems to be 
at risk is “not well-founded”: it ignores the fact that violations to the
51 In a similar vein, Sylvia Walby argues in “The Myth of the Nation-State: 
Theorizing Society and Polities in a Global Era” that the nation-state is more 
“mythical” than “real”. Nation-states have been actually very rare as existing social 
and political forms. They may be widespread as imagined communities or aspirations 
but their existence as social and political practice is “much over-stated. There are many 
states, but very few nation-states” (Walby 2003: 529-530).
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principles of territoriality and autonomy “have been an enduring 
characteristic of the international system before and after the Peace of 
Westphalia” (Krasner 2000: 129). The conclusion in his “Abiding 
Sovereignty” paper is that over the several hundred years during 
which the rules of sovereignty have been widely understood, state 
control “could never be taken for granted. States could never isolate 
themselves from the external environment. Globalization and 
intrusive international norms are not new phenomena” (Krasner 
2001b: 248). There is nothing unique in what globalization brings 
about, according to Krasner: states have never been able to perfectly 
regulate transborder flows, international capital flows were important 
in the Middle Ages, the Asian flu of the late 1990s was hardly the first 
international financial crisis, capital market integration was very high 
at the end of the 19th century, international migration rates reached 
their highest levels in history during the 19th century, international 
trade also increased rapidly then, etc (Krasner 2001b: 233-236). It is 
certainly too early to speak of the end of the sovereign-state system: 
there are new challenges to conventional rules but they will not 
displace sovereignty (Krasner 2001b: 245).
Skeptics tend to reject the hypothesis put forward by globalists 
that what we are witnessing is the emergence of a new, less state­
centric world order. They stress the growing centrality o f states. States 
are not the “victims” of globalization but its “midwives” (Weiss). 
Neither global governance nor economic liberalization and 
internationalization seems to be undermining the sovereignty of 
nation-states and their autonomy in determining the course of 
national welfare, tax and social policies.
3.3.3. T h e  M od erates
The third position taken with respect to the impact of globalization on 
the nation-state is represented by such different scholars as e.g. Anthony 
Giddens, Jan Aart Scholte, Manuel Castells, Saskia Sassen, James N. 
Rosenau, as well as David Held, and Anthony McGrew (and this is the 
view I support). What is happening to the power of the nation-state
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according to the moderates? Let us refer to the varied descriptions of 
various authors to see the scope of the phrases used: under the impact of 
current patterns of globalization, the power of the state is “repositioned”, 
“recontextualized”, “transformed”, “reconstituted”, “re-engineered”, 
“restructured”, “displaced”, “rearticulated”, “relocated”, “re-embedded”, 
“decentered”, “reconfigured”, “reshaped”, “eroded” etc. This is certainly 
a good indication of the level of complication at which the moderates 
differ among themselves and from mere globalists and skeptics alike. 
Before passing on to a brief discussions of individual authors, let us 
present David Held and his colleagues’ description of this line of 
thinking:
At the heart of the transform ationalist thesis is a conviction that, at the 
dawn of a new millennium, globalization is a central driving force  behind the 
rapid social, political and econom ic changes that are reshaping modern 
societies and world order. ... [G]lobalization is conceived as a powerful 
transformative force w hich is responsible for a “massive shake-out” of 
societies, econom ies, institutions of governance and world order. ... [T]he 
direction of this “shake-out” remains uncertain, since globalization is 
conceived as an essentially contingent historical process replete with 
contradictions. At issue is a dynamic and open-ended conception o f  where 
globalization might be leading and the kind of world order w hich it might 
prefigure. In com parison w ith the sceptical and hyperglobalist accounts, 
the transform ationalists make no claims about the future trajectory of 
globalization; nor do they seek to evaluate the present in relation to some 
single, fixed ideal-type “globalized world”, whether a global market or a 
global civilization. Rather, transform ationalist accounts emphasize 
globalization as a long-term  historical process w hich is inscribed with 
contradictions and w hich is significantly shaped by conjunctural factors. 
Such caution about the exact future of globalization is matched, 
nonetheless, by the conviction that contem porary patterns of global 
economic, military, technological, ecological, migratory, political and 
cultural flows are historically unprecedented (Held et al. 1999: 7, emphases 
mine).
In the most general terms, the moderates (or transformationalists) 
do not expect the arrival of a single world society nor do they find 
evidence for global convergence in economy, politics and culture. On 
the contrary, they stress “new patterns of global stratification” in
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which some states and societies are becoming central, and others 
marginal in the global order. At the core of their convictions, as Held 
summarizes them, is a belief that globalization is reconstituting the 
power, functions and authority of national governments (while 
economic activity becomes increasingly deterritorialized due to 
production and finance acquiring global and transnational 
dimensions). They reject both “the hyperglobalist rhetoric of the end 
of the sovereign nation-state and the skeptics’ claim that ‘nothing 
much has changed’”. Territorial boundaries have become 
“increasingly problematic”, and sovereignty, state power and 
territoriality stand today in a “more complex” relationship than in the 
epoch during which the modern nation-state was forged. New non­
territorial forms of economic and political organization have emerged 
such as e.g. multinational corporations, transnational social 
movements and international regulatory agencies. The world is no 
longer purely state-centric or even primarily state-governed -  as 
authority has become increasingly diffused among public and private 
agencies at all levels. Globalization brings about, rather than the “end 
of the state”, a whole spectrum of adjustment strategies: the power of 
national governments is being “reconstituted and restructured” in 
response to the growing complexity of the processes of governance 
(Held et al. 1999: 9). Jan Aart Scholte describes the moderate stance as 
the one from which “globalization is indeed a distinctive and 
important development in contemporary world history. However, its 
scale and consequences need to be carefully measured and qualified. 
Nor is globalization the only, or always the most significant, trend in 
today’s society” (Scholte 2000: 18).
David Held and his colleagues in their Global Transformations 
claim that the contemporary globalization of politics is transforming 
“the very foundations of world order” by reconstituting traditional 
forms of sovereign statehood and reordering international political 
relations. But these transformations are neither historically inevitable, 
they stress, nor fully secure. As a result,
The contemporary world order is best understood as a highly complex,
contested and interconnected order in which the interstate system is
increasingly embedded within evolving regional and global political
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networks. The latter are the basis in and through which political authority 
and mechanisms of governance are being articulated and rearticulated (Held 
et al. 1999: 85).
They introduce a fourfold periodization of globalization: premodern 
(9,000-11,000 years ago), early modern (ca. 1500-1850), modern 
(ca. 1850-1945) and contemporary globalization. For our purposes 
here, it will suffice to discuss contemporary globalization only. 
Against many skeptics, they argue that contemporary globalization is 
a distinctive historical form of it rather than a return to nineteenth- 
century forms of globalization. In nearly all domains contemporary 
globalization has not only quantitatively surpassed its earlier forms 
but also displayed “unparallel qualitative differences”. The 
contemporary era represents a “historically unique confluence or 
clustering of patterns of globalization” in all domains, including 
politics, law governance, military affairs, and culture, as well as in all 
domains of economic activity and in shared global environmental 
threats. There is only a single potential hegemonic power -  the United 
States -  they argue. Although important continuities do exist with 
previous phases of globalization, contemporary globalization is a 
“distinctive historical form” which is a product of a “unique 
conjuncture of social, political, economic and technological forces” 
(Held et al. 1999: 424-429).
Contemporary globalization does not prefigure the demise of the 
nation-state, the moderates claim. But this structural shift should not 
be taken to suggest, as some globalists do, that globalization is a 
linear historical process: it is not an “automatic or self-regulating 
process”, Held et al. claim. Advanced capitalist states are undergoing 
a profound transformation as their powers, roles and functions are 
“rearticulated, reconstituted and re-embedded at the intersection of 
globalizing and regionalizing networks”. Yet “the metaphors of the 
loss, diminution or erosion of state power can misrepresent this 
reconfiguration or transformation”.
Economic globalization is transforming “the conditions under 
which state power is exercised”. The impact of globalization on the 
nation-state is not experienced uniformly by all states; it is mediated 
by a state’s position in the global political, military and economic
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hierarchies; its domestic economic and political structures; the pattern 
of domestic politics, as well as specific government and societal 
strategies to cope with globalization (Held et al. 1999: 440-441). The 
consequences of the ongoing transformation of the Westphalian order 
-  of state sovereignty and autonomy -  are different for different 
states. The impact of financial globalization on national 
macroeconomic policies is more radical though. This is an example of 
the impact not on sovereignty per se but on autonomy:
the de jure entitlement to rule is not challenged fundamentally by financial 
globalization, but the de facto autonomy of states to establish and pursue 
their own policy preferences certainly is. ... Globalization has not led to a 
simple increase or a simple decrease in the autonomy or choices of states. But 
the costs and benefits o f  different policies have unquestionably been altered (Held et 
al. 1999: 443, emphasis mine).
The manner in which global financial markets operate have 
“profound implications for national sovereignty and autonomy” 
(Held et al. 1999: 228).52 National sovereignty and national autonomy 
have to be thought of as “embedded within broader frameworks of 
governance in which they have become but one set of principles, 
among others, underlying the exercise of political authority” (Held et 
al. 1999: 442-444).
What, as a result, is the power of national governments in their 
view? The answer is that
The idea of the government of the state, democratic or otherwise, can no 
longer be simply defended as an idea suitable to a particular closed political 
community or nation-state. ... For the locus o f  effective political power can no 
longer be assumed to be national governments -  effective power is shared, bartered 
and struggled over by diverse forces at national, regional and global levels. In other 
words, we must recognize that political power is being repositioned, 
recontextualized and, to a degree, transformed by the growing importance of
52 As they argue, global financial markets are conceived as central to “inducing a 
convergence of political and social agendas among governments of varied ideological 
persuasions to ‘market friendly’ policies: a general commitment to price stability; low 
public deficits and indeed expenditure, especially on social goods; low direct taxation; 
privatization and labour market deregulation” (Held et al. 1999: 85).
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other less territorially based power systems (Held et al. 1999: 447, emphasis 
mine).
Consequently, the world is being transformed into a common social 
space and events in one part of it may have an immediate impact on 
other parts of the world. This is exactly where not so much the 
sovereignty of nation-states is affected but their autonomy.
An extremely interesting line of argumentation about the 
transformations of the sovereignty and autonomy of contemporary 
nation-states under the influence of globalization has been presented 
by Saskia Sassen in her two books, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an 
Age of Globalization and Globalization and Its Discontents. The growth of 
a global economy plus new telecommunications and computer 
networks have profoundly reconfigured institutions fundamental to 
the processes of governance and accountability in the modern state, 
Sassen argues. State sovereignty and the institutional apparatus in 
charge of regulating the economy (central banks, monetary policies) 
are being “destabilized” and “transformed” under the pressures of 
globalization and new technologies. Consequently, Sassen’s main 
argument is:
[G]lobalization under these conditions has entailed a partial denationalizing o f  
national territory and a partial shift of some components of state sovereignty 
to other institutions, from  supranational entities to the global capital market 
(Sassen 1996: xii, emphasis mine).
Economic globalization has transformed both the territoriality and 
sovereignty of the nation-state (it may have an impact on citizenship 
as well -  and Sassen introduces the provocative notion of “economic 
citizenship” that belongs to firms and markets, mostly corporate 
global economic players). What is crucial to her argumentation is that 
the state itself has been deeply involved in the implementation of the 
laws and regulations necessary for economic globalization.53
53 Sassen develops the theme of “denationalized state work” elsewhere by saying, 
“one of the roles of the state vis-à-vis economic globalization has been to negotiate the 
intersection of national law and the activities of foreign actors -  whether firms, 
markets or supranational organizations -  in its territory as well as the activities of 
national economic actors overseas” (Sassen 2003a: 7).
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Globalization has therefore been accompanied by the creation of new 
legal regimes, especially for international commercial arbitration, 
along with institutions that perform ratings and advisory functions. 
Transnational commercial disputes are resolved by the former. As 
Sassen comments on the new private legal regimes that have emerged 
together with globalization,
International commercial arbitration is basically a private justice system, and 
credit-rating agencies are private gate-keeping systems. ... W ith other 
institutions, they have emerged as important governance mechanisms whose 
authority is not centered in the state. The current relocation of authority has 
transformed the capacities of gov ern m en ts. (Sassen 1996: 17, emphases 
mine).
All the new transnational legal regimes that have emerged, centered 
in Western economic concepts as both standards for the regulation of 
financial systems and standards for reporting financial information 
etc, are currently American. Consequently, American business law 
has become “a kind of global jus commune” (Sassen 1996: 21). The 
nation-state itself (in Western advanced democracies) is becoming 
reconfigured as it is directly involved in this emerging transnational 
governance system. The state legitimates a new global doctrine about 
its new role in the economy -  and what is central to this doctrine is a 
consensus among states to continue globalization, to further the 
growth of the global economy (Sassen 1996: 23). An important issue, 
Sassen argues, is that global capital has made claims on nation-states, 
so they have responded through the production of new forms of 
legality (accepting new transnational legal regimes). Nation-states 
decided to pursue globalization with its new forms of legality but we 
need to remember that national legal systems are still crucial as they 
enforce the guarantees of contracts and property rights.54 Even the
54 The emergent consensus in the community of states to further globalization is 
not merely a political decision: Sassen argues in “Globalization or Denationalization?” 
that it entails “specific types of work by a large number of state institutions in each of 
these countries”. These are legislative measures, regulations, executive orders, and 
court decisions, enabling foreign firms to operate in their territories, their own firms to 
operate abroad and markets to become global. This, sometimes imposed, consensus is 
not just a decision: it entailed “new state practices which changed the actual work of
200 Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State
developing countries, in which various austerity policies and 
structural adjustment programs are imposed, actually further the 
goals of globalization: these policies “have to be run through national 
governments and reprocessed as national policies. It is clearer here 
than in other cases that the global is not simply the non-national, that 
global processes materialize in national territories and institutions” (Sassen 
1996: 113, emphasis mine). Therefore in Sassen’s view it is highly 
problematic to define the nation-state and the global economy as 
mutually exclusive.55
Consequently, the nation-state in Sassen’s account is not merely 
declining in significance: the state is a key agent in the implementation 
of global processes and now it is quite altered by this participation. The 
form and content of this participation obviously varies between highly 
developed and developing countries. Sassen refers to the “beginning of 
an unbundling of sovereignty as we have known it for many centuries” 
-  sovereignty is not “collapsing” but rather “eroding” and “being 
transformed”. Economic globalization has “reconfigured the
intersection of territoriality and sovereignty”, and this reconfiguration 
is partial, selective and strategic (Sassen 1996: 30-31). The powers 
historically associated with the nation-state have been taken on by 
global financial markets on the one hand and the new covenants on
states” (Sassen 2003a: 8). In a similar vein, governments in transition countries, 
including new EU members, spent a considerable amount of time and energy on 
harmonizing its legislation, jurisdiction etc with both the EU and global requirements. 
Whether the consensus on the furthering of globalization is imposed or not is another 
issue; there is a general sense of the consensus serving, be it even in the long run, 
national interests. State institutions today, Sassen argues, must all “contribute to 
reorient their particular policy work or, more broadly, state agendas towards the 
requirements of the global economy. This then raises the question about what is 
‘national’ in these institutional components of states linked to the implementation and 
regulation of economic globalization” (Sassen 2003a: 9). Finally, it changes the answer 
to the question -  what are states for?
55 In a parallel manner, Tom Conley argues in “The State of Globalisation and the 
Globalisation of the State” about the states’ role in introducing and maintaining 
globalization: states, especially in the developed world, have “actively supported” 
globalization and its progress remains “substantially dependent” on state support. The 
state remains “the pre-eminent structuring agent in the world political economy” 
(Conley 2002: 466).
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human rights on the other (see Kwiek 2004d). They are very different 
from each other. Global capital markets represent a
concentration of power capable of influencing national government economic 
policy and, by extension, other policies as well. These markets now exercise the 
accountability functions associated with citizenship: they can vote
governments’ economic policies down or in; they can force governments to 
take certain measures and not others. Investors vote with their feet, moving 
quickly in and out of countries, often with massive amounts of money 
(Sassen 1996: 42, emphasis mine).
This is exactly the point where tax, welfare and, by extension, 
educational and research and development policies will be influenced 
and transformed. Historically, educational policies were largely 
national policies; currently, they seem to be a part of much broader, 
and mostly economic, policy packages. The “economic electorate” that 
Sassen provocatively introduces to the discussion has the right to vote 
(with their feet) on most policies that were previously national. This is
one of the strategic points in which we can clearly see why education 
and research, and higher education and university research in particular, are 
not isolated islands. They are under constant scrutiny, as a small part of 
national economic policies. Sassen calls the function that global 
capital market exercises on national governments “disciplining” and 
concludes: “when it comes to public spending, governments are 
increasingly subject to outside pressures” (Sassen 1996: 48). This “new 
geography of power” is further discussed in Globalization and Its 
Discontents (1998). Sassen emphasizes that globalization and 
deregulation have reduced the role of the state but the state still 
“remains as the ultimate guarantor of the rights of capital”, 
guaranteeing property rights and contracts (Sassen 1998: 198). No 
other institutional arrangements can replace it in its technical 
administrative capacity, and it continues to play a crucial role in the 
“production of legality” for new forms of transnational economic 
activity (Sassen 1998: 200).56 Thus, the transformations of the nation­
56 To introduce new ideas about which areas of state intervention to maintain, and 
which to withdraw from in the future -  preserving public trust at the same time -  is 
what Yergin and Stanislav in their The Commanding Heights. The Battle Between
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state are unprecedented and the impact of globalization on its forms, 
roles and functions is very significant indeed.
Another moderate, Manuel Castells, in his magisterial trilogy, The 
Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, presents a wide 
panorama of the current transformations to our societies caused by 
today’s technological revolution, centered around information 
technologies, and the global interdependence of economies. Social 
changes are as dramatic as the technological and economic processes 
of transformation, he argues.57 Information technology has been 
instrumental in allowing the restructuring of the capitalist system 
from the 1980s onwards. The trilogy studies a new social structure 
associated with the emergence of a new mode of development -  
“informationalism” (Castells 1996: 14). The processes in technology, 
finance, production, communications and politics are “radically new” 
(Castells 1998: 244) and Castells, against those who claim that 
globalization is not a new phenomenon (as exemplified above by the 
skeptics in this chapter), states that he is not convinced that the new 
infrastructure based on information technology does not introduce a 
“qualitative social and economic change, by enabling global processes 
to operate in real time” (Castells 1997: 244). At the dawn of the 
Information Age,
a crisis of legitimacy is voiding of meaning and function the institutions of 
the industrial era. Bypassed by global networks of wealth, power, and 
information, the modern nation-state has lost much of its sovereignty. By
Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking the Modern World call a “challenge of 
imagination”: “After all, there is no market without government to define the rules 
and the context. The state creates and maintains the parameters within which the market 
operates. And that is the new direction. The state accepts the discipline of the market; 
government moves away from being producer, controller, and intervener, whether 
through state ownership or heavy-handed regulation. The state as manager is an 
increasing laggard in the competitive, mobile economy. Instead, government shifts 
towards being a referee, setting the rules of the game to ensure, among other things, 
competition” (Yergin and Stanislaw 2000: 321, emphasis mine).
57 To quote Martin Carnoy: globalization brings about a “revolution in the 
organization of work, the production of goods and services, relations among nations, 
and even local culture. No community is immune from the effects of this revolution. It is 
changing the very fundamentals of human relations and social life” (Carnoy 1999: 14).
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trying to intervene strategically in this global scene the state loses capacity to
represent its territorially rooted constituencies (Castells 1997: 354).
The modern nation-state seems to be losing on both fronts, global 
and domestic, vis-à-vis global actors and vis-à-vis their citizens. State 
control over space and time is bypassed by global flows of capital, 
goods, services, technology, communication, and information such 
that national identity is being challenged by the plural and hybrid 
identities of citizens. The modern nation-state “seems to be losing its 
power, although, and this is essential, not its influence” (Castells 1997: 
243). The challenge to state sovereignty seems to originate, Castells 
argues, from its inability to navigate between the “power of global 
networks” and the “challenge of singular identities”. According to 
Giddens’ definition of the nation-state, referred to at the beginning of 
this chapter, a nation-state is a “bordered power-container”. What 
happens, Castells asks, and how should we conceptualize the state, 
when borders break down, and when containers are becoming 
contained themselves? Giddens’ nation-state “appears to be 
superseded by historical transformation” and its instrumental 
capacity is decisively undermined by globalization (Castells 1997: 244).
In economic terms, the interdependence of financial markets and 
currency markets link up national currencies; the exchange rate 
between the main currencies of the world is systematically 
interdependent, and so are, or will be, monetary policies; and if 
monetary policies are somehow harmonized, so are, or will be prime 
interest rates, and ultimately, budgetary policies: it follows that 
nation-states are losing and will lose control over “fundamental 
elements” of their economic polices. So the degree of freedom for 
national economic policy has been “drastically reduced” since the 
1990s, with their budget policy caught between automatic welfare 
entitlements inherited from the past -  as discussed in Chapter 4 on 
the transformations of the welfare state -  and current high capital 
mobility (Castells 1997: 246). The globalization of production and 
investment threatens also the welfare state -  probably the main 
“building block” for the legitimacy of the nation-state (Castells 1997: 
243). The contradiction between the internationalization of 
investment, production, and consumption on the one hand, and the
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national basis of taxation systems, on the other, is growing (at the 
same time, as repeated constantly in globalization literature, “a basic 
premise of current welfare policy-making is that taxes cannot be 
raised”, Bonoli et al. 2000: 72). The decline of the nation-state is 
closely linked to the decline of the welfare state. The two processes 
are interrelated because they are the twins of modern social 
organization. Castells links the two processes and claims that
In an economy whose core markets for capital, goods and services are 
increasingly integrated on a global scale, there is little room fo r  vastly different 
welfare states, with relatively similar levels of labor productivity and 
production quality. Only a global social contract (reducing the gap, without 
necessarily equalizing social and working conditions) linked to international 
tariff agreements, could avoid the demise of the most generous welfare 
states. Yet, because in the new liberalized, networked, global economy such a 
far-reaching social contract is unlikely, welfare states are being downsized to the 
lowest common denominator that keeps spiralling downwards. So doing, a 
fundam ental component o f  the legitimacy and stability o f  the nation-state fades 
away, not only in Europe but throughout the world (Castells 1997: 254, 
emphases mine).
Consequently, the nation-state is doomed because it is increasingly 
powerless in controlling monetary policies, deciding its budget, 
collecting its corporate taxes and fulfilling its commitments to provide 
social benefits to its citizens. In sum, the state has lost its economic 
power, even though it retains some regulatory capacity, as in Saskia 
Sassen’s diagnoses about the state basically having one final thing to 
do: producing new legal regimes for the global age in national 
settings (Castells 1997: 254). At the same time, the citizens for whose 
well-being nation-states are responsible are not the former subjects of 
territorially-bounded states; they have diversified interests and 
conflicting loyalties; their identities are hybrid and often 
incommensurable with one another. Consequently, the nation-state is 
unable to respond to their conflicting claims and contradictory 
demands. As Castells argues,
[T]he increasing diversification and fragmentation of social interests in the 
network society result in their aggregation under the form of (re)constructed 
identities. Thus, a plurality o f  identities forwards to the nation-state the claims,
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demands, and challenges o f  the civil society. The growing inability of the nation­
state to respond simultaneously to this vast array of demands induces what 
Habermas called a “legitimation crisis” or, in Richard Sennett’s analysis, “the 
fall of the public man”, the figure that is the foundation of democratic 
citizenship (Castells 1997: 271, emphases mine).
In normative terms, like Zygmunt Bauman in his recent books about 
modernity (Modernity and the Holocaust in particular), Castells has no 
particular sympathy for modern nation-states as in the 20th century 
they have mobilized their people for reciprocal mass slaughter.
In the new world order, the nation-state is just one of the sources 
of authority. It is submitted to competition by other, undefined and 
sometimes indefinable, sources of power. So, “while the nation-states 
do continue to exist ... they are, and they will increasingly be, nodes of 
a broader network o f power”. They have become part of a network of 
powers and counter powers and they are “powerless by themselves: 
they are dependent on a broader system of enacting authority and 
influence from multiple sources”. However, it does not follow that 
they have become irrelevant or that they will disappear. They will 
not, at least for a long time (Castells 1997: 304-305).
Anthony Giddens, another transformationalist, in his Runaway 
World. How Globalisation Is Reshaping Our Lives, argues that we are 
living through a major period of historical transition. The world in 
which we are living today seems more and more out of our control -  
it is a runaway world. Globalization is restructuring the ways in 
which we live in a “very profound manner” (Giddens 1999: 1-4). The 
current world economy has no parallels in history. Consequently, 
globalization is “not only new, but also revolutionary”. But it should 
not be seen in solely economic terms but rather in political, 
technological, cultural, as well as economic terms (Giddens 1999: 10). 
Nation-states are still powerful, yet at the same time they are being 
“reshaped” before our eyes. National economic policy cannot be as 
effective as it once was (Giddens 1999: 18). Globalization is not 
incidental: it is the way we now live, Giddens argues. As Will Hutton 
claims, in a conversation with Anthony Giddens, there is a sense that 
change is all-encompassing and carries a new inevitability, the force 
of change is “close to irresistible” (Hutton and Giddens 2000: 2). To
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Giddens, as a proponent of third way politics, the reform of 
government and the state is the first priority: the state should not 
dominate either markets or civil society although it needs to regulate 
and intervene in both (Giddens 2001a: 6). Welfare reform in most 
societies is an “absolute necessity”, although in practice it is difficult. 
The current welfare state developed in an era when neither the risks 
to be covered, nor the groups in most need, are the same (Giddens 
2001a: 11).58 A new social contract needs to be constructed. The state 
should not have more and more tasks to cope with as an overloaded, 
bureaucratic state is unlikely to provide good public services and 
would be dysfunctional for economic prosperity. Consequently, a 
fundamental theme of his third way politics is “rediscovering an 
activist role for government, restoring and refurbishing public 
institutions” (Giddens 2001a: 6). The state has to be strong but not 
large; and an effective market economy is the best way of promoting 
prosperity and economic efficiency. The role of markets must be kept 
confined though:
W here the market is allowed to intrude too far into other spheres of social 
life, a variety of unacceptable consequences result. M arkets create 
insecurities and inequalities that require governm ent intervention or 
regulation if they are to be controlled or minimized. Powerful agents 
w ithin the marketplace can subvert dem ocratic processes. Com m ercialism  
can invade areas that should either be the province of government or civil 
society (Giddens 2001a: 7).
Such authors as Fritz Scharpf (in his widely reprinted “Negative 
Integration: States and the Loss of Boundary Control”) and John 
Gerard Ruggie (in such papers as e.g. “International Regimes, 
Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar 
Economic Order” or “Globalization and the Embedded Liberalism 
Compromise: the End of the Era?”) stress the idea that the economic 
space of the nation-state and national territorial borders no longer
58 The entry into Ulrich Beck’s Risikogesellschaft occurs at the moment when “the 
hazards which are now decided and consequently produced by society undermine 
and/or cancel the established safety systems o f  the welfare state’s existing risk calculations” 
(Beck 1999a: 76, emphasis mine).
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coincide. Consequently, the postwar “embedded liberalism 
compromise” -  the social contract between the state, market, and 
labor -  does not work anymore as it was designed to work within 
closed national economies. Scharpf argues that in the history of 
capitalism, the decades following the Second World War were 
“unusual in the degree to which the boundaries of the territorial state 
had become coextensive with the boundaries of markets for capital, 
services, goods and labor” (Scharpf 2000a: 254). Investment 
opportunities existed mainly within national economies and firms 
were mainly challenged by domestic competitors. At the time, 
however, when major European welfare state regimes were being 
constructed, it was not fully realized how much the success of 
“market-correcting policies” depended on the capacity of the 
territorial nation-states to control their economic boundaries. Under 
the forces of globalization, though, this controlling capacity was lost. 
“The ‘golden years’ of the capitalist welfare state came to an end” 
(Scharpf 2000a: 255). The social contract which had allowed the 
nation-states in advanced capitalist countries to be accompanied by a 
welfare state originated right after the Second World War. With the 
advent of globalization, it is eroding. The compact between state and 
society in postwar territorially-bounded national democracies was 
intended to mediate the deleterious domestic effects of postwar 
economic liberalization (and was based on Enlightenment beliefs in 
scientific solutions to social problems59). John Gerard Ruggie was 
already calling this compromise the “embedded liberalism 
compromise” in 1982. Referring to Karl Polanyi’s distinction between 
“embedded” and “disembedded” economic orders, he suggested the 
following definition:
59 Anthony Welch in his paper on “Globalisation, Post-modernity and the State: 
Comparative Education Facing the Third Millennium” rightly observes that “the post­
war certainties ... were largely based on the supposedly secure and safe bedrock of 
scientific (or scientistic) epistemologies and an unproblematised modernity. These 
assumptions, directly traceable to the influence of a somewhat naive Enlightenment 
optimism about the perfectibility of society, using the methods and techniques of the 
newly emerging sciences which were already showing such promise in the natural 
world, have been eroded. At the onset of a new millennium, such confidence has 
passed. We live in ‘new times’” (Welch 2001: 486).
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The essence of embedded liberalism ... is to devise a form of multilateralism 
that is compatible with the requirements of domestic stability. ...
Governments ... also promised to minimize socially disruptive domestic 
adjustment costs as well as any national economic and political 
vulnerabilities that might accrue from international functional differentiation 
(Ruggie 1982: 399).
This postwar compromise assigned specific policy roles to 
national governments -  which governments are increasingly unable, 
or unwilling, to perform today.60 One of the indirect effects of 
globalization is its impact on the ability of the state to “live up to its 
side of the postwar domestic compact” (Ruggie 1997: 2). The 
emergence of global capital markets posed entirely new policy 
problems. The existing systems of supervision and regulation, 
systems of taxation and accounting, were created for a “nation-based 
world economic landscape” (Ruggie 1997: 2). But economic policies 
are becoming increasingly denationalized and the state is increasingly 
unable, or unwilling, to keep its promises from the Golden Age of the 
welfare state.61 And the welfare state has traditionally been one of the
60 This is how David Held and colleagues comment on the difference between 
prewar and postwar international financial order: “Unlike the classical Gold Standard, 
the postwar international financial order -  the Bretton Woods System -  was designed 
to ensure that domestic economic objectives were not subordinated to global financial 
disciplines but, on the contrary, took precedence over them” (Held et al. 1999: 200).
61 It is extremely hard to keep promises from the Golden Age of the welfare state 
while “fiscal termites” are gnawing at the foundations of the fiscal house in all major 
developed economies. Vito Tanzi argues that the most direct and powerful impact of 
globalization on the welfare state will probably come through its effect on tax systems: 
“for the time being there is little, if any, evidence that the tax systems of the industrial 
countries are collapsing. On the contrary, for the majority of these countries the level 
of taxation is at a historical high. However, in most countries in recent years, the tax 
level has stopped growing and, in a few, there has actually been some decline. ... 
While the fiscal house is still standing and looks solid, one can visualize many fiscal 
termites that are busily gnawing at its foundations”. These include: increased travel by 
individuals (shopping in places where sales taxes are lower); increased activities on 
the part of some highly skilled individuals conducted outside of their countries 
(underreporting or not reporting at all their foreign earnings); a growing use of 
electronic commerce and electronic transactions in general (largely taking place 
outside of the tax system); the growing importance of off-shore companies and tax-
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main pillars in the appeal of nation-state construction. As Ruggie 
describes the process,
The postwar international economic order rested on a grand domestic bargain : 
societies were asked to embrace the change and dislocation attending 
international liberalization, but the state promised to cushion those effects, by 
means of its newly acquired economic and social policy roles. ...
Increasingly, this compromise is surpassed and enveloped externally by 
forces it cannot easily grasp, and it finds itself being hollowed out from  the 
inside by political postures it was intended to replace (Ruggie 1997: 8, 
emphasis mine).
As we can see again, the power of the nation-state, and the power 
of the loyalty of its citizens, has rested on a firm belief in (historically 
unprecedented) welfare rights. When the Keynesian welfare state was 
formed, the role of the state was to find a fair balance between the 
state and the market -  which had fundamentally transformed 
postwar social relations in all the countries involved in this social 
experiment.62 The task of this postwar institutional reconstruction 
was to devise a framework which would safeguard and aid the quest 
for domestic stability without triggering the mutually destructive 
external consequences that had plagued the interwar period. In the 
approach of both Scharpf and Ruggie, the impact of globalization on 
the nation-state is through undermining the founding ideas behind 
the postwar welfare state: through liberalization and the opening up
heavens; the growth of new financial instruments (such as e.g. derivatives and hedge 
funds); the growing importance of trade that takes place within multinationals 
(intrafirm trade conducted at “transfer prices”); the growing inability of countries to 
tax, especially with high rates, financial capital; and the possibility that real money 
may begin to be substituted by electronic money in the normal transactions between 
individuals (Tanzi 2001: 192-195). Interestingly enough, the issue of high taxes is 
certainly not only globalization-related but also hinges on the will of the electorate. As 
Martin Wolf argues, “sustaining a high measure of redistributive taxation remains 
perfectly possible. The constraint is not globalization, but the willingness of the 
electorate to tolerate high taxation” (Wolf 2001: 188).
62 Now we are experiencing what Ulrich Beck called (in World Risk Society) a 
“domino effect”: “Things which used to supplement and reinforce one another in good 
times -  full employment, pension savings, high tax revenue, leeway for government 
action -  now tend mutatis mutandis to endanger one another” (Beck 1999a: 11).
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of economies, nation-states begin to lose their legitimacy provided, in 
vast measure, by a social contract valid only in closed, national 
economies.
For Jan Aart Scholte, the impact of globalization on the nation­
state has been significant and we are witnessing the emergence of a 
new post-sovereign governance; however, “the death notices have 
been recklessly premature” (Scholte 2000: 132).63 States have played a 
crucial role in promoting the rise of supraterritoriality and they 
remain key players in the contemporary governance of global flows. 
Whatever new world order might be emerging under the impact of 
globalization forces, the state has remained a major part of it. Instead 
of eliminating the state, the spread of supraterritoriality has tended to 
create a “different kind of state”, “the reconstructed state”. The most 
significant reconfiguration of the state, in relation to globalization, 
involved “the demise of sovereignty” (in its Westphalian sense of the 
term, Scholte 2000: 134-135). In traditional conceptions, sovereignty 
meant a claim by the state,
to supreme, comprehensive, unqualified and exclusive rule over its territorial 
jurisdiction. W ith supreme rule, the sovereign state answers to no higher 
authority; it always has the final say in respect of its territorial realm and its 
cross-border relations with other countries. With comprehensive rule, the 
sovereign state governs all aspects of social life: money supply, language, 
military affairs, sexual behaviour, formal education, etc. With unqualified rule, 
sovereign states respect a norm of nonintervention in one another’s territorial 
jurisdictions. W ith exclusive rule, the sovereign state does not share authority
over its realm with any other party (Scholte 2000: 135).
This order is certainly over, Scholte argues, “the end of sovereignty” is 
a fact: today, no state is able to achieve “absolute, comprehensive, 
supreme and unilateral” control over the global flows that affect its
63 Scholte does not really seem to appreciate the current level of much of the 
globalization debate: “much discussion of globalization is steeped in oversimpli­
fication, exaggeration and wishful thinking. In spite of a deluge of publications on the 
subject, our analyses of globalization tend to remain conceptually inexact, empirically 
thin, historically and culturally illiterate, normatively shallow and politically naive” 
(Scholte 2000: 1). The phrasing is interesting; one could hardly present a more 
negative view in four lines...
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realm. Consequently, Scholte suggests developing a new vocabulary 
of post-sovereign governance. While the state persists, it is being 
fundamentally transformed through the ending of its sovereignty; the 
state is becoming a part, only a part, of a wider multilayered complex 
of regulation in which “private as well as public agencies play key 
roles” (Scholte 2000: 157). Globalization has not fundamentally 
undermined the position of nationhood as a primary framework of 
collective solidarity but it has helped to loosen some links between 
nations and states. Nationhood as a frame of reference for citizens’ 
loyalties has been accompanied by the rise of non-national 
frameworks of collective identity: new bonds have grown on lines of 
e.g. age, class, gender, race, religion and sexual orientation (Scholte 
2000: 159-160). In the most general terms, the impact of globalization 
on the state and governance in Scholte can be summarized as 
“reconstructed statehood” (e.g. loss of sovereignty, service to both 
supraterritorial and territorial constituents, retreat from direct state 
provision of comprehensive welfare needs, and increased 
participation in and reliance on multilateral arrangements), 
“multilayered public governance” (e.g. devolution of competences 
from state to substate bodies and an expanded role for transworld 
institutions and global laws) and “privatized governance” (e.g. 
increased use of nonofficial agencies to implement public policies and 
considerable drafting of regulations by nonofficial bodies) (Scholte 
2000: 157).
Finally, James N. Rosenau, the last from among the moderates 
discussed here, in his “Governance in a Globalizing World” argues 
that the world is going to witness the extension of anarchic structures, 
a “new form of anarchy”, and “continuing disaggregation” (Rosenau 
2000: 184). The world will not be able to find a single organizing 
principle, a coherent pattern of transformations, or any global 
coherence through the changes to its governance structures. As he 
claims,
[T]here is no single organizing principle on which global governance rests,
no emergent order around which communities and nations are likely to
converge. Global governance is the sum of myriad -  literally millions -  of
control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, structures and
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processes. ... [T]here are no characteristics or attributes common to all 
mechanisms. This means that any attempt to assess the dynamics of global 
governance will perforce have multiple dimensions, that any effort to trace a 
hierarchical structure of authority which loosely links disparate sources of 
governance to each other is bound to fail. In terms o f  governance, the world is 
too disaggregated fo r  grand logic that postulates a measure o f  global coherence” 
(Rosenau 2000: 183, emphasis mine).
Rosenau identifies major shifts in the location of authority and 
control mechanisms on every continent and in every country, but 
those shifts are not uniform; their directions vary, even though, on a 
global scale, the shift of authority “away from government” is 
substantial. The world is becoming ever more interdependent, 
complex and multi-layered; people, information, products and ideas 
are on the move -  and what happens in one corner or at one level 
may have consequences for every other corner and level (Rosenau 
2000: 181).64
3.4. G lo b a liz a tio n , th e  P u b lic  Sector, 
and  H igh er E d u cation
Western liberal democracies are reforming, or trying to reform, their 
welfare state institutions, as will be discussed in Chapter 4, and the 
modern university, as a claimant on public resources, is a significant 
part of the welfare sector. The costs of both teaching and research are 
escalating, as are the costs of maintaining advanced healthcare 
systems and other segments of the welfare state, and consequently the 
whole public sector is under new, mostly unheard of before, and 
mostly financial, pressures. In this context one way that globalization 
has had a major impact on education has been through what Martin
64 Or as Held et al. put it, “globalization reflects a widespread perception that the 
world is rapidly being moulded into a shared social space by economic and 
technological forces and that developments in one region of the world can have 
profound consequences for the life chances of individuals or communities on the other 
side of the globe” (Held et al. 1999: 1). This worldwide interconnectedness is one of the 
crucial descriptions of globalization in this context.
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Carnoy termed “finance-driven reforms” (as opposed to
“competitiveness-driven reforms” and “equity-driven reforms”, see 
Carnoy 1999: 42ff) the main goal of which is to reduce public 
spending on education. As he argues in Globalization and Educational 
Reform: What Planners Need to Know, the former set of reforms may 
contribute to the shortage of public resources for education “even 
when more resources could be made available to education with net 
gains for economic growth” (Carnoy 1999: 52).65
It is important to remember that linking economic and social 
change to changes in how societies transmit knowledge, as Martin 
Carnoy and Diana Rhoten argue, is a relatively new approach to 
studying education (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002: 1). Before the 1950s, 
comparative education focused mainly on the philosophical and 
cultural origins of educational systems: educational change was seen 
as resulting from changing educational philosophies. In the 1960s and 
1970s this view was challenged by various historical studies in which 
educational reform was situated in economic and social contexts. 
Today, they claim, it is the phenomenon of globalization that is 
providing a new empirical challenge and a new theoretical 
framework for rethinking higher education:
Globalization is a force reorganizing the world’s economy, and the main 
resources for that economy are increasingly knowledge and information. If 
knowledge and information ... are fundamental to the development of the 
global economy, and the global economy, in turn, shapes the nature of 
educational opportunities and institutions, how should we draw the
65 To recall an idea already referred to: there is a need, following Martin Carnoy, 
to distinguish between the “objective” conditions of the global information economy 
and a particular ideology that stresses reduced public spending on social services in 
general; in Carnoy’s formulation, “to what extent public resources for education in a 
particular country really cannot be increased, and to what extent the ‘shortage’ of
public funding represents an ideological preference for private investment in education
is crucial to educational policy-making in the new global environment. It does make a 
major difference to educational delivery how the role of the public sector in education 
expansion and improvement is played out” (Carnoy 1999: 51, emphases mine). At he 
same time, it does not make a major difference to institutions themselves whether the 
shortage of public funding for higher education is caused by real or perceived 
budgetary stress.
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directional arrows in our analysis? ... One point is fairly clear. I f  knowledge is 
fundam ental to globalization, globalization should also have a profound impact on 
the transmission o f  knowledge (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002: 2, emphasis mine).66
And the impact of globalization on the transmission of knowledge is 
the impact on, inter alia, education and educational institutions, 
especially at the higher level. Carnoy argues elsewhere (Carnoy 1999: 
14) that although education appears to have changed little at the 
classroom level, globalization is having a profound effect on 
education at other levels. But at the heart of the relationship between 
globalization and education is the relationship between the globalized 
political economy and the nation-state (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002: 3), one 
of major concerns of the present chapter.67 To the question of whether 
the power of the nation is diminished by globalization, Carnoy 
answers in the positive and in the negative. Both answers are 
important but the argumentation behind the positive answer is 
crucial for our purposes here. So in his view globalization diminishes 
the power of the nation-state because global economic competition 
makes the nation state focus on “economic policies that improve global 
competitiveness, at the expense of policies that stabilize the current 
configuration of the domestic economy or possibly social cohesion” 
(Carnoy 1999: 20, all emphases mine).
This major shift of concern by today’s states towards economic 
and global concerns at the expense of social and domestic ones makes
66 I am in agreement with Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw who claim in The 
Commanding Heights. The Battle Between Government and the Marketplace That Is Remaking 
the Modern World that “within, outside, and across organizations and national 
boundaries, people are tied together, sharing information and points of view, working in 
virtual teams, bartering goods and services, swapping bonds and currencies, exchanging 
chatter and banalities, and passing the time. Information of every kind is available. With 
the establishment of the US government data Web site in 1997, a ten-year-old could gain 
access to more and better data than a senior official could have done just five years earlier” 
(Yergin and Stanislaw in Held 2000: 319, emphasis mine). Consequently, the gap 
between the “knowledge poor” and the “knowledge rich” (resulting also from e.g. the 
“digital divide”) is of crucial importance for social cohesion.
67 I am in full agreement with Anthony R. Welch when he argues that “it is 
becoming increasingly difficult to understand education without reference to such [i.e. 
globalisation] processes” (Welch 2001: 478).
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the state completely different from what Bob Jessop called once “The 
Keynesian National Welfare State” (Jessop 1999a: 348). What it may 
mean in practice is a shift in public spending and monetary policy: 
from measures favoring workers and consumers to those favoring 
financial interests. Or as Carnoy and Rhoten put it,
Globalization forces nation-states to focus more on acting as economic
growth promoters for their national economies than as protectors of the
national identity or a nationalist project (Carnoy and Rhoten 2002: 3).
Consequently, the role of universities seems quite different from these 
two perspectives: the traditional perspective saw universities as 
useful instruments for inculcating national identity and the new one 
sees universities as (equally useful) instruments in promoting 
economic growth and boosting national economies. A negative 
answer to Carnoy’s question is more neutral towards our educational 
concerns; he claims that the power of the nation-state is not 
diminished by globalization because “ultimately nation-states still 
influence the territorial and temporal space in which capital has to 
invest” (Carnoy 1999: 20-21).
At the same time, the debate on the university today comes as 
part and parcel of a much wider debate on the public sector (and state 
intervention in, or provision of, different, traditionally public, 
services). Certainly in the period of the traditional Keynesian welfare 
state regimes it was the state -  rather than the market -  that was 
deeply involved in the economy and in the protection of nation-state 
citizens against the potential social evils of postwar capitalism. As the 
World Bank’s flagship publication on the role of the state argues, for 
much of the 20th century people looked to government or the state to 
do more; but since the 1980s, the pendulum has been swinging again, 
and the existing conceptions of the state’s place in the world have 
been challenged by such developments as e.g. the collapse of 
command-and-control economies or the fiscal crisis of the welfare 
state. Consequently, today, the countries are asking again what 
government’s role ought to be and how its roles should be played 
(World Bank 1997: 17). The state’s behavior and the consequences of 
that behavior are under severe scrutiny worldwide. The post-war
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paradigm of the Keynesian welfare state (John Gerard Ruggie’s 
“embedded liberalism compromise” -  a compact between the state 
and society to mediate the deleterious domestic effects of postwar 
international economic liberalization, see Ruggie 1982 and 1997) 
coalesced around three basic themes. It was the social need to provide 
welfare benefits, the desirability of a mixed public-private economy 
which would often mean the nationalization of a range of strategic 
national industries, and finally the need for a coordinated 
macroeconomic policy directed toward e.g. full employment (World 
Bank 1997: 22). From a historical perspective,
The Great Depression was seen as a failure of capitalism and markets, while 
state interventions -  the Marshall Plan, Keynesian demand management, and 
the welfare state -  seemed to record one success after another. ... By the 
1960s states had become involved in virtually every aspect of the economy, 
administering prices and increasingly regulating labor, foreign exchange, and 
financial markets. By the 1970s the costs of this strategy were coming home to 
roost. The oil price shocks were a last gasp for state expansion. . The 
collapse of the Soviet Union . sounded the death knell for a developmental 
era. Suddenly, government failure, including the failure of publicly owned 
firms, seemed everywhere glaringly evident. Governments began to adapt 
policies designed to reduce the scope of the state’s intervention in the 
economy (World Bank 1997: 23).
To return to an image used by numerous commentators -  that of a 
state/market pendulum:68 the pendulum had swung from the statist
68 Peter Evans in his paper on “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in 
an Era of Globalization” (1997) also refers to the hypothesis of “the return of the 
ideological pendulum” but emphasizes that it need not sanction a return to the past 
and that it can be easily conflated with a return to “embedded liberalism”: “In this 
view, the recent push to reduce the role of the state represented a natural reaction to 
the previous overarching of politicians and state managers. The glaring capacity gap 
led to a period during which, in Dani Rodrik’s words, ‘excessive optimism’ about 
what the state would be able to accomplish was replaced by excessive pessimism. 
... This perspective makes sense. States took on more than they could handle during 
the period following World War II. Dealing with the capacity gap clearly required 
rethinking the state’s role. Readjustment was necessary, and overzealousness in 
reducing the state’s role, natural. The return of the pendulum need not sanction a 
return to the past, but it would legitimate new efforts to turn states into effective
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development model to the “minimalist state” model of the 1980s, 
epitomized by such names as Margaret Thatcher in the United 
Kingdom and Ronald Reagan in the USA. The countries involved in 
implementing “New Public Management” and “reinventing 
government” policies69 squeezed programs in education and health70 
but the result of this “overzealous rejection of government” was, the 
World Bank admits, the “neglect of the state’s vital functions, 
threatening social welfare and eroding the foundations for market 
development” (World Bank 1997: 24). So, after a few years, probably 
for the first time in the World Development Report of 1997 referred to 
here, that the World Bank, heavily involved in implementing 
structural adjustment policies in developing countries, had to admit 
that the idea of the “minimal state” did not work.71 It is here that the 
two crucial passages which show a considerable change in the Bank’s 
attitude to the state appear: “Development -  economic, social, and
instruments for the achievement of collective goals. The question is whether the 
pendulum is likely to come to rest at a point that reflects dispassionate analysis of 
accumulated global experience with regard to the relative effectiveness of different 
forms and strategies of state action” (Evans 1997: 83).
69 The implementation of both sets of policies was accompanied by the 
introduction of a new set of terms and expressions such as e.g. downsizing or 
rightsizing; lean and mean; contracting out, off-loading or outsourcing; steering rather 
than rowing; empowering rather than serving; earning rather than spending; such 
slogans as “let managers manage” or “management is management” etc. The idea was 
to see no difference between the manner in which public affairs and private enterprise 
ought to be run -  to conduct public affairs, as far as possible, on business principles 
(see United Nations 2001: 38).
70 With respect to both the UK and USA, it is useful to see how Paul Pierson 
conceptualizes the processes of welfare state retrenchment in his Dismantling the 
Welfare State? (1994), though without much reference to the education sector; for the 
developments in the education sector, see especially Sally Tomlinson’s Education in a 
Post-welfare Society (2001).
71 It is still unclear to what extent structural adjustment policies, programs and 
conditionalities are still imposed in their most rigid forms by the IMF in the developing 
world (we also need to remember that the work of the World Bank is closely tied to that 
of the IMF -  without the endorsement of the Fund it is not possible to enter into 
negotiations with the Bank, as Carlos Alberto Torres reminds us in his recent paper on 
“The State, Privatisation and Educational Policy: a Critique of Neo-Liberalism in Latin 
America and Some Ethical and Political Implications”, Torres 2002: 374).
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sustainable -  without an effective state is impossible. It is increasingly 
recognized that an effective state -  not a minimal one -  is central to 
economic and social development”, as well as another passage which 
argues that “State-dominated development has failed, but so will 
stateless development. Development without an effective state is 
impossible” (World Bank 1997: 18, 25). Up to World Development 
Report 1996: From Plan to Market, the ideal for the World Bank had 
been the “minimal state”.72
At the same time, for education and healthcare services, the 
publication presents another historical excursus, used apparently to 
introduce a historical relativization of what can, and what does not 
necessarily have to, be seen as the state’s responsibility. After 
suggesting private and community participation in social services, the 
historical note stresses the following:
Viewed against the common postwar presumption that infrastructure and 
social services are the exclusive domain of public monopolies, pluralistic 
approaches might seem radical and untested. In fact, private and community 
participation in infrastructure and social services has a long historical 
pedigree. Only in the twentieth century did governments, first in Europe and 
later elsewhere, become important providers of services, in extreme cases 
excluding the private sector altogether. ... Only in the twentieth century did 
the state assume an important role in providing social services such as 
education and health care (World Bank 1997: 53-54; see also Barr 1996).73
The state is thus viewed by the World Bank not as a direct provider of 
growth but a “partner, catalyst, and facilitator”, not as a sole provider 
but a “facilitator and regulator”, not as a “director” but a “partner and 
facilitator” (World Bank 1997: 1, 2, 18). The state should certainly be 
assisting households to cope with certain risks to their economic
72 As already mentioned, the role of government in producing and distributing 
goods and services must “shrink dramatically”, it must mostly “facilitate private 
activity”, and what is needed in most general terms is a “wholesale reinvention of 
government” (World Bank 1996: 110ff).
73 Which is more or less parallel to an excellent one-sentence description of 
welfare from a historical perspective given by Nick Manning and Ian Shaw: “For most 
of the world’s history, except for the very privileged, the most important problem has 
been that of survival” (Manning and Shaw 1999: 341).
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security but “the idea that the state alone must carry this burden is 
changing”. Innovative solutions are needed -  which is especially 
important for those developing countries which are not yet “locked 
into costly solutions” (of the kind provided by the generous Western­
style welfare state, let us add).74 Coming back to the picture of the 
state/market pendulum, citizens (especially from the developing 
world) should not look for solutions from the state -  but should focus 
instead on solutions provided by the market. The consequences for 
the public sector, including higher education, are far-reaching:75 
“although the state still has a central role in ensuring the provision of 
basic services -  education, health, infrastructure -  it is not obvious 
that the state must be the only provider, or a provider at all” (World 
Bank 1997: 27). An “effective state” can leave some areas to the market 
and the areas where markets and private spending can meet most 
needs are “urban hospitals, clinics, universities, and transport”
74 The picture is clear, as are the recommendations that can be drawn from it, 
especially for developing countries: “[t]here is a growing recognition that in many 
countries monopoly public providers of infrastructure, social services, and other 
goods and services are unlikely to do a good job. At the same time, technological and 
organizational innovations have created new opportunities for competitive, private 
providers in activities hitherto confined to the public sector. ... It is now well 
established that the state can help households to cope with certain risks to their 
economic security. ... But the idea that the state alone must carry this burden is changing. ... 
Innovative solutions that involve businesses, labor, households, and community 
groups are needed to achieve greater security at lower cost. This is especially important 
for those developing countries not yet locked into costly solutions” (World Bank 1997: 4-5, 
emphases mine).
75 The “end-of-history” mood captured by Francis Fukuyama in his The End o f  
History with respect to the public sector has been summarized by some commentators 
in the following manner: “The collapse of Eastern European regimes ... has fostered a 
wider disillusion with all publicly owned and funded institutions. Any public organization, 
whatever social benefit it aims to provide, is for the moment tarred with the brush of 
intervention in the free market environment. There is a quiet suspicion that all such 
institutions are somehow doomed, or at least doomed not to be successful” (Smith and 
Webster 1998: 5, emphasis mine). To give a local example: the initial enthusiasm with 
which private higher education institutions were being opened at the beginning of the 
1990s in several Central and East European countries (most notably in Poland, 
Romania and Estonia) was accompanied by the motive to follow new (academic and 
economic) paths, independent of (any) state interventionism.
220 Chapter 3. The University and the Nation-State
(World Bank 1997: 53). The state should not leave to the market such 
public goods as clean air, safe water or basic literacy but with respect 
to higher education it is not obvious that it must be a provider at 
all.. ,76 “Choosing what to do and what not to do is critical”, as the 
idea is nicely phrased in a different passage (World Bank 1997: 3).
New publications on the tertiary education sector in the World 
Bank carry different overtones though. Constructing Knowledge 
Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education (2002) is very careful in 
describing a state’s obligations with respect to higher education: 
obligations include working within a coherent policy framework, 
providing an enabling regulatory environment, and working towards 
financial incentives; the state’s role is guidance rather than steering, 
and in the elaboration of a clear vision for the long-term development 
of the education system on a national level (World Bank 2002: xxii- 
xxiv). Despite diminished fiscal resources and competing claims from 
other sectors (see Hovey 1999), governments in the World Bank’s 
account still have at least three strong reasons for supporting the 
sector: investments in higher education generate external benefits 
essential for economic and social development; capital market 
imperfections make loans largely unavailable to students on a large 
scale, in a wide range of programs; and finally, higher education 
plays a key role in supporting basic and secondary education (World 
Bank 2002: 76). The report does not leave much doubt about the need 
to adequately finance higher education from the public purse when it 
presents a long list of the social and economic costs of under­
investment in higher education:
76 A brief note is necessary here: there is a tremendous difference between the 
Bank’s writings on the state and related issues and its writings on higher education. The 
difference has been evident from the Bank’s first book on the education sector published 
in 1994 (Higher Education. The Lessons o f Experience) to the most recently published 
Constructing Knowledge Societies (2002). There is an interesting incompatibility between 
the way the Bank in general views the role of the state vis-à-vis higher education, and the 
way the relationship is viewed by its education sector. Consequently, such flagship 
publications as subsequent World Development Reports are not compatible in their 
views on the state/ market relationships with most of the books published by its 
education sector. Which makes the latter’ s publications more important.
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[T]he cost of insufficient investment in tertiary education can be very high. 
These costs can include reduced ability of a country to compete effectively in 
global and regional economies; a widening of economic and social 
disparities; declines in the quality of life, in health status, and in life 
expectancy; an increase in unavoidable public expenditures on social welfare 
programs; and a deterioration of social cohesion (World Bank 2002: xxiii).
Higher education plays a crucial role in the construction of knowledge 
societies and the rationale for the state support of higher education 
(within clearly defined limits) is surprisingly strong here. But the 
differences between the Bank’s major publications and its (somehow 
niche) publications on the education sector has to be born in mind.
In the developing countries, as a UN Globalization and the State 
2001. World Public Sector Report reminds us, the retreat of the state in 
such social areas as health care, education or housing has had 
detrimental effects (United Nations 2001: 32). The report stresses the 
point that while in Western Europe privatization, deregulation, de­
bureaucratization and decentralization have been carefully 
coordinated with the goals of the welfare state, and much energy has 
been spent on reconciling the acquired social structure and social 
benefits with the new age of “permanent austerity” (Pierson 2001a), 
which is discussed separately, in the developing countries (in the 
1980s) and in Central and Eastern Europe (in the 1990s) neo-liberal 
strategies brought about quite different consequences.77 As the report 
describes the process from a historical perspective, “in barely two 
decades, the ‘reinvention’ movement and NPM [New Public 
Management] have set the tone and content of the discourse in 
administration and government in ways that sharply contrast with 
the course of its development during the major part of the 20th 
century. The proponents of these tenets were able to carry their
77 It is sufficient to mention the argument put forward by Zsuzsa Ferge about a 
“significant higher degree of compliance with the new ideology of globalization in the 
transition countries than in most democracies of Western Europe”. The reasons for this 
state of affairs in CEE countries are the following: transition countries are poor; 
cutbacks in state spending are an economic necessity; weak local resistance to 
exogenous neoliberal pressures; delegitimation or corruption of the values 
underpinning social policy; and still weak civil society (Ferge 2001a: 150-151).
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message literally throughout the world” (United Nations 2001: 53).78 
Even though their criticism concerned bureaucracy,79 in the last 
analysis it affected government intervention -  implemented e.g. 
through public sector institutions -  as seen in Keynesian economics 
and the New Deal ideology.80 Markets and states should be seen as 
complementary forces -  and the role of an “intelligent, democratic 
state” is to provide, through rules and institutions, an “enabling 
framework” for private sector development and economic growth. 
The role of the state is
To establish the rules of the game for the operation of the market and at the
same time to perform the role of arbitrator (United Nations 2001: 68).
78 What is at stake is instilling a new set of values, an indirect influence over the 
nation-state -  which is much more effective as a strategy in changing national policies 
than explicit threats of punitive sanctions, as Nicholas C. Burbules and Carlos Alberto 
Torres argue (Burbules and Torres 2000: 9).
79 As Manuel Castells comments in The Power o f  Identity, “the privatization of 
public agencies and the demise of the welfare state, while alleviating societies from 
some bureaucratic burdens, worsen considerably living conditions for the majority of 
citizens, break the historical contract between capital, labor, and the state, and remove much 
of the social safety net, the nuts and bolts of legitimate government for common 
people” (Castells 1997: 354, emphasis mine).
80 Not to jump to hasty conclusions, that may be one of the lessons learned from the 
unexpected change in thinking about the role of the state between the 1980s and 1990s. 
As the United Nations report noted, “in the 1980s, the discussion of the role of the state 
appeared to have been closed. ... [T]he conclusion reached was that the State should be 
dismantled and reduced to the bare minimum. These views had replaced the notion that 
the state alone could generate development, views which were characteristic of previous 
decades. Today both extremes of the pendulum have been given the lie by concrete facts. 
... Both extremes have produced very debatable results and, today, a new wave of 
questioning begins on how to achieve a different balance among the state, market and 
the other important actor, civil society, as well as what role the state could play in this 
search. The rhetoric is changing” (United Nations 2001: 63). Hence new (apart from 
many new academic) definitions of the state, like the World Bank’s “effective state” or 
UN’s “intelligent, democratic state” which clearly oppose the “minimal state”. What is 
commonly shared, though, is the notion that the future state will differ significantly and 
substantially from the traditional post-war welfare state as we knew it. In the UN’s view, 
there will be a growing need to combine some of the goals of the welfare state model 
with some of the methods of the “managerial state” -  in proportions depending on the 
needs and possibilities of each country.
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3.5. C on clu sion s
How is the public funding of education and education spending (as 
part of social expenditure within the welfare state undergoing 
restructuring) to be seen as an investment rather than a cost? 
Paradoxically, the unwillingness or inability of the state to increase 
the level of public funding for higher education (or in more general 
terms, to use Philip G. Cerny’s expression, the decreased state’s 
potential for “collective action”81) is accompanied by a clear 
realization that -  in the new global era -  higher education is more 
important for social and economic development than ever before. The United 
Nations’ report argues that countries that want to benefit from 
globalization must invest in education, to upgrade their citizens’ 
skills and knowledge (United Nations 2001: 84). Martin Carnoy (as 
part of his UNESCO explanation of “what planners need to know” 
about restructuring higher education under global pressures) 
concludes that what is needed is a coherent and systemic effort by the 
public sector -  which “usually means more, as well as more effective, 
public spending” (Carnoy 1999: 86).82 There is thus an interesting
81 As Cerny argues, globalization leads to a “growing disjunction between the 
democratic, constitutional and social aspirations of people -  which continue to be 
shaped by and understood through the framework of the territorial state -  and the 
increasingly problematic potential for collective action through the state political 
process” (Cerny 1995: 618). We are especially concerned here with those “social” 
aspirations which include all the services and benefits characteristic of the traditional 
“Keynesian National Welfare State” (Jessop’s), certainly including higher education.
82 Arguments provided by Geoffrey Garrett in such papers as “Global Markets 
and National Politics” (2000b), and “The Causes of Globalization” (2000a) as well as 
“Globalization and the Welfare State” which he co-authored with Deborah Mitchell 
(1999) -  about the public provision of collective goods that are undersupplied by 
markets and valued by players who are interested in productivity (“ranging from the 
accumulation of human and physical capital, to social stability under conditions of 
high market stability, to popular support for the market economy itself”, Garrett 
2000b: 313) -  could certainly be used as arguments in favor of the public support for 
higher education. It would be interesting to see to what extent Garrett’s view that “the 
financial markets are essentially disinterested in the size and scope of government. 
Their primary concern is whether the government balances its books” (2000b: 314) is 
correct regarding e.g. postcommunist transition countries. My perception is that in the
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tension between what most education sector specialists and 
academics dealing with higher education issues say about the future of 
higher education and what political economists, political scientists or 
sociologists say about the future of the state, as well as the welfare 
state and its services in particular, including higher education. There 
is no easy way out of this apparent paradox and we have to stress its 
significance. Perhaps this is one of those cracks in the otherwise 
seamless fabric of globalization accounts regarding the future role of 
higher education in which some future, unexpected shifts in the 
relations between the state and the university may take place. We 
have moved a long way from the relationship between the modern 
nation-state and the modern university described by Andy Green 
(with respect to education as such, not merely higher education) in 
the following manner:
National education was a massive engine of integration, assimilating the 
local to the national and the particular to the general. In short, it created, or 
tried to create, the civic identity and national consciousness which would 
bind each to the state and reconcile each to the other. ... Education was the 
pre-eminent author and guardian of this national identity and culture (Green 
1997: 134).
All or almost all above assumptions no longer hold. Where higher 
education is heading under the new pressures on the nation-state 
(and the welfare state) -  and especially why -  were the major 
concerns of the present chapter.
current ideological climate, it is much more than merely the books; it is also the 
direction of the transformations to the public sector. At the same time Garrett’s 
“domestic compensation” traditionally coupled with (economic) “openness”, referring 
directly to Karl Polanyi, does not have to necessarily mean higher education as a part 
of the public sector in the Keynesian welfare state. It might be that even if Garret is 
right in his thinking about the real (rather than rhetorical) changes to Western welfare 
state regimes, the conclusions may not pertain to education which might no longer be 
seen as a collective good, which does not seem to be undersupplied by the market and 
which has not been a protective, conflict-mitigating measure against market-generated 
conflicts (but still part of the public sector). Still another issue is whether high 
redistributive taxation remains possible and whether its future is related only to 
globalization (or perhaps also to the changing moods of the electorates).
Ch a p t e r  4
The University and the Welfare State
4.1. W elfare  S ta te  D eb ates  vs. H igh er E d u cation  D ebates
It is necessary to make one reservation at this point: it would be 
misleading to say that the issue of higher education is widely 
discussed in welfare state debates. Surprisingly, it is extremely rare to 
see more than a few parenthetical remarks on education, not to 
mention higher education, in these debates. For obvious reasons, the 
major issue in these debates is the future of the welfare state in very 
general terms, with both theoretical research and more empirically- 
oriented studies devoted to healthcare systems and pensions systems 
(as the two biggest and fastest-growing consumers of welfare state 
resources) and unemployment issues. While there are quite a few 
papers and studies which closely link higher education and the 
nation-state, there are very few analyzing the links forged between 
higher education and the welfare-state. The issue seems to be largely 
disregarded by higher education specialists and this fact is even more 
surprising seeing the large volume of research done on, broadly 
speaking, “globalization and the university”; consequently, on 
reviewing the existing literature, it should be stated that while the 
interrelations between nationhood, the nation-state, higher education 
and globalization are perceived as important for the future of the 
Humboldtian model of the research university, the parallel 
interrelations between the collapsing post-war social contract of the 
Keynesian welfare state and higher education are largely overlooked. 
There may be several reasons for this: an American understanding of
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“welfare” refers much more to social security, unemployment 
benefits1 and social safety nets in general (and education seems to be 
excluded in most general accounts), and Anglo-Saxon discussions 
about the dismantling, retrenchment, and restructuring of the welfare 
state have for the most part been dominating the discussions since the 
mid-1990s2; in a European context, on the other hand, even though 
the welfare state has been debated, such radical transformations of 
higher education as those observed in the Anglo-Saxon world (the 
UK, USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada) have not actually 
been perceived and analyzed, except obviously in the United 
Kingdom; additionally, the transnational and neoliberal contexts of 
thinking about higher education were much less interesting to 
European scholars than to e.g. Anglo-Saxon scholars, often directly 
affected by new neoliberal educational policies in their own 
institutions; however, in a European context, one of the major issues 
to have been discussed was “European” welfare and the European 
social model, or the future of welfare in integrating Europe. These 
issues -  the “minimalist state” promoted until recently by the World 
Bank and major development agencies in Latin America and in
1 See for instance an excellent book written at the beginning of the 1990s by Paul 
Pierson, Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics o f Retrenchment 
(Pierson 1994). Pierson discusses programmatic retrenchment in three sectors: a core 
sector (old-age pensions), a vulnerable sector (housing policy) and a residual sector 
(income-support policy). Neither education in general, nor higher education in 
particular, are discussed in any detail, even though the period analyzed would have 
provided universities as an excellent research topic. In his “Coping With Permanent 
Austerity” paper, Pierson provides the following definition of the welfare state: “’The 
welfare state’ is generally taken to cover those aspects of government policy designed 
to protect against particular risks shared by broad segments of society. Standard 
features, not necessarily present in all countries, would include: protection against loss 
of earnings due to unemployment, sickness, disability, or old age; guaranteed access 
to health care; support for households with many children or an absent parent; and a 
variety of social services -  child care, elder care, etc -  meant to assist households in 
balancing multiple activities which may overtax their own resources” (Pierson 2001b: 
420). In contrast, European definitions most often include education.
2 But it is useful to remember that, in Paul Wilding’s formulation, the term 
welfare state “expresses an ideology and an aspiration rather than describes a specific 
set of institutions. It expresses a view of state responsibility” (Wilding 2000: 2).
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several European and post-Soviet transition countries, the 
“downsizing” (or “rightsizing”) of the public sector in general, the 
changing balance between the state and the market in providing 
public services (including educational services), and the privatization 
of education (together with, or following, the privatization of the 
healthcare and pension systems) -  are directly related to the future of 
the university, but have largely been absent from the debates about 
the welfare state in Europe.3
Consequently, the link between higher education as a significant 
part of the public sector (under scrutiny globally) and the welfare 
state has been largely overlooked for, so to speak, structural reasons: 
in Anglo-Saxon countries education traditionally does not belong in a 
general sense to the “welfare state”4; in Continental Europe, by 
contrast, there has so far been no actual major restructuring with 
respect to education as part of redefining the future role(s) of the 
welfare state.5 Paradoxically enough it was in Central and Eastern
3 As Gary Teeple in Globalization and the Decline o f  the Social Reform reminds us, the 
privatization of the welfare state can take different routes: “One route, for instance,
involves government attempts to transfer the production of a service or a good from
the public to the private sector while maintaining public financing. ... Another avenue 
of privatization takes the route of state-regulated services and benefits that are 
mandatorily provided by the private sector. . The least visible and yet a widely taken 
route of privatization is the policy of incremental degradation of benefits and services” 
(Teeple 1995: 104-105). In the context of the last route, it is worth mentioning that this 
can be seen in the case of public higher education in many transition countries by 
looking at the national statistics concerning public investment in higher education and 
research and development over the last decade.
4 In a short description by an IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, the term 
“welfare state” has “typically been applied to countries in which public spending has 
risen to very high levels in order to finance social programs. How high? There is no hard 
and fast rule, but the countries that are considered as being welfare states normally 
have governments whose expenditure is about half of their GDP: indeed in some 
countries it has risen as high as 60 percent of GDP” (Camdessus 1988: 1). At the 
beginning of the 20th century, public spending in countries now classified as welfare 
states was only around 10-15 percent of national incomes.
5 Ramesh Mishra comments on European (Continental) welfare from an American 
perspective: “True, many European nations have inherited a large welfare state from 
the golden age and, for the moment, seem to be able to hold on to them. But can they 
hold out against global pressures?” (Mishra 1999: 70). This is a crucial point, especially
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Europe, exposed to the influences of global agencies in redefining 
their future models of the welfare state and consequently national 
welfare policies, that the direct link between the new “effective” state 
on the one hand, with a downsizing of the public sector and a 
redefined minimal welfare state, and higher education policies on the 
other, was very much visible. Still another paradox, largely 
overlooked except for a handful of Central European social scientists, 
was that the policies for the ten accession countries, generally 
promoted and praised in subsequent accession countries’ reports by 
the European Commission, were not exactly “European” policies 
rooted in European models of the welfare state with its generally 
accepted “European social model”6; on the contrary, as Zsuzsa Ferge
from medium- and long-term perspectives. For obvious reasons, the answer is 
immediate and negative in the case of most of the new EU members which in fact 
never had a chance to have Western-style welfare systems, and have nothing inherited 
from the past to hold on to in the future.
6 Formally speaking, the European Social Model has not been defined as such in any 
single place. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 includes a Social Chapter, and the 
“Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” adopted at Nice in 2000 
includes an important chapter on “Solidarity”. The overview to article 34 states that “The 
right to social security is a traditional fundamental right recognized for everyone. It 
involves receiving from society (the public authorities) the means to satisfy the rights of 
an individual that are essential to his or her dignity and the free development of his or 
her personality. At source it is linked to the right to an adequate standard of living. This 
necessitates the implementation of social services to protect individuals in the situations 
mentioned in article 34: maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependence or old age, 
and loss of employment”. Further on it is stated that “Poverty and the social exclusion to 
which it leads are today recognized as a breach of human dignity, and a hindrance to the 
enjoyment and exercise of the fundamental rights of the person”. In paragraph 3, the 
combating of social exclusion and poverty are set out as objectives for the public 
authorities. The right to a minimum income and the right to housing are not expressly 
set out here, but can be deduced from the right to social and housing aid which must be 
respected and implemented in the context of combating social exclusion, “in accordance 
with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and practices” 
(Overview to art. 34). If we see how this particular article is implemented in Central and 
Eastern Europe, it is evident that the acquis communautaire of the EU does not include the 
social acquis. The current (2005) battle over the new Constitution for Europe, to a large 
extent, is about how far Europe should go in social security and social assistance (for the 
French, the new Constitution seems too liberal, for the English, as well as some new EU 
entrants, including Poland, it seems too socially-oriented).
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convincingly demonstrates (and as many of us Central Europeans 
know very well from policies actually being implemented in the 
healthcare, pensions and other public sectors7), these policies are 
largely neoliberal -  to which we will return later.8 That is another 
reason to take the link between the welfare state and higher education
7 One of the major differences between affluent Western democracies and the 
European transition countries is that the point o f departure for welfare transformations is 
different. Paul Pierson rightly notes that “in most of the affluent democracies, the politics 
of social policy centers on the renegotiation and restructuring of the terms of the post­
war social contract rather than its dismantling” (Pierson 2001a: 14). In CEE countries, in 
general terms, there is no social contract to renegotiate and welfare provisions need to be 
defined from the very beginning. Consequently, while the dismantling of the welfare 
state, especially with strong democratic electoral structures and powerful civil society 
groups, might not occur in the near future in Western Europe, the process might be long­
term so that eased by social protection measures, an already “dismantled” welfare state 
may be built along neoliberal lines in CEE countries without actually renegotiating the 
postwar European social contract -  which was absent there. Ideologically, there is an 
important difference between the potential dismantling of the welfare state (in Western 
Europe) and the actual dismantling of the remnants of bureaucratic welfare from the 
ancient regime (in Central and Eastern Europe). It is extremely interesting to draw 
parallels between Paul Pierson’s description of welfare state retrenchment in the United 
Kingdom and the US (in the times of Reagan and Thatcher) and the ongoing welfare 
reforms in selected countries of the CEE (Poland being a natural and well-researched 
candidate). Christiane Lemke in “Social Citizenship and Institution Building: EU- 
Enlargement and the Restructuring of Welfare States in East Central Europe” (2001) 
rightly assumes that emerging patterns of social support and social security “diverge 
from the typology described in the comparative welfare state literature inasmuch as the 
transformation of postcommunist societies is distinctly different from the building of 
welfare states in Europe” (Lemke 2001: 5). She seems to have been wrong when stating 
that the applicant countries had to adapt to the rules and regulations of the EU, 
“including the social acquis”, as well as that the idea of European-wide social standards 
“gained a higher profile” (Lemke 2001: 14). Unfortunately, the European social acquis, 
from the perspective of one year after Enlargement, seems unattainable.
8 Even though Ferge distinguishes between four trends in the welfare policies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, she finds the neoliberal tendency dominant. It is “practically 
ubiquitous” and “seems to be dictated by concerns allegedly related to globalization 
pressures. Its hallmarks are the will to deregulate all markets, the labour market included; 
the drive to lower direct and indirect labour costs; and the privatization and 
marketization of former public goods and services resulting in a smaller state. These 
endeavors are underpinned by a forceful rhetoric about the need to end ‘state 
paternalism’, and to strengthen self reliance and self-provision” (Ferge 2001a: 129-30).
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seriously in this part of Europe; it is here that educational policies, 
and consequently the future of public universities, may be going hand 
in hand with changing welfare policies, as in the traditional World 
Bank formulation of the “third wave of privatization” where changes 
in education follow changes in the two major claimants on welfare 
state resources: healthcare services and public pensions systems (see 
Rama 2000; Torres and Mathur 1996).9
Thus in the context of debates about the future of higher 
education, and of universities in particular, the close links between 
the welfare state and the nation-state have not been emphasized. 
Although the university/ globalization/nation-state nexus has been 
thoroughly studied, discussions about the parallel nexus of the 
university/globalization/welfare state are largely absent, the links 
between the university and the welfare state being underestimated. 
From my perspective it is analytically wrong not to do research in this 
direction. Let us remember that the welfare state developed and still 
remains a “national enterprise” (Mishra 1999: 11); that the nation-state 
was the “political and operational framework of the welfare state. 
That is, social reforms have been defined and administered as national 
programs” (Teeple 1995: 18). As Anthony Giddens argued in Beyond 
Left and Right: the Future o f Radical Politics,
The welfare state has always been a national state and this connection is far 
from coincidental. One of the main factors impelling the development of 
welfare systems has been the desire on the part of governing authorities to
9 There is also one more reservation that needs to be taken here: if we take into 
account the distinction between state welfare and private welfare, we are focusing in this 
chapter on the former Keynesian i.e. state variant of welfare. This is a crucial point 
because, as Giuliano Bonoli, Vic George and Peter Taylor-Gooby remarked in passing, 
without actually developing the idea, “while globalization had a constraining effect on 
state welfare, it had an expansive effect on private welfare. The net result may have been 
that though the total volume of welfare may have been unaffected, a greater proportion of 
that is taken up by private welfare provision. All the available evidence shows a 
country’s ranking on total welfare effort can differ from that of its state welfare sector”, 
as e.g. in the USA (Bonoli et al. 2000: 69, emphases mine). But private welfare is based on 
market mechanisms -  while in the traditional Esping-Andersen description of welfare in 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism the crucial point is “maintaining a livelihood 
without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 22).
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promote national solidarity. From early days to late on, welfare systems were 
constructed as part of a more generalized process of state building. Who says 
welfare state says nation-state (Giddens 1994: 136, emphasis mine).
The welfare state was an integrated national state in which there 
was no big difference between wealth and national wealth -  which 
may no longer be the case. This was presented in the most dramatic 
way by Robert B. Reich in The Work o f Nations through the transition 
from a metaphor of the citizens being in the same large boat (called 
“the national economy”) to a metaphor of the citizens increasingly 
occupying different, smaller, individual boats. In Reich’s view, 
Americans (or citizens of any other nation for that matter) are no 
longer in the same economic boat, there is no longer any common 
economic fate for citizens of a given nation. The centrifugal forces of 
the global economy tear at the ties binding citizens of national states 
together (see Reich 1992).10
4.2. Is  th is the End o f the W elfare  S tate  as W e K n ow  It?
In the “Golden Age” of the post-war Keynesian welfare state in 
Europe (1950-1975, roughly speaking), higher education was very 
important -  as testified to by the constant growth in student 
enrollments, the increasing number of higher education institutions,
10 Robert B. Reich’s theses seemed very radical in the beginning of the 1990s when 
his Work o f  Nations was published. After a decade, in the (then unknown) context of 
“knowledge societies” (and knowledge economies), they seem much more plausible: 
“We are living through a transformation that will rearrange the politics and economics 
of the coming century. There will be no national products or technologies, no national 
corporations, no national industries. There will no longer be national economies, at 
least as we have come to understand that concept. All that will remain rooted within 
national borders are the people who comprise a nation. Each nation’s primary assets will 
be its citizens’ skills and insights”. And further on: “Underlying all such discussions is 
the assumption that our citizens are in the same large boat, called the national 
economy. There are different levels of income within the boat, of course ... Yet all of 
us are lifted and propelled along together. The poorest and the wealthiest and 
everyone in between enjoy the benefits of a national economy that is buoyant, and we 
all suffer the consequences of an economy in the doldrums” (Reich 1992: 3, 4, 
emphases mine).
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rapidly rising scholarization rates and the relatively lavish public 
research funding available to universities. This massification of higher 
education was in full swing in Europe, with universalization as its 
aim (although participation rates are still considerably lower in 
Europe than in the United States). Such a post-war welfare state was 
sustainable only as long as post-war European economies were 
growing and were relatively closed; however, over the years, as 
entitlements grew ever bigger and coverage became ever more 
universal, the proportion of GDP spent on public services rose 
considerably. With economies becoming more open, the stagnation 
which started in the second half of the seventies in Europe, following 
the oil crisis, was perhaps the first symptom that the welfare system 
in the form designed for one period (the post-war reconstruction of 
Europe) might be not be working in a different period.11 The social 
conditions had changed considerably: the post-war social contract 
was related to an industrial economy in a period of considerable 
growth; the male bread-winner model of work was changing; closed, 
national economies with largely national competition for investment, 
goods, products and services were becoming internationalized; the 
marriage of the nation-state and the welfare-state was under pressure, 
and so on. In 1960, the average expenditure on social payments was 
7.5 percent of gross domestic product in the affluent countries of 
Western Europe, as compared to 6 percent being spent in the United
11 As G0sta Esping-Andersen, a leading world authority on the welfare state, put 
it recently, “most European social protection systems were constructed in an era with a 
very different distribution and intensity o f  risks and needs than exist today. ... The postwar 
model could rely on strong families and well-performing labor markets to furnish the 
lion’s share of welfare for most people, most of their lives. Until the 1970s, the norm 
was stable, male breadwinner-based families. With few interruptions, the male could 
count on secure employment, steady real earnings growth, and long careers -  
followed by a few years in retirement after age 65. Women would typically cease to 
work at first birth, and were thus the main societal provider of social care for children 
and the frail elderly. . The problem behind the new risk configuration is that it stems 
primarily from weakened families and poorly functioning labor markets. As a 
consequence, the welfare state is burdened with responsibilities for which it was not 
designed” (Esping-Andersen 2001, emphasis mine). Ulrich Beck in such books as 
World Risk Society and The Brave New World o f  Work calls ours a “post work” society 
which turns the assumptions o f  the Keynesian welfare state upside-down.
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States. Already by 1980, though, the average expenditure on social 
payments in Europe had doubled and reached a level of 14 percent of 
GDP, while the United States was spending only 9.75 percent. The 
differencial between the USA and European countries was growing 
(Myles and Quadagno 2002: 34). As a result the social agenda of the 
eighties and nineties changed radically: after the policies of the 
golden age of expansion, European welfare states have been shaped 
by the (Paul Pierson’s) “politics of austerity”. Despite attempts to 
reduce the role of the state in welfare provision during the 90’s, 
“social expenditure as a proportion of GDP continued to increase 
during the past decade, although at a slower rate than before” (Bonoli 
et al. 2000: 1). John Myles and Jill Quadagno describe this shift in the 
social and economic climate as follows:
The forces of globalization and postindustrialism, the revolution in family 
forms and gender relations, and an extended period of modest economic 
growth have created a  very different social and political climate from that in 
which contemporary welfare states came to maturity between the 1950s and 
the 1970s (Myles and Quadagno 2002: 35).
Consequently, the rhetoric of a “crisis” in the welfare state has 
been with us since the 1970s. There was also a growing interest in 
non-state welfare providers. The OECD report, The Welfare State in 
Crisis, had already stated in 1981 that “new relationships between 
action by the state and private action must be thought; new agents for 
welfare and well-being developed; the responsibilities of individuals 
for themselves and others reinforced” (OECD 1981: 12). From the 
1970s, various theorists have claimed a fiscal crisis, a crisis of 
government overload, a crisis of liberal democracy or, as Jürgen 
Habermas called it, a “crisis of legitimacy”.
Social scientists have divergent views about the causes of the 
current pressures on the welfare state; they agree on a single point 
though; we are facing the end of the welfare state as we know it. Let me 
quote here several diagnoses of sociologists, economists, and 
philosophers:
Signs o f  strain are everywhere. The struggle to balance budgets is unending, even 
as many governments cope with levels of debt unprecedented in peace-time. ...
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Despite their striking resilience over a quarter-century of “crisis”, welfare states 
are widely held to be under siege (Pierson 2001c: 81, emphasis mine).
The welfare state now faces a context of essentially permanent austerity. 
Changes in the global economy, the sharp slowdown in economic growth, 
the maturation of governmental commitments, and population aging all 
generate considerable fiscal stress. There is little reason to expect these 
pressures to diminish over the next few decades. If anything, they are likely 
to intensify (Pierson 2001b: 411, emphasis mine).
Throughout Europe, the dominant theme in contemporary social policy is the 
retreat of the welfare state. ... There is now general agreement that the bulk 
of the social legislation introduced in recent years in intended to reduce the 
role of the state in welfare. Policies that lead in the opposite direction play a 
subordinate role (Bonoli et al. 2000: 1).
For two reasons, the continued viability of the existing welfare state edifice is 
being questioned across all of Europe. The first is simply that the status quo 
will be difficult to sustain given adverse demographic or financial conditions. 
The second is that the same status quo appears increasingly out-of-date and 
ill suited to meet the great challenges ahead (Esping-Andersen et al. 2002: 4).
The welfare state cannot survive in its existing form; or, if it does, it is likely 
to be progressively corroded or cut back, even by governments which 
strongly support the principles underlying it (Giddens 1994: 174).
The dismantling of the Welfare State (once an operative reflection of the 
principle of universally shared responsibility for individual weal and woe) -  
a prospect till a few years ago deemed unthinkable by the most perceptive of 
minds -  is now taking place (Bauman 1993: 243-44).
No matter how one looks at it, the globalization of the economy destroys a 
historical constellation that made the welfare state compromise temporarily 
possible (Habermas 1998: 52).
Large-scale provision of social insurance and social services to redistribute 
wealth and reduce social risk has been perhaps the defining characteristic of 
the mixed economies of the postwar OECD. But today this type of welfare 
state is considered as an outmoded institution, a luxury that can no longer be 
afforded (Garrett and Mitchell 1999: 1).
There is no major disagreement, broadly speaking, about the future 
of the welfare state in its current European postwar form: its foundations,
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for a variety of internal and external reasons and due to a variety of 
international and domestic pressures, need to be renegotiated today. 
Major differences are based on different explanations about what has 
been happening to the European welfare state since the mid-1970s 
until now, about different variations of restructuring in different 
European countries, and different degrees of emphasis concerning the 
scope of welfare state downsizing in particular countries in the future. 
In more general terms, perhaps the most interesting issue for our 
purposes here is the differing options with regard to the role of 
globalization in redefining the model of the welfare state possible 
today. Globalization and the welfare state is the issue that most 
sharply divides current researchers on welfare issues.
The question debated today is not whether welfare retrenchment 
has come to be seen as necessary by the governments of most affluent 
Western democracies, international organizations (such as the 
OECD), global organizations and development agencies (such as the 
World Bank) and the European Commission; it is rather why.12 As 
Giuliano Bonoli and his colleagues argue, there are four main factors 
involved in the current pressures for the retrenchment of the welfare 
state. They are the following: globalization, an anti-taxation bias, a 
neo-liberal approach to political economy and the dilemma of 
“squaring the welfare circle”:
The four factors are, first globalization which imposes an international 
competitive logic which different nation-states cannot escape and which 
constrains national policies, particularly in relation to taxation and the labour 
market; secondly, the assumption of politicians and others that the public 
will not tolerate increases in taxes and social contributions to finance 
improvements in welfare; thirdly, the neo-liberal approach to political 
economy, now dominant in the assumptive worlds of policy-makers, which 
argues the priority of market freedom over welfare intervention; and 
fourthly, the dilemma of “squaring the welfare circle”, which confronts all 
welfare states. This refers to the way governments now experience
12 Although it has to be remembered that, as Carnoy put it, “objective data in the 
economic, demographic and social spheres have greater or lesser impact as focus for 
welfare retrenchment according to the way they are politically interpreted and accepted in 
the country’s policy-making process” (Carnoy 1999: 153, emphasis mine).
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simultaneous and contradictory pressures from  opposite directions. Increases in the 
numbers of older people, rising demand for education and training, rising 
unemployment and the expectations of citizens that social progress will 
involve higher standards of service press for higher spending. At the same 
time, concern about the impact of globalization, the logic of liberalism and 
fears of tax revolt demand the contraction of provision (Bonoli et al. 2000: 2, 
emphasis mine).
So here we are. European welfare states are confronting differing 
mixes of the above factors in different countries. Bonoli and his 
colleagues argue that in deciding how these conflicts are played out 
in different countries and how they are resolved, a crucial position is 
held by their respective institutional frameworks to a very large 
extent (including political institutions, the labor movement, business, 
finance and the voluntary sectors etc).13 As retrenchment is difficult to 
measure, the best way to gain insight into the transformations of the 
welfare state in recent years is to have a look at the legislative 
changes adopted in different countries and assess their likely 
implications for the coverage, level and quality of welfare provision 
(the new EU countries, having adopted an enormous number of 
legislative changes in welfare state structures over the last few 
years, are an excellent and still under-researched subject)14. We need
13 Esping-Andersen reminds us of the considerable differences in the interplay of 
state, family, and market (i.e. of welfare regimes, in his classic formulation of 1990) 
and argues therefore that “such differences mean that we cannot forge general 
strategies for social reform at an abstract pan-European level. It also follows that we 
shall err terribly if we limit our attention solely to governments’ welfare role. I believe it 
is futile to discuss whether we should reduce public social commitments without 
considering what effects such might have on family and market welfare delivery. ... 
Reforming European welfare commitments for the coming century implies regime 
change, that is reordering the welfare contributions of markets, families and state so 
that the mix corresponds better to the overall goals we may have for a more equitable 
and efficient social system” (Esping-Andersen 2001: 137).
14 To show the interesting direction of this research with respect to transition 
countries: “This mass of restrictive social legislation consisted of several overlapping 
types. Some new policies have reduced the level of cash benefits, restricted entitlement 
and reduced the period for which the benefits can be paid. Other legislation increased 
the payments made by users of the health, education and social care services. Still 
other legislation made the provision or the administration of some of the cash benefits
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to bear in mind that social expenditure as a proportion of GDP did 
not decrease but continued to increase during the last decade, even 
though its rate of growth was considerably slower than in the 
previous two decades.
Bonoli’s more general claims are parallel to those pronounced 
among the supporters of the idea of the “risk society”, especially 
Ulrich Beck and his British colleagues. Beck’s account of the end of 
the postwar social contract between the state and its citizens, which 
happens together with the end of the welfare state as we know it, will 
be discussed in the next chapter; suffice it to say now that the most 
interesting feature of the new world as described by Bonoli is what he 
terms shifting the burden o f uncertainty to the individual. The expansion 
of private provision means that individuals will be much more 
exposed to risks (Bonoli’s example: the market performance of 
pension funds15). The level of security is lower, and the risk­
protection is lower (Bonoli et al. 2000: 47-8). People’s dependence on 
the market is increasing and the burden of social security is being 
taken off the shoulders of the state. Consequently, the trend is clearly 
towards the recommodification of society, meaning increasing people’s
the responsibility of employers or other bodies or introduced market principles in the
management of services. Finally, legislation privatized parts of the social services or 
many public utilities in their entirety” (Bonoli et al. 2000: 1). Each and every way of 
changing the legislation towards welfare retrenchment can be exemplified by 
particular laws adopted recently (and Poland, comprising half of the population of the 
ten new EU countries, is a good example here). At the same time, it is interesting to 
note that the new directions in European welfare policies are actually poorly reflected 
in most quantitative indicators because social expenditure as a share of GDP has not 
declined, as Bonoli et al. remind us.
15 See in this context the whole idea of multi-pillar pension schemes (consisting of 3 
parts: a mandatory publicly-managed tax-financed pillar for redistribution, a mandatory 
privately-managed fully funded pillar for saving, and a voluntary pillar for people who 
want more protection for old age) as opposed to traditional “pay-as-you-go” systems. 
Pure multi-pillar systems only exist in a few countries (and Chile is the flagship 
example), while the number of countries with blended systems (PAYG and multi-pillar) 
is growing. Poland is an example of the successful implementation of a blended system. 
For an overall view see Louise Fox and Edward Palmer’s paper on “New Approaches to 
Multi-Pillar Pension Systems: What in the World Is Going On?” (1999). For the Polish 
case, see Jerzy Hausner’s “Poland: Security Through Diversity” (2000).
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dependence on market forces (and, let us add the complementary 
picture, towards the desocialization o f the economy).16 As already 
emphasized in previous chapters, the balance between state and 
market in meeting people’s needs (so far met by public sector 
healthcare and pensions, and possibly including education17) is 
shifting towards the market. This is, in Bonoli’s terms, “the reversal of 
the tendency that dominated social policy-making during most of the 
post-war period” (Bonoli et al. 2000: 49).18
16 In the classic formulation of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds o f  Welfare 
Capitalism, decommodification was the crucial phenomenon referred to in the 
Keynesian welfare state: “The outstanding criterion of social rights must be the degree 
to which they permit people to make their living standards independent o f  pure market 
forces. It is in this sense that social rights diminish citizens’ status as commodities”. 
And in a section on “rights and de-commodification” he claims that “in pre-capitalist 
societies, few workers were properly commodities in the sense that their survival was 
contingent upon the sale of their labor power. It is as markets become universal and 
hegemonic that the welfare of individuals comes to depend entirely on the cash nexus. 
Stripping society of the institutional layers that guaranteed social reproduction 
outside the labor contract meant that people were commodified. In turn, the 
introduction of modern social rights implies a loosening of the pure commodity status. 
De-commodification occurs when a service is rendered as a matter o f  right, and when a person 
can maintain a livelihood without reliance on the market” (Esping-Andersen 1990: 3, 21-22, 
emphasis mine).
17 An IMF managing director stated, not surprisingly, when presenting his 
“responses to the challenges”, that in reforming the education sector, “educational 
expenditures can be reduced by introducing modern technology and teaching 
methods in schools and thus replacing some traditional direct teaching by staff, by 
shifting some expenses to the private sector, especially for higher levels of education” 
(Camdessus 1998: 6).
18 Skepticism towards state solutions to welfare problems has been expressed by 
both the left and the right. As Fiona Ross says, “despite continuing public attachment 
to welfare institutions, leaders on the left and right reveal a growing skepticism 
towards state provision and an increasing acceptance of market-based approaches to 
social problems” (Ross 2000: 4). Clear examples among left-wing intellectuals are 
provided by the “third-way” thinkers in Britain. Anthony Giddens in Beyond Left and 
Right explains that “protecting the welfare state seems to many on the left essential to 
what a civilized society is all about; the needy and the sick are not abandoned to fend 
for themselves, but through the actions of government have the chance to lead 
satisfying lives. Yet this situation needs enquiring into, because welfare institutions 
have only partly been the creation of socialists -  and more radical socialist thinkers, in
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Let me now refer briefly to the ideas of “better and slimmer 
government” and a “wholesale reinvention of government” as 
promoted by the World Bank in the first half of the 1990s which point 
directly towards the downsized state and its reduced social 
responsibilities. They are parallel to the “reinventing government” 
movement in the United States and New Public Management in the 
United Kingdom.19 Let me refer to two of the Bank’s flagship 
publications, the World Development Reports from 1996 and 1997, 
namely From Plan to Market and The State in a Changing World. Both 
are quite explicit in presenting their views on the state. The latter 
retreats from the notion of the “minimalist state” and turns towards 
the notion of the “effective state”. The former argues that “the 
transition from plan to market calls for a wholesale reinvention of 
government. The state has to move from doing many things badly to 
doing its fewer core tasks well. This means government must at once 
shrink and change in nature. No longer the prime economic agent in 
most areas, it must instead facilitate private activity” (World Bank 
1996: 110, emphasis mine). The most programmatic formulation for 
the transition countries is probably the following:
In transition countries the job of redefining government is at once more 
urgent and more daunting. First, the role of government in producing and 
distributing goods and services must shrink dramatically. Public provision 
must become the exception rather than the rule. State intervention is justified only 
where markets fa il -  in such areas as defense, primary education, rural roads, 
and some social insurance -  and then only to the extent that it improves upon 
the market. Second, government must stop restricting and directly 
controlling private commercial activity and extricate itself from intimate 
involvement in the financial sector, focusing instead on promoting
fact, used to spend a lot of time criticizing them” (Giddens 1994: 134). It is interesting 
to reread Claus Offe’s Contradictions o f  the Welfare State (1984) in this context.
19 As the United Nations’ World Public Sector Report. Globalization and the State 2001 
argues, the “reinvention” movement and New Public Management have “set the tone 
and contents of the discourse on administration and government in ways that sharply 
contrast with the course of its development during the major part of the XX century. 
... The butt of their critique has been the world of ‘bureaucracy’ but, in the last 
analysis, government intervention predicated on Keynesian economics and the New 
Deal ideology” (United Nations 2001: 53-4).
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macroeconomic stability and providing a legal and institutional environment 
that supports private sector development and competition. Finally, instead of 
providing generous guarantees to secure adequate living standards for all, 
governments need to foster greater personal responsibility for income and 
welfare (World Bank 1996: 110, emphasis mine).
Higher education is certainly not among the priorities of the 
slimmed-down minimalist state, and state support for higher education 
in general, from short- and long-term perspectives in the transition 
countries, does not have to be among the “core tasks” of the state. 
Consequently, the suggested ideal leads not only to downsizing 
(dubbed also “rightsizing”) the state but also to setting new spending 
priorities. Changes in the role of the state require shifts in spending 
patterns: “the aim is to make the composition of expenditures consistent 
with the tasks of government in a market economy and conducive to 
long-term growth. Indeed, robust empirical evidence supports the view 
that government spending tends to be productive and to promote 
economic growth where it corrects proven market failures and truly 
complements private activity ... but rarely otherwise” (World Bank 
1996: 115). The policy options suggested (this time not to transition 
countries but on a more global scale) by The State in a Changing World 
basically follow the same direction but in a softer version. The role of the 
state in economic and social development is increasingly seen as that of 
a “partner, catalyst, and facilitator” or a “facilitator and regulator” rather 
than as that of a direct provider of growth. The report takes as its point 
of departure the conclusion that “the world is changing, and with it our 
ideas about the state’s role in economic and social development”. 
Markets and states are complementary and consequently the state is 
essential for “putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations 
for markets”. There is growing recognition that in many countries the 
monopoly public providers of infrastructure, social services, and other 
goods and services “are unlikely to do a good job” (World Bank 1997: 1, 
1, 4). The new responsibilities of the state need to be redefined and 
societies need to accept them. What is needed is a “strategic selection of 
the actions” that states will try to promote, coupled with greater efforts 
to “take the burden off the state”, “more selectivity” in the state’s 
activities and “greater reliance on the citizenry and private firms”
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(World Bank 1997: 3).20 It would be interesting to follow the evolution of 
the Bank’s thinking about the state and how it both answers criticism 
and incorporates lessons learned in various parts of the globe. But there 
is no need to go any further into details so let us merely emphasize 
again that higher education is under scrutiny for a variety of reasons 
and in a variety of contexts that are traditionally wholly alien to higher 
education studies. To show the relationships between higher education, 
the state, and the public sector in general, let me turn for a moment to 
the American context.
An American perspective on the state subsidy of higher education 
is relatively simple and its simplicity finds followers in various 
American and global lending and development agencies. Even 
though the perspective apparently looks restrictive in its scope for the 
USA and the developing countries reforming higher education 
systems under the aegis of various US-led development programs, it 
is very useful to have a brief look at it (in the context of the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe, with almost permanent budget 
deficits and lacking the resources for European models of the welfare 
state, the exercise of scrutinizing this perspective may be even more 
rewarding21). Let me refer again to a report by Harold A. Hovey,
20 As Susan Strange in her book The Retreat o f  the State explained: “How then is it
possible to proclaim a retreat by government, a decline in the authority of the state
within its territorial frontiers? The answer ... relates not to the quantity of authority 
exercised by the governments of most territorial states, but to the quality of that 
authority. It rests on the failure o f  most governments to discharge those very basic functions 
for which the state as an institution was created -  the maintenance of civil law and order, 
the defense of the territory from the depredations of foreign invaders, the guarantee of 
sound money to the economy, and the assurance of clear, judicially interpreted rules 
regarding the basic exchanges of property between buyers and sellers, lenders and 
borrowers, landlords and tenants” (Strange 1996: xii, emphasis mine). As emphasized 
by many analysts, in affluent societies, what is not provided by the public sector will 
be provided, as an alternative, by the private sector.
21 Especially that, as Zsuzsa Ferge and others show, “the EU suggestions for some 
reforms of social security may steer these countries in a more American than European 
direction” (Ferge 2001b: 1). Based on a careful reading of the Accession Reports from the 
Community to the ten applicant countries, Ferge finds a “hidden policy agenda” there: 
“the Union has a different social security agenda for the accession countries than for the EU
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director of the National Center for Public Policy and Higher 
Education, “State Spending for Higher Education in the Next Decade. 
The Battle to Sustain Current Support” (Hovey 1999). Hovey takes as 
a point of departure the claim that state funding for higher education 
has always been heavily influenced by a states’ fiscal situation:
changes in state fiscal conditions are often multiplied in their impacts on higher 
education. When finances are tight, higher education budgets are often cut 
disproportionately. W hen financial conditions are good, higher education often 
receives larger increases than most other programs (Hovey 1999: 1).
Consequently, drawing from an American experience, we can 
extrapolate the idea to Europe, or at least Central and Eastern Europe, 
and say that state funding for higher education depends on the 
overall outlook for state finances. The state of higher education 
funding in the EU-15 compared with new EU countries does not need 
to be discussed here; the gap between the two is enormous. The 
projections for the future suggest that the tight fiscal environment will 
continue, if not intensify, in the coming years. In an American context, 
“higher education will find itself in an environment where merely 
maintaining current services ... will be difficult” (Hovey 1999: 9). In 
the USA, the traditional government-funded activities are higher
members. ... there seems to be a hidden agenda for the applicant countries not quite in
line either with the European model or with the subsidiarity principle. The hidden
agenda suggests to the accession countries measures contrary to the European model, such 
as the privatization of pensions and health, or the cutback of already low social 
expenditures” (Ferge 2001b: 1, emphases mine). Her conclusions are clear-cut: “The 
implicit model for Central Eastern Europe which in many cases is dutifully applied is 
different from the European model as we knew it, and close in many respects to the 
original World Bank agenda. As a matter of fact high officials of the Bank do present the 
developments in Central-Eastern Europe as a social policy model to be followed by the current 
members o f the Union” (Ferge 2001b: 12, emphasis mine). Nita Rudra in her paper about 
the impact of globalization on the welfare state in less-developed countries claims that 
“trends in welfare spending in developed and developing countries have diverged. . in 
the face of globalization labor in LDCs [less-developed countries] has been unable to 
prevent the dismantling of the welfare state, quite unlike labor in the more developed 
countries of Western Europe” (Rudra 2002: 410-411). Central and Eastern Europe, 
despite being already nominally within the EU, in this context, is much more likely to 
follow the route of less-developed countries than that of the old EU member states.
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education, law enforcement, health care and public schools. The fiscal 
environment for higher education in most US states in the near future 
may be significantly worse than in the late 1990s. Basically, the 
situation faced by governments is that of a zero-sum game: gains in 
share by one program (e.g. higher education) have to come at the 
expense o f other programs. Therefore a very important question, 
largely overlooked in European discussions, should be raised:
The underlying question about spending will be whether, at the margin, 
higher education spending is contributing more than spending at the margin 
in other programs. This question will be raised in a political dimension with 
the adverse electoral consequences of cuts in higher education compared 
with cuts affecting public schools, health care providers, and others active in 
state politics. The question will be raised in a substantive dimension with the 
values of improvements in higher education compared w ith values of 
improvements in job training, preschool education, preventive health and 
other programs (Hovey 1999: 17-18).
This lose-lose situation is very clear in most postcommunist 
transition countries: there are priorities in the transformation processes, 
the pie to be distributed is very small indeed and it is largely current 
politics -  rather than explicitly formulated long-term government 
policies -  that determines how the pie is cut. As Andrei Marga sadly 
remarked in a paper about “reforming the postcommunist university”; 
“politics and law, macroeconomics and finance, civil rights and 
liberties, the church and the family, have all been objects of 
consideration. But universities -  despite the vital roles they play in 
providing research and expertise and in selecting and forming the 
leaders of tomorrow -  have not” (Marga 1997: 159). It was no different 
for welfare policies in European transition countries: Bob Deacon notes 
that “what became immediately evident ... was that debates of any 
kind about social policy became relegated to almost last place in the 
priority of many of the new governments” (Deacon et al. 1997: 92).
Higher education has to compete with other forms of state 
spending, and the costs of other forms of social needs are growing 
rapidly; the statistics concerning unemployment rates, access to 
public health care systems, the level of funding accessible to the 
elderly through existing pension schemes etc, are clear. And higher
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education has not been competing successfully with other programs 
over the last decade in most CEE countries; it is enough to see the 
data on the generally declining public support for higher education 
and research and development in many countries of the region. The 
American response to the ever rising costs of all government-funded 
programs results from an awareness that there is basically no limit to 
potential consumer demand and thus to government costs; “meeting 
all of the resulting demand is impossible, so governments find ways 
to limit consumption of what they produce” (Hovey 1999: 28).22 In the 
case of higher education though (as well as the services of state 
schools, the police, libraries etc), long tradition holds that it must be 
offered to all citizens rather than to selected eligible individuals. 
Consequently, public higher education does not necessarily meet high 
standards of quality, which drives more affluent or more ambitious 
“users” into the arms of private sector providers.23 What is 
guaranteed by the state is meeting minimum standards. Higher 
education, to gain a bigger share of government funds, would have to 
compete successfully against other state-funded programs, regardless 
of whether taxes are raised (a rather difficult, if not impossible option) 
or not.24 As Giuliano Bonoli and his colleagues put it recently in a
22 The major difference from the redistributive side of government policies between 
Europe and the US is that European governments redistribute income among their 
citizens on a much larger scale; European social programs are much more generous 
and European tax systems are more progressive. While European countries provide 
more public welfare than the United States, Americans engage in more private 
provision of welfare (e.g. charity) than Europeans do (see Alesina et al. 2001).
23 An interesting process is a move from “producer dominated service provision” 
to a “more consumer shaped and oriented approach”. The processes mentioned below 
can easily be applied to learning situations, and to higher education in particular. As 
Paul Wilding in his prophetic study on European welfare claims, “producer power 
cannot survive the ever greater availability of information available to consumers 
through, for example, the world wide web. Patients can now do their own 
investigations of their health problems and go to their GP with their own impressive 
file of information. ... Professional dominance and standing and consumer 
subordination depended substantially on the imbalance o f  available knowledge. This 
balance has begun to tilt in favour of the consumer” (Wilding 2000: 8, emphasis mine).
24 “Tax competition” in more or less disguised forms seems unavoidable in the 
increasingly open economies in which there are less and less protective trade
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European context, “a basic premise of current welfare policy-making 
is that taxes cannot be raised” (Bonoli et al. 2000: 72). The programs to 
compete with are socially highly sensitive and in an American context 
include education from birth through grade 12, programs for the aged 
(with such major problems as the increasing number of elderly people 
and the provision of care for the aged), health care (with such major 
problems as rising costs and costs being shifted to the government -  
e.g. 40 million people without any health insurance), programs for 
people on low incomes and the safety net, and finally law 
enforcement.25 At the same time none of these programs have any 
interest in being associated with tax increases; the more sensible 
position is to suggest that a given program be funded by “giving it an 
appropriate priority in spending decisions” (Hovey 1999: 40). 
Allocating priority to different programs is a highly political issue in 
every country; it does not seem to be any different in Europe, or in 
CEE countries, for that matter.26 The prospects in the future for 
increasing public funding on public higher education, including 
public universities, are very low indeed; even documents from the 
European Commission, discussed in Chapter 6, do not propose such 
actions either for higher education or for research and development, 
suggesting instead, as in the case of the “3 percent” goal of national 
GDPs devoted to R&D activities in EU Member countries by 2010, 
that private funds contribute to reaching this goal.27 So, to sum up,
barriers. Globalization will make it increasingly difficult for countries to have tax 
levels that are substantially above those countries with which they compete (see 
Camdessus 1998).
25 At the same time, recent figures from EUROSTAT suggest that in the EU-15, 18 
percent of the population, or approximately 65 million citizens, live in poverty (see 
Ferrera et al. 2001).
26 One thing is certain, though: “There is complete agreement among researchers 
studying the post-socialist transition that one key task ahead is radical reform of the 
pension system, health care, provision for children and the aged, social assistance, and 
the other spheres of the welfare system”, as Janos Kornai put it (1997: 339).
27 Consequently, the European Commission states that “the resources and policies 
that need to be mobilised encompass much more than government R&D spending. 
Indeed, more than 80% of the R&D investment gap with the United States lies in the 
funding levels of the business sector”. The main challenge for inducing higher private
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seeing higher education policies in isolation from larger welfare state 
policies would be assuming a short-sighted perspective: higher 
education is a significant (and fund-consuming) part of the public 
sector and a part of the traditional welfare state that is right now 
under severe pressures, even though they may not be as strong as 
pressures on the two main parts of it, healthcare and pensions.28 
Knowing the zero-sum game character of the fiscal decisions of 
national governments, it may be useful to get to know the rationale, 
arguments and debates about the larger contexts of the problem.
4.3. G lo b a liz a tio n  and th e  W elfare  S tate : G en era l Issu es
Let us pass on to the issue broadly called “globalization and the 
welfare state”. There are two sharply opposing positions competing 
with each other, and a number of accompanying soft positions, 
concerning the negative impact of globalization on the welfare state. 
The opposing positions are the following: first, globalization has been 
the fundamental factor behind the gradual retreat of the welfare state, 
all other factors being much less significant; second, the role of 
globalization has been grossly overestimated; it may be important but 
it is the internal developments in Western welfare states in recent 
decades that are crucial. All other positions seem to be softer or more 
conditioned versions of either the former or the latter paradigmatic 
position. From a broader perspective, Torben Iversen in his paper on 
“The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion” draws a distinction 
between “pessimists” and “optimists”: according to the pessimists, 
globalization is a serious threat to the continuation of the Keynesian
investment in the R&D sector is to make it “more attractive and profitable” (EC 2002c: 
5). It is no accident that the communication bears the subtitle “Towards 3% of GDP”.
28 To put the two issues in a different perspective: “simply stated: longer life costs 
more” (Camdessus 1998: 5) and “today, throughout the industrial world, retirement 
has become a lengthy period of state-supported leisure for surging populations of 
retirees, a high percentage of whom, thanks to modern medicine and less disabling 
forms of work, remain able-bodied well into their seventies. Until now, this state of 
affairs has been a tolerable form of excess only because enough young people were 
willing to bear the increasing economic burden” (Hewitt 2002: 14).
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welfare state; but optimistic accounts of globalization say that it is 
compatible with, and can even strengthen, the welfare state (see 
Iversen 2001). The best known representatives of the (relatively small) 
camp of “optimists” are Geoffrey Garrett and Dani Rodrik, both 
influential political economists and political scientists. Garrett for 
instance claims that
The widespread support for the notion that globalization has undermined 
the welfare state is somewhat surprising given the results of the most 
systematic empirical studies on the subject. Quantitative research has found 
neither clear nor consistent globalization constraints on government 
spending or taxation in the OECD. Indeed, in many cases, the globalization- 
size of government relationships tend to be positive. These results are 
consistent with the view that globalization has a distinct political logic of 
“compensation” that may override the lowest common denominator 
economic “efficiency” pressures highlighted in the popular debate on the 
welfare state. The compensation perspective emphasizes three points. First, 
market integration has tended to increase inequality and economic insecurity 
in the advanced industrial countries. Second, this creates strong incentives 
for governments to ameliorate market dislocations using the policy 
instruments of the welfare state. Finally, these policies may not necessarily be 
detrimental to macroeconomic performance or the interest of finance and 
industry (Garrett and Mitchell 1999:1).
Garrett and Mitchell evaluate the relative impact of the efficiency and 
compensation perspectives on the globalization-welfare state 
relationships using data for 18 OECD countries in the 1961-1994 
period. The efficiency hypothesis highlights the increasing 
competition in international markets for goods and services and in 
the mobility of capital, but it focuses on only one aspect of the 
globalization-welfare state nexus -  “the economics of big
government” (Garrett and Mitchell 1999: 8). It neglects the assertion -  
made by thinkers from Karl Polanyi (1944) to Dani Rodrik (1997) -  
that “there are also clear political incentives to expand welfare efforts 
in response to internationalization”. So, in the optimists’ view, 
“market integration may benefit all segments of society in the long 
run through the more efficient allocation of production and 
investment. But the short-term political effects of globalization are 
likely to be very different ... increasing inequality and increasing
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economic insecurity” (Garrett and Mitchell 1999: 9). The 
“compensation hypothesis” suggests that globalization may actually 
increase demands on governments to cushion market-generated 
inequality and insecurity by welfare state expansion. This optimism is 
very rare among researchers on welfare issues though, and further 
evidence for a positive relationship between trade openness and 
compensatory social spending needs to be found.
The traditional picture of the relations between nations and their 
economies and its radical questioning by the forces of globalization is 
excellently captured by Fritz Scharpf: “in the history of capitalism, the 
decades following the Second World War were unusual in the degree 
to which the boundaries of the territorial state had become coextensive 
with the boundaries of markets for capital, services, goods and labour. 
These boundaries were by no means impermeable, but transactions 
across them were nevertheless under the effective control of national 
governments. As a consequence, capital owners were generally 
restricted to investment opportunities within the national economy, 
and firms were mainly challenged by domestic competitors” (Scharpf 
2000a: 254, emphases mine). He goes on to argue that
During this period, therefore, the industrial nations of Western Europe had a 
chance to develop specifically national versions o f  the capitalist welfare state -  and 
their choices were in fact remarkably different. ... It was not fully realized at
the time, however, how much the success o f  market correcting policies did in fact 
depend on the capacity o f  the territorial state to control its economic boundaries. 
Once this capacity was lost, through the globalization of capital markets and 
the transnational integration of markets for goods and services, the “golden 
years” o f  the capitalist welfare state came to an end (Scharpf 2000a: 255, emphases 
mine).
It is crudely stated but basically captures the point. It is no longer 
possible to disregard the forces of globalization in discussions about 
the future of the welfare state, even though their role may be 
considerably downplayed in some formulations, as we shall see.
Conceptually, Giuliano Bonoli and his colleagues (in European 
Welfare Futures) suggest four different positions regarding welfare 
state responses to the pressures of globalization. The first three accept 
the fact that individual countries are part of the global economic
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environment and that their welfare systems need to adapt to this new 
situation, but differ on the kind of adaptation needed. The fourth 
approach does not see globalization as a major constraining force or 
suggests that governments can stand up to multi-national enterprises. 
The three adaptive positions are the following. The first is described 
under the heading “competitiveness requires a welfare state”: 
globalization necessitates more, not less government provision of 
public services; there are two interrelated reasons -  industrial 
societies in a globalized economy have to compete with one another, 
and therefore they need first-class education and training for all their 
citizens; and labor flexibility on a national level must be compensated 
for by the state through social protection policies (to maintain social 
justice and social harmony).29 The second is “globalization against 
welfare”: it is based on the theoretical premise that globalization has 
intensified the problems created by high levels of public expenditure; 
this is the neoliberal view in general. The third position is “a 
compromise between welfare and competitiveness”: this approach 
steers a middle course; while accepting the positive contribution of 
welfare provision to the life of a nation, it claims that the forces of 
globalization make certain adjustments and modifications to existing 
welfare provisions necessary. In this approach, favored by both the 
EU and OECD, only some “fine tuning” to their public services is 
necessary in order to improve their competitiveness.30 Finally, the
29 This is also the conclusion Ramesh Mishra comes to in his Globalization and the 
Welfare State, rightly describing it as “paradoxical”: “Increasing globalization and 
competitiveness create economic conditions which require the state or the public 
sector to play a more, not less, important role in social protection. ... [A] globalized 
economy leaves the state, whether national or supranational, as the only stable and 
legitimate organization able to assume responsibility for adequate social protection 
(Mishra 1999: 32). As we shall see discussed below, in a European context, the biggest 
hopes for the future of welfare are cherished with respect to the new form of the 
European Union. This vision of transnational/transeuropean welfare is shared by both 
Ulrich Beck and Jürgen Habermas, whose ideas will be discussed later in Chapter 5.
30 “Competitiveness”, following Alesina and Perotti (1997: 921), may be defined in 
simple economic terms as “unit labor costs in manufacturing in one country, relative 
to its competitors”, so that an improvement in competitiveness is defined as a fall in 
relative unit labor costs. In thinking about the welfare state and competitiveness, the
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fourth approach does not see globalization as a major force exerting 
an influence on the current problems of the welfare state (see Bonoli 
et al. 2000: 65-69). The responses of national governments to the 
pressures of globalization is one line of thinking; another line is the 
actual influence of globalization pressures on the ongoing redefinition 
of the welfare state.
4.4. G lo b a liz a tio n  as th e  F u n d am en tal Factor b eh in d  
the R etrea t o f  the W elfare  S tate
One of the most radical positions recently taken in the globalization/ 
/ welfare state debates can be exemplified by that of Ramesh Mishra 
presented in his controversial book Globalization and the Welfare State
(1999). For Mishra, in the most general terms, the collapse of the 
socialist alternative together with the fall of the iron curtain was the 
cause of globalization, and the decline of the nation-state its effect. 
Consequently, globalization is without doubt now “the essential 
context of the welfare state” (Mishra 1999: 15). His general description 
runs as follows:
three major developments in recent decades have altered the economic, 
political and ideological context of the welfare state in important ways. They 
are: the collapse of the socialist alternative, the globalization of the economy, 
and the relative decline of the nation state. Although overlapping and 
interrelated, each of these has implications for the welfare state which require 
us to reconsider some of the basic ideas and assumptions which have guided 
thinking about social policy and social welfare since the Second W orld War 
(Mishra 1999: 1).
First, the collapse of socialism made it clear that the prospect of a 
systemic alternative to capitalism had disappeared. The inequalities 
and insecurities of the market society were hard to justify in the
basic idea from an economist’s point of view is simple: “An increase in labor taxation 
used to finance redistribution to pensioners and/or unemployed workers induces the 
labor union to increase wage pressure, which in turn induces higher labor costs and a 
loss of competitiveness. As a consequence, the demand for exports and employment 
fall” (922).
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presence of the socialist world outside and a socialist labor opposition 
within until the 1970s in the West. Now, after 1989, “the collapse of 
the socialist alternative and the disappearance of any serious internal 
threat from the labour movement has made possible the return of 
classical capitalism with its ideal o f a free market economy and the drive 
towards deregulation and privatization” (Mishra 1999: 3, emphasis mine). 
Second, the globalization of the economy became a reality, especially 
financial globalization: “the most dramatic and significant change 
from the viewpoint of the welfare state is that of financial 
globalization” (Mishra 1999: 4). True, this is not new in itself, the 
example of the United Kingdom before the first world war is a good 
example, Mishra goes on to argue, “however, from the standpoint o f the 
welfare state the financial openness o f economics is an entirely new and 
significant development. The point is that before 1914 when economies 
were more open, there was no welfare state -  no Keynesian 
macroeconomic management to maintain full employment, no 
universal social programmes, and no high levels of taxation. 
Conversely, after WW2 when modern welfare states came into being, 
Western economies were relatively closed and self-contained” 
(Mishra 1999: 5). So the crucial issue, as emphasized by Fritz Scharpf, 
to whom we have already referred above, is the “structural 
dependence of the welfare state on a relatively closed economy” 
(Mishra 1999: 5). And third, the nation state declined: the welfare state 
was developed and still very much remains a “national enterprise”; 
welfare reforms were to fashion national unity and national purpose 
and the full employment universal welfare state institutionalized the 
idea of nations by way of “social citizenship”; as Mishra rightly 
argues,
Indeed the idea of maintaining and consolidating the national community -
economically, politically and socially -  was the ideological underpinning par
excellence of the welfare state (Mishra 1999: 12).
Shared national identities, national community, solidarity and the 
belief in nationhood, largely present in the post-war welfare states, 
may be disappearing today though; consequently the question Mishra 
asks is whether the nation state “can survive as anything other than
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an institutional legacy of the past in the process of gradual decay” 
(Mishra 1999: 12). In general terms, the sovereignty and autonomy of 
nation states are already being curtailed through globalization and 
such regional economic associations as the EU or NAFTA.
The Keynesian welfare state came into being largely in response to 
the human and financial costs of mass unemployment. There was also 
a political element involved, Mishra argues: communism, an 
alterative form of social system and a serious challenger to capitalism, 
had abolished unemployment and guaranteed the right to work for 
everyone.31 The postwar social compromise was reached because of 
the threat to private property presented by both socialism and the 
labor movement and meant the “relative decommodification” of 
certain life-chances under capitalism (Mishra 1999: 1). Gary Teeple, 
the author of Globalization and the Decline o f Social Reform, argues along 
similar lines: the welfare state came into being in the form of social 
policies, programs, standards and regulations in order to “mitigate 
class conflict” and to provide for the “social needs for which the 
capitalist mode of production in itself has no solution or makes no 
provision”. In the postwar conditions, the welfare state became a 
“political and economic ‘necessity’” (Teeple 1995: 15). State 
intervention was to help rebuild the war-torn European economies 
and to contain or diminish a growing interest in socialism, following 
both the hardships of the 1930s and the devastation brought about by 
the second world war.32 As he puts it explicitly,
31 Mishra describes the social setting in which the postwar Keynesian welfare 
state emerged in terms of the challenge that socialism was to the capitalist system at
that time as well as between the world wars: “The economic and political crisis of 
Western capitalism during the interwar years, culminating in the Great Depression 
and mass unemployment, made it a social order very much on the defensive. The 
acceptance, in broad outline, by the parties of the Right, o f the full employment welfare 
state was the result, among other things, o f the growing strength o f  the left alternative. 
... Moreover, a socialist world had come into existence which challenged morally and 
materially, at least in the early post-war decades, the social system of capitalism” 
(Mishra 1999: 2, emphases mine).
32 Paul S. Hewitt, director of the Global Aging Initiative, reminds us that 
“whatever its humanitarian intent, the creation of the modern welfare state was, at 
heart, a pragmatic response to the social upheaval caused by the large-scale
Chapter 4. The University and the Welfare State 253
Social reforms of one sort or another were politically, economically and 
socially necessary and financially feasible w ith the coming of industrial 
capitalism, but particularly during the post-World War II reconstruction 
period (Teeple 1995: 25).
What Mishra sees as new in the situation of the welfare state is 
providing capital with an “exit” option which strengthened the 
bargaining power of capital very considerably against both 
governments and labor movements. Consequently, he claims that “it 
is not the economic facts about globalization as such but their political 
implications that make it a new and significant phenomenon. Thus 
money and investment capital can vote with their feet if they do not 
like government policies” (Mishra 1999: 6).What is gone, in Mishra’s 
view? Three successive decades after the second world war witnessed 
a significant improvement in living standards (“full employment, 
good wages and the growth of social protection helped to secure a 
measure of redistribution of income and life chances -  thus providing 
security as well as a measure of equity”, Mishra 1999: 29) -  but now 
these standards, although still available, have become much more 
insecure.
A crucial role in maintaining in place mainstream social programs 
in recent years, even though sometimes with cutbacks, has been 
played by democratic institutions; otherwise, changes in welfare 
programs would have been much more drastic, as has been the case 
in the transition countries where electoral democracy and political 
rights are not as strong or well-grounded in society as in the West. 
Unfortunately, globalization pressures on the welfare state 
substantially narrow the choices available to the political parties by 
way of fiscal and monetary policies and social expenditure (Mishra 
1999: 54). Keynesian strategies for maintaining full employment are 
not working anymore and unemployment becomes chronic, not
unemployment of the early twentieth century. In order to create prosperity, capitalism 
required stability. ... The ideological turmoil of the 1930s underscored the dangers 
that democracies courted by permitting unemployment to impoverish large numbers 
of the younger generation. In the election of 1932, a majority of Germans voted for 
fascist and communist candidates who promised to end democratic rule” (Hewitt 
2002: 13, emphasis mine).
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periodic and related to the development cycles of capitalism. As 
Mishra summarizes the situation faced by governments today, earlier 
policy options of social democracy (such as e.g. nationalization of 
industries, high redistributive and progressive taxation, job creation 
through public sector expansion) have virtually disappeared. As a 
result,
At best social democracy is striving to slow down the erosion of social 
protection and to ensure a more equitable process of retrenchment, i.e. one 
which protects the weaker and more vulnerable population. Overall, thanks 
to democratic institutions and electoral considerations, change has been and 
is likely to be gradual and incremental. Yet the direction of change is also clear 
(Mishra 1999: 55).
Mishra discusses the “logic of globalization” presented in the form 
of seven propositions. These theses spell out this logic in relation to 
social policy and social welfare. Let me refer to them now 
(remembering that Mishra’s views are presented here as an 
exemplification of the position for which globalization changes 
welfare states futures radically and substantially) and discuss them in 
more detail in the context of changing higher education policies:
(1) Globalization undermines the ability of national governments to pursue 
the objectives of full employment and economic growth through 
reflationary policies. ‘Keynesianism in one country’ ceases to be a viable 
option.
(2) Globalization results in an increasing inequality in wages and working 
conditions through greater labour market flexibility, a differentiated 
“post-Fordist” work-force and decentralized collective bargaining. Global 
competition and mobility of capital result in “social dumping” and a 
downward shift in wages and working conditions.
(3) Globalization exerts a downward pressure on systems of social protection 
and social expenditure by prioritizing the reduction of deficits and debt 
and the lowering of taxation as key objectives of state policy.
(4) Globalization weakens the ideological underpinnings of social protection, 
especially that of national minimums, by undermining national solidarity 
and legitimating the inequality of rewards.
(5) Globalization weakens the basis of social partnership and tripartism by 
shifting the balance of power away from labour and the state and towards 
capital.
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(6) Globalization constrains the policy options of nations by virtually 
excluding left-or-centre approaches. In this sense it spells the ‘end of 
ideology’ as far as welfare state policies are concerned.
(7) The logic of globalization comes into conflict with the “logic” of the 
national community and democratic politics. Social policy emerges as a 
major issue of contention between global capitalism and the democratic 
nation state (Mishra 1999: 16-17).
Now let us analyze whether and to what extent the above 
propositions of Mishra concerning the “logic of globalization” may 
refer to higher education, beginning with the first proposition.
His first proposition means the increasing privatization and the 
shrinking of state welfare (which may be compensated for by private 
welfare -  but with a new distribution of risks and certainties, as 
discussed by Giuliano Bonoli, following the Risikogesellschaft line of 
thinking common to Beck, Giddens or Lash); the reduction in the 
number of public sector employees; the end of the option of 
developing the welfare state through creating new public sector jobs 
(as in Scandinavian countries), including jobs in higher education; 
generally speaking, taxation and spending models may be becoming 
increasingly convergent (following the idea of “investor-friendly” or 
“business-friendly” climates in particular countries), as funding 
policies may become with respect to higher education; as well as there 
being no way to avoid a “globally accepted” downward trend in 
funding public services in general and a global trend which favors the 
market rather than the state in providing public services in general. 
So the prospects for the future seem to be that higher education will be 
increasingly seen as part o f the public sector, with its traditional uniqueness 
dead and gone, with all its consequences. One way to break away from 
this perspective is to view higher education as an investment, rather 
than a burden, crucial for the development of “knowledge-based” 
societies and economies or to view higher education through the lens 
of social capital formation33. Martin Carnoy sounds moderately
33 The “social policy approach” advocated by e.g. James Midgley in “Growth, 
Redistribution, and Welfare: Toward Social Investment” seeks to harmonize social 
policy with economic development. The idea is to identify and implement social 
programs that make positive contributions to economic growth. Midgley suggests we
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optimistic when he concludes in his book about globalization and 
educational reforms that his analysis
suggests that a major “real” impact of globalization is to change the role of 
nation-states. Nation-states are becoming limited as direct economic actors 
and, as a result, are losing political legitimacy. But at the same time, nation­
states, and regional and local governments, will depend increasingly for their 
legitimacy on their ability to create the conditions fo r  economic and social 
development. In the new global economy, these conditions will depend 
increasingly on the way the state organizes the education system . Because 
knowledge is the most highly valued commodity in the global economy, 
nations have little choice but to increase their investment in education 
(Carnoy 1999: 82, emphases mine).
The question is which level of education Carnoy means; it is 
interesting to note Gosta Esping-Andersen’s arguments against 
increasing investments in higher education for knowledge-based
societies (as opposed to massive investments in children and families 
with children).34 In his view, a knowledge-intensive economy will 
lead to a new social polarization and new dualisms. The long-term 
scenario might very well be “a smattering of ‘knowledge islands’ in a
stop defending the traditional welfare state with its provisions and changing 
perspectives: “Rather than seeking to defend an unworkable redistributive conception 
of social welfare, social policy advocates should consider the merits of the social 
development approach that calls for harmonizing social policy and economic 
development and offers a conception of redistribution based on investments in people 
and communities. ... Traditional rationales for redistribution based on altruism and 
social rights have lost their resonance” (Midgley 2001: 167).
34 In his 2001 report to the Belgian Presidency of the European Union (A New 
Welfare Architecture for Europe?), Esping-Andersen argues that vocational training and 
increased participation in higher education are unlikely, by themselves, to solve the 
problems caused by a fall in the demand for low skill labour: “If fighting social 
exclusion through employment remains the principal policy goal of the European 
social model in the early 21st century, the learning offensive will have to be 
complemented with strategies of raising employment opportunities for low skill 
workers through other means. In the 1990s, many left-of-centre governments have 
experimented with various forms of ‘activation’ measures in the lower tiers of the 
system of social protection. Activation programs are designed to strengthen and repair 
the conditional ties between work and income. The underlying philosophy of 
activation is one of reciprocal obligations” (Esping-Andersen et al. 2001: 230).
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great sea of marginalized outsiders”. To avoid this bleak 
development, cognitive capacities and the resource base of citizens 
must be strengthened. On numerous occasions, he recommends 
massive investment in children, and families with children (e.g. 
Esping-Andersen 2002: 3). As he argues,
The most simple-minded “third way” promoters believe that the population, 
via education, can be adapted to the market economy and that the social 
problem will, hence, disappear. This is a dangerous fallacy. Education, training 
or life-long learning cannot be enough. A  skill-intensive economy will breed 
new inequalities; a full-employment service economy will reinforce these. 
And if we are unwilling to accept low-end services, it will be difficult to 
avoid widespread unemployment. In any case, education cannot undo 
differences in people’s social capital (Esping-Andersen 2001: 134-35, 
emphasis mine).
The claim shared by many economists, sociologists and welfare 
analysts is that the limits of public expenditure and taxation has 
probably already been reached in EU member countries. Investment 
for the knowledge society is already subject to strong external 
constraints.35 Esping-Andersen rightly mentions “the new inequalities 
and social risks that knowledge-based economies inevitably 
provoke”, “new winners and losers” and a deepening gulf between 
those with and without skills.36 He suggests two ground rules for
35 Catherine L. Mann argues in “The New Economy: End of the Welfare State?” 
that the new economy means that the welfare state “must change the way it operates, 
the way government sets policies on behalf of its citizens, and the way that citizens 
respond to the marketplace. The New Welfare State for the dynamic environment of 
the New Economy will be characterized more by incentives and responsibilities than 
by rule and outcomes. In the Welfare State, policies should focus on enabling 
transformation to achieve superior productivity and growth, not on avoiding change 
by moderating possibilities and regulating outcomes. Some might see in this 
redirection the end of the Welfare State as they know it” (Mann 2001: 2).
36 Let us remember here an interesting distinction drawn recently in a European 
Commission communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and Training between the 
“knowledge rich” and the “knowledge poor”. As the document argues, “with an 
increasing premium on skills, the polarisation between the knowledge rich and the 
knowledge poor puts strains on economic and social cohesion. Access to employer funded 
training is often limited to those who are already well qualified and some groups get
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policy making: one, “we cannot pursue too one-dimensionally a 
‘learning society’, a human capital-based strategy in the belief that a 
tide of education will lift all boats. Such a strategy inevitably leaves 
the less-endowed behind”; and two, “new social policy challenges 
cannot be met by any additional taxation or spending as a percent of 
GDP. We must accordingly concentrate on how to improve the status 
quo” (Esping-Andersen 2001: 146-47). So the pie will have to be 
divided up differently. Let us remember here Harold A. Hovey’s 
discussion of competing welfare programs in which higher education 
has recently been less successful than other claimants of government 
funding. It looks like the whole traditional post-war slice-cutting o f the 
pie o f state funding will have to be renegotiated. Former winners may be 
future losers (and vice versa) in the new setting of changing 
priorities, growing inequalities and possibly new ideas regarding 
what counts most in our societies and what counts less, and 
consequently new ideas on how to cut the pie differently. We are in 
a very dynamic situation right now; it is hard to predict future 
policy directions, especially that they may differ considerably from 
country to country, or region to region, although some desirable 
policy mix to meet the requirements of a “competitive, employment- 
friendly and equitable welfare state” may be defined in advance 
(Ferrera et al. 2001: 114).37
There are very few social scientists discussing the issue of higher 
education and the emergent knowledge society who believe that
locked into the lower end of the labour market. An important challenge is to develop
education and training throughout life in such a way that change and restructuring in the
economy have no adverse effects on social cohesion” (EC 2003: 8). Although European 
social policies are very much focused on enabling citizens to make increasing use of 
educational opportunities throughout life, in most if not all transition countries this 
dimension seems largely absent, despite the efforts of governments to promote lifelong 
learning. The education available is still tailored to students of 19-24 years of age.
37 Such a desirable policy mix is defined by Ferrera, Hemerijck and Rhodes in 
“The Future of Social Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy” in 
the following way: “a robust macroeconomic policy; wage moderation and flexibility 
(achieved where possible within broader ‘social pacts’); employment-friendly and 
efficient tax social policy; labour market ‘flexicurity’ [secured flexible employment]; 
and new methods of tackling poverty and social exclusion” (Ferrera et al. 2001: 115).
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globalization may actually encourage increases in spending on 
education from the public purse, at the expense of other programs of 
the welfare state. One of them is Vito Tanzi from the IMF who in his 
recent paper on “Taxation and the Future of Social Protection” claims 
that
globalization may create pressures for increased spending for education, 
training, research and development, the environment, infrastructures, and 
for institutional changes partly to increase efficiency and partly to comply 
with international agreements. These expenditures are consistent with the 
traditional or basic role of the state in its allocation function. Thus, 
expenditure for social protection, which is a newcomer in the role of the state, 
could be squeezed between falling revenue and increasing needs for more 
traditional types of spending. In such a situation, the state will need to 
rethink its role in the economy (Tanzi 2001: 196).
This approach is very rare indeed. Although theoretically it is 
possible to claim increases in the share of the public funds for national 
public higher education systems using the “knowledge-based society” 
argumentation, in practice it has not worked in any of the major 
OECD countries or European transition countries so far. The situation 
of financing higher education recalls that of raising taxes for the sake 
of raising the standards of welfare provisions: everyone would like to 
have better public universities but no one is willing to pay higher 
taxes for this reason (compare the generally supportive attitude 
towards welfare opposed to the unwillingness to be taxed 
accordingly). The future of public universities in Europe is discussed 
separately in Chapter 6 on the emergent “knowledge-based” society 
in a European context, and as shown in detail there, the option of 
more public funding for higher education or research and 
development in the future is explicitly excluded.38
38 Thinking of the emergent European Research Area, let us remember briefly the 
European Commission’s views: “it is very important to realise that the largest share of 
this deficit stems from the low level of private investment in higher education and 
research and development in the EU compared with the USA. At the same time, 
private returns on investment in tertiary education remain high in most EU countries”. 
Consequently, the thesis of the communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and 
Training: an Imperative for Europe is that “faced with relatively low private investment
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Now let us turn to Mishra’s second proposition about “changing 
working conditions through greater labour flexibility” -  which 
applies directly to the academic world. The issue of the academic 
profession working under new pressures has been discussed 
thoroughly in recent years and there is no need to develop this theme 
here. Research has been done both in an Anglo-Saxon context and in 
that of the European Union (see especially Currie and Newson 1998; 
Leslie and Slaughter 2001; Burbules and Torres 2000; Enders 2000; 
Altbach 2002; de Weert and Enders 2004). The changing academic 
workplace has been widely debated in recent years. Mishra’s third 
proposition, relating globalization to the new prioritization of 
reducing deficits and debts and lowering taxation as objectives of 
state policy, directly affects the public funding available to higher 
education but has already been dealt with in the present chapter.
Mishra in his glosses on the fourth thesis argues that a national 
minimum standard of living in the period of the Keynesian welfare 
state was to be in the nature of a right of all citizens,
virtually a function of citizenship or membership of the national community. 
... The welfare state itself has been very much a national enterprise fuelled by 
nationalistic aspirations and the desire for national integration. In place of a 
nation divided and weakened by class and regional inequalities, the welfare 
state was to create one nation united on the basis of social citizenship (Mishra 
1999: 99, emphasis mine).
As we present it in the chapters on the modern idea of the 
university and on the relations between the university/globalization/ 
/nation-state, what Mishra calls “nationalistic aspirations and the 
desire for national integration” had lain precisely at the foundations 
of modern universities as well. In the period of the postwar welfare 
state, with the growing student enrollment rates all over Europe and 
in all advanced countries, the linkage between the welfare state and
levels and high private returns on university education, the main responsibility of 
authorities is not only to continue to provide higher education institutions and
students with a sufficient level of public funding, but also to find ways to add to it by 
increasing and diversifying private investment in higher education”. What is needed 
is therefore a “combination of targeted public investments and higher private contributions” 
(EC 2003a: 13, 15, emphasis mine).
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the massification of higher education had intensified. In different 
countries to different degrees, in the last two decades at least, higher 
education in a European context has been increasingly seen as a 
citizens’ right, a function of citizenship (in most communist countries, 
additionally, higher education was mostly guaranteed by their 
constitutions to be “free”, but the elite nature of higher education and 
relatively low enrollments until the beginning of the 1990s must be 
remembered too39).
Mishra’s fifth proposition does not seem to be directly related to 
education, even though in an indirect way the shifting of power away 
from the state and towards capital certainly weakens the bargaining 
position of universities. As emphasized here several times already: a 
good “investment climate” as valued by capital and markets does not 
go hand in hand with high (or above average) public spending, 
including public spending on higher education. The sixth proposition 
refers to higher education in the same indirect way: only some policy 
options are available to most national governments today, and the 
general attitude towards welfare, whether we like it or not (and 
whether we see it or not), especially in transition countries, is largely 
neoliberal.40 And in this context, obviously, the minimal -  or 
“efficient” -  state with minimal (or efficient) public services (as 
opposed to private services), is the policy ideal. Finally, the seventh 
proposition is crucial. As Mishra succinctly puts it, “globalization is
39 Speaking of low and high enrollments, it is useful to have a longer historical 
perspective than the modern university: see e.g. L.W.B. Brockliss’ “Patterns of 
Attendance at the University of Paris, 1400-1800” (1978) and Statistics o f  the German 
Universities, from a recent work on German University Education by Dr. Perry, o f Gottingen, 
by James Heywood (1845). Read before the statistical section o f  the British Association at 
Cambridge, 19th June, 1845.
40 As Gary Teeple comments, “now introduced into almost every country of the 
world, neo-liberal policies are the hallmark of the transition between two eras. They 
are the policy changes that will ‘harmonize’ the world of national capitals and nation­
states, creating a global system of internationalized capital and supranational 
institutions”. Consequently, “neo-liberalism has increasingly come to appear as a set o f 
ideas ‘whose time has come’, while social democracy, trade unionism, and the Keynesian 
welfare state have begun to appear more and more anachronistic” (Teeple 1995: 2, 3, 
emphasis mine).
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about turning the whole world into a giant market place where 
national boundaries mean, or should mean, little” (Mishra 1999: 105). 
For higher education this is very true indeed, especially in the context 
of the GATS negotiations in which trade in “educational services” 
may be treated like any other trade in any other services. I am not 
going to develop the issue here but the debates about the collapse of 
the ideal of the “public good” in recent years in connection with the 
GATS negotiations have been enormous.41
4.5. C u rren t T ran sfo rm atio n s o f  W estern  W elfare  S tates: 
T h e R o le  o f  G lo b a liz a tio n  vs.
T h e  R o le  o f  In te rn a l D ev elo p m en ts
The opposite view about the role of globalization in bringing about 
the retrenchment of the welfare state is presented by Harvard-based 
Paul Pierson (and his colleagues from a recent interesting 
international research program). At the beginning of the 1990s 
Pierson was engaged in research on the “retrenchment” of the welfare
41 In his “Higher Education and the WTO: Globalization Run Amok”, Philip G. 
Altbach observed that “the trade in higher education is, of course, more difficult to 
codify than bananas. But efforts are now under way to do precisely this -  to create a 
regime of guidelines and regulations to institute free trade in higher education. 
... Educational products of all kinds would be freely exported from one country to 
another. Copyright, patent, and licensing regulations, already part of international 
treaties, would be further reinforced. It would become very difficult to regulate the trade 
in academic institutions, programs, degrees, or products across international borders. 
Those wishing to engage in such imports and exports would have recourse to 
international tribunals and legal action. At present the jurisdiction over higher education 
is entirely in the hands of national authorities” (Altbach 2001: 2). Susan L. Robertson 
reminds that “there is clearly a great deal at stake, and it is critically important that a 
wider ranging debate takes place in a range of communities, including the academy, 
about what GATS means for national education systems, of whether these developments 
are desirable or not and for whom, and what might be done to, slow down, halt or even 
reverse decisions that have already been made” (Robertson 2003a: 260). See a special 
issue of Globalisation, Societies and Education devoted to “WTO/GATS and the Global 
Education Services Industry” (November 2003). See also Larsen et al. 2001 and Sauvé 
2003, and criticism of them in Roberson 2003b.
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state which resulted in a ground-breaking book Dismantling the 
Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics o f Retrenchment (1994). It 
was followed by two already classic papers in welfare studies, “The 
New Politics of the Welfare State” (from World Politics, 1996) and 
“Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in 
Affluent Democracies” (2001a).
In the most general terms, Pierson claims that the globalization 
thesis overlooks the social facts, overestimates the role of international 
factors at the expense of domestic ones, and owes its popularity 
among social scientists to the correlation in timing between the 
internal problems of the welfare state and the resurgence of 
globalization. He formulates his thesis as follows:
changes in the global economy are important, but it is primarily social and 
economic transformations occurring within affluent democracies that generate 
fiscal strain. Slower economic growth associated with the transition to a post­
industrial economy, the maturation of government policy commitments, and 
population ageing and changing household structures have all combined to 
create a context of essentially permanent austerity (Pierson 2001a: 13, 
emphasis mine).
He is especially interested in the apparent causal explanation for the 
linkage between globalization and the reformulation of the welfare 
state. He believes that what makes the globalization thesis so 
convincing is the undeniable difficulty that governments now face in 
funding their social commitments:
Austerity has been on the agenda everywhere, and the intensity of fiscal 
pressures is clearly growing. Governments appear increasingly unable to 
respond to new demands. The correlation in timing between globalization, on 
the one hand, and both mounting demands for austerity and strong 
indications of lost policy making capacity, on the other, has lent credence to 
claims of a causal relationship betw een globalization and a weakening 
nation-state (Pierson 2001c: 81, emphasis mine).
While Pierson admits that welfare states face an unprecedented 
level of budgetary stress today, he claims that this stress is related to 
“post-industrial” changes characteristic of affluent democracies. In the 
most explicit passage, he claims that “to focus on globalization is to
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mistake the essential nature of the problem. Perhaps, one might say, it 
does not matter. Regardless of the source of pressure, the strains are 
very real. Yet it is important to get the causal story right” (Pierson 
2001c: 82). Perhaps the most important part of the picture Pierson 
draws is the question whether, in the absence of globalization, welfare 
states would be in a radically different situation or national policy 
makers would be more capable of addressing new public demands. 
His answer is in the negative (Pierson 2001c: 82).
This is a crucial point: would it really be different without the 
pressures associated with the global integration of economies? 
I believe Pierson’s theses are very strong, but I am not quite sure we 
get from him the convincing arguments that globalization just does 
not matter. I believe the situation affluent industrialized countries are 
in is strongly shaped by global pressures, as is the selection of policy 
options at their disposal to meet new demands; there is an interplay 
of international and domestic factors and it is very hard to distill them 
in today’s world. For it is not only the real impact that globalization is 
having on societies; it is also, I would argue, the way social, economic, 
and political problems are actually perceived as problems, i.e. 
ideology. Pierson may be right about the real influence, in measurable 
terms, of the internationalization of the economy on the welfare state. 
He is very much correct about the growing domestic pressures 
common to all major affluent democracies; that they do not have 
much to do with globalization. But the way they are perceived by 
governments and policy makers, the way they are framed for public 
discussions, the way they enter the social world through the social 
sciences, experts and the media -  seems crucial. In this sense, 
globalization is indeed much more than a simple economic 
phenomenon; it has to do with the way we do politics and the way 
we run businesses, the way we think of our states and our 
universities; the way we think of ourselves.
The social phenomena of greatest interest to me in the present book 
-  the recommodification of society, the desocialization of the economy, 
the denationalization of both societies and economies, the 
deterritorialization and despatialization of economic activities, the 
changing distribution of risks in society, the growing individualization,
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the growing market orientation in thinking about the state and public 
services, the disempowerment of the nation-state, the globalization and 
transnationalization of welfare spending patterns, the detraditiona- 
lization of nationhood and citizenship -  all influence the way welfare 
issues are perceived, how problems are seen as problems and solutions 
accepted as solutions. And these processes are at least intensified by 
globalization to a large extent (as Martin Carnoy in his book about 
globalization and educational policies reminds us, “the essence of 
globalization” is contained in “a new way of thinking about economic 
and social space and time. Firms, workers, students, and even children 
watching television or using the Internet at school, are recon­
ceptualizing their ‘world’” (Carnoy 1999: 19). Consequently, I would be 
very unwilling to disregard the impact of globalization on the situation 
of the welfare state today because what we can see and how we can see 
the issue is largely framed by the processes, phenomena and 
interpretations that globalization has already brought about.
Pierson distinguishes four major transitions in Western welfare 
democracies and discusses their relationship to globalization: “the 
slowdown in the growth of productivity (and consequently economic 
growth) associated with a massive shift from manufacturing to 
service employment; the gradual expansion, maturation, and ‘growth 
to limits’ of governmental commitments; the demographic shift to an 
older population; and the restructuring of households and their 
relationship to the world of paid employment. Each of these 
transitions constitutes a powerful and continuing source of pressure 
on the welfare states of affluent democracies. Globalization is 
essentially unrelated to the last three of these transitions; its links to 
the first transformation are at best modest” (Pierson 2001c: 83). In his 
view, globalization accompanied these transitions; it accentuated and 
modified the pressures on welfare states. But it is these transitions to 
post-industrialism that “made the real difference” (Pierson 2001c: 83).
His explanation seems to show only part of the picture; part of it 
which is much less measurable and much less economic in nature 
somehow seems to get lost:
the fundamental symptoms of declining governmental capacity and
mounting budgetary stress would clearly be with us even in the absence of
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trends associated with globalization. This is not to suggest that increasing 
economic integration is unimportant, or to dismiss the linkages between 
international and domestic developments. Such links, however, are likely to 
be more modest, complex and bi-directional than is commonly suggested. At 
the same time, we need to pay more attention than has recently been the case 
to profound social transformations that are essentially domestic in character. 
Societies are becoming more service-based, w ith a consequential decline in 
productivity growth. Social programmers have grown to maturity. 
Populations are getting older. Household structures are changing 
dramatically. These trends, loosely lumped under the label of post­
industrialism, explain most of the strain facing the welfare states of affluent 
societies” (Pierson 2001c: 98-9, emphasis mine).
What is important for our purposes here, though, is the current state 
of affairs, regardless -  to some extent -  of whether the (Pierson) 
causal story is right. No matter which of the two extreme positions on 
the globalization/welfare state relationship we follow (whether 
Mishra’s strong link or Pierson’s weak one, as representatives of both 
camps) the point of arrival is roughly the same. This is exactly what 
Pierson admits at some point:
To say that the role of globalization in the transformation of welfare states 
has been overstated is not to deny that fiscal strains on welfare states are real. 
Quite the contrary. Welfare states are under intense budgetary pressure, and 
that pressure is likely to remain and indeed intensify. In this crucial respect 
the current analysis echoes a central implication of the globalization story. 
For practical purposes, we have reached a situation o f  permanent austerity (Pierson 
2001c: 99, emphasis mine).
4.6. C on clu sion s
Consequently, for the purposes of this book, it actually does not make 
a lot of difference which factors have been more important in 
bringing us to the point where we are; the future of the welfare state 
and its services, including public higher education, looks roughly 
similar. For me it is important to realize where we are and where we 
might be heading in the coming decades. Unfortunately, most lines of 
argumentation point in the same direction, even though the concepts
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used may be different. And additionally, the story gets even more 
homogenous if we leave the domain of “affluent” democracies which 
have inherited their welfare provisions from the “Golden age” and 
pass on to most developing countries and the European transition 
countries, which are of greatest interest to me. In this new context, 
many discussions about welfare futures seem academic: what they 
shyly predict for affluent democracies in the future is in fact already 
happening in transition economies; happening in full swing, with 
almost no other policy options being considered; sometimes with no 
other options being supported, championed or acclaimed by these 
very same affluent democracies. There is certainly a lot of social 
experimentation with respect to welfare going on in the transition 
countries. It could even be argued that the future directions of welfare 
transformations in Western democracies are being experimented with to 
various degrees of success in transition countries; in some areas, like 
pensions reform with the three-pillar model designed by the World 
Bank and applied in some Latin American and European transition 
countries, this intention happens to be formulated explicitly.
Ch a p t e r  5
Globalization, the Welfare State, 
and the Future of Democracy
5.1. T h e  “P o stn atio n a l C o n ste lla tio n ” 
and  the End o f th e  P ostw ar W elfare-S ta te  C om p rom ise 
(Jü rgen  H aberm as)
Having discussed the future of the welfare state from the perspective 
of (mainly) political scientists and researchers on welfare issues, 
I would like now to pass on to a more general part of the emergent 
social picture: I want to discuss the nexus of our understanding of 
globalization, the future of the welfare-state and the future of 
democracy as analysed by three leading European social scientists -  
two sociologists and a philosopher. They view the issue from an even 
wider perspective and provide, through their rethinking of the 
welfare state, additional arguments for my point that the 
transformation of public higher education on a global scale is 
unavoidable if the transformation of the state, including the welfare 
state, goes along the lines sketched in the present book.
The social thinkers in question are: Jürgen Habermas, perhaps 
the most famous living German philosopher, as the author of The 
Postnational Constellation; followed by Ulrich Beck, perhaps the most 
famous living German sociologist, author of several important 
recent books including What is Globalization?, The Brave New World o f 
Work and The World Risk Society; and finally Zygmunt Bauman, one 
of the most famous British sociologists (as Anthony Giddens wrote:
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the sociologist of postmodernity), author of The Individulized Society, 
Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts and Globalization: the Human 
Consequences.
Let us begin with Jürgen Habermas. In his view, globalization 
heralds the end of the dominance of the nation-state as a model of 
political organization. It fundamentally challenges the relevance of the 
nation-state -  but at the same time, there seems to be no guarantee 
that the nation-state will be replaced by anything better, as Max 
Pensky comments in his introduction to The Postnational Constellation. 
Political Essays. The problem we will all face in the 21st century is the 
following: “can democracies based on social welfare survive beyond 
national borders?”. The answer is a federalist, socially and 
economically effective European Union (Habermas 2001b: xix). In 
these essays, Habermas also refers to the “end” and the “revocation” 
of the welfare-state compromise of the postwar period in Europe as a 
defining feature of the new situation in affluent Western European 
democracies. He summarizes the current problems of the welfare 
state in the following way:
Ironically, developed societies in the twenty-first century are faced w ith the 
reappearance of a problem  they seemed to have only recently solved under 
the pressure of system atic com petition. The problem is as old as capitalism 
itself: how to make the most effective use of the allocative and innovative 
functions of self-regulating markets, while sim ultaneously avoiding 
unequal patterns of distribution and other social costs that are incompatible 
w ith the conditions for social integration in liberal democratic states. In the 
mixed economies of the W est, states had a considerable portion of the 
domestic product at their disposal, and could therefore use transfer 
payments, subsidies, and effective policies in the areas of infrastructure, 
employment and social security. They were able to exert a definite 
influence on the overall conditions of production and distribution with the 
goal of maintaining growth, stable prices, and full employment. In other 
words, by applying growth-stim ulating measures on the one side, and 
social policies on the other, the regulatory state could simultaneously stimulate 
the economy and guarantee social integration  (Habermas 20001b: 50, emphasis 
mine).
The golden era of the Western European Keynesian welfare state is 
certainly over though, and nation-states have fewer and fewer policy
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options open to them, Habermas claims; there can be no discussion 
with the data and its interpretation. Habermas, with respect to the 
future of the current welfare state, is in agreement with Anthony 
Giddens and Ulrich Beck, Scott Lash and Zygmunt Bauman as well as 
many other contemporary social thinkers. He has no hesitations 
when he makes the point that “the welfare state mass democracies 
on the Western model now face the end of a 200-year developmental 
process that began with the revolutionary birth of modern nation­
states” (Habermas 2001b: 60). The idea of the welfare state has so far 
been realized only in the framework of the nation-state, but the 
nation-state is reaching “the limits of its capacities” in the changed 
context defined by global society and the global economy, as he 
argues in a paper “Crossing Globalization’s Valley of Tears” 
(Habermas 2000: 51).
Traditionally, and especially in the postwar period, the state, 
society and the economy were co-extensive within national 
boundaries.1 He dubs the new reality and the radically new histori­
cal configuration the postnational constellation which justifies the 
development of a new “postnational” political project accompanied 
by a transition to a new cosmopolitan law.2 Generally, Habermas’ 
political project presented in The Postnational Constellation
1 By contrast, international “footlose” capital “exempt from the obligation to stay at 
home in its search for investment opportunities and speculative profits can threaten to 
exercise its exit option whenever a government puts burdensome constraints on the 
conditions for domestic investment in the attempt to protect social standards, maintain 
job security or preserve its own ability to manage demand” (Habermas 2000: 53).
2 For a strong criticism of Habermas’ stance towards globalization, see Klaus­
Gerd Giesen’s “The Post-National Constellation: Habermas and the ‘Second 
Modernity’” (Giesen 2004). His conception of the cosmopolitan law is “fundamentally 
anti-democratic”. Commenting on recent works by Habermas, Giddens, and Beck, he 
argues that “the political transition towards cosmopolitan law proposed by Habermas 
corresponds exactly to the move into a second modernity, a ‘postnational age’ of 
world governance. If the new Habermas finds enough allies, we should perhaps 
resign ourselves to living in an age when intellectuals of all persuasions back down 
one after another in the face of the demands of the strong. After the Age of Reason, it 
would seem ... we are now well into the Age of Abdication” (Giesen 2004: 6, 13). 
Strong words indeed.
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encompasses the idea that globalization can only be mastered by 
delegating state prerogatives to a regional supranational 
organization, in the case of Europe -  to the EU (see Giesen 2004: 8ff). 
His diagnosis is the following: “the phenomena of the territorial 
state, the nation, and a popular economy constituted within national 
borders formed a historical constellation in which the democratic 
process assumed a more or less convincing institutional form”. What 
is happening today is that developments summarized under the 
rubric “globalization” have put this entire constellation into question 
(Habermas 2001b: 60). The postnational constellation is bringing to 
an end a situation in which politics and the legal system 
intermeshed with economic cycles and national traditions within the 
boundaries of nation-states (Habermas 2000: 52). The dilemma 
national governments face today derives from the zero-sum game 
into which they have been forced and it is described by Habermas in 
the following manner: necessary economic objectives can be reached 
only at the expense of social and political objectives. The dilemma is 
elaborated in the form of two theses:
First, the economic problems besetting affluent societies can be explained by 
a structural transformation of the world economic system, a transformation 
characterized by the term “globalization”. Second, this transformation so 
radically reduces nation-states'1 capacity for action that the options remaining 
open to them are not sufficient to shield their populations from  the undesired social 
and political consequences o f  a transnational economy (Habermas 2001b: 51, 
emphasis mine).
Habermas fully acknowledges the significance of the impact of 
current global transformations on the traditional European welfare 
state models and on the growing incapacity of national governments 
to conduct national policies, traditionally ascribed to nation-states. 
His conclusions are clear-cut and reflect a deeply historical 
perspective from observing the last half a century in Europe:
no matter how one looks at it, the globalization of the economy destroys a 
historical constellation that made the welfare state compromise temporarily 
possible. Even if this compromise was never the ideal solution for a problem 
inherent within capitalism itself, it nevertheless held capitalismes social costs 
within tolerable limits (Habermas 2001b: 52, emphases mine).
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What must be especially hard to acknowledge for such a 
universalistically-minded social philosopher as Habermas is the 
contingency of post-war European social developments (which, 
incidentally, brings him very close to the general philosophical 
principles of Richard Rorty among which the notion of contingency 
plays a crucial role, see Kwiek 2004a, 2003d, 1998b, 1996). It was 
Gosta Esping-Andersen who made the excellent point that the 
contemporary welfare state addresses a past social order (Esping Andersen 
1996: 9). There was no historical necessity for the appearance and 
evolution of the European welfare state in the way it actually 
appeared and evolved; it merely happened due to unexpected 
historical circumstances and most Europeans have already forgotten 
that these circumstance were related to a particular place and time: 
the social, political and economic circumstances following the second 
world war.3 Habermas thus presents in his essays a historical and 
political narrative with a beginning (the emergence of the postwar 
“national constellation” which gave rise to the development of the 
Keynesian welfare state in Europe) and an end (the emergence of the 
current, globalization-related “postnational constellation” in which 
the traditional form of the welfare state is being questioned). Let me 
quote him here in extenso:
3 These unusual circumstances in the decades following the second world war -  in 
Fritz Scharpf’s formulation in “Globalization and the Welfare State. Constraints, 
Challenges and Vulnerabilities” -  included the conditions “in which the nation state was 
able to exercise a historically exceptional degree o f control over its own economic boundaries. 
As governments were able to regulate capital movements, to determine exchange 
rates, and to adjust tariffs to imports, external economic factors had little or no 
influence on domestic policy choices” (Scharpf 2000b: 1, emphasis mine). Currently, 
even under the liberal regimes of the WTO, governments have not abdicated their 
capacity for border control and the freedom of world trade is still constrained. It is 
different in the European Union where legal and administrative restrictions against 
the free movement of goods and capital have been completely removed. As Scharpf 
comments, “as a consequence, the capacity of national governments to protect 
domestic firms against competitors producing under different regulatory regimes 
abroad has been eliminated, and their capacity to tax and to regulate domestic capital 
and business firms is now limited by the fear of capital flight and the relocation of 
production” (Scharpf 1996: 6).
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In some privileged regions o f  the world, and under the favorable conditions o f  the 
postwar period, the nation-state -  which had in the meantime established the 
worldwide model for political organization -  succeeded in transforming itself 
into a social welfare state by regulating the national economy without 
interfering with its self-correcting mechanisms. But this successful 
combination is menaced by a global economy that now increasingly escapes 
the control of a regulatory state. Obviously, welfare-state functions can be 
maintained at their previous level only if they are transferred from the 
nation-state to larger political entities which could manage to keep pace with 
a transnational economy (Habermas 2001b: 52, emphasis mine).
The possible solution to social problems, both for Habermas and for 
Ulrich Beck, lies in the integrated Europe of the future -  that is, at the 
level of the supranational authorities of a federal European state (“the 
European Union as the initial form for a postnational democracy” in 
the case of Habermas, or as Beck formulates his argument, “without 
Europe there can be no response to globalization ... There is no 
national way out of the global trap”4). The application of corrective
4 Claus Offe in his paper on “The Democratic Welfare State” (2000) shows how 
difficult it is going to be to find possible foundations for European “identity” in the 
presence of the European “democratic deficit”. He argues that “the optimistic view of 
Europe is that the European Union will steadily acquire greater legitimacy by virtue of 
its perceived accomplishments, the growing familiarity of European citizens, and 
gradual institutional innovation. The democratic deficit, in other words, will wither 
away of its own accord. A less optimistic, but perhaps more realistic alternative can be 
summed up in the proposition that the horizons of trust and solidarity and the 
potential for creating a community on a civic-societal and republican-political basis 
narrows as the frame of reference for relations of competition and interdependence 
widens”. Based on the fact that, historically, the largest social body capable of 
supporting redistributive sacrifices has been the nation state, his conclusions are that 
“we should expect resistance to be all the greater when the demands of distribution 
are extended beyond that entity. Individuals begin to feel that excessive moral 
demands are being made of them, and they react by morally under-challenging 
themselves”. Consequently, the social welfare state and democracy can be realized 
“only ‘within borders’; that is, within a mode of socialization limited to the nation­
state whose protagonists recognize each other as worthy of trust and solidarity and 
who perceive each other as equal participants in a community of law, which is 
enduring and binding for all” (Offe 2000: 24-25). In the context of Robert B. Reich’s 
The Work o f  Nations (1992), the idea of trust and solidarity between different segments 
of the population of the nation-state as expressed in the metaphor of being in the same
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measures to markets and the setting up of redistributive regulatory 
mechanisms under globalization pressures is possible, Habermas 
argues, only if the European Union evolves beyond its current form of 
an interstate alliance towards a “true federation”, (Habermas 2000: 55). 
It is also interesting to refer Habermas’ “privileged regions of the 
world” and “favorable conditions” to the postcommunist transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe today. From a historical 
perspective, the issue is quite clear: neither the so called “European 
social model”5 nor any of the European “welfare state regimes” 
(Esping-Andersen) available today are valid in most transition 
countries in question, at least in the full forms discussed or enacted in 
the West in the postwar period.6 From a global perspective, the 
emergence of fully-fledged Continental welfare states there looks
common national boat called the national economy seems endangered too. The 
emergent transnational capitalist class [TCC] as analyzed recently by Leslie Sklair 
seems to have different loyalties and follow values other than national; as Sklair 
argues, TCC “is domiciled in and identified with no particular country but, on the 
contrary, is identified with the global capitalist system” (Sklair 2001: 10). EU 
bureaucrats might be another interesting research topic in this context.
5 The “social dimension” in EU legislation can be traced back to the Treaty of 
Rome, the Social Charter of 1961 and the Maastricht Treaty. In the new draft a “Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution of Europe” (which has not been adopted so far) in Part III -  
The Policies and Functioning of the Union -  there are chapters on the internal market 
(I), economic and monetary policy (II), and policies in other specific areas such as 
freedom, security and justice, as well as “areas where the Union may take 
coordinating, complementary or supporting action”(III). Social policy is included in 
section 2 of Chapter III, together with such other sections as e.g. employment, 
consumer protection, transport, research and energy. Part IV (on “Solidarity”) 
basically repeats the formulations from the 2000 “Charter on Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union”.
6 I am in full agreement with Zsuzsa Ferge that in the transition countries there is 
no unique label for emergent welfare systems (except perhaps in terms of their neo­
liberal nature) but they share one feature: “the absence of a project for a welfare system 
which would significantly mitigate the costs of the transition in the short run, and 
would promote the emancipatory dimension of social policy as well as the formation 
of an integrated society in the long run” (Ferge 2001a: 131). Poland, with its 
unemployment rate reaching 20% in recent years, is a good example. The argument of 
social Darwinists would perhaps be that this is exactly the (necessary) cost for an 
otherwise mostly quite successful transition away from a command-driven economy.
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merely out of the question. Most new Central and East European EU 
entrants do not fit any of the three Esping-Andersen welfare state 
regimes -  neither the liberal, nor the social democratic, nor the 
continental; the closest in the future is probably the liberal regime as it 
appears in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the USA and the UK).7 
Habermas is very well aware that the economic expectations of the 
European population towards the newly enlarged European Union, 
especially of new EU members, cannot suffice; what is required is the 
“legitimisation of shared values”, as he explains in a paper “Why 
Europe Needs a Constitution”. During the third quarter of the last 
century, citizens of Western Europe were fortunate to develop a 
“distinctive form of life” based on “a glittering material infrastructure”. 
Today, under globalization, they are prepared to defend the core of a 
welfare state in a society oriented towards social, political and cultural 
inclusion (Habermas 2001a: 8-9). The general thesis of “The Post­
national Constellation and the Future of Democracy” is reformulated in 
the paper on the European Constitution:
7 Guy Standing in analyzing welfare transitions in CEE countries notes that 
underlying the debates has been the most basic dilemma: “how to provide greater 
social protection for the growing number of people in need, while cutting back on 
total social expenditure because of actual or perceived resource constraints” (Standing 
1996: 225). It is interesting to remember in this context what Martin Carnoy claims 
about the real and perceived impact of globalization on educational policies: “the 
approach governments take in educational reform, hence their educational response to 
globalization, depends on three key factors: their objective financial situation, their 
interpretation of that situation, and their ideological position regarding the role of the 
public sector in education. These three elements are expressed through the way that 
countries ‘structurally adjust’ their economies to the new globalized environment”. As 
a result, “to what extent public resources for education in a particular country really 
cannot be increased, and to what extent the ‘ shortage’ of public funding represents an 
ideological preference for private investment in education is crucial to educational 
policy-making in the new global environment. It does make a major difference to 
educational delivery how the role of the public sector in education expansion and 
improvement is played out” (Carnoy 1999: 47, 51). Paul Wilding argues in a similar 
vein: “there is, of course, much debate as to what globalization is -  or even whether it 
is. In a  sense, that does not matter. If governments believe it is happening and has certain 
consequences, it is real because it will influence perceptions and policies” (Wilding 2000: 15, 
emphasis mine). See also United Nations (2001).
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[N]ational governments, whatever their internal profiles, are increasingly 
entangled in transnational networks, and thereby become ever more 
dependent on asymmetrically negotiated outcomes. Whatever social policies 
they choose, they must adapt to social constraints imposed by deregulated 
markets -  in particular global financial markets. That means lower taxes and 
fiscal limits which compel them to accept increasing inequalities in the 
distribution of the gross national product. The question therefore is: can any 
of our small or medium, entangled and accommodating nation-states preserve a 
separate capacity to escape enforced assimilation to the social model now 
imposed by the predominant global economic regime? (Habermas 2001a: 11).
The answer to the last question is certainly in the negative, and hence 
the growing significance of the European project for Habermas.
For Habermas, the most significant dimension of globalization is 
economic (Habermas 2001b: 66). The main questions he asks are which 
aspects of globalization could degrade the capacity for democratic 
self-steering within a national society and are there any “functional 
equivalents” at the supranational level for deficits that emerge at the 
nation-state level. The conventional model of the state is less and less 
appropriate to the current situation:
As we consider the “disempowerment” of the nation-state, we think in the 
first instance of the long-established transformations of the modern state that 
first emerged with the Peace of Westphalia. ... According to this model, the 
world of states consists of nation-states regarded as independent actors 
within an anarchic environment, who make more or less rational decisions in 
pursuit of the preservation and expansion of their own power. The picture 
changes very little if states are seen as economic utility maximizers instead of 
accumulators of political power (Habermas 2001b: 69).
The global age introduces a new quality (or as the “manifesto” of 
Beck’s Suhrkamp series -  to which both Giddens and Habermas 
contributed -  put it, “a world order has collapsed! What a chance for a 
new departure towards a second modernity!”, as Giesen also reminds 
us, Giesen 2004: 12); to quote two memorable phrases Habermas 
used, “power can be democratized; money cannot” and “money 
replaces power” (Habermas 2001b: 78). Under the pressure of 
globalizing markets national governments lose their capacity to 
influence economic cycles, so there remains little room for the 
effective exercise of legitimized domestic policy.
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As markets become increasingly more important than politics, the 
nation state increasingly loses its capacity to raise taxes and stimulate 
growth, and with it the ability “to secure the essential foundations of 
its own legitimacy” (Habermas 2001b: 79). “Denationalization” forces 
societies constituted as nation states to “open” themselves up to an 
economically-driven world society. Nation-states seem to be losing 
both their capacity for action and the stability of their collective 
identities, and hence fears about the disempowering effects of 
globalization are far from unjustified. The fading away of the 
“national constellation” brings to the life far-reaching consequences 
for the Keynesian model of the welfare state -  the “compromise” 
reached after the second world war is over, and so may be the taming 
of capitalism brought about by the historical circumstances of that 
period. European states no longer have the necessary resources for 
the continuation of the traditional European welfare state model, and 
with globalization forces in operation, the old problem of how to 
combine the self-regulating nature of markets with the social 
dimension, especially the changing patterns in the distribution of the 
gross national product, has reappeared. And in a European context, 
whenever we mention the welfare state, we also have to mean public 
higher education and its traditional postwar modes of functioning. 
The possible reformulation of the welfare state -  possibly different in 
different European economies, or according to some common 
European guidelines currently being tentatively worked out by the 
European Commission -  are bound to lead to new conceptualizations 
of how our universities are going to be functioning in changing social 
and economic realities.
5.2. T h e  “S eco n d  M o d ern ity ” and th e  B ro k en  H istorica l 
B o n d  b etw een  C ap ita lism , the W elfare  S tate , 
and  D em ocracy  (U lrich  B eck )
Let us pass on now to Ulrich Beck, the second of the three social 
thinkers to be discussed here briefly in the context of the future of the 
welfare state and the impact of globalization on it. In the most general
278 Chapter 5. Globalization, the Welfare State, and Democracy
terms, in thinking of radical transformations of contemporary society, a 
number of key sociological and philosophical concepts have been 
evoked over the last two decades and even from slightly earlier (some 
of them have been discussed in the present book): the “postindustrial 
society” as developed for the first time by Daniel Bell; “postmodernity” 
as developed by Jean-François Lyotard, “postmodernity” and “liquid 
modernity” as elaborated by Zygmunt Bauman; “late modernity” as 
presented by Anthony Giddens; the “postnational constellation” as 
elaborated in Jürgen Habermas’ political essays; “cosmopolitan 
democracy” as viewed by David Held; the “network society” from the 
Manuel Castells’ famous trilogy on The Information Age; as well as 
“post-Fordism”, “post-Taylorism”, “post work” society etc. Also the 
emergent “knowledge society” and “knowledge economy” are 
accompanying concepts from the international and transnational 
discourses on the current economic and political changes in the 
developed world, especially as conceptualized by the reports from the 
OECD and the European Commission. They usually emphasize 
different aspects of the rapidly changing social reality; all of them 
testify, though, to a sense of substantial social transformations, in some 
cases also a sense of a radical rupture with the past. In the case of Ulrich 
Beck, the key concepts relating to the present are the “risk society” and 
the “second, postnational modernity”.
For Beck, it is the processes of globalization that define our 
current social reality. In the paradigm of the second modernity, Beck 
argues, “globalization is no longer understood as external and 
additive, but replaces the ‘container image’ of society and the state. It 
designates a transnational, despatialized power game whose rules 
and boundaries, paradoxes and dilemmas, first have to be 
deciphered” (Beck 2000b: 28-29). There is a far-reaching parallelism 
between the social diagnoses with respect to globalization presented 
by Ulrich Beck, Zygmunt Bauman and Jürgen Habermas, even 
though it will be useful to see the differences between them too. The 
key themes from Beck’s recent writings of major interest to us here 
are the following: the passage from the first, national, to the second, 
postnational, modernity; the passage from the work society to the risk 
society (Risikogesellschaft); general uncertainty, insecurity, and
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unclarity of individual and collective futures8; the first, industrial 
modernization and the second, reflexive modernization; the end of a 
historical bond between capitalism, the welfare state and democracy; 
the future of political freedom and democracy in a post-work 
European society; democracy as work-democracy -  the material 
security of citizens vs. their political freedom; the interplay of 
transnational and national dimensions of the social; the future of 
social justice in an age of globality; and certainly the future of 
European welfare states. All of them are very closely interrelated and 
together form a coherent sociological and political account of current 
realities.
Beck in his analyses moves back and forth between the results of 
empirically-based studies combined with international data and high- 
level theoretical sociological conclusions (calling his genre of writing 
“visionary non-fiction”, Beck 2000a: 8). It is very interesting to see 
how the two planes reinforce each other and make his claims 
intellectually convincing. Generally speaking, what is crucial for us 
here is his emphasis on the radicalism of current social transformations 
in his analyses: in brief, and simplifying his views to the extreme, the 
picture of society is changing dramatically right before our eyes; the 
globalization processes are irreversible; the welfare state cannot be 
revived on a national level (although it might be revived on a 
regional, European level); the work society based on the territorial 
nation-states in which we are used to living is right now breaking 
apart; the social contract between capitalism, the welfare state and 
democracy is broken9; we are living in a world of endemic insecurity;
8 John Gray in his False Dawn. The Delusions o f  Global Capitalism argues that not 
only individuals but also nation-states must now act “in a world in which all options are 
uncertain. ... National governments find themselves in environments not merely o f risks 
but o f  radical uncertainty. In economic theory, risk means a situation in which the costs 
of various actions can be known with reasonable probability, while uncertainty is a 
situation in which such probabilities cannot be known. . Governments are in a 
situation in which even the span of options that is available to them is uncertain. This 
continuing radical uncertainty is the most disabling constraint on the power of 
sovereign states” (Gray 1998: 75, emphasis mine).
9 Assar Lindbeck rightly claims in “The End of the Middle Way? The Large 
Welfare States in Europe. Hazardous Welfare-State Dynamics” that reforming the
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and finally there is no way to avoid the emergent risk society (whose 
defining feature is not so much the increased amount of risk but 
rather the changed nature of uncertainty). All the above processes go 
hand in hand with, and are direct consequences of, the process of 
industrial modernization (Esping-Andersen in his report on 
“Towards a Welfare State for the XXI Century” describes the Gordian 
Knot we are facing in the following way: “how to sustain Europe’s 
normative commitments to social justice while aspiring to be a truly 
competitive force in the evolving knowledge economy”, Esping- 
Andersen 2002: 1). The major force at work is globalization. What are 
the major differences between the first and the second modernity? To 
quote Beck in extenso,
The former term I use to describe the modernity based on nation-state societies, 
where social relations, networks and communities are essentially understood 
in a territorial sense. The collective patterns of life, progress and controllability, 
full employment and exploitation of nature that were typical of this first 
modernity have now been undermined by five interlinked processes: 
globalization, individualization, gender revolution, underemployment and 
global risks (an ecological crisis or the crash of global financial markets). The 
real theoretical and political challenge of the second modernity is the fact that 
society must respond to all these changes simultaneously (Beck 1999a: 1-2).
welfare state is bound to create serious problems for the population, “as welfare-state 
entitlements may be regarded as long-term contracts between the government and the 
citizens. A 60-year-old who is told that the government cannot live up to its earlier 
promises of sick payments, unemployment benefits, or pensions will find it difficult to 
relive his life for the purpose of saving and buying annuities for himself! Thus, 
welfare-state policies not only mitigate market risks, but may also create new types of 
risks in the form of unpredictable changes in politically determined rules...” 
(Lindbeck 1995: 13-14). This has been exactly a by-product of the collapse of 
communist (state bureaucratic collectivist) “welfare” and one of the most significant 
costs of the transformation processes from socialism to market economies in CEE 
countries. Some analysts claim that the cost had been well calculated and that there 
was a sinister cynicism, sometimes found among those influencing social policy 
reforms in CEEs, described as follows: “the countries of the region cannot afford a 
comprehensive social protection system, but it is essential to ensure that the ‘middle 
classes’ support the development of ‘democracy’ in the longer term. They must 
receive adequate social protection so that they do not become disaffected. This 
probably means that the poor cannot be provided with adequate benefits, because 
they could not be afforded” (Standing 1996: 251).
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What do these five processes have in common? They are all 
unforeseen consequences of the victory of the first industrial 
modernization based on the national state (Beck 1999a: 2). 
Consequently, the picture of the current social reality is very radical 
indeed and this reality requires a new conceptual framework to be 
analyzed; in a strong formulation it is the following:
A new kind of capitalism, a new kind of economy, a new kind of global 
order, a new kind of society and a new kind of personal life are coming into 
being, all of which differ from earlier phases of social development. Thus, 
sociologically and politically, we need a paradigm-shift, a new fram e o f  reference. 
This is not “postmodernity” but a second modernity, and the task that faces 
us is to reform sociology so that it can provide a new framework of for the 
reinvention of society and politics (Beck 1999a: 2, emphasis mine).
Nothing in the social sphere remains intact at the turn of the 21st 
century, the world is radically and substantially different. Nothing 
will be the same, Beck claims. The “second modernity” is a “magical 
password” that will “open the door to new conceptual landscapes”:
On all sides, the great volcanic questions continue to bubble beneath the 
surface. If the full employment society has come to an end, then we must 
eventually face up to the collapse of pensions due to the imbalance between a 
shrinking labour force and the ever larger and older numbers of the elderly. 
At the same time, the whole conceptual world o f  national sovereignty is fading  
away -  a world that includes the taming o f  capitalism in Europe by the postwar 
welfare state (Beck 2000b: 17, emphasis mine).
Beck never uses catastrophic overtones with reference to the 
interrelated processes of globalization which he sees as unintended 
but irreversible, harsh but inherent in the development of the world 
of the first modernity which is now breaking apart. As he puts it 
dramatically, in the transition from the first to the second modernity, 
we are dealing with a “fundamental transformation, a paradigm shift, 
a departure into the unknown world of globality, but not with a 
‘catastrophe’ or ‘crisis’, if the concept of crisis means that we could 
return to the status quo ante by taking the ‘right’ (= usual) measures” 
(Beck 2000a: 123). (It is important to note that Beck is never a 
pessimistic visionary who presents a gloomy picture of the new, 
hostile and hard to understand reality. The theoretical underpinning
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of his recent books was developed almost two decades ago and 
presented for the first time in Risikogesellschaft. A uf dem Weg in eine 
andere Moderne in 1986; at that time, in a significant part of his social 
criticism, the clue to understanding the changing world was provided 
by the vague concept of “postmodernity”, with globalization slowly 
emerging as the major theoretical concept of the 1990s).
Beck in his attempts to revitalize sociological thinking tradi­
tionally embedded in the ideas of the nation-state calls for the 
renegotiation of the basis of the first modernity. In the most general 
terms, his fundamental questions are the following:
What does tolerance mean? What do supposedly universal human rights 
involve in a context of cultural difference? Who will uphold human rights in 
a world that has left behind the national state? How can social safeguards 
that have been overwhelmingly guaranteed by the national state be redrawn 
and preserved amid increasing world poverty and a decline in paid 
employment? If national states crumble, will new wars of religion ensue, 
perhaps intensified by ecological disasters? Or are we heading towards a 
world without violence, finally at peace after the triumph of the world 
market? Are we perhaps even on the threshold of a second Enlightenment? 
(Beck 2000a: 15).
Globalization in Beck’s account calls into question a basic premise 
of the first modernity according to which the “contours of society 
largely coincide with those of the national state”. It is not only new 
connections and interconnections which come into being: “much 
more far-reaching is the breakdown of the basic assumptions 
whereby societies and states have been conceived, organized, and 
experienced as territorial units separated from one another” (Beck 2000a: 
21). What is the common denominator for the various dimensions of 
globalization and what does the changing sense of borders mean for 
social players today:
One constant feature is the overturning of the central premise of the first 
modernity: namely, the idea that we live and act in the self-enclosed spaces o f  
national states and their respective national societies. Globalization means that 
borders become markedly less relevant to everyday behaviour in the various 
dimensions of economics, information, ecology, technology, cross-cultural 
conflict and civil society (Beck 2000a: 20).
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Beck’s concept of “reflexive modernization” developed for the first 
time in his Risikogesellschaft book of 1986, puts an emphasis on the self­
transformation and opening-up of the first, national modernity. What 
these largely unintended and unforeseen processes signal is a change to 
the whole of society, a change affecting the “foundations of whole 
modern societies” (Beck 2000b: 19). Consequently,
The term “reflexive modernization”, then, refers to the transition away from a 
first modernity locked within the national state, and towards a second, open, 
risk-filled modernity characterized by general insecurity. This transition 
takes place, as it were, within a continuity of “capitalist modernization”, 
which is now in the process of removing the fetters of the national and the 
welfare state (Beck 2000b: 19).
“Reflexive modernization” means the possibility of a creative 
(self-)destruction for an entire epoch: for the epoch of the industrial 
society. “The ‘subject’ of this creative destruction is not the 
revolution, not the crisis, but the victory of Western modernization” 
(Beck 1994: 2; see also Giddens’ magisterial Consequences o f Modernity, 
1990). It is a radicalization of modernity which breaks up the premises 
and contours of industrial society and opens paths to “another 
modernity” (Beck 1994: 3). Modernization annihilates the contours of 
the industrial society and gives birth to a new historical being (Beck 
2002: 17). The end of the cold war brought about the political 
renaissance of Europe but it has not contributed to the revival of 
Europe’s ideas, leading rather to “a general paralysis” (Beck 1999a: 
24). In answer to the general agreement of pessimism and optimism 
that there is only one shape to modernity, that of industrial society 
(consumer society accompanied by democracy), the theory of 
reflexive modernization answers: “many modernities are possible” 
(Beck 1994: 24). Let us pass on to the fundamental premises of the first 
and the second modernity in Beck’s formulation.
There are seven premises of the first modernity which took its 
shape in postwar Europe:
1. Each country’s organization of its own “national” economy;
2. widespread exclusion of women from the labour market;
3. the withholding of certain basic rights from women and children;
4. the existence of intact small families as the basis for the reproduction of 
labour-power as a chiefly male commodity;
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5. relatively closed proletarian and bourgeois lifeworlds as the social or 
“status” precondition of class formation;
6. a hierarchy of experts and laymen based upon professionally generated 
and supervised monopolies of knowledge; and
7. geographically fixed production, cooperation and company activity -  as 
the supposedly “natural” arena in which the contradictions of labour and 
capital both appear and become susceptible to organization and 
pacification (Beck 2000b: 20).
These are basic premises also in the sense that they are seen as 
institutionally and individually self-evident -  “as a kind of second 
nature” (Beck 2000b: 20). In the second modernity, the process of 
modernization is reflexive which means that it has to face unintended 
and unwanted consequences of its own success. The social conditions 
which framed the first modernity are breaking apart in the course of 
modernization. Here are Beck’s examples of how he sees the second 
modernity:
1. The corporatist internal structure of classes, and therefore of class society 
as a whole, tends to fade as social inequalities increase.
2. Openly debated ecological crises make the public more alive to the cultural 
perception and evaluation of “nature”.
3. Sexual and inter-generational relations between men and women, adults 
and children are stripped of their basic pseudo-natural premise, so that a 
gradual revolution affects the whole world of the small family, with its 
conceptions of the division of labour, love, and home life.
4. The society of formal work and full employment, as well as the welfare- 
state nexus associated with it, enter into crisis as production and 
cooperation lose their clearly defined local ties.
5. The imaginative world of a private sphere, in the sense of “normal 
biographies” exclusively geared to market opportunities, becomes political 
again.
6. The experience of global risks to civilization calls into question the traditional 
rule by experts in economics, politics and science. Basic democratic 
movements, with their claims to technocratic citizenship, are thus released 
into the public debate of experts and counter-experts (Beck 2000b: 21).
These changes make us increasingly use such concepts as 
“ambivalence”, “unclarity”, “contradictoriness” or “disorientation” for 
the description of the social. The institutional answers provided for
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the problems faced by society in the first modernity are no longer 
convincing: “for contemporary societies are going through a 
fundamental transformation which radically challenges the 
understanding of modernity rooted in the European Enlightenment. 
The field of reference is now made up of many different options, and 
new, unexpected forms of the social and the political are emerging 
within this field” (Beck 2000b: 22).
This is exactly the situation of higher education in the global age 
which I have been analyzing: new points of reference for analysis, 
new actors on the stage, new forces at work nationally, regionally 
(Europe for us here) and globally, and finally new options on how 
to proceed in these critical times. It would be interesting to see how 
the above synthetic description of the first and the second 
modernity refers to our educational concerns here. Beck claims that 
“in the model of the first modernity, everything is constantly 
changing -  but not the basic categories and concepts of social change 
itself. In the second modernity, however, these categories and 
concepts are openly challenged -  above all, the conviction that there 
is ultimately a rational solution to every problem that moderniz­
ation itself produces. This challenge takes place both at the level of 
institutions and at the level of discourse” (Beck 2000b: 24, emphasis 
mine). In the area of higher education policy, the challenges ahead 
are indeed both at the level of institutions and at the level of 
discourse; the changing realities in the of functioning of (mostly 
state-funded) higher education institutions are increasingly 
analyzed in shifting discourses, and increasingly in global 
discourses alien to the traditional Humboldtian set of ideas still 
used 20-30 years ago10.
In the paradigm of the first modernity, globalization is interpreted 
through the lenses of the “territorial” state, politics, society and 
culture; in the paradigm of the second modernity, though, 
globalization changes the relationship between and beyond the
10 Suffice it to compare the discourse used in Magna Charta Universitatum signed in 
Bologna in 1988 and in the Bologna Declaration, signed ten years later (as put in a 
wider context in Chapter 6). For an excellent commentary, see Brzeziński 1997.
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nation-states as well as the inner “quality” of the social itself. The very 
principle of territoriality becomes questionable in an age of globality. 
From this perspective, the core of globalization is the 
“deterritorialization of the social”. Consequently, in the second 
modernity
[A] question mark is placed over the inner consistency of a social construction 
made up of anthropological constants and functional imperatives of the first 
modernity. A territorially fixed image of the social, which for two centuries has 
captivated and inspired the political, cultural and scientific imagination, is in 
the course of breaking up. Corresponding to global capitalism is a  process of 
cultural and political globalization which transcends territoriality, as the 
ordering principle of society (Beck 2000b: 26-27).
The meaning of this deterritorialization (or despatialization) of the 
social and the political, Beck argues, can be best illustrated by the 
example of the future of work. Our work society is becoming a risk 
society, and accompanying concepts in the academic and public 
debates are e.g. “post-industrialism”, “post-Fordism”, “post­
Taylorism” or “neo-Fordism”. In the second modernity, the risk 
regime prevails in every field: “economy, society, polity. Here the 
appropriate distinction is therefore not between an industrial and 
post-industrial or Fordist and post-Fordist economy, but between the 
securities, certainties and clearly defined boundaries of the first modernity, 
and the insecurities, uncertainties and loss o f boundaries in the second 
modernity” (Beck 2000b: 70). The possible consequence of the free­
market utopia is what he calls in The Brave New World o f Work the 
“Brazilianization of the West” (Beck 2000b) or the “Brazilianization of 
Europe” in What Is Globalization? (Beck 2000a: 161). The general 
description of similarities highlights the diversity and insecurity in 
people’s work and life.11 Beck draws parallels between the changing 
European work environment and the current realities in Brazil where
11 “Insecurity” becomes one of the defining features of both living and working in a 
post-welfare environment; as Geoffrey Garrett claims, “perhaps the most important 
effect of globalization is the increase of social dislocations of economic insecurity, as 
distribution of incomes and jobs across firms and industries becomes increasingly 
unstable. The result is that increasing numbers o f people have to spend ever more time and 
money trying to make their future more secure” (quoted in Iversen 2001, emphasis mine).
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Those who depend upon a wage or salary in full-time work represent only a 
minority of the economically active population; the majority earn their living 
in more precarious conditions. People are travelling vendors, small retailers 
or craftworkers, offer all kinds of personal service, or shuttle back and forth 
between different fields of activity, forms of employment and training (Beck 
2000b: 1-2).
What Beck calls “nomadic ‘multi-activity’” is a rapidly spreading 
variant in late work-societies where attractive and well-paid full-time 
employment is on its way out (Beck 2000b: 2).12 Consequently, 
insecurity prevails in almost all positions within society in the West 
today. What may emerge is what Will Hutton called “the 30/30/40 
society” in his “High-Risk Strategy” paper where he describes the 
emergence of a new stratification of British society, “there is a bottom 
30 percent of unemployed and economically inactive who are 
marginalized; another 30 percent who, while in work, are in forms of 
employment that are structurally insecure; and there are only 40 
percent who can count themselves as holding tenured jobs which 
allow them to regard their income prospects with certainty” (Hutton
12 Similar conclusions, although not so dramatic, can be drawn about the present 
and future of the work environment in the academic profession. As Philip G. Altbach 
observes in his introduction to the study of the academic profession in developing and 
middle-income countries, The Decline o f the Guru, “The central realities of higher 
education in the 21st century -  massification, accountability, privatization, and 
marketization -  shape universities everywhere, and those who work at them, to 
differing degrees. Massification has led, among other things, to an expanded academic 
profession and an academic community that is increasingly unrecognizable. 
Accountability has limited the traditional autonomy of the profession, more tightly 
regulating academic work and eroding one of the major attractions of the academic 
profession. Privatization has, in some contexts, placed pressure on academics to 
generate income for themselves and for the university through consulting and other 
nonteachng activities. Marketization has forced academics to be more cognizant of 
student curricular interests and opportunities for entrepreneurial activities. The sad 
fact in the era of mass higher education is that the conditions o f  academic work have 
deteriorated everywhere” (Altbach 2002b: 3, emphasis mine). I would be very willing to 
link quite closely at least three of the processes Altbach enumerates with, among other 
things, the advent of globalization: namely accountability, privatization, and 
marketization. These effects of globalization on higher education would be indirect 
rather than direct, through the effects on the state and governance in general.
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2000: 337). Global capitalism in Beck’s description is doing away with 
work and unemployment is no longer a marginal fate: it affects 
everyone as well as our very “democratic way of life” (Beck 2000a: 
58).13 Consequently, Beck’s question is how democracy will be 
possible when the full-employment society is over, or is there a 
chance for political freedom and democracy without material security: 
in short, “how democracy will be possible without the securities of 
the work society” (Beck 2000a: 63). The rhetoric of “independent 
entrepreneurial individualism” cannot conceal the fact that
The bases of the much-praised welfare state and a lively everyday democracy, 
together with the whole self-image of a worker-citizen society, based on 
“institutionalized class compromise”, are falling apart (Beck 2000b: 4).
An exclusively profit-driven capitalism that excludes from con­
sideration employees rights, the welfare state and democracy, is a 
capitalism that undermines its own legitimacy, Beck argues: “the 
neoliberal utopia is a kind of democratic illiteracy. For the market is 
not its own justification; it is an economic form viable only in 
interplay with material security, social rights and democracy, and 
hence with the democratic state. To gamble everything on the free 
market is to destroy, along with democracy, that whole economic 
mode” (Beck 2000b: 4).
Beck proposes a workable antithesis to the work society of the 
past: a society of active citizens -  which is “no longer fixed within the 
container of the national state” and whose activities are organized 
both locally and across frontiers -  can develop answers to the new 
challenges of individualization, globalization, falling employment 
and ecological crisis (Beck 2000b: 5). The antithesis to the work society 
is going to be a multi-active society; the self-active, self-aware, 
political civil society.
Beck draws a careful distinction between globalization, globalism 
and globality. Globalization denotes a process through which
13 Esping-Andersen summarizes the difference: “The standard production worker 
and the low-skilled could by and large count on a decently paid and secured job in the 
welfare capitalist era. This is unlikely to be the case in the twenty-first century” 
(Esping-Andersen et al. 2002: 3).
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sovereign nation-states are undermined by transnational players 
(Beck 2000a: 11), globalism is the view that the world market 
“eliminates or supplants political action” i.e. the ideology of 
neoliberalism. Globalism is a monocausal and economistic mindset 
which “reduc[es] the multidimensionality of globalization to a single, 
economic dimension” (Beck 2000a: 9). Globalism is a “thought virus” 
whose main article of faith is that “everyone and everything -  politics, 
science, culture -  should be subordinated to the primacy of the 
economic” (Beck 2000a: 122). Finally, globality means that
From now on nothing which happens on our planet is only a limited local 
event; all inventions, victories and catastrophes affect the whole world, and 
we must reorient and reorganize our lives and actions, our organizations and 
institutions, along a “local-global” axis. Globality, understood in this way, 
denotes the new situation of the second modernity (Beck 2000a: 11-12).
It is this new globality that cannot be reversed; it is “an unavoidable 
condition of human intercourse at the close of the twentieth century” 
(Beck 2000a: 15).
What is especially interesting for our discussions here is Beck’s 
strongly formulated thesis about the broken historical bond today 
between capitalism, the welfare state, and democracy (that parallels 
the end of John Gerard Ruggie’s postwar “embedded liberalism 
compromise”).14 As Beck formulates the point, if global capitalism 
dissolves the core values of the work society, a historical link between 
capitalism, the welfare state and democracy will break apart. As he 
argues, democracy in Europe and North America came into the world 
as labor democracy: it rested upon paid employment. Employment 
breathed life into political rights and freedoms:
paid labour has always underpinned not only private but also political 
existence. What is at issue today, then, is not “only” the millions of 
unemployed, nor only the future of the welfare state, the struggle against 
poverty, or the possibility of greater social justice. Everything we have is at
14 To recall briefly Ruggie’s idea: “the extraordinary success of postwar 
international economic liberalization hinged on a compact between state and society 
to mediate its deleterious domestic effects” (Ruggie 1997: 1), which is what he earlier 
called the “embedded liberalism compromises” in 1982 (see Ruggie 1982).
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stake. Political freedom  and democracy in Europe are at stake (Beck 2000a: 62, 
emphasis mine).
The association of capitalism with basic political, social and economic 
rights, in Beck’s view, is not “’some favour’ to be dispensed with 
when money gets tight”. Rather, such a socially-buffered capitalism 
was an answer to the experiences of fascism and the challenges of 
communism, as Karl Polanyi argued for the first time in The Great
Transformation. Therefore, without material security there is no
political freedom and no democracy (Beck 2000a: 62-63).15
Though in Ancient Greece and Rome, freedom was (among other 
things) freedom from work, in modern times the citizen was 
conceived as a working citizen (true, apart from the fact, crucial for our 
considerations in Chapter 3, that he was also a citizen of the nation­
state). The idea of democracy came into the world as a “work- 
democracy”; consequently, the issue now is not only chronic 
unemployment, nor the fate of the welfare state, but also “the future 
of political freedom and democracy in Europe” (Beck 2000b: 13).
Beck acknowledges the significance of the collapse of communism 
in Eastern Europe in 1989 (the annus mirabilis, as another leading 
German sociologist Wolf Lepenies once described it, see Kwiek 2004a 
and 2003h). This historical phenomenon as seen by those political 
scientists and sociologists who are dealing with the advent of 
globalization and the collapse of the welfare state requires separate 
attention; suffice it to say here, though, that Beck (like e.g. Zygmunt 
Bauman or Ramesh Mishra) draws a significant connection between 
1989, capitalism, democracy and the welfare state. After 1989, Beck 
argues, basic aspects of the capitalist mode that were covered up in 
postwar Western welfare capitalism have emerged in a “sharper 
form” (Beck 2000a: 96). He claims that
15 As Anthony McGrew formulated the point: “For if state sovereignty is no 
longer conceived as indivisible but shared with international agencies; if states no 
longer have control over their national territories; and if territorial and political 
boundaries are increasingly permeable, the core principles o f  democratic liberty -  that is 
self-governance, the demos, consent, representation, and popular sovereignty -  are 
made distinctly problematic” (McGrew 1997: 12, emphasis mine).
Chapter 5. Globalization, the Welfare State, and Democracy 291
[I]t is already clear that the West was not left unaffected by the collapse of the 
East. ... The West is confronted by questions that challenge the fundamental 
premises of its own social and political system. The key question we are now 
confronting is whether the historical symbiosis between capitalism and 
democracy that characterized the West can be generalized on a  global scale 
without exhausting its physical, cultural and social foundations. ... And 
should we not, after the end of the cold war and the rediscovery of the bitter 
realities of “conventional” warfare, come to the conclusion that we have to 
rethink, indeed reinvent, our institutional civilization, now that the old 
system of industrialized society is breaking down in the course of its own 
success? Are not new social contracts to be born? (Beck 1994: 1).
Certainly, most our social institutions are being currently 
reinvented, beginning with the institution of the state (from 
“managerial” to “minimalist” to “effective”) but the idea of new social 
contracts is still open. Somehow the plane of thinking about social 
contracts became altered -  from national, confined to single nation­
states, to regional if not global (and the EU is a good example here). 
Consequently, the social sciences may need to substantially revise 
their fundamental premises and reorient their thinking; sociology, for 
instance, has traditionally -  in today’s, retrospective view -  been 
merely a sociology of the first modernity focused mostly, if not 
exclusively, on the nation-state. As Beck comments, “beyond all their 
differences, such theorists as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber and even 
Karl Marx shared a territorial definition of modern society, and thus a 
model of society centred on the national state, which has today been 
shaken by globality and globalization” (Beck 2000a: 24).
Beck’s political economy of insecurity or his “political economy of 
world risk society” is outlined in five points. First, the new power 
game is acted out between “territorially fixed” political players and 
“non-territorially fixed” economic players (i.e. between governments, 
parliaments, trade unions -  and capital, finance markets and 
commerce). Second, the room for maneuver of individual states is 
limited to the dilemma of either paying with higher unemployment 
for decreasing poverty rates (as in most European countries) or 
accepting more poverty in exchange for less unemployment (as in the 
United States). Three, the work society is coming to an end. 
Consequently, there are no more “jobs for life” and rising
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unemployment is due to the success of technologically advanced 
capitalism. Four, we are currently experiencing what he terms a 
“domino effect”:
those factors which in good times used to complement and reinforce one 
another -  full employment, guaranteed pensions, high tax revenue, leeway in 
public policy -  are now facing knock-on dangers. Paid employment is 
becoming precarious; the foundations of the social-welfare state are 
collapsing; normal life-stories are breaking up into fragments; old age 
poverty is programmed in  advance; and the growing demands on welfare 
protection cannot be met from the empty coffers of local authorities.
And finally, five, “labor market flexibility” has become a political 
mantra. What is especially important for us here is the more general 
conclusion that “flexibility also means a redistribution of risks away 
from the state and the economy towards the individual”. What is evident is 
one future trend: “endemic insecurity” for a majority of people (Beck 
2000b: 2-3, emphasis mine).16
Beck argues that the social consequences of globalization touch on 
the very substance o f freedom and democracy. Between political freedom 
and the new political economy of risk and uncertainty there is “a 
basic contradiction” (Beck 1999a: 12). Globalization will make possible 
things which remained hidden during the stage of the welfare- 
democratic “taming” of capitalism.17 Global corporations are playing
16 Harvard-based economist, Janos Kornai, summarizes the attitude of the public 
in Hungary towards welfare: “Members of post-socialist society have not yet digested 
the idea that they bear the main responsibility for their lives. After all, it was 
drummed into them for decades that the state would look after them when they fell 
sick, became disabled or grew old. They have not yet accepted that they, primarily, are 
the ones who have to prepare for these eventualities” (Kornai 1997: 339). He clearly 
represents an American perspective; generally speaking, I would not expect major 
differences between Continental European countries (like e.g. France) and Hungary, 
from where research results were taken. I would go even further and claim that today, 
after a few years, an awareness of being responsibility for one’s welfare is even higher 
in Central Europe, on average, than in traditional European welfare state regimes.
17 At the same time, in post-1989 Central and Eastern Europe, for the first time in 
history, social policy has been shaped and influenced by international financial 
agencies and global organizations (see Standing 1996). As one of few Western analysts 
dealing with welfare issues in the region, Bob Deacon describes the early years of
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a key role “in shaping not only the economy but society as a whole” 
(Beck 2000a: 2). Transnational corporations have launched an attack 
upon the material lifelines of modern national societies (Beck 2000a: 3). 
Transnational corporations are bidding farewell to the nation-state 
and refusing further loyalty to it:
This, however, lowers the degree of internal social integration, all the more so 
as its basis was purely economic. It is precisely the well-endowed welfare 
states which are facing the worst predicament. They have to provide 
statutory benefits for an ever higher number of registered unemployed ... 
and at the same time they lose control over taxes because the TNCs deal 
themselves a quite unparallel hand in the poker game over their local ties 
and obligations. . The downward pressure on the welfare state, then, results 
not only from a combination of dwindling resources and rocketing 
expenditure, but also from the fact that it lacks the means to satisfy demands 
upon it at a time when the gulf between rich and poor is growing ever wider. 
As the national fram ew ork loses its binding force , the winners and the losers o f  
globalization cease to sit at the same table. The new rich no longer “need” the 
new poor (Beck 2000a: 7, emphasis mine).
While transnational corporations are growing in number and 
diversity, what is decisive about them is that, in the course of 
globalization, they are able to play off nation-states against one 
another. Beck argues that looked at from outside, everything has 
remained as it was: companies produce, hire and fire, pay taxes. The 
crucial point, however, is that they “no longer do this under rules o f the
transition as follows, “into the vacuum of national policy making in the wake of the 
1989 events stepped the international organizations. ... Whether Eastern Europe was 
to become a women friendly, redistributive, socially just and well regulated kind of 
capitalism like Sweden; a cut-throat, devil-take-the-hindmost kind of unsafe casino 
capitalism like the USA, or worse Brazil; or perhaps a socially managed if unequal 
kind of capitalism like France and Germany, was to be, at least in part, in the hands of 
the army of human resources specialists from international organizations about to 
descend on the region” (Deacon et al. 1997: 92-93; see also Brusis 2003). From one 
perspective, though, the choices in welfare policies available in most transition 
countries were very limited indeed, no matter who was playing a major advisory role. 
Today, after a decade and a half, the welfare policy choices epitomized by Deacon as 
Sweden, Germany or France seem increasingly unattainable. I am again very much 
inclined to accept Zsuzsa Ferge’s interpretations which emphasize the increasing 
neoliberal dimension (Ferge 2001a, 2001b).
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game defined by national states, but continue to play the old game while 
nullifying and redefining those rules. It thus only appears to be a 
question of the old game of labour and capital, state and unions. For 
while one player continues to play the game within the framework of 
the national state, the other is already playing within the framework 
of world society” (Beck 2000a: 64-65, emphasis mine). The social 
consequences are stark. What has been re-emerging and growing 
sharper is the “conflictual logic of the capitalist zero-sum game”, 
while “the state has been losing its customary means to pacify and 
conciliate by increasing the size of the economic cake available for 
distribution” (Beck 2000a: 7).
What is especially interesting regarding my educational concerns 
is one particular form of the responses to globalization available 
today: the reorientation of educational policy (education played an 
important role in Beck’s Risk Society). One of the main political 
responses to globalization is “to build and develop the education and 
knowledge society; to make training longer rather than shorter; to 
loosen or do away with its link to a particular job or occupation, 
gearing it instead to key qualifications that can be widely used in 
practice” (Beck 2000a: 137-138). What counts is social competence, the 
ability to work in a team, conflict resolution and the understanding of 
other cultures (Beck 2000a: 138).18 There is an interesting paradox 
here: Beck, confirming the unavoidable collapse of the welfare state as 
we know it today under the pressures of globalization, does not seem 
to recognize the link between state-funded higher education and the 
welfare state. Consequently, the above postulate may work in the 
most general terms -  but it needs to be reformulated when translated 
into practice in detail. It is interesting to bear in mind the connections 
between the European notion of the welfare state, the public sector, 
and European publicly-funded educational institutions.
18 And the risks and uncertainties of the second modernity are substantial. 
According to a vivid description of British society provided by Will Hutton: “the 
British are increasingly at risk. The chances of their jobs disappearing, of their incomes 
falling, of their homes being repossessed or being impossible to sell, of their families 
breaking up, of their networks of friendships disintegrating, have not been higher 
since the war” (Hutton 2000: 337).
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5.3. G lo b a liz a tio n  -  the H u m an C on seq u en ces 
(Z ygm u nt Baum an)
Finally, let us pass on to the last of the three leading European 
thinkers being discussed briefly in this chapter in connection with the 
future of the welfare state, and, consequently, the impact of 
globalization on higher education -  Zygmunt Bauman. Bauman’s 
discussion of the “human consequences” of globalization, in the 
context of what interests us here, draws our attention to the new 
polarization of the world population into the globalized rich and the 
localized poor. Mobility becomes one of the key dimensions of human 
life. As Bauman argues, “all of us ... are on the move. ... ‘globals’ set 
the tone and compose the rules of the life-game. Being local in a 
globalized world is a sign of social deprivation and degradation” 
(Bauman 1998: 2). The globalizing and localizing tendencies exist 
alongside each other -  what appears as globalization for some means 
localization for others. It is mobility, the freedom to move, that 
becomes the main stratifying factor of our times. Consequently, there 
are winning globals and losing locals, “increasingly global and 
extraterritorial elites” and the “ever more ‘localized’ rest” (Bauman 
1998: 3). This new investment mobility means a radical disconnection 
between economic interests and social obligations: it means, Bauman 
claims, “freedom from the duty to contribute to daily life and the 
perpetuation of the community” (Bauman 1998: 9).
Bauman emphasizes the consequences of this processes of 
despatialization and deterritorialization of the economy when he calls 
the last quarter of the twentieth century the period of “the Great War 
of Independence from Space”. The human consequences of the 
despatialization of the economic arena are far-reaching; as he 
describes the asymmetrical relation between the global and the local,
the employers, the suppliers and the spokesmen of the community have no 
say in the decisions that the ‘people who invest’ may take. ... It is up to them 
therefore to move the company wherever they spy out or anticipate a chance 
of higher dividends, leaving to others -  locally bound as they are -  the task of 
wound-licking, damage-repair and waste-disposal. The company is fr ee  to 
move; but the consequences o f  the move are bound to stay (Bauman 1998: 8-9, 
emphasis mine).
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That is the major difference from the classic period of welfare 
capitalism: as Bob Deacon in Global Social Policy argued, during the 
times of classic Keynesianism when competition between firms was 
largely within national boundaries, the same rules could apply to the 
social costs; however: “once global movements of capital took place 
and once governments consequently lost control of investment 
policies through Keynesian economic management, capital could in 
principle go ‘regime shopping' and engage in ‘social dumping'” (Deacon 
et al. 1997: 11). Running away from the locality is tantamount to 
running away from the (social) consequences. The decision-making 
centers are free from territorial constraints, while the immediate 
“human consequences” are locally-tied. The features of power-holders 
are “bodilessness” and “non-terrestriality” (Bauman 1998: 19).
Globalization for Bauman refers primarily to the new global effects 
rather than to global initiatives and undertakings. “'Globalization' is 
not about what we all ... wish or hope to do. It is about what is 
happening to us all” (Bauman 1998: 60). Not surprisingly, “the deepest 
meaning conveyed by the idea of globalization is that of the 
indeterminate, unruly and self-propelled character of world affairs; the 
absence of a centre, of a controlling desk, of a board of directors, of a 
managerial office” (Bauman 1998: 59, emphasis mine). For Bauman, 
globalization (seen as deterritorialization) and territorialization 
(viewed as localization) are mutually complementary processes, two 
sides of the same process of the new world-wide redistribution of 
sovereignty, power and the freedom to act, triggered (though not 
determined) by the new technologies (Bauman 1998: 69ff). What we 
are witnessing today is the process of a world-wide “restratification” 
on a world-wide scale, the emergence of a new socio-cultural 
hierarchy.19 According to what Bauman calls the “folkloristic beliefs” 
shared by this new generation of the “enlightened classes”,
19 As he claims, “the quasi-sovereignties, territorial divisions and segregations of 
identities which the globalization of markets and information promotes and renders ‘a 
must', do not reflect diversity of equal partners. What is a free choice for some descends as 
cruel fate upon others. And since those ‘others' tend to grow unstoppably in numbers 
and sink ever deeper into despair born of a prospectless existence, one will be well 
advised to speak of ‘glocalization’ ... and to define it mostly as the process of the
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[F]reedom (of trade and capital mobility, first and foremost) is the hothouse 
in which wealth would grow faster than ever before; and once the wealth is 
multiplied, there will be more of it for everybody. The poor of the world -  
whether old or new, hereditary or computer-made -  would hardly recognize 
their plight in this folkloristic fiction. ... New fortunes are born, sprout and 
flourish in the virtual reality, tightly isolated from the old-fashioned rough- 
and-ready realities of the poor. The creation of wealth is on the way to finally 
emancipating itself from its perennial -  constraining and vexing -  
connections with making things, processing materials, creating jobs and 
managing people. The old rich needed the poor to make and keep them rich. 
That dependency at all times mitigated the conflict of interests and prompted 
some effort, however tenuous, to care. The new rich do not need the poor any 
more (Bauman 1998: 72).
Consequently, Bauman presents a vision of a radically polarized 
world: the world of the “globally mobile” and the world of the 
“locally tied”. The former are constantly on the move, the world for 
them is despatialized; the latter are barred from moving and thus 
bear passively “whatever change may be visited on the locality they 
are tied to”. Residents of the first world live in time; space does not 
matter to them any more. Residents of the second world live in space. 
In the consumer society, or in the society of “tourists”, they are 
useless, and consequently -  unwanted. Globalization and localization 
are the two sides of the same coin; they make some winners, and 
some losers. The difference is not exactly between the “knowledge 
rich” and the “knowledge poor”; it is much more between those 
whose skills are highly valued in world markets and those whose 
skills are not. As Robert B. Reich insists in The Work o f Nations, the 
standard of living of citizens of a given country depends on the 
“worldwide demand for their skills and insights” (Reich 1992: 77). 
Reich is talking about Americans in the passage quoted below, but the 
remark should hold for citizens of any country:
So when we speak of the “competitiveness” of Americans, in general, we are 
talking only about how much the world is prepared to spend, on average, for
concentration of capital, finance and all other resources of choice and effective action, 
but also -  perhaps above all -  of the concentration o f freedom  to move and to act” 
(Bauman 1998: 70, first emphasis mine).
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services performed by Americans. Some Americans may command much 
higher rewards, others, far lower. No longer are Americans rising or falling 
together, as if in one large national boat. We are, increasingly, in different, 
smaller boats (Reich 1992: 173).
Who are the winners? They are the “symbolic analysts” who “solve, 
identify, and broker problems by manipulating symbols” (Reich 1992: 
178).20 For everybody, though “’globalization’ is the intractable fate of 
the world, an irreversible process; it is also a process which affects us 
all in the same measure and in the same way. We are all being 
‘globalized’ -  and being ‘globalized’ means much the same to all who 
‘globalized’ us” (Bauman 1998: 1).
For Bauman, as for many other social thinkers, the collapse of 
communism in 1989 is of crucial importance for the further 
development of global capitalism. It marks the beginning of “living 
without an alternative” (Bauman 1992: 175). Right after 1989, Bauman 
voiced his concerns, far away from the Francis Fukuyama “end-of- 
history” rhetoric:
Communism has died. Some say, of senility. Some say, of shameful 
afflictions. All agree it will stay dead for a long, long time. ... The theme of 
the celebration is well known: “our form of life” has once and for all proved 
both its viability and its superiority over any other real or imaginable form, 
our mixture of individual freedom and consumer market has emerged as the 
necessary and sufficient, truly universal principle of social organization, 
there will be no more traumatic turns of history, indeed no history to speak
20 Reich’s “symbolic analysts” would be e.g.: research scientists, design engineers, 
software engineers, public relations executives, investment bankers, lawyers, real 
estate developers, and creative accountants. Also included in symbolic-analytic 
services would be much of the work done by management consultants, financial 
consultants, tax consultants, architectural consultants, management information 
specialists, organization development specialists, strategic planners, corporate 
headhunters, and system analysts. Also: advertising executives and marketing 
strategists, art directors, architects, cinematographers, film editors, production 
designers, publishers, writers and editors, journalists, musicians, television and film 
producers “and even university professors” (Reich 1992: 177-178). The crucial point is, 
though, they no longer depend on the economic performance of other Americans (or 
any other nationals, for that matter) and have been “seceding from the rest of the 
nation” (Reich 1992: 253).
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of. For “our way of life” the world has become a safe place. The century 
remarkable for fighting its choices on the battlefield is over, ten years before 
the appointed time. From now on, there will be just more of the good things 
that are. In the din of celebration, the few voices of doubt are barely audible. 
Some doubts do not dare to be voiced. Some inarticulate worries have not 
even congealed into doubts fit to be put into words. One can only guess what 
they are (Bauman 1992: 175).
A new aspect of the situation in which the Western form of life 
found itself after the collapse of its communist alternative is the 
“unprecedented freedom” it will from now on enjoy in defining its 
own identity. We do not really know, Bauman warns, what effects 
such freedom may bring; we cannot learn it from history. Capitalism 
had its alternative from almost the very beginning when this role was 
played by socialist movements.21 What is of special interest for our 
considerations here, is the link between the internal changes of 
capitalism and the existence of its alternative. As Bauman argued,
Vivid displays of a social organization that focused on the ends which 
capitalist modernity neglected made it necessary to broaden the systemic 
agenda, and enforced corrections which prevented the accumulation of 
potentially lethal dysfunctions. (The welfare state was the most conspicuous, 
but by no means the only example). This relative luxury of autonomous, self­
constituted critique is now gone (Bauman 1992: 183-84).
The alternative has now been gone for a decade and a half; apart 
from the internal factors resulting from social and economic 
transformations occurring within Western European democracies 
(slower economic growth, high governmental policy commitments 
made in the past decades, population aging and changing 
demographics, evolving household and family structures -  see 
Pierson 2001), “living without an alternative” has had a tremendous 
impact on our thinking about the welfare state. Not only in the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, breaking away from
21 As Bauman argued almost immediately following the collapse of communism
in Central and Eastern Europe: “Alternatives appeared as real contenders and
resourceful enemies; as threats to be reckoned with, adapted to and actively staved
off. Alternatives were sources of at least temporary dynamism even if the capacity for 
change proved in the end limited to prevent ultimate defeat” (Bauman 1992: 183).
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patronage and the modernity-inspired, over-ambitious and over­
protective model of the state, but in Western countries as well. Before 
the collapse of the Communist block in Europe,
Everything in the world had a meaning, and that meaning emanated from a 
split, yet single centre -  from the two enormous power blocks locked up,
riveted and glued to each other in an all-out com bat. W ith the Great Schism
out of the way, the world does not look a totality anymore; it looks rather like 
a field of scattered and disparate forces... To put it in a nutshell: no one seems 
now to be in control. Worse still -  it is not clear what ‘being in control’ could, 
under the circumstances, be like (Bauman 1998: 58).
Bauman in Globalization seems to associate the idea of the mature 
welfare state with that of the communist-style patronage state. 
Communism did not keep a balance between freedom and security, 
the system being dismantled after 1989 was “the state-administered 
patronage: that coercively imposed a trade-off between freedom and 
security”.22 He captures the point which is crucial to understanding 
the apparently strange election results in recent years in numerous 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe -  the widespread “nostalgia” 
for the ancient regime. To put it in a brutal way, it is still difficult for 
the wider electorate to try to balance the philosophical achievement of 
regaining individual responsibility for one’s life (and the political 
achievement of freedom) with the social loss of collective security, the
22 That is the way Bauman describes the interplay between the lack of welfare 
provision, freedom and the attitude towards communism in postwar Poland: “And 
the same thinking was behind the communist experiment, and that’s why many 
people were so seduced, actually. A great part of the Polish intelligentsia was attracted 
to it as Poland was in a different state than England, anyway. In 1939, when the 
independent existence of Poland ended, there were eight million unemployed in the 
country. Around one-third of the population was without work. Poverty was 
unimaginable by British standards: there was no provision for the unemployed, and 
people would just sit on the street idly, without hope, without having any energy to 
do something, look for anything. So, to speak about freedom as the one thing that was 
missing there would immediately have aroused an ironical smile. ... What most 
people were worrying about was the daily bread, and the security of work, the 
certainty that their children would get jobs -  these sort of things. ... Freedom was not 
exactly at the top of the agenda; what was on top of the agenda was providing people 
with these conditions of life” (Bauman 1992: 220).
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existence of a safety net (in another pair of oppositions between the 
patronage/ welfare state and emergent forms of state, the difference is 
between the “commonality of fate” and the “diversity of fate”, 
Bauman 1993: 243). As Bauman argued, “to the strong, bold and 
determined, the patronage state feels like a most sinister rendition of 
the Weberian ‘iron cage’; yet to many weak, shy and lacking in will it 
may also feel like a shelter. While the end of the oppressive 
supervision by the agencies of the state and the opening up of space 
for individual initiative is a change likely to be warmly greeted by all, 
the removal of the safety net and the burdening of the individual with 
responsibility previously claimed by the state may well arouse mixed 
feelings” (Bauman 1992: 163).
In an interview with Richard Kilminster and Ian Varcoe, 
appended to Intimations o f Postmodernity, Bauman presents his vision 
of the ideas behind the welfare state, associating it closely with the 
ambitions of the modern state, and more generally, of modernity. He 
claims that
The idea of welfare state provision really was to engage the state in order to 
create for ordinary people, who did not have freedom, the conditions for it. It 
was very much like Aneurin Bevan’s view of the National Health service, 
that it was a “one o f f ’ expenditure. You introduce it, then everybody would 
become healthy; and then there would be no expenditure on national health 
any more -  at least, it would be going down and down, year by year. That 
was the idea. And it was the same with the welfare state. The welfare state 
was thought of as an enabling institution, as a temporary measure to provide 
a sort of safety cushion for people, so that they know they can dare, they can 
take risks, they can exert themselves, because there is always this safety 
provision if they fail (Bauman 1992: 219-20, cited in Mann 2000).
In a similar vein, in a postscript to the Polish translation of Freedom 
(1988), Bauman associates the emergence of the welfare state with 
common social responsibility for those who are not able to cope by 
themselves. The welfare state was supposed to take care of those who 
were temporarily unable to lead individual lives so that they could 
return to “normal” lives. But today, it seems, for some people 
unemployment benefits are no longer a way to get rid of temporary 
existential problems but a “receipt for life”. Bauman goes on to argue
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that, “not surprisingly, in all affluent societies, slowly but more and more 
explicitly, ambitious intentions that powered the undertakings of the 
welfare state, are being gotten rid of”. Bauman understands, although he 
seems unable to share, the ideal of the end of collective solidarity.
Zygmunt Bauman, like Ulrich Beck or Anthony Giddens, with 
emphases on different aspects of the welfare state however, is not 
going to defend its traditional Keynesian version. In a world “without 
an alternative”, the welfare state as an institution -  in its traditional 
version -  seems increasingly unviable, even though the process of the 
gradual dismantling the welfare state in the West comes as a surprise 
indeed. Claus Offe suggested over 20 years ago (as one of 
“contradictions of the welfare state”, see Offe 1984) that it is hard to 
get rid of the welfare state once it has been installed: Bauman 
comments that after 20 years, the unthinkable has become thinkable; 
“.. .and a state which is not a welfare state and a capitalist economy 
without the safety net of state-administered securities have become a 
distinct possibility, if not quite yet the reality in the most affluent and 
‘economically successful’ societies” (Bauman quoted in Abrahamson 
2000: 174).
Bauman associates very closely the ambitions of the modern state 
(a product of modernity as vividly described in a number of books 
during well over a decade now, but especially from Legislators and 
Interpreters, Modernity and the Holocaust, and Modernity and 
Ambivalence) with policies implemented as part of the welfare state. 
The images of the gardener’s state, the patronage state, the 
communist state as realizations of the modern war cry the “Kingdom 
of Reason -  now!” (communism “took the precepts of modernity most 
seriously and set out to implement them in earnest”, Bauman 1992: 
179) and his general vision of modernity come very close together. 
Consequently, Bauman in his Postmodern Ethics provides a gloomy 
account of the dismantling of the welfare state (seen as part and 
parcel of the philosophical dismantling of modernity as he sees it) in 
Western countries:
The dismantling of the Welfare State (once an operative reflection of the
principle of universally shared responsibility for individual weal and woe) -
a prospect a few years ago deemed unthinkable by the most perceptive of
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minds -  is now taking place. ... If the installation of the Welfare State was an 
attempt to mobilize economic interest in the service of moral responsibility -  
the dismantling of the Welfare State deploys economic interest as a means to 
liberate political calculation from moral constraints. Moral responsibility is 
once more something that “needs to be paid for” and hence something one 
can well be “unable to afford”. ... The dismantling of the Welfare State is 
essentially a process of “putting moral responsibility where it belongs” -  that 
is, among the private concerns of individuals. . It is a “your value for my 
money” situation: citizenship means getting better service for less expenses, 
the right to pay less into the public kitty and get more from it. Responsibility 
does not come into it either as a reason or as a purpose. The ideal for the 
citizen is a satisfied customer. Society is there for individuals to seek and find 
satisfaction for their individual wants (Bauman 1993: 243-244).
While for a few years in a number of key books Bauman used the 
word “postmodernity” to describe contemporary society (see 
especially Bauman 1987, 1992, 1993, 1995), he has recently settled with 
the concept of liquid modernity to describe it. Liquid modernity is 
much more closely related to the global age: there are no stable 
institutions, there are no stable conditions because everything is in 
process. While trust and confidence were constitutive of early 
modernity, risk and uncertainty are now the hallmarks of liquid 
modernity (Abrahamson 2004: 171-172). Bauman gives his recent 
views on poverty and welfare in Work, Consumerism and the New Poor 
(1998) and in Wasted Lives: Modernity and Its Outcasts (2004). He is 
convinced, although unable to approve of this shift, that we have 
already moved away from the social state and towards an 
exclusionary state. The welfare state is “out of tune” with the 
consumer society, which is now. It is through the ideology of 
consumerism that neoliberalism is threatening the attractiveness of 
the welfare state. Following Claus Offe, Bauman suggests the 
introduction of a basic income scheme as the solution to the present 
social crisis: modest income should be guaranteed to all citizens as 
human beings and this basic entitlement would be dictated by the 
status and dignity of being human. The state should guarantee its 
citizens survival with dignity. At the same time, though, Bauman is 
aware that we are at the crossroads -  at the moment of choice with 
respect to the future of welfare which the world is currently facing;
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and the choice is ours. But in a world dominated by the ideology of 
consumerism, there seems to be no room for a welfare state (at least a 
welfare state as we know it). His pessimism with respect to the future 
of the welfare state is further reinforced by the conviction that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult, perhaps altogether impossible, to “re­
forge social issues into effective collective action” (Bauman 1998: 69).
5.4. C on clu sion s
Habermas, Beck and Bauman, despite coming from different 
philosophical and sociological traditions, feel compelled to agree on 
one point about the future of the welfare state in Europe: the 
transformations we are currently witnessing are irreversible, we are 
passing into a new age with respect to the balance between the 
economic and the social. With respect to welfare futures, the 
emergence of Habermas’ “postnatnational constellation” carries 
roughly the same message as the emergence of Beck’s “second, 
postnational modernity” and Bauman’s “liquid modernity”: the 
traditional postwar Keynesian welfare state, with its powerful 
“nation-state” component, is doomed, and for the three thinkers the 
culprit behind the end of this social project in Europe is globalization, 
in its theories and its practices. None of them focuses on the internal 
developments of the European welfare state (like changing 
demographics, including the aging of Western societies; shifts in 
familial structures; the burden of past entitlements within the inter­
generational contract between the old and the young, the working 
and the unemployed etc), clearly linking the new geography of social 
risks and uncertainties with the advent of -  mainly economic -  
globalization. At the same time, they do emphasize the role of 
changing social attitudes towards social outcasts, the new poor, the 
excluded (Bauman); or towards high levels of taxation and social 
democratic redestributive policies (Beck). The emergence of the 
“individualized society” (Bauman) is accompanied by the 
overwhelming power of consumer ideologies, still reinforced by the 
general neoliberal tendency to desocialize the economic and to
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recommodify the social. While understandable in a European, 
including Central European, context, their belief in a future federalist 
European solution for welfare issues (Beck, Habermas) or for a global 
scheme of basic income understood as a human right (Bauman) seems 
-  from a global perspective -  very hard to realize under global 
pressures. They have all observed the passage from social solidarity 
to enhanced individualism, and from the ideals of social cohesion to 
those of economic competitiveness (even on a regional basis in the 
enlarged EU) and are not able to accept them on philosophical, social 
and finally moral grounds (and it is no accident that they have never 
particularly been “specialists” in their respective areas; especially 
Habermas who has been the traditional European intellectual, while 
Bauman dealt with the “question of the intellectual” in the majority of 
his books from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s).
To sum up. No matter how we view the origins of current 
reformulations of the welfare state (more radical in theory than in 
actual practice in most countries but already perceived in changing 
national polices, national legislation and the general attitude taken 
towards the public sector), and no matter whether we link them to the 
impact of domestic and internal developments or to external and global 
forces, they cannot be denied. As Giuliano Bonoli et al. phrased it,
In brief, the consensus of opinion is that globalization has reduced the power 
of governments. There are no voices that globalization has increased 
government power. ... There is general agreement that the forces of 
globalization have important implications for the volume, the generosity and 
the composition of contemporary European welfare state provision (Bonoli et 
al. 2000: 65).
Using a strong façon de parler, the end of the world as we know it -  
the typical sociological description of a global age -  means also the 
end of the social and economic world as we know it, including (Bob 
Jessop’s) “Keynesian National Welfare State” as we know it. The 
impact of these transformations on the institution of the university, or 
on publicly-funded higher education in more general terms, is under 
discussion here. In broad outline, the current situation may be 
described as the simultaneous renegotiation of the postwar social 
contract concerning the welfare state and the renegotiation of a
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smaller-scale, by comparison, modern social pact between the 
university and the nation-state (or between knowledge and power).23 
The renegotiation of the latter is not clear outside of the context of the 
former, as state-funded higher education formed one of the bedrocks 
of the European welfare system. We also cannot forget about the 
context of higher education being a significant part of the public 
sector, which was discussed in Chapter 3.
23 There is an accompanying -  crucial, although somehow neglected -  internal 
(academic) dimension to the issue as well. There has been a clear interdependence 
between decreasing state subsidies for universities, and academics becoming 
“entrepreneurs” or “academic capitalists”, as shown by Sheila Slaughter and Larry L. 
Leslie regarding Canada, Australia, the USA and the United Kingdom. The 
uniqueness of the institution of the university seems to be less compelling since the 
above two processes became more widespread (which started in the 1980s). Certainly, 
the causal arrow goes from diminished state funding to increased academic 
entrepreneurialism, not the other way round. Slaughter and Leslie stress the significance 
of the participation of academia in the market which “began to undercut the tacit 
contract between professors and society because the market put as much emphasis on 
the bottom line as on client welfare. The raison d’etre for special treatment for 
universities, the training ground of professionals, as well as for professional privilege, 
was undermined, increasing the likelihood that universities, in the future, will be 
treated more like other organizations and professionals more like other workers” 
(Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 5).
C h a pter  6
The University and the New European 
Educational and Research Policies
6.1. T ow ard s a “Europe o f K n o w led g e”
-  the R ev ita liza tio n  o f the P ro ject fo r  E u rop ean  In teg ratio n  
T h rou g h  E d u cation
The discussion about current and future transformations of the 
institution of the university -  parallel to the current and future 
transformations of the state -  would be incomplete without clear 
reference to a specific regional variation of the two processes: those 
taking place in the European Union. Recent years have brought about 
intensified thinking, writing and discussion regarding the future of 
public universities in Europe, from a European perspective. Regional 
processes for the integration of educational and research and 
development policies add a new dimension to the state/university 
issue discussed throughout the present book. On top of the 
discussions about the nation-state and the welfare state, we are 
confronted with new transnational ideas on how to revitalize the 
European project through education and how to use European 
universities for the purpose of creating in Europe a globally 
competitive knowledge economy (“The Europe of Knowledge”). 
These ideas as presented at European foras are certainly radical when 
compared with traditional modern models of the university. Both the 
European Research Area and the European Higher Education Area 
introduce new ways of thinking about the role of universities in
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society and the economy. For the first time these new ways of 
thinking about higher education were formulated at an EU level -  
and were accompanied by a number of practical measures, 
coordinated and funded by the European Commission. Higher 
education, certainly left at the disposal of particular nation-states in 
recent decades in Europe, returns to the forefront in discussions about 
its future. In practice, this return to the European level has different 
meanings in different countries. But its significance may possibly be 
higher in European transition economies which might be willing to 
take recent EU recommendations very seriously indeed -  as a 
comprehensive package of ideas on how to reform their collapsing 
education systems. We think it is crucial to view the changing roles of 
the university in this regional, European context.
In recent years the project of European integration seems to have 
found a new leading legitimizing motif: education and research for 
the “Europe of Knowledge”. A crucial component of the 
Europeanization process today is its attempt to make Europe a 
“knowledge society” (and, perhaps even more, a “knowledge 
economy”) in a globalizing world. “Education and training” (to use a 
general EU category) becomes a core group of technologies to be used 
for the creation of a new Europe; the creation of a distinctive and 
separate “European Higher Education Area” as well as a “European 
Research (and Innovation) Area” is the goal the EU has set itself by a 
deadline of 2010. The construction of a distinctive European 
educational policy space -  and the introduction of the requisite 
European educational and research polices -  has become part and 
parcel of EU “revitalization” within the wide cultural, political and 
economic Europeanization project. As Martin Lawn excellently hit the 
point,
Europe is not a place... Europe is a project, a space of meaning, a state in 
process, and education is the core technology in which governance, ordering 
and meaning can be constructed. Without education, there can be no Europe. 
... The emergence of the revelation of a “European education area” is 
fundamental to the contemporary structuring of the EU; it announces the 
arrival of a major discursive space, centered on education in which the 
legitimation, steering and shaping of European governance is being played 
out (Lawn 2003: 325-326).
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We are witnessing the emergence of a “new Europe” whose 
foundations are being constructed around such notions as 
“knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, “education” and “training”. 
We are building a new “common European home”, to which higher 
education and research are providing “decisive” contributions (as the 
president of the European University Association put it recently, 
Froment 2003: 27). Education, and especially lifelong learning, 
becomes a new discursive space in which European dreams of 
common citizenship are currently being located. This new 
“knowledge-based Europe” is becoming increasingly individualized 
though; ideally, it consists of individual European learners rather than 
citizens of particular European nation-states. The emergent European 
educational space is unprecedented in its vision, ambitions and 
possibly the capacity to influence national educational policies. In the 
new knowledge economy, education policy, and especially higher 
education policy, cannot remain solely at the level of Member States 
because only the construction of a new educational space in Europe 
can possibly provide it with a chance to forge a new sense of 
European identity. “Europeans”, in this context, could refer directly to 
“European (lifelong) learners”; individuals investing their dreams for 
the future in a specific kind of knowledge -  knowledge for the 
knowledge economy. The symbol of this new Europe is not “the 
locked up cultural resources of nation states, but the individual 
engaged in lifelong learning” (Lawn 2001: 177); not the nationally- 
bound and territorially-located citizen of a particular member state 
but the individual with an individuated “knowledge portfolio” of 
education, skills, and competencies. European citizenship is being 
discursively located in the individual for whom a new pan-European 
educational space is being built. The individual attains membership 
in this space only through knowledge, skills and competencies.
The idea of Europe, with its founding myths and symbols as well 
as the core normative narratives and major discourses that hold 
Europeans as Europeans together, is being redefined and 
renegotiated; and it is this new education space (being constructed 
through the emergent European educational and research policies 
discussed in the present chapter) in which the new European identity
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is being forged that seems crucial today when discussing 
transformations of European universities. In this new space, 
education is no longer merely a public good, as it is increasingly being 
tied to the individual and his or her future role in the “Europe of 
Knowledge”, which a whole series of policy papers have indicated, 
with the Jacques Delors White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, 
Employment. The Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century 
(1993) and the Presidency Conclusions o f the Lisbon European Council
(2000) in the forefront.1 Through prioritizing the idea of “lifelong 
learning” in the Lisbon strategy and in the EU agenda of “Education 
and Training 2010” (see EC 2000d), learning becomes redefined as an 
individual activity, no longer as closely linked with national projects 
that we discussed in the chapter on the university and the nation­
state. The new “learning society” comprises more and more 
“(European) learning individuals”, wishing and able to opt in and opt 
out of particular European nations and states (for whom the crucial 
ability is the ability “to learn to learn”, as the European Commission 
put it in Towards a Europe o f Knowledge). Consequently, one of the key 
concepts in the Bologna Process for the integration of European 
higher education systems is no longer employment but employability, a 
transfer of meanings through which it is the individual's responsibility 
to be employed, rather than the traditional responsibility of the state, 
as in the Keynesian “full employment” welfare model.2 Lawn refers in
1 Martin Lawn defines this new European identity through the importance of 
creativity, adaptability, entrepreneurship and education for democratic citizenship. As 
he argues, “being European means embodying the new discourse; the new citizens 
will be integrated, successful, responsible and mobile. ... They will carry with them 
the obligation to upgrade their learning, a learning related to knowledge and 
citizenship within a vision called the European educational space” (Lawn 2003: 332).
2 As the Memorandum o f Lifelong Learning phrased it, “people themselves are the 
leading actors of knowledge societies. It is the human capacity to create and use 
knowledge effectively and intelligently, on a continually changing basis, that counts 
most. To develop this capacity to the full, people need to want and to be able to take their 
lives into their own hands” (EC 2000d: 7, emphasis mine). I am not able to agree with 
Nico Hirtt’s sarcastic comments to the Memorandum in his “From Brussels to Lisbon: 
the European Round Table Education-Agenda Put into Practice by the European 
Commission”, with his strong opposition between the state and the individual,
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this context to a “deliberate attempt to create a project for Europe in 
which the citizen, the employee and the learner are constructed 
together and are formed within a new mode of governance” (Lawn 
2003: 332).
6.2. T e n  Y ears o f  E u ropean  H igher E d u cation  P o lic ies
The European Council in Lisbon of 2000 (and its aftermath) brought 
about a dramatic shift in thinking about national vs. European levels 
of competence in higher education:
At its meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, the European Council (the Heads of 
State of EU countries) acknowledged that the European Union was 
confronted with a  quantum shift resulting from globalisation and the 
knowledge-driven economy, and agreed a strategic target for 2010: To become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable o f  
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion. 
These changes required not only a radical transformation o f  the European 
economy, but also a challenging programme fo r  the modernisation o f  social welfare 
and education systems (EC 2002d: 7).
Current developments, especially the emergence of the European 
Research Area, are consequences of this shift of interest which was 
the signal for taking the idea of knowledge-based economies and 
knowledge-based societies in Europe very seriously.3 What followed 
regarding both the common European higher education and research 
areas, must be viewed in this context.
including his “well now, if you can’t get a good job, it’s entirely your own fault!” or 
“not only the worker has to be able to adapt to a changing environment. So does the 
school itself” (Hirtt 2001: 5, 8).
3 The term “knowledge-based economy” was probably first defined in 1996 in the 
OECD’s book under this title; the description reads as follows: “the term ‘knowledge- 
based economy’ results from a fuller recognition of the role of knowledge and 
technology in economic growth. Knowledge, as embodied in human beings (as 
‘ human capital’ ) and in technology, has always been central to economic 
development. But only over the last few years has its relative importance been 
recognized, just as that importance is growing. The OECD economies are more 
strongly dependent on the production, distribution and use of knowledge than ever 
before” (OECD 1996: 9; see Peters 2001, 2003; Delanty 2001).
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European universities had not been the focus of much reflection at 
the European Union level in the 1990s (between 1991 when 
Memorandum on Higher Education in the European Community was 
published -  and 2000 when the Lisbon strategy was formulated). The 
formal competencies of the European Commission for higher 
education policy, in general, are still very limited. The limitation in 
question relates to the so-called Subsidiarity Principle which implies 
that in the areas which do not belong to the exclusive competence of 
the Community, community policy will be developed only in these 
areas in which national policy-making is insufficient (see van der 
Wende 2000: 306).4 As the European Commission’s communication 
Towards a European Research Area reaffirmed in 2000, “the Treaty [of 
Maastricht, 1992] provides the European Union with a legal basis for 
measures to help to support European cooperation in research and 
technological development. However, the principal reference framework 
for research activities in Europe is national" (EC 2000a: 7, emphasis 
mine).
The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) introduced two new articles into 
the section on “Education, Vocational Training and Youth”: article 
149, point 1, states that “the Community shall contribute to the 
development of quality education by encouraging cooperation 
between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting and 
supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of 
the Member States for the content o f teaching and the organisation of 
education systems and their cultural and linguistic diversity”. The 
authority of the EU is also limited in the area of vocational training by 
the statement that the Community shall support and supplement the 
action of the Member States “while fully respecting the responsibility 
of the Member States for the content and organisation of vocational 
training”. At the same time, the EU shall adopt measures to contribute 
to the achievement of the objectives referred to in this Article, 
“excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the
4 The involvement of the EU in educational policy, technically speaking, is linked to 
the so-called Open Method of Coordination (OMC) -  a new, “post-regulatory” form of 
governance -  used already to reach an agreement that made the introduction of the 
common currency in some EU countries possible (see Dale 2002: 14).
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Member States” (The Treaty on European Union 1992: art. 149, 150). The 
aims of Community action in the Treaty of Maastricht were presented 
in soft language and included such formulations as “to facilitate”, 
“stimulate”, and “develop exchanges of information”.5 The principle 
of subsidiarity, formally limiting the EU’s scope of interest in e.g. 
education, reads as follows:
[T]he Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it 
by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do 
not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the 
proposed action, be better achieved by the Community (The Treaty on 
European Union 1992: art. 5).
Higher education is one of those areas which do not fall within 
the exclusive competence of the European Union; consequently, the 
involvement of the EU is strictly defined and limited to some actions 
only (de Witt and Verhoeven 2001).
In the most general terms, the new (Draft) Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, submitted to the President of the European 
Council in Rome (and then rejected in December 2003) follows the 
same lines of thinking about education and training. Section 4, 
“Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport”, consisting of two 
articles (art. III-182 and art. III-183), does not introduce any major 
changes to the formulations of the Treaty of Maastricht. The Union is 
supposed to contribute to quality education by “encouraging 
cooperation between Member States and, if necessary, by supporting 
and complementing their action”. In the spirit of the previous 
formulation of the issue, the Union shall “fully respect the 
responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and 
the organisation of education systems and their cultural and linguistic 
diversity” (Draft Treaty 2003: art. III-182).
5 As Pat Davies comments on the two articles from the Maastricht Treaty, 
“although the Treaty established and confirmed the competence of the EU in both 
education and training, its powers were strongly constrained and its opportunities for 
action remained ambiguous” (Davies 2003: 104).
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The crucial periods, as Anders J. Hingel in “Education Policies 
and European Governance” argues, were the period 1993-1996 (when 
the European Commission published the Jacques Delors White Paper 
on growth, competitiveness, and employment, and a policy paper on 
Teaching and Learning -  Towards the Learning Society) and the period 
1997-1999, leading to the present period which began in 2000: that of 
building a European Research and Innovation Area (paralleled, since 
1999, by the Bologna Process for building a European Higher 
Education Area). The crucial documents, from the perspective of 
current developments, were Growth, Competitiveness, Employment. The 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century (1993), Presidency 
Conclusions o f the Lisbon European Council (2000), The Concrete Future 
Objectives o f Education and Training Systems (2001), complemented by 
the recent Wim Kok report, Facing the Challenge. The Lisbon Strategy for  
Growth and Employment (2004).
The Jacques Delors White Paper showed novel ways of thinking 
about the role of education and training for Growth, Competitiveness 
and Employment. It elaborated the theme of “research and 
technological development” (Chapter 4) and urged the “adaptation of 
education and vocational training systems” (Chapter 7), placing 
education in an important position within the emergent “new 
development model” (Chapter 10).6 The paper was far-reaching in its 
visions on the future of Europe and gave, inter alia, a new impetus to 
thinking about the role of education and training in job creation and 
economic growth. As its Preamble states,
Yes, we can create jobs, and we must do so if we want to safeguard the future 
-  the future of our children ... and the future of our social protection systems, 
which are threatened in the short term by inadequate growth and in the long 
term by the deterioration in the ratio of the people in jobs to those not in 
employment (EC 1993: 1).
6 The Delors White Paper is referred to as perhaps “the most influential general 
policy document ever made by the Commission” (Hingel 2001: 6) and one of the “most 
significant documents in terms of its reach into a whole range of policy areas, 
including education and training, and its impact on the actions that followed” (Davies 
2003: 104).
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The paper urges the need to create a “healthy”, “open”, “decen­
tralized”, “characterized by solidarity” and “more competitive” 
economy (EC 1993: 12-14) to reverse the “disastrous course” which 
the European Union was taking -  and to create 15 million jobs by the 
end of the 20th century (EC 1993: 11). It is here that the idea of lifelong 
learning is for the first time so forcefully presented to a European 
audience (and three years later the theme is further developed in 
Teaching and Learning -  Towards the Learning Society):
lifelong education is ... the overall objective to which the national 
educational communities can make their own contributions. ... [P]ublic and 
private efforts must be married to create the basis in each Member State fo r  a 
genuine right to initial or ongoing training throughout one’s lifetime. This should 
be a key area of social dialogue at European level (EC 1993: 17, emphasis in 
original).
The Jacques Delors White Paper views education (and vocational 
training) as having a key role in stimulating the growth of, and 
restoring competitiveness to, the European economy but it stresses 
that education and training should not be seen as the sole solution 
to the most urgent questions and the most immediate problems; 
education and training policies should be combined with other new 
policies in other areas. Nevertheless, the Paper presents its strong 
view on the need for a re-examination of education systems 
in Europe -  the need to adapt them to the emergent environment. 
The formulations used in this context include “adaptation”, “suiting 
to the (new) task”, “re-examination”, “reworking”, “recomposition”, 
“redevelopment”, “reorganization”, “readjustment” etc; the paper 
reads:
There is no doubt that they could play a significant part in the emergence of a 
new development model in the Community in the coming years. However, 
European systems of education and training will be able to do this only if 
they are suited to the task. Indeed, it is the place of education and training in 
the fabric of society and their links with all economic and social activity 
which must be re-examined. In a society based fa r  more on the production, 
transfer and sharing o f  knowledge than on trade in goods, access to theoretical and 
practical knowledge must necessarily play a major role (EC 1993: 117, emphasis in 
original).
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The areas in which “re-examined” and “re-focused” (as well as “well- 
planned”) education and training should produce positive results were 
the following: combating unemployment, boosting economic growth, 
and developing such a form of growth which produces more 
employment. Specific suggestions for the improvement of education 
and training systems included: an increasingly practical orientation 
of training, a rationalization of education by providing a shorter period 
of general education (better tailored to market needs), and 
improvements in coordinating the measures taken by various 
authorities and bodies (EC 1993: 118). The paper also introduced other 
distinctly “Bologna” themes while referring to the weaknesses of 
education systems at a European level: “the lack of a genuine European 
market in skills and occupations; the lack of mutual transparency and 
the limited recognition of qualifications and skills at Community level; 
the lack of a genuine European area for open and distance learning” 
(EC 1993: 11). As will be seen later in this chapter -  while discussing the 
current stage of the integration of European higher education -  very 
similar general themes about education and training have run for half 
a century now: from the Treaty of Rome to the documents of the 
Bologna Process.7 The core concept in rethinking the role of education 
and training in society is “lifelong learning”, merely suggested in the 
paper but developed further in a separate communication on the 
“learning society”.8
Following the European Council meetings in Lisbon in 2000 (the 
“Lisbon agenda” of transformations to the European economy,
7 As Growth, Competitiveness, Employment put it 6 years before the Bologna 
Declaration and 5 years before the Sorbonne Declaration: the first objective should be 
to “develop still further the European dimension in education: ... to establish a genuine 
European area o f ... skills and training by increasing the transparency, and improving the 
mutual recognition, of qualifications and skills; to promote European-level mobility 
among teachers, students and other people undergoing training” (EC 1993: 122, 
emphasis mine).
8 As the paper argues, “all measures must ... necessarily be based on the concept o f 
developing, generalizing and systematizing lifelong learning and continuing training. This 
means that education and training systems must be reworked in order to take account 
of the need . for the permanent recomposition and redevelopment o f knowledge and know­
how” (EC 1993: 120, emphasis in original).
Chapter 6. The University and the New European Policies 317
welfare, and education9) and Barcelona in 2002 (the goal of European 
universities becoming “world quality reference” by 2010), the 
European Commission is clearly enlarging its field of operation in 
education (see van der Wende 2003: 16). While until 2001 the 
European Commission was not officially invited to become a full 
member of the Bologna Process (and the Bologna Process was 
deliberately situated outside EU-institutions, as Balzer and Martens 
remind us, 2004: 3), currently the Commission is working within the 
overall framework of “Education and Training 2010” which includes 
under its subheadings both the Bologna Process, the European Higher 
Education Area and the Bruges-Copenhagen process of establishing a 
European area for vocational training (with the common deadline for 
the three processes and for the Lisbon strategy set at 2010).10
9 In the most general terms, the Lisbon strategy can be presented through its 
structural indicators in different policy areas. Without getting into the details of the 
actual targets to be reached by 2010, let us enumerate the main policy areas and 
corresponding indicators: economic background (GDP per capita, labor productivity 
per person employed), employment (total employment rate (15-65 age group) and 
total employment rate of older workers (55-64), innovation and research (gross 
domestic expenditure on R&D, as % of GDP, and youth education attainment level, as 
% of 20-24 years old completing at least upper secondary education), economic reform 
(comparative price levels, business investment by private sector as % of GDP), social 
cohesion (at-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers, dispersion of employment rates 
across regions, within countries, and total long-term unemployment rate), and the 
environment (total greenhouse gas emissions, energy intensity of the economy, and 
transport -  volume of freight transport) (see EC 2004b: 15). The relative performance 
of the EU-15 countries and new EU member states according to these structural 
indicators for 2003 have been presented in Annexes to the Kok Report (EC 2004a: 48ff).
10 The Bruges-Copenhagen process was started in 2002 and it comprises more 
than 30 states today (also, in contrast to the Bologna Declaration, the Copenhagen 
Declaration was actually signed by the European Commission as well). Both the 
Declaration and the process somehow emulate the development of the Bologna 
Process. For example the opening sentence stresses that cooperation at the European 
level within education and training has come “to play a decisive role in creating the 
future European society”. Vocational educational and training systems have to 
continuously adapt to “new developments and changing demands of society”. The 
main priorities of the Copenhagen process are the European dimension (in order to 
make Europe “a worldwide reference for learners”); transparency, information and 
guidance (including the integration of the European CV, certificate and diploma
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The reason for the renewed EU interest in higher education is 
clearly stated by the Commission: while responsibilities for 
universities lie essentially at national (or regional) level, the most 
important challenges are “European, and even international or 
global” (EC 2003b: 9). The divergence between the organization of 
universities at the national level and the emergence of challenges 
which go beyond national frontiers has grown, and will continue to 
do so. Thus a shift of balance is necessary, the arguments go, and the 
Lisbon agenda in general, combined with the emergence of the 
European Research Area in particular, provide new grounds for 
policy work at the European level, no matter what particular Member 
States think of it and no matter how they view the restrictions on 
engagement in education issues imposed on the EU by the Maastricht 
Treaty with its principle of subsidiarity.11
supplements, the Common European framework of reference for languages and 
EUROPASS into a single framework); the recognition of competences and 
qualifications (developing common principles of certification and a credit transfer 
system for vocational education and training); and quality assurance (exchange of 
models and methods, common criteria and principles). The guiding principles of the 
process are: a target date of 2010, the measures taken should be voluntary and 
principally developed through “bottom-up” cooperation, initiatives should be focused 
on the “needs of citizens and user organizations” and cooperation should be inclusive 
(see Copenhagen Declaration 2002: 1-3). On the role of vocational education in the 
Lisbon agenda, see the recent report to the European Commission, Achieving the Lisbon 
Goal: The Contribution o f VET (EC 2004b), especially section 1 for the general context.
11 It is useful to remember a distinction between “hard” and “soft” methods of 
coordination on the part of the European Community. In those areas where Member 
States have transferred responsibility to the EU, the former methods are used. In the 
case where the principle of subsidiarity is in force (e.g. employment and education), 
the European Commission operates through OMC (“Open Method of Coordination”), 
introduced for the first time with respect to education and welfare issues in the Lisbon 
Presidency Conclusions in 2000. The OMC that is currently implemented in dealing 
with education policies on a European level is a new form o f  governance. This method 
involves guidelines, timetables, indicators, benchmarks, targets, measures, 
monitoring, and evaluation. As the Conclusions read: “fixing guidelines for the Union 
combined with specific timetables ... establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and 
qualitative indicators and benchmarks against the best in world ... translating these 
European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting specific targets and 
adopting measures . periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as
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The Lisbon European Council of 2000 described the new economic 
and social challenge of the last decade as a
quantum shift resulting from  globalisation and the challenges o f  a new knowledge- 
driven economy. These changes are affecting every aspect of people’s lives and 
require a radical transformation of the European economy (Lisbon Council 
2000: 1, emphasis mine).
Reaching this “strategic goal” over the next decade (the oft-quoted 
one, already referred to above: “to become the most competitive and 
dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion”) requires setting up programs for building 
knowledge infrastructure, enhancing innovation and economic 
reform, and -  of most interest to us here -  “modernising social 
welfare and education systems” (Lisbon Council 2000: 1). The shift to 
a digital, knowledge-based economy will be a powerful engine for 
growth and competitiveness, the communication argues. Con­
sequently, the idea of a European Area of Research and Innovation 
was affirmed, with research and development’s role in “generating 
economic growth, employment and social cohesion” also being 
mentioned. The communication invoked the full exploitation by the
mutual learning process” (Lisbon Council 2000: para. 37, emphases mine). Balzer and 
Martens described the idea more generally in their “International Higher Education 
and the Bologna Process. What Part Does the European Commission Play?”: 
“governance by ‘co-ordination’ refers to the ability of the European Union to provide 
the means to organize, manage and handle procedures which promote initiatives in 
educational policy. Governance by co-ordination marks the special capacity to ‘pull 
strings together’ . It encompasses activities such as the organization of conferences and 
meetings where diverse and significant actors come together, but also its 
infrastructure such as the size of the organization, the number of staff (manpower) 
and the professional background and network they bring into the organization. 
Through such co-ordinative governance, the European Union can give incentives, 
initiate projects, and structure future developments. It is able to influence political 
processes by organising, directing and speeding up programmes and processes in 
educational policy” (Balzer and Martens 2004: 6-7). See a very critical position of 
Roger Dale in “The Lisbon Declaration, the Reconceptualisation of Governance and 
the Reconfiguration of European Educational Space” (2003: 13-15) who argues that the 
OMC makes policy decisions into “technical” matters for long-term negotiations 
between “experts” who are not merely “de-nationalized” but also “Europeanized”.
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European Commission of “the instruments under the Treaty and all 
other appropriate means” (Lisbon Council 2000: 3).
Incidentally, it is interesting to note that in the case of the 
presidency conclusions of the Lisbon Council (2000) and of the 
Barcelona Council (2002), both stressing the role of education, 
research and development, universities as such (as opposed to 
education and training systems in general) are not mentioned; the word 
is non-existent except for two minor contexts: university degrees and 
an enhanced communication network for libraries, universities and 
schools.
The necessary steps mentioned in the Lisbon conclusions with 
respect to establishing a European Area of Research and Innovation 
include developing mechanisms for networking, improving the 
environment for private research investment, research and de­
velopment partnerships and high technology start-ups, encouraging 
the development of an “open method of coordination” for the 
benchmarking of national research and development policies, a high 
speed transeuropean communication network, taking steps to 
increase the mobility of researchers and introducing Community­
wide patents (Lisbon Council 2000: 3-4). Again, universities do not 
appear as separate subjects, or objects, of these steps. The subsection 
on “education and training for living and learning in the knowledge 
society” appears in the section on “modernizing the European social 
model by investing in people and building an active welfare state”. 
The crucial paragraph reads as follows:
Europe’s education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands 
of the knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality 
of employment. They will have to offer learning and training opportunities 
tailored to target groups at different stages of their lives: young people, 
unemployed adults and those in employment who are at risk of seeing their 
skills overtaken by rapid change. This new approach should have three main 
components: the development of local learning centers, the promotion of new 
basic skills, in particular in the information technologies, and increased 
transparency of qualifications (Lisbon Council 2000: 7).
The targets set in Lisbon included a substantial annual increase in 
per capita investment in human resources, the number of 18 to 24
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year olds who are not in further education and training to be halved 
by 2010, schools and training centers to be developed into “multi­
purpose local learning centers” accessible to all, and the development 
of a European framework defining the new basic skills to be provided 
by lifelong learning and defining a common European format for 
curricula vitae. Finally, the European Council asked the Education 
Council to undertake a “general reflection on the concrete future 
objectives of education systems, focusing on common concerns and 
priorities while respecting national diversity” (Lisbon Council 2000: 
7-8). Indeed, in 2001 the Education Council presented the product of 
this general reflection, its report The Concrete Future Objectives o f 
Education and Training Systems.
The report refers to the three general aims which society attributes 
to education and training: the development of the individual, the 
development of society, and the development of the economy (Council 
of the European Union 2001: 4). The three objectives for the coming 
decade were defined as increasing the quality and effectiveness of 
education and training systems, facilitating access to all to them, and 
opening them to the wider world (Council of the European Union 
2001: 7). In the most general terms, the crucial themes of the report are 
developing skills for the knowledge society, the importance of “the 
ability to learn” and lifelong learning, open learning centers and 
attractive learning, and, finally, developing “the spirit of enterprise” 
in European societies.12 The report does not refer specifically to 
universities but argues that changes are needed in the way education 
and training systems in general are delivered: “all parts of those 
systems have to become more democratic and more welcoming in 
their attitude to learners -  particularly higher education” (Council of 
the European Union 2001: 12). The fundamental role of education is 
reaffirmed, together with the need for its adaptation to the new 
knowledge society; the future of the European Union, the report 
argues, requires a
12 Or as the Lisbon conclusions put it, the need to create “a friendly environment 
for starting up and developing innovative businesses”, or as the Wim Kok report on 
the Lisbon strategy echoed the theme, Europe requires entrepreneurship but it is “not 
‘entrepreneur-minded’ enough” (EC 2004a: 28).
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solid contribution from the world of education and training. It requires that 
education and training systems can be adapted and developed so as to 
deliver the skills and competencies everyone needs in the knowledge society; 
to make lifelong learning attractive and rewarding; and to reach out to 
everyone in society (Council of the European Union 2001: 16).
To cut short the long story of the implementation of the Lisbon 
strategy: in November 2004 the Wim Kok report reviewing the Lisbon 
strategy was presented. The general message of the report was clear: 
there was slow progress and disappointing delivery due to an 
“overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities” and 
a lack of determined political action (EC 2004a: 6). The report argues 
that halfway to 2010, the Lisbon deadline, the overall picture is “very 
mixed” and much needs to be done “to prevent Lisbon from 
becoming a synonym for missed objectives and failed promises”, so 
the report asks for the “revitalization” of the strategy (EC 2004a: 10, 
39). Europe, if it wishes to protect and retain its particular social 
model, must act, and must act now.13 The picture of the challenges 
ahead is daunting, and we need to see European (and EU, a 
distinction to be born in mind) educational policies in this context:
At risk -  in the medium to long run -  is nothing less than the sustainability of 
the society Europe has built. Europeans have made choices about how to 
express the values they hold in common: a commitment to the social contract 
that underwrites the risk of unemployment, ill-health and old age, and 
provides opportunity for all through high-quality education, a commitment 
to public institutions, the public realm and the public interest, and that a 
market economy should be run fairly and with respect for the environment. 
These values are expressed in systems of welfare, public institutions and 
regulation that are expensive in a world where low  cost and highly efficient 
producers are challenging the old order. If Europe cannot adapt, cannot 
modernise its systems and cannot increase its growth and employment fast
13 A recent thick (almost 250 pages) report to the European Commission about 
vocational education’s role in the Lisbon agenda (Achieving the Lisbon Goal: The 
Contribution o f  VET) is much less pessimistic about the Lisbon targets in general: “in 
spite of the gloomy and problematic overall prognosis, some targets are certainly 
within reach and some countries have made outstanding progress along specific lines”
(EC 2004b: 12).
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enough, then it will be impossible to sustain these choices (EC 2004a: 16,
emphases mine).
This is a clear message: if Europe does not focus on growth and 
employment, the new global order may sweep away the old order, including 
its expensive social model. It is the solid appeal of the above picture that 
plays a fundamental role in current EU views on the future role of 
higher education and research and development systems. The 
underlying rationale for the EU agenda of “Education and Training 
2010” is clearly economic and can be derived directly from the Lisbon 
strategy. But at the same time the stakes have never been so high: 
they are the “be or not to be” of the European Social Model and, by 
extension, of the educational systems that this model still makes 
possible. The extent to which educational institutions themselves are 
aware of the stakes is unclear though.
The Kok report recommends four main areas of action to increase 
employment levels and improve productivity in Europe. These are: 
increasing the adaptability of workers and enterprises; attracting 
more people into the labor market for longer; investing more 
intensely and effectively in human capital, particularly through 
lifelong learning; and improving governance to ensure better 
implementation (see EC 2004a: 15). Only one of the five broad priority 
policy areas, the realisation of the knowledge society in Europe, is of 
interest to us here.14 As the future of Europe’s economic development 
depends on its ability to create innovative and research-based sectors 
of the economy, capable of global competition, one of the 
preconditions for their growth is increasing research and 
development spending. The Kok report concludes that one of the 
most “disappointing” aspects of the Lisbon strategy, as realized up to 
today, is that the importance of research and development is still “so 
little understood and that so little progress has been made” (EC 2004a:
14 The other four being the completion of the internal market and the promotion 
of competition (including services and financial services), the establishment of a 
favorable climate for business and enterprise, building an adaptable and inclusive 
labor market, and the promotion of win-win environmental economic strategies (see 
EC 2004a: 18).
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19). Surprisingly, the report goes as far as to state that Europe needs 
to improve its attractiveness to researchers “dramatically”, that 
Member States need to rethink the problem of funding for 
universities (including researchers’ remuneration), and that public 
support for research and development should be “boosted” (EC 
2004a: 21). In contrast to other major EU publications on the subject -  
and clearly in contrast to the tradition started by the Delors White 
Paper (where the problem was not just a “question of increasing the 
level of public funding”, EC 1993: 121) -  the Kok report locates the 
major part of the responsibility for research and development funding 
back in the state, although in partnership with the private sector.
6.3. T ow ard s a R e d e fin itio n  o f the R o les and  M issio n s 
o f  the M od ern  U n iversity
The process of creating the European Higher Education Area and the 
simultaneous emergence of the European Research Area have one 
major common dimension: that of a redefinition of the roles, missions, 
tasks, and obligations of the institution of the university in the rapidly 
changing and increasingly market-driven and knowledge-based 
European societies and economies. Both teaching and research are 
undergoing substantial transformations today and the institution of 
the university in all probability will not be able to avoid the process of 
substantial, in part planned and in part chaotic, transformations to its 
functioning.
The two parallel processes are already relatively well advanced in 
some countries and are being promoted all over Europe, including 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Balkans. While the effects of the 
emergence of the European Research Area are restricted mostly to the 
beneficiaries of research funds available from the EU, the Bologna 
Process may potentially influence the course of reforms to national 
higher education systems in over 40 countries, both EU members, EU 
candidate countries and others, potentially reaching as far as the 
Caucasus. While the Sorbonne Declaration (1998) was signed by the 
ministers of education of four countries (France, Italy, the United
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Kingdom, and Germany), the Bologna Declaration (1999) was signed 
by ministers from 29 countries, and finally at the Berlin conference in 
September 2003 and the Bergen conference in May 2005 more 
newcomers to the Bologna Process were accepted.15 Though official 
Bologna documents usually refer in this context to the “diversity” of 
the countries and institutions involved, the process in its present 
geographical, economic and political composition faces the 
tremendous challenge of maintaining a single pace of change in all 
the countries involved. Judging from the experience of the social and 
economic transformations in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Balkans, to keep the process going at one speed is going to be very 
difficult; in the coming years, most probably, the process will follow 
separate tracks and therefore should be accompanied by separate 
descriptions of the most urgent reforms, the different challenges 
facing different countries and, most importantly, by separate sets of 
policy recommendations for clusters of countries implementing 
reforms at different paces -  if the reforms are not going to be just a 
theoretical exercise in many of them.
The primary objectives of the Bologna Process as stated in the 
Bologna Declaration are the following:
(1) Adoption of a system of easily readable and comparable degrees, also 
through the implementation of the Diploma Supplement.
(2) Adoption of a system essentially based on two main cycles, under­
graduate and graduate.
(3) Establishment of a system of credits ... as a proper means of promoting 
the most widespread student mobility.
15 Such as e.g. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Holy See, Russia, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine. It is interesting 
to note (to a large extent only recently) that an EU-driven process may potentially 
have an impact on national higher education systems far beyond the EU-25, reaching 
even to the Caucasus. It is not an EU directive, not a European law -  but simply a 
declaration of intent. As Zgaga argued, “entering the Bologna Club is a serious 
decision. It is not only a verbal note to neighbours; it also requires hard work at 
national level to connect the local infrastructure to agreed upon ‘common roads’: 
readable and comparable degrees, quality assurance, promotion of mobility, etc” 
(Zgaga 2003b: 253).
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(4) Promotion of mobility by overcoming obstacles to the effective exercise of 
free movement.
(5) Promotion of European co-operation in quality assurance with a view to 
developing comparable criteria and methodologies
(6) Promotion of the necessary European dimensions in higher education, 
particularly with regards to curricular development, inter-institutional co­
operation, mobility schemes and integrated programmes of study, 
training and research (Bologna Declaration 1999: 4).
One of the major problems is that the “Bologna Club” (as Pavel 
Zgaga has called the signatory countries) comprises higher education 
systems which are not only so much diverse (as within the EU-15) but 
also totally incompatible (such as countries which originated from former 
Soviet republics in Eastern Europe or the Balkans, compared with the 
EU-15); consequently the objectives of the reforms to be implemented 
in these separate groups of countries are different: most transition 
countries are experiencing problems which most EU-15 countries faced 
in the 1970s, e.g. the massification of higher education with 
dramatically rising enrolment rates, plus a low correlation between the 
skills and competencies gained in the education sector and labor 
market needs. Current issues also include often virtually non-existent 
research and development in the areas crucial to emergent knowledge 
societies; the scant influence of globalization pressures on education 
policies; very high levels of unemployment reaching 60% or more in 
some transition countries; no intention of preserving the European 
social model because such European welfare never existed in most of 
these countries etc. The economic rationale behind the whole range of 
European transformations to higher education as well as research and 
development policies16 -  recently gathered together under the agenda
16 As Pat Davies argues in “Widening Participation and the European Union: 
Direct Action -  Indirect Policy?”, “the European Union has its roots in the idea of 
economic union; one that was initially built around the coal and steel industries ... 
Despite the fact that the modern EU is a very different animal from those early days, 
economic growth and competitiveness remain at the heart of the EU project, albeit in a 
different economic context -  globalisation and the knowledge society, rather than 
post-War reconstruction” (Davies 2003: 99). What has changed in the meantime, and 
accelerated especially over the last decade or so, is the idea that some kind of 
emergent European research and education space might be at the very heart o f  the
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of “Education and Training 2010” which can be clearly derived from 
the Lisbon strategy of 2000 and which comprises both the Bologna 
Process, the Bruges-Copenhagen process for the integration of 
vocational education and the European Research Area boosted by the 
EU 6th Framework Programme -  may seem very abstract indeed in 
such countries as Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Armenia, 
Moldova or Azerbaijan. The ideas which started in a few core Western 
European countries, with powerful intellectual and financial input 
from the European Commission, are now spreading at an astounding 
speed (through a process which might itself require “epidemiology” for 
its explanation, as Amaral and Magalhaes suggest, 2002). At the same 
time, we have to remember that the global situation in higher 
education is very dynamic indeed: as Peter Scott phrased it recently, “it 
is not Central and Eastern European higher education that is in 
transition; it is all higher education” (Scott 2002b: 151).17
Even though the tracks of the emergence (or construction) of the 
European Higher Education Area and of the European Research Area 
have been separate, there has been clear convergence between them 
recently.18 (In more general terms, we can distinguish between three 
tracks: inter-institutional, inter-governmental, and supranational. 
Firstly, the Magna Charta Universitatum signed in Bologna in 1988 by
European project and might contribute directly to growth, competitiveness and 
employment (to refer directly to the Jacques Delors White Paper again).
17 Another fundamental difference between changes in higher education systems 
in Western and Central/Eastern Europe is the difference between what Harry de Boer 
and Leo Goedegebuure (while analyzing the systems in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovenia in “New Rules of the Game? Reflections on Governance, 
Management and System Change”) called “evolution” and “revolution”. Apart from 
the pace of changes, the difference was also in belief vs. complete loss of faith in the 
role of the state in social transformations, and deeper belief in, and practical reliance 
on, market mechanisms of coordination (De Boer and Goedegebuure 2003: 227).
18 But it is also interesting to follow the motif recently evoked by Ronald J. 
Pohoryles -  why the “creation” or “establishment” of a European Research Area? Why 
does the 6th Framework Programme involve a “radical shift” from activities within 
prior framework programs? The area, he argues, is “an already existing reality and not 
a theoretical construct” (Pohoryles 2002a: 391). The major difference is certainly 
political (the Lisbon agenda) and involves such notions as “knowledge-based 
societies” and “knowledge-based economies”.
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the rectors of European universities initiated the track of higher 
education institutions, followed by the Salamanca and Graz 
Conventions of European higher education institutions organized in 
2001 and 200319 secondly, the Sorbonne -  Bologna -  Prague and Berlin 
meetings have all been on the track of national ministers of 
education/governments; and thirdly, the last track was at the EU 
level and consisted of various communiqués by the European 
Commission and other documents, the first being Towards a European 
Research Area in 2000 with the two most recent being: The Role o f 
Universities in the Europe of Knowledge and Researchers in the European 
Research Area: One Profession, Multiple Careers, both in 2003). Recently, 
the supranational, inter-governmental and inter-institutional levels 
have been getting increasingly mixed (see Zgaga 2003a: 7). Let us start 
with the intergovernmental level of the Bologna Process, noting the 
impact of the supranational EU level.20
The European Commission, European governments and the vast 
majority of rectors of European higher education institutions seem 
determined to implement the Bologna requirements, while the least 
determination is shown by the academic profession in Europe. 
Consequently, the actors most directly involved in the actual 
implementation of the Bologna ideas are still largely unaware of, or 
disinterested in, its consequences, at least in the majority of the 
countries of the region. However, without clear support both for the
19 For a substantial discussion of the Charta, see Jerzy Brzezihski’s “Reflections on 
the University” (1997). Brzeziński presents an interesting chart of values -  eight bi­
polar value-dimensions in which the institution can be located.
20 Thinking about emergent EU educational policies, it is also worth remembering 
here Roger Dale’s recent argument about the selectivity of the shift in educational policies 
from the national to the European level: “as the politics of education moves to a European 
level as national economies become increasingly Europeanised, the education sector 
settlement -  the arena on which the agenda for education comes into contact with the 
means of achieving the agenda -  shifts selectively from the national to the European level. 
Very broadly, we might suggest that those elements linked directly to the reproduction of 
national social formations will remain at the nation-state level, while those more directly 
associated with the extended reproduction o f the mode o f production will move to the 
European level, increasingly the site and focus of that extended reproduction” (Dale 2003: 
5, emphases mine; see also Robertson and Dale 2003). The shift Dale evokes is seen in 
subsequent communiqués about the European Research Area.
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general reform agenda and for its implementation that reaches down 
to the level of each department in each university on the part of the 
academic faculty, the Bologna Process may fail, especially in countries 
other than the “old EU” (EU-15). The whole process might grind to a 
halt if the academic community is not convinced of the new 
opportunities it provides. Saying that, I fully agree with Alberto 
Amaral and Antonio Magalhaes’ warning signal that “if the Bologna’s 
convergence process gets out of control of academics and becomes a 
feud of European bureaucracy, then one may well see a process of 
homogenization, and this represents another factor endangering the 
traditional role of European universities” (Amaral and Magalhaes 
2002: 9).21 There is also a danger that the Bologna Process may, in the 
region, turn out to be a theoretical exercise; by contrast, the two 
parallel processes of creating a common European higher education 
area and a common European research area in “core” European 
countries are not theoretical at all: what is already occurring is the 
rechannelling of EU research funds, changing research and 
development policies according to new priorities, as well as new 
policies about the recognition of diplomas for educational and 
professional purposes on an integrated European labor market.
6.4. T h e  E u rop ean  In teg ra tio n  o f H igh er E d u cation  
and  G lo b a l D ev elop m en ts
The Bologna Process in its present form seems relatively closed to 
global developments in higher education: it may be perceived as 
largely inward-looking, focused mostly on European regional 
problems, and European regional solutions, in the relative absence of 
references to global changes in higher education and the huge 
political and economic transformations underlying them.22 The
21 In a similar vein, Ronald J. Pohoryles, President of the European Association for 
the Advancement of Social Sciences, locates the European Research Area between the 
two poles of “bureaucratic vision” and “academic mission” (Pohoryles 2002a).
22 I am taking the side of Peter Scott here who reminds us in “Challenges to 
Academic Values and the Organization of Academic Work in a Time of Globalization”
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institution of the university is playing a significant role in the process of 
the emergence of a common European higher education space and an 
increasingly important role in the parallel process of constructing a 
common European research space. What is clear, though, is that in 
neither of the two processes, is the university seen in the traditional 
way we know from the debates preceding the advent of globalization, 
the speeding up of the process of European integration and the passage 
from industrial and service societies to postindustrial, global, 
knowledge and information societies. The institution, in general, has 
already found it legitimate, useful and necessary to begin evolving 
together with the radical transformations of the social setting in which 
it functions. In this new global order, universities are striving for their 
new place as they are increasingly unable to maintain their traditional 
roles and tasks. As Zygmunt Bauman put it, the once evident functions 
of the universities are far from obvious today:
The principles which in the past seemed to legitimize beyond doubt the 
centrality of universities are no more universally accepted, if not dismissed as 
obsolete or even retrospectively condemned. One is tempted to surmise that it 
is this ever more visible absence of institutional anchorage that is reflected in the 
widely noted, and mostly bewailed, transformation of the intellectual 
atmosphere characteristic of academic work -  and particularly in the striking 
lack of intellectual confidence and trust in philosophical foundations of academic 
work (Bauman 1997: 49).
Both the official discourses on the common European space in 
higher education and research as well as a large part of the 
accompanying academic debates on the subject increasingly 
acknowledge that the current role of universities could be that of 
engines of economic growth for countries and regions, of contributors 
to the economic competitiveness of nations or suppliers of highly- 
qualified, well-trained workers for the new knowledge-driven 
economy and well-prepared citizens for the new knowledge-based
that “there is a danger ... that the Bologna Process will ... become preoccupied with 
defining and defending an inward-looking, historical, defensive, exclusive (and 
exclusionary?) interpretation of the challenges facing European higher education” 
(Scott 2003: 295).
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societies -  which is clearly a radical reformulation of the traditional 
modern account of the role of the university in society, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Without many discussions about principles (such as e.g. 
those accompanying the emergence of the Humboldtian model of the 
research university at the beginning of the 19th century or such as the 
major 20th century debates about the “idea” of the university), the 
university in a European context seems to be about to enter willy-nilly 
a new era of its development (see Kwiek 2005d).23
From among a plethora of factors leading to these transformations 
in viewing the social and economic role of the university, some should 
be especially emphasized here: the globalization pressures on nation­
states and its public services and the strengthening of the common 
European political and economic project at the turn of the 20th century, 
as discussed in Chapter 324; the end of the “Golden age” of the 
Keynesian welfare state (so positively inclined towards national public 
research and strong national public higher education systems) as we 
have known it over the first three decades or so of the second half of 
the 20th century, as reviewed in Chapter 425; and the emergence of 
knowledge-based societies (and economies) in the countries of the 
affluent West, with the accompanying new social and educational 
policy paradigms. In more general terms, the processes (sometimes 
directly but more often indirectly) affecting the institution of the 
university today would be the gradual individualization (and
23 As Ruth Keeling comments on the ongoing transformations in her paper on 
“Locating Ourselves in the ‘European Higher Education Area’: Investigating the 
Bologna Process in Practice”, the Bologna Process has become a “major reference for 
the restructuring of higher education systems throughout Europe. ... The Bologna 
Process is co-ordinating changes in national higher education policies on an 
unprecedented scale” (Keeling 2004: 2).
24 Paul Pierson, one of the leading welfare scholars, reminds us in his oft-quoted 
“Coping with Permanent Austerity: Welfare State Restructuring in Affluent 
Democracies” that the pressures on the state are structural and will not easily go away: 
“the welfare state now faces a context of essentially permanent austerity” (Pierson 
2001a: 411).
25 As Gosta Esping-Andersen argued recently in “A Welfare State for the 21st 
Century”, the welfare state is burdened with “responsibilities for which it was not 
designed” (Esping-Andersen 2001).
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recommodification) of our societies and the denationalization (and 
desocialization) of our economies, as well as the universalization of 
higher education and the increasing commodification of research. The 
recent European discourse on the European Research Area leaves no 
doubts about the direction of changes in the roles and social tasks of the 
institution in emergent new societies: the economic discourse (rather 
than e.g. the social exclusion or social solidarity discourses) on the 
functioning of the institution is clearly on the rise at a European level.
There are many issues in which Bologna has been relatively 
uninterested; let us mention here the GATS negotiations which might 
include the services of the education sector (in which the European 
Commission, rather than particular EU member states, is a partner) 
and the role of “borderless” or transnational education26; the 
emerging private and for-profit sectors in higher education; the 
growing role of market forces in higher education and the increasing 
significance of the market paradigm (including the neoliberal 
paradigm) in thinking about higher education; declining public funds 
for higher education and for public higher education research; and 
the differences in the challenges of higher education faced by the old 
EU-15, new EU members and the postcommunist transition countries 
generally etc. Some recommendations provided by Trends in Learning 
Structures in European Higher Education III (Reichert and Tauch 2003) 
seem abstract in this context, especially with respect to the transition 
countries.
The Bologna documents seem to refer to relatively homogeneous 
higher education and research structures with fairly similar problems, 
and similar challenges for the future. Despite numerous references to 
the “diversity” of systems, the cultural and linguistic differences 
between them, and the varying degrees in the implementation of the 
process in various countries so far, it is very difficult to read the 
Bologna documents as if referring to the same degree to the old EU 
and the postcommunist transition countries (say, Germany or France
26 Transnational education means in this context “higher education activities in 
which the learners are located in a host country different from the one where the 
awarding institution is based” (van der Wende 2001a: 440).
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on the one hand, and Albania, Macedonia and Russia on the other). 
What level of generality in describing the challenges as well as 
providing recommendations for action is needed if the Bologna 
documents are to refer to all the countries in question? What do these 
contrasted national systems of higher education have in common 
today the moment we leave the most general level of analysis? The 
relevant analysis comprising both the EU-15 and transition countries 
in general (especially in view of the fact that the number of transition 
countries involved in the Bologna Process is growing dramatically 
and today almost all of them are Bologna signatories) is still a job to 
be done, and it is a huge challenge for the future. Certainly, it is 
possible to introduce changes in these second tier countries on an 
official, especially legislative level. It may be even relatively easy to 
change the laws on higher education, especially if the Bologna Process 
arguments of catching up with the West are used for promotional 
purposes. But changing laws is not enough to reach the objectives of 
the Bologna Process, although it may be understood in this way by 
many government officials. Consequently, it is going to be another 
huge challenge for Bologna to avoid a reform on paper, especially in 
going beyond national laws, in many transition countries.
Let us move on to an inter-institutional level for a while. The 
Magna Charta Universitatum (which was signed by European 
university rectors in Bologna in 1988 and which precedes the Bologna 
Process per se by a decade -  and which is referred to in both the 
Bologna Declaration and the Salamanca Convention message) is a 
document in a different register than later declarations and 
communiqués, whether from the supranational, intergovernmental or 
inter-institutional level; it is general, humanistic, and -  from the 
perspective of current global and European developments in higher 
education -  quite vague in its messages.
As a general declaration, it contains few details on how to 
proceed; but most of all, it is written in the vocabulary of a pre­
knowledge economy and pre-globalization era. Consequently, it 
includes no remarks about globally competitive knowledge 
economies and knowledge-based societies, universities as drivers of 
economic growth, the need for more and better jobs, social cohesion
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and social exclusion/inclusion, external -  and especially global -  
pressures on higher education systems, emerging powerful market 
forces in research and development and its corporate takeover, 
changing European (or global) labor market requirements, long-term 
risks for private investments in public research, public-private 
partnerships, public sector reforms etc -  all of which are mentioned in 
later documents of the Bologna Process or the process for the 
construction of the European Research Area. Instead, in the Magna 
Charta there are traditional ideas of universities’ social roles and tasks. 
The idea that the university is an institution which “produces, 
examines, appraises and hands down culture by research and 
tradition” (Magna Charta 1988: 1, emphasis mine) would find very 
few followers among promoters of the common European 
educational and research spaces: it is technical knowledge rather than 
humanistic culture (understood along the German lines as Bildung) 
that is at stake today in the discussions on the role of the university in 
society and the economy, along the lines produced in recent years 
within the discourse on knowledge-based societies. It is specifically 
defined knowledge -  knowledge to be commercialized and traded 
rather than traditional “universal” knowledge as presented in major 
19th and 20th century works on the “idea of the university”27. (A 
counterpoint to the ideas of culture and universal knowledge in the 
new vocabulary comes from the European Commission’s 
communiqué on the role of universities: “the knowledge society 
depends for its growth on the production of new knowledge, its
27 To look at history again: Karl Jaspers in The Idea o f  the University describes the 
university as an institution “uniting people professionally dedicated to the quest and 
transmission of truth in scientific terms” (Jaspers 1959: 3). The modern founding 
fathers of the German research university introduced a radically new perspective: 
“uniting people” (students and professors working together for the sake of science), 
“professionally dedicated” staff (rather than dedicated in an “amateurish” way 
characteristic of the institutions of the Enlightenment), “the quest and transmission of 
truth” (i.e. teaching becomes accompanied by research) and “in scientific terms” (the 
German ideal of Wissenschaft). So almost all the components of the definition contrast 
the new idea of the university with the old, Medieval, one. The aim of instruction and 
research is the “formation of the whole man”, it is “education in the broadest sense of 
term” -  i.e. Bildung (Jaspers 1959: 3).
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transmission through education and training, its dissemination 
through information and communication technologies, and on its use 
through new industrial processes or services” (EC 2003b: 2), or from a 
recent World Bank framework policy paper on Constructing Knowledge 
Societies: “the ability of a society to produce, select, adapt, 
commercialize, and use knowledge is critical for sustained economic 
growth and improved living standards”, World Bank 2002: 7. None of 
the two major policy documents mention culture as an important 
point of reference).
Consequently, from the perspective of the developments over the 
last decade, the Magna Charta Universitatum comes as a remembrance 
of things past. In the context of the development of the joint European 
research space, it is hard to find in current discussions about the 
“Europe of Knowledge” more than conventional signs for the 
continuation of ideas about the university as an institution whose 
“constant care is to attain universal knowledge” and which is a 
“trustee of the European humanist tradition” (Magna Charta 1988: 
14). Instead, as Jean-François Lyotard argued more than two decades 
ago in The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge, “knowledge is 
and will be produced in order to be sold; it is and will be consumed in 
order to be valorised in a new production: in both cases, the goal is 
exchange” (Lyotard 1984: 4).
It seems not only no longer possible to discuss the European 
integration of higher education and research in the language of the 
founders of the modern German research university (von Humboldt, 
Schelling, Fichte, Schleiermacher and others, as well as their ancestors) 
but also it seems no longer possible to use for a description of the recent 
course of events on both global and European planes solely the 
language used by rectors of European universities a mere 15 years ago 
in Bologna. The working vocabulary used for debates on the future of 
the university -  the vocabulary of the European research area, the 
Bologna Process and global accounts of higher education and research 
(including those provided by UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the 
OECD, and the World Bank) -  has changed substantially since 1988, and 
the shift in vocabulary underlies the shift in the ways in which society 
accounts for the roles and tasks of educational institutions.
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The Bologna Process is occurring on several interrelated planes: 
the first plane is that of the official plane of ministers of 
education/governments, conferences of rectors and university 
associations, and the accompanying changes in laws on higher 
education, laws on for-profit education, laws on (educational and 
other) non-profit associations, laws on research funds etc; the second 
is the official plane of particular higher education institutions i.e. that 
of senior university management; and finally there is the practical 
plane of particular institutions and their faculty.28 In most transition 
countries, there is a gap between the good intent on the part of 
ministers of education and the reality of the functioning of higher 
education systems. There is a gap between the intentions expressed 
by officials and the capacity for action they -  and the institutions 
themselves -  can currently offer to the Bologna integration project 
(also the motivation for joining the Bologna Process often seems more 
political than educational in the region, as stressed by Tomusk 2002b).
Higher education in the region, generally and with a few 
exceptions, has been in a state of permanent crisis since the fall of 
Communism (for case studies of success stories, see Marga 1997, 2003;
28 Discussions on the Bologna Process rarely go down to the level of institutions, 
particular universities and their faculty; as Ruth Keeling put it recently, they have 
been dominated by a “’Europe-scale’ perspective” (Keeling 2004: 1). She distinguishes 
between two strands in the academic debate, with the focus of attention being either 
on whether the Bologna objectives are being achieved across Europe or on whether it 
is desirable to achieve these goals at all. There has been little attempt, she goes on to 
argue, “to study in depth, analytically and empirically .... the complexities of how the 
Bologna Process is actually being experienced and interpreted ‘on the ground’ in 
higher education settings” (Keeling 2004). The answer for a number of transition 
countries with which the present author is familiar is that, broadly speaking, the 
process quite often does not go down to the level of institutions and academics and 
remains at the level of ministries and possibly heads of institutions. In most transition 
countries, clearly what counts most at the moment is changing higher education 
legislation in accordance with the Bologna requirements, while the details (including 
institutions and their faculties) are left for the future. This somewhat contrasts with 
the Western European scene in which “the Process takes shape in its interpretation 
and application in ‘real time’, in everyday practices and discourse in the higher 
education field. At hundreds of sites throughout Europe, people are actively 
translating the Bologna policies into practice” (Keeling 2004).
Chapter 6. The University and the New European Policies 337
Ten Years After 2000): from the paralysis of substantial research 
functions, the steady decrease in public funds, the mushrooming of 
both public and private diploma mills, corruption, through to the 
lowering of professional ethos and morale; with the combination of 
the above depending on the country (for Poland, see Kwiek 2003b, 
2003g, 2004c). There has not been enough general reflection on the 
transformations to higher education systems in the region. 
Paradoxically enough, in the majority of the countries in question 
(and in the Balkans and Eastern Europe more so than in Central 
Europe) the situation of the universities -  in areas other than 
academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and the international 
mobility of students and faculty -  has severely decreased over the last 
decade. Even though it may be quite possible to go on with the 
Bologna Process in these countries in terms of legislation, it is much 
more difficult to follow through with its implementation at the level 
of the institutions.
The Bologna Process is based on a few underlying assumptions 
(not really formulated in a single place): both Europe and the world 
are entering a new era of knowledge-based and market-driven 
economies competing against each other; Europe as a region has to 
struggle with its two main competitors in higher education and 
research and development, the USA and Japan (plus Australasia); the 
knowledge society depends for its growth on the production, 
transmission, dissemination, and use of new knowledge; the 
underlying goal behind current transformations to educational 
systems as well as research and development systems, whether 
expressed directly (as in the documents relating to the European 
Research Area) or indirectly (and accompanied by the “social 
dimension”, as in the Bologna documents), is to meet the target set 
out by the European Council in Lisbon (in 2000). The target is that by 
2010 Europe must become “the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable 
economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion” (the creation of the European Higher Education Area must 
also be completed by 2010). Europe is at the crossroads; it is trying to 
combine higher competitiveness and social cohesion in an
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increasingly globalized world and it is in the process of transition 
towards a “knowledge society”.29 Thus knowledge, and consequently 
the social and economic disparity between the knowledge rich and the 
knowledge poor, will become the key issue in the years to come.30
But the Bologna Process seems inward-looking: while globally, 
the impact of globalization on higher education policies is widely 
acknowledged31, none of the official documents of the Bologna 
Process -  from the Sorbonne, Bologna, Prague, and Berlin 
declarations and communications, nor any of the accompanying 
declarations from the academic world (signed by the Salamanca and 
Graz conventions of higher education institutions) -  even once refers 
to the term “globalization”. (Even though the Trends III report 
prepared for the Berlin summit in 2003 mentions “globalization” no 
more than five times in total, which is a reflection of its descriptive 
rather than analytical ambitions, it states overtly that ministers and 
higher education institutions should “ride the tiger of globalisation
29 As the Third European Report on Science & Technology Indicators 2003 argues, “of 
course knowledge per se is not a new asset; it has always been a basis for human 
activity. However, what is radically new is the pace o f  its creation, accumulation and 
diffusion resulting in economies and society following a new knowledge-based 
paradigm. Working and living conditions are being redefined; markets and 
institutions are being redesigned under new rules and enhanced possibilities for the 
exchange of information. Moreover, knowledge is not only becoming the main source 
of wealth for people, businesses and nations, but also the main source of inequalities 
between them” (EC 2003c: 1, emphasis mine).
30 This refers to an interesting -  already referred to -  distinction drawn recently by 
a European Commission communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and 
Training; as it argues, “with an increasing premium on skills, the polarisation between 
the knowledge rich and the knowledge poor puts strains on economic and social cohesion” 
(EC 2003a: 8).
31 With an important reservation to be remembered here again, though: that the 
effects of globalization are mostly indirect, via the transformations of the state, as 
shown in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. As Roger Dale argued in “Specifying Globalization 
Effects on National Policy: a Focus on the Mechanisms”, “absolutely central to 
arguments about the effect of globalization on public services like education is that 
those effects are largely indirect; that is to say, they are mediated through the effect of 
globalization on the discretion and direction of nation states” (Dale 1999: 2, emphasis 
mine).
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rather than hope it will disappear” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 57).32 In 
general, though, the underlying assumptions are not developed in 
more detail in any of the Bologna Process documents or reports. This 
means that the overall interpretation of the huge social and economic 
changes occurring in Europe is either neglected, or taken for granted 
in some of its prevailing forms (e.g. the Lisbon agenda). 
Unquestionably, though, globalization is one of the main driving 
forces behind current transformations to the public sector, welfare 
state model (and educational policies worldwide); globalization is 
also one of the main reference points in the EU Lisbon strategy.33
Consequently, the Bologna Process seems relatively weak at an 
analytical level. It may be worrying that the main and supporting 
documents of a huge intellectual and institutional undertaking which 
aims at changing the way our universities function in both their 
teaching and research aspects do not attempt to present a wholesale 
analytical approach to current challenges and solutions based on 
perspectives wider than European ones.34 Without the analytical part
32 As Dani Rodrik in Has Globalization Gone Too Far? emphasizes: “we need to be 
upfront about the irreversibility of the many changes that have occurred in the global 
economy. Advances in communications and transportation mean that large segments 
of national economies are much more exposed to international trade and capital flows 
than they have ever been, regardless o f what policymakers choose to do. There is only limited 
scope for government policy to make a difference. In addition, a serious retreat into 
protectionism would hurt the many groups that benefit from trade and would result 
in the same kind of social conflicts that globalization itself generates” (Rodrik 1997: 9, 
emphases mine).
33 The global dimension has to be constantly taken into account in any decision­
making: as The State in a Changing World argues, “the state still defines the policies and 
rules for those within its jurisdiction, but global events are increasingly affecting its choices. 
People are now more mobile, more educated, and better informed about conditions 
elsewhere. And involvement in the global economy tightens constraints on arbitrary 
state actions, reduces the state’s ability to tax capital, and brings much closer financial 
market scrutiny of monetary and fiscal policies” (World Bank 1997: 12, emphasis mine).
34 As Erkki Berndtson in a paper on Bologna rightly remarks, “the goals of the 
Bologna Declaration (and of the Prague communiqué) have been presented as 
solutions to the problems which have never been outlined systematically. This may 
have been one of the reasons for the fast development of the process, but without a 
systematic analysis of the problems and challenges which the European Higher
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of the task, we might not be sure that the solutions provided refer to 
the right problems.35
The ambivalence of the Bologna Process concerns the process of 
globalization itself: roughly, following Dirk Van Damme (2003), there 
may be at least two contrasting (and simplified) global views of 
Bologna. The first view may present it as merely an introduction to a 
much further-reaching integration of national educational systems in 
the future, resulting from competitive pressures from other parts of the 
world resulting in turn from global liberalization in the operations of 
higher education institutions worldwide (especially in two biggest 
“exporters” of educational services, North America and Australasia). 
The second, contrasting, view may present Bologna as a large-scale 
defensive mechanism to avoid the pitfalls of globalization as seen (and 
mostly disliked) globally today -  and to stay together in Europe against 
the global odds. Thus the first view may imply a strong convergence 
between Bologna and globalisation processes on a regional scale, 
especially in the future, while the second may imply that the process is 
an attempt to make national educational systems stronger against the
Education Area faces today, there is a danger that the cosmetic features of the reform 
will be strengthened” (Berndtson 2003: 10).
35 Voldemar Tomusk recently presented a very harsh criticism of the Bologna 
Process (in his paper on “Three Bolognas and a Pizza Pie: notes on 
institutionalization of the European higher education system”); he reminds us that 
“hardly anybody involved in the Bologna Process does not consider her- or himself 
an intellectual, perhaps even of the highest calibre. Still, it is hard to see these 
individuals experiencing any moral dilemma about what they are doing, although there seem 
to be more than enough reasons fo r  them to be afraid fo r  their reputation. It suffices to 
mention the European Commission aggressively hijacking a sector without a 
mandate for doing so, academic activists writing political reports filled with 
contradictions, and knowledge workers contracted by the Commission producing 
knowledge for which they themselves have created a need and which they 
themselves consume in order to create more such knowledge”. He continues his 
criticism with the statement that “it is unfortunate that one particular logic has 
gained near-complete dominance over the European higher education project, and 
those whose calling is normally to problematize such issues and expose them to 
public scrutiny have either found this particular topic irrelevant for them, perhaps 
for the reason that no funding has been made available for critical studies, or have 
assumed the role of messengers of a particular agency” (Tomusk 2004: 93, emphasis 
mine). Strong words indeed; hopefully, Tomusk is only partly right.
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forces of globalization and to stay away from whatever is seen as its 
excesses in higher education, especially stay away as long as possible 
from the processes of privatization, commercialization, and 
commodification of higher education and research etc. Bologna is 
certainly ambivalent, and the two threads are very much interwoven in 
its documents. Both the “protectionist” threads at a European level 
(especially in its references to education as a “public good” and “public 
responsibility” which mostly means calls for more public funding from 
national states in the future) and the “expansionist” threads of 
attracting foreign students and researchers in a global competition for 
talent can be found. As Van Damme put it, “Europe is seeking its own 
way out between the Scylla of academic capitalism and the Charybdis 
of protectionism” (Van Damme 2003: 6).
6.5. C oncerns ab o u t the B o lo g n a  P rocess: b etw een  
th e O ld  and N ew  C h allen g es fo r  U n iv ersities  T od ay
Some concerns may be raised about certain “cosmetic” changes to 
higher education systems that may be introduced by Bologna; but 
other concerns could be raised about potentially misguided policy 
decisions which might be taken in some transition countries based on 
regionally-irrelevant analyses or regionally-mistaken recommenda­
tions. There may also be concerns about the various senses of 
“harmonization” concerning European higher education systems36,
36 Although the word “harmonization” does not appear in the Bologna Declaration 
itself (where only “convergence” is mentioned), it did appear in the Sorbonne Declaration 
in 1998 (Joint Declaration on Harmonization o f Architecture o f the European Higher Education 
System). The ongoing projects focused on core European learning outcomes and 
competencies, and the possibility of “European quality labels” obtained through some 
kind of European accreditation, can rightly raise concerns about the final destination of 
the Bologna Process in terms of the curricular contents. Even though, as Pavel Zgaga put 
it, “richness is the end, and ‘common roads’ are (only) the means” (Zgaga 2003: 253), 
concerns about the “Europeanization” of teaching contents do not seem exaggerated. 
Whenever Bologna skeptics are reading sentences like Eric Froment’s (President of the 
EUA, European University Association) that Bologna signatory countries are “working 
together constantly on common topics, attempting to reduce the diversity of their national
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which may potentially lead to the development of a “common 
framework of qualification” or some still unspecified core (European) 
curricula, as evidenced by such pilot projects as “Tuning Educational 
Structures in Europe” as well as the debates on pan-European 
accreditation schemes and quality assurance mechanisms etc.37 The 
question is whether the problems facing most of the EU-15 countries 
and their higher education systems are the same as the problems facing 
most transition countries, including most new EU members. I believe 
an important failure of the Bologna Process in its current geographical, 
economic and social scope is its analytical (and consequently practical) 
neglect of some of the pressing issues present in the educational 
systems of transition countries today. The analytical flaw in the 
documents and reports is the lack of any description of the old 
challenges that transition countries still face (and which are mostly 
irrelevant to the old EU-15 countries), and consequently the lack of any 
clear recommendations on how to proceed in countries plagued by two 
different sets of challenges at the same time, old and new ones.
higher education systems” or “we are managing the pre-existing great European 
diversity, reducing it at the level of structure” or “higher education in Europe must be 
unified at European level and differentiated with regard to the rest of the world” 
(Froment 2003: 29-31), they may be rightly concerned. See also initial ad hoc comments on 
Bologna by Marijk van der Wende in “The Bologna Declaration: Enhancing the 
Transparency and Competitiveness of European Higher Education” (2000).
37 Let us think in this context of passing from the “readable and comparable 
degrees” of the Bologna Declaration to a Common European Qualifications 
Framework, as the following passage from Trends III testifies: “it will be essential that 
governments and HEIS [higher education institutions] use the next phase of the 
Bologna Process to elaborate qualifications frameworks based on external reference 
points (qualification descriptors, level descriptors, skills and learning outcomes), 
possibly in tune with a common European Qualifications Framework” (Reichert and 
Tauch 2003: 14). Let us refer also in this context to one of the conclusions of a recent 
UNESCO study: there is a “need to establish a new pan-European framework for 
quality assurance, accreditation, and recognition of qualifications” (UNESCO 2003: 
28). The concern can thus certainly be the traditional diversity of European universities. 
As Zygmunt Bauman stressed well before the Bologna declaration was signed, “it is 
the good luck of the universities that despite all the efforts of the self-proclaimed 
saviours, know-betters and well-wishers to prove the contrary, they are not 
comparable, not measurable by the same yardstick and -  most important of all -  not 
speaking in unison” (Bauman 1997b: 25).
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To put it in a nutshell: while the affluent Western European 
countries face new challenges brought about by the emergence of the 
knowledge-based economy; globalization pressures on higher 
education and research activities, the attempts to introduce life-long 
learning on a wide scale, the theory (rather than the practice) of 
welfare state reinvention and public sector downsizing etc; almost a 
dozen transition countries, signatory countries of the Bologna 
Process, to varying degrees, face old challenges as well. A recent 
report by the World Bank, Constructing Knowledge Societies: New 
Challenges for Tertiary Education, argues that developing and transition 
countries are confronted with a “dual task”: “a key concern is whether 
developing and transition countries can adapt and shape their tertiary 
education systems to confront successfully this combination of old 
and new challenges” (World Bank 2002: 2).
The Bologna Process seems thus far to be focusing on new 
challenges and new problems (i.e. the problems of affluent Western 
European social democracies); the transition countries of the region, 
in contrast, are still embedded in the challenges and problems of the 
old type generated mostly over the last decade through the process of 
shifting from elite to mass higher education under severe resource 
constraints and in the context of huge economic and social 
transformations from (various forms of) communism to market 
economies (see Kwiek 2001a, 2001c). Even though the way Western 
Europe has dealt with the passage from elite to mass higher education 
is well documented, the global environment in which the process took 
place will not recur. It was a process which was taking place under 
different political, economic, and social constraints. Both higher 
education and research and development had different reference 
points at that time; the universities were still national treasures (most 
often lavishly) funded by nation-states in a period of consolidation for 
the expanded Keynesian welfare state model, national politics still 
mattered more than the economy, and national prestige often 
mattered more than particular decisions about resource allocations.38
38 To repeat the question Ramesh Mishra posed in Globalization and Welfare State 
on European (Continental) welfare and its future from an American perspective: 
“True, many European nations have inherited a large welfare state from the golden
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But this time is over, as the chapters on the university and the 
nation-state and the welfare state show. It is a real challenge in some 
European transition countries today, having to undergo the passage 
from elite to mass higher education with steadily declining public 
funds almost every consecutive year whilst developing higher 
education systems towards the “Bologna goals”. The Trends III report 
makes it clear that it is unrealistic to believe that the Bologna reforms 
are costless: public funds have to be available if the reforms are to 
succeed. Though for most of the countries of the region the funds will 
not be available. The chronic underfunding of higher education, 
widely documented by the statistical data, makes it very difficult to 
implement the Bologna recommendations in any other than a 
theoretical way. Underfunding makes it difficult to face old and new 
challenges at the same time.39 There are no specific recommendations 
or prescriptions for transition countries on how to proceed based on 
the experiences that the EU-15 or OECD countries had had during the 
same process of passing from elite to expanded models of higher 
education two to three decades ago.
This is the crucial point in educational policy for the countries in 
transition: how to combine the educational reforms presented by two 
types of challenges, old and new, traditional and related to the 
knowledge economy and globalization? How to weigh their relevance 
today -  should the transition countries turn to the past or current 
experiences of other advanced and affluent European countries in 
thinking about their higher education systems? How to progress in 
basic reforms related to much higher demand and the consequent 
massification of higher education if the material basis for these 
reforms, the welfare state, is either already dismantled or in the
age and, for the moment, seem to be able to hold on to them. But can they hold out 
against global pressures?” (Mishra 1999: 70).
39 As argued in the Introduction, higher education has to compete with other 
forms of state spending; other social needs are growing rapidly and higher education 
has not been competing successfully with other programs in recent decades in most 
CEE countries. The chances of increasing public funding for it are low. Seeing higher 
education policies in isolation from larger welfare state policies and transformations of 
the public sector would be taking a short-sighted perspective.
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process of decomposition, or even never had had a chance to exist?40 
As Voldemar Tomusk captures the point,
[W]ith the decline of the welfare state and the massification of higher education 
in the West, the Eastern vision on the resource abundant University has 
become a mere dream. The simple truth about current higher education reform 
is that the only thing we know for sure is that we want our Universities to have 
considerably more resources; ... Looking at the resources available in 
particular countries one can easily conclude that this is absolutely impossible. It 
is an empirical fact different from many unrealistic growth programs 
developed to attract foreign matching funds (Tomusk 2000: 55).
Also, spending on higher education is generally considerably lower in 
the region, as are current enrollment rates in higher education, except 
for a few countries (World Bank 2000a: 122).41
We are talking about different societies having vastly different 
economies, with mostly different standards of living and substantially 
different higher education systems still facing large structural 
reforms, especially if we go beyond the EU-15 and new EU members. 
If the knowledge economy, the point of reference for both the Bologna 
Process and the construction of the European Research Area, is 
emerging from two defining forces -  the “rise in knowledge intensity 
of economic activities” and the “increasing globalisation of economic
40 One of the major differences between Western democracies and the European 
transition countries, as argued in Chapter 4, is that the point of departure of current 
welfare transformations is different. Paul Pierson rightly notes that “in most of the 
affluent democracies, the politics of social policy centers on the renegotiation and 
restructuring of the terms of the post-war social contract rather than its dismantling” 
(Pierson 2001a: 14). In most CEE countries, though, in the most general terms, there is 
no social contract to renegotiate and welfare provisions need to be defined from the 
very beginning. There is an important difference between the potential dismantling of 
the welfare state (as in Western Europe) and the actual dismantling of the remnants of 
bureaucratic welfare in CEE countries.
41 With a few exceptions (notably France and Germany), participation in higher 
education grew in almost all European countries in the second half of the 1990s -  but 
the most spectacular increase took place in several CEE countries (like the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland). However, a recent UNESCO study argues, “there are 
already indications that foremost, owing to demographic trends, further increases of 
student enrollment are less likely” (UNESCO 2003: 4).
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affairs” (Houghton and Sheehan 2000: 2) -  the region is far behind 
indeed, and the chances of getting closer to the old EU countries are 
very low in the medium term (for more data, see OECD 1999). The 
significance of this fact does not seem to be acknowledged in the 
Bologna Process documents.
My concern about Bologna is that it is not trying to raise to the 
conceptual level which would be required to assist higher education 
systems in the region integrate with Western European systems 
within the emergent European higher education area. My perspective 
is that Bologna might provide a good opportunity -  possibly a useful 
policy agenda -  to assist in reforming those national higher education 
systems in the region which need reforms most; it might provide clear 
recommendations on what to do and how, presenting almost a 
blueprint for reforms, a comprehensive package of reforms, even 
though their scope would be quite different in different countries. In 
this respect, Bologna does not meet the expectations of the academic 
community in the region; it is still unclear in its visions, and 
consequently in its recommendations for action in respect of the 
region. At the same time, there is no way to use it as a lever for 
external, additional funding for educational reforms. Although the 
success of the process is conditional on the public funding of the 
project, it is obvious to many that no public funding will follow (“the 
Bologna reforms cannot be realised without additional funding”, 
Reichert and Tauch 2003: 29). So the question is what should be done 
under the circumstances.
Today, there are generally crucial differences in thinking about 
reforms in Western Europe and in transition countries. Reforms to be 
undertaken in Western Europe are much more functional (fine­
tuning, slight changes etc); reforms to be undertaken in some 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe and of the Balkans, by 
contrast, should be much more substantial (or structural) (see Rado 
2001). There is little common ground between the two sets of reforms 
except for their technical details and the Bologna Process in its official 
documents so far has not drawn a clear distinction between functional 
and structural reforms, or defined the respective regions for their 
future implementation. The differences between the condition of
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higher education systems in these parts of Europe are very substantial 
indeed; and so should probably be the analyses, descriptions, and 
policy recommendations. The problems and challenges, and 
consequently the depth of reforms required, are different in the 
transition countries; therefore any fine-tuning and small adjustments 
undertaken within the Bologna Process, perfectly suitable for many 
Western institutions, without any accompanying structural trans­
formations to East and Central European institutions may lead to 
merely cosmetic changes when what is needed is a transformation of 
the underlying structures of the higher education systems, at least in 
some countries of the region.
Concerns about Bologna can be both general and specific and they 
can refer to the process as a whole as well as to its potential impact in 
the region. They are based on theoretical assumptions (such as e.g. the 
traditional “idea of the university” and the universal role of the 
university, see Sadlak 2000) on the one hand, and practical knowledge 
of the functioning of higher education in many countries of the region 
on the other. Some concerns derive from traditional notions of the 
sovereignty of nation-states and the sovereignty of their educational 
policies (see Enders 2002a); some from irreconcilable differences 
between educational systems deriving from different cultures, 
languages, traditions and inheritance from the past; but other 
concerns derive from a more technical and pragmatic understanding 
of the picture of global changes in higher education whose role is 
clearly, and wrongly, downplayed in Bologna. Still other concerns 
derive directly from an awareness of the budgetary situation in the 
public sector in many countries of the region, and trends that have 
emerged there over the last decade or so (often towards welfare state 
retrenchment rather than towards a traditional “European social 
model”, still referred to in the EU Lisbon strategy of 2000).42
42 The impact of globalization on national higher education systems is indirect 
and diverse. Dale argues that “the mechanism through which globalization affects 
national policy are crucially important in defining the nature of that effect. Those 
mechanisms are not merely neutral conduits, but modify the nature of the effect they 
convey. Thus, at one level the argument is that the ‘delivery mechanisms’ themselves 
have an independent influence on the message, on how globalization affects national
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Let me now refer again to Martin Carnoy who draws in his 
Globalization and Educational Reform: What Planners Need to Know a very 
useful distinction between the three factors that in practice are crucial 
to any approach governments take in educational reform, and hence 
in any educational responses to globalization:
Their objective financial situation, their interpretation of that situation, and 
their ideological position regarding the role of public sector in education. 
These three elements are expressed through the way that countries 
“structurally adjust” their economies to the new globalized environment 
(Carnoy 1999: 47143
Even though, as we have emphasized here, the dimension of 
globalization’s challenges to higher education is severely 
underestimated in the Bologna documents, globalization is one of the 
underlying factors behind the wider Lisbon strategy of the European 
Union: globalization’s role is crucial to understanding the whole 
package of reforms, including those in the education and R&D sectors 
within the processes behind the emergence of the European research 
area. It is interesting to refer the above distinction to transition 
countries involved in the Bologna Process and to make comparisons 
with the EU-15. All three of Carnoy’s parameters are entirely different 
in transition countries compared to the EU-15: the objectively 
dramatic financial situation is easily supported by statistical data and 
it may be taken for granted in the majority of transition countries; 
consequently, the interpretations of the differences in the objective 
financial situation between the EU-15 and most transition economies
policy, and that this is a significant source of diversity within and across the effects of 
globalization. It must, of course, also be noted ... that the nature and impact o f  
globalization effects varies enormously across different countries, according to their position in 
the world and regional economies” (Dale 1999: 2, emphasis mine). Also among the 
signatory countries of the Bologna Process, the economic positions they assume in 
Europe and on a global basis are incommensurable.
43 Hay and Rosamond argue in a similar vein in their paper about globalization 
and Europeanization as discursive constructs: “it is important, at the outset, that we 
differentiate between the internationalization of a discourse of globalization as an 
accurate representation of the relevant ‘material’ constraints and the more intentional, 
reflexive and strategic choice of such a discourse as a convenient justification for 
policies pursued for altogether different reasons” (Hay and Rosamond 2002: 150).
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can be presented in even more dramatic terms; finally, in a number of 
transition countries -  escaping the model of command-driven 
economies -  the ideological position regarding the role of the state in 
the public sector differs considerably from the position taken, with a 
few national exceptions, in Europe: the ideal of the state about to 
emerge once the chaos of the transition period is over is much more 
the (American-style) model of cost-effectiveness and self-restraint in 
social issues than the “European social model” of the EU-15 (which, 
by the way, is also testified to by subsequent EU progress reports 
about the former accession countries in Central Europe44). There are 
several determinants of this state of affairs but certainly a general 
dissatisfaction with the inefficiency and incompetence of state 
bureaucracies is one of them, another being the increased role of 
market mechanisms in public sector reforms already undertaken 
(ranging from healthcare to pension systems to decentralization of 
primary and secondary education) and the increasing role of the 
private sector in the economy in general. Again, it will be interesting 
to see how the Bologna Process documents are going to conceptualize 
these crucial differences in viewing the role of the public sector in 
general and interpreting the current financial situation of transition 
states among its signatory countries.
Using another set of Carnoy’s distinctions -  the difference 
between “competitiveness-driven reforms”, “finance-driven reforms”, 
and “equity-driven reforms” in higher education (Carnoy 1999: 37; see 
also Carnoy 1995) -  it is possible to argue that not only are two speeds 
of reforms necessary within the Bologna Process (as some required 
reforms are merely functional, while others are structural), but also 
that the current drivers of reforms are different: in the EU-15 it is 
mostly competitiveness (decentralization, improved standards and 
management of educational resources, improved staff recruitment
44 As Zsuzsa Ferge shows, “the EU suggestions for some reforms of social security 
may steer these countries in a more American than European direction” (Ferge 2001b: 
1). She finds in the Accession Reports from the Community to the ten applicant 
countries a “hidden policy agenda” which suggests “measures contrary to the 
European model, such as the privatization of pensions and health, or the cutback of 
already low social expenditures” (Ferge 2001b: 1).
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and training), but in at least some transition countries, by contrast, it 
is mostly the wish to change the “business climate”, to make use of 
structural adjustments in an attempt to reduce public spending on 
education (which results from the objective situation, its 
interpretation, and the ideological stance governments take).45 These 
complications in the picture of “European” higher education systems 
are not evident in the Bologna documents, but I believe they would be 
useful in mapping the current, diverse, and often incompatible state 
of affairs in the EU-15 and in most transition countries.
The new vocabulary in which both higher education and 
research is cast in both Bologna and the European Research Area 
initiatives may be worrying; but at the same time, especially in 
connection with the latter, the vocabulary used, and the concepts 
employed, are standard in current global discussions about higher 
education and research and development, from UNESCO to the 
OECD to the Council of Europe to the World Bank. It is hard to use 
any other vocabulary today and be engaged in meaningful 
contemporary debates on the future of higher education and 
research. Concerns should be raised about the apparently economic 
(and sometimes even economistic) view of the role of higher 
education in the discussions about the European Research Area 
though. Although the ideals behind the Bologna Process are cast in a 
slightly different vocabulary, ultimately, the message is similar: we 
need tangible and measurable results from our educational 
institutions; universities will change and the kind of research they 
do, as well as the teaching they have to offer, will have to change 
too; the responsibility of universities is no longer the search for truth 
in research or the constitution of moral and civic students/citizens 
(Bildung of the traditional German model of the university) through
45 Martin Carnoy rightly argues that “the effects o f  globalization on education depend 
greatly on how countries adjust the structure of their economies to the new globalized 
environment and how they interpret the role o f  the public sector in reforming education to 
meet the needs of that new environment. In most developing countries, educational 
response to globalization is dominated by finance-driven reforms” (Carnoy 1999: 61, 
emphasis mine). The same is the case in most European postcommunist transition 
countries.
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teaching; it is much more, if not exclusively, the competitiveness of 
the European economy and European higher education systems vis- 
à-vis other economies and higher education systems, the European 
mobility of students and professionals, and the employability of 
graduates.46 The responsibility of universities is towards the 
economic growth of Europe as a whole, supporting a knowledge- 
based economy, contributing to new skills for the new emerging 
workforce of the emerging competitive, global age (the three goals 
of the Bologna Process are enhancing the employability of 
graduates, the promotion of mobility, and the attractiveness of 
Europe to the rest of the world, Reichert and Tauch 2003: 36-60).
Commenting briefly on “ambivalent Bologna”, Trends III notes 
two potentially conflicting agendas: the “competitiveness agenda” 
and the “social agenda”,47 and rightly concludes, without much
46 The difference between employment and employability is crucial: the latter term 
transfers the responsibility for a graduate’s future away from the state and towards 
the individual concerned. Especially in the context of “lifelong learning”, one’s 
“employability” clearly depends on one’s “knowledge ‘portfolio’” (Marin Carnoy). 
In the new situation in which “job” becomes “permanently temporary”, “workers 
are gradually being defined socially less by the particular long-term job they 
hold than by the knowledge they have acquired by studying and working. 
This knowledge ‘ portfolio’ allows them to move across firms and even across types 
of work, as jobs get redefined” (Carnoy 1999: 33). The responsibility becomes 
somehow privatized and individualized: given that the opportunities for studying, 
training and retraining are there, it is simply the individual’s “fault” not to be 
“knowledge rich” (European Commission), not to have the right knowledge 
“portfolio”. See Neave’s (2001a) criticism of the concept of “employability” -  but not 
only in the context of the Bologna Process but a wider one, introduced by The World 
Declaration on Higher Education (1998), which saw “employability” as the connector 
between what societies expect from higher education institutions and what these 
institutions really do, see UNESCO (2003), section on “higher education and its 
environment”.
47 The concepts of the “social dimension” of the Bologna Process and the “public 
good” approach to higher education appeared for the first time in the Prague 
Communiqué (2001). The Communiqué reads: “Ministers asserted that building 
the European Higher Education Area is a condition for enhancing the attractiveness 
and competitiveness of higher education institutions in Europe. They supported the 
idea that higher education should be considered a public good and is and will 
remain a public responsibility” (Prague Communiqué 2001: 7). Per Nyborg recently
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further discussion: “it would be naïve to assume that the EHEA 
[European Higher Education Area] is being built only on the latter 
agenda” (Reichert and Tauch 2003: 149). In the case of the region, it is 
the cooperation and solidarity motives as well as the social agenda 
that count much more than the competitiveness motive today; it 
would be naïve to assume that the institutions of the region are 
competing with the US and Japan. While Bologna may be quite 
successful in promoting its agenda in Western Europe (especially 
combined with funding already available and the additional 
incentives already included in the instruments of the European 
Research Area), it might fail in the transition countries, for a variety of 
reasons, but especially because of the combination of old and new 
challenges faced simultaneously by their higher education systems 
and of the chronic underfunding of their public higher education 
institutions. While Western European institutions currently seem to 
be much more afraid of losing their autonomy, freedom to teach and 
do research in the way their national priorities and funding 
allocations still lavishly allow them to, for educational institutions in 
several transition countries the Bologna Process could be a coherent 
reform agenda, should it be further developed to include this 
purpose.48
drew a useful distinction between the notion of public good and that of public 
responsibility with respect to higher education. His argument is that in the context 
of the Bologna Process it may be more relevant to explore the implications of 
the public responsibility for higher education than to focus solely on the concept 
of the public good, because higher education may also be interpreted as a private 
good (bringing its graduates higher incomes, Nyborg 2003: 355-356). See also Kladis 
2003.
48 It would be interesting to compare the impact of the Bologna Process in the EU- 
15 and in transition countries. The following observation from a recent UNESCO- 
CEPES report on Trends and Developments in Higher Education in Europe (2003) appears 
much more appropriate to the latter countries: “It may be that not everything that is 
happening in European higher education today or in the future is a  direct consequence of the 
Bologna Process. Nevertheless, this process has gained such momentum that it 
permeates most discussions on higher education topics, if only by creating, for the first 
time, a genuine European platform for exchange and the conscious notion of ‘a 
European Higher Education Area’ as a goal with distinctive features and a specific 
target date to be met -  2010” (UNESCO 2003: 24, emphasis mine).
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6.6. T h e  U n iv ersity  fo r  the K n ow led ge Econom y: 
the E m ergen t EU  D iscou rse  on the N ew  T ask s 
o f  the In stitu tio n
Let s focus now on the emergent role(s) of the institution of the 
university in the new EU discourse of the “Europe of Knowledge”. The 
institution of the university is playing a significant role in the processes 
surrounding the emergence of the common European higher education 
and common European research spaces, but in none of these two 
processes, is the university seen in a traditional way. The institution of the 
university is evolving together with radical transformations of the 
social setting in which it functions (the setting of “globalization”, the 
“knowledge economy” and the “knowledge society”). The new world 
that is emerging assumes different names in different formulations and 
the social, cultural, and economic processes in question are debated in 
multiple vocabularies of the social sciences; though recently, it has 
increasingly been through the lens of globalization. As Colin Hay and 
Ben Rosamond argue in “Globalization, European Integration and the 
Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives” regarding the 
pervasiveness -  but also the usefulness -  of the concept: “globalization 
has become a key referent of contemporary political discourse and, 
increasingly, a lens through which policy-makers view the context in which 
they find themselves” and “globalization has come to provide a cognitive 
filter, frame or conceptual lens or paradigm through which social, political 
and economic developments might be ordered and rendered intelligible” 
(Hay and Rosamond: 2002: 148, 151, emphases mine). It is exactly its 
ability to order and render our world more intelligible that the concept 
of globalization and the discourse of globalization came in handy to 
policy-makers. This is the overriding notion in most major European 
discussions about the role(s) of higher education and research and 
development, the notion behind the Lisbon strategy, especially when 
combined with such accompanying new notions as the “knowledge 
economy” and the “knowledge society” -  and in respect of the 
traditional contexts of economic growth, national and European 
competitiveness and fighting unemployment, presented probably for 
the first time by the Jacques Delors White Paper more than a decade
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ago (1993). In this emergent new global order,49 universities are striving 
for a new place, as they are increasingly unable and/ or unwilling to 
maintain their traditional roles and tasks.50 The official discourses on 
the common European space in higher education and in research and 
innovation increasingly acknowledge that the future role of universities 
will have to be radically different from the traditional modern role of 
the university in society.51 Consequently, the university both in Europe 
and globally seems to be entering a new epoch.52
The emergence of common European higher education and 
research spaces will have far-reaching consequences for both the 
enlarged Europe and for postcommunist transition countries in 
general.53 The ideas of both European spaces are evolving and are still
49 Even the Wim Kok report on the Lisbon strategy uses the term ancient regime 
(although in its English version of the “old regime”) for the description of the current 
European social model (EC 2004a: 16).
50 See the powerful trend towards “entrepreneurial universities” in Europe, 
associated for the first time with particular institutions by Burton Clark in his ground­
breaking Creating Entrepreneurial Universities. See also the findings of the new 2004­
2007 EU project “European Universities for Entrepreneurship -  Their Role in the 
Europe of Knowledge” (EUEREK coordinated by the Institute of Education of the 
University of London, in which the present author is a partner).
51 This may result in the relative marginalization of the social sciences in EU- 
funded research. The only major social science priority in the 6th Framework 
Programme is “citizens and governance in knowledge-based society” with a budget of 
225 million Euro, out of 16 billion Euro. From a global perspective, “increasing levels 
of privatisation and commodification of tertiary education have marginalised non­
commercial areas of inquiry and research, particularly in the humanities and social 
sciences” (Henry et al. 2001: 169).
52 To recall here Bill Readings’ saddening conclusions from The University in Ruins, 
“the recognition that the University as we know it is a historically specific institution, is one 
with which academics have a hard time coming to terms. History grants no essential or 
eternal role to the modern research University, and it is necessary to contemplate the 
horizon of the disappearance of that University. Not to embrace the prospect of its 
vanishing, but to take seriously the possibility that the University, as presently 
constituted, holds no lien on the future” (Readings 1996: 128-29, emphasis mine).
53 As Martin Lawn and Bob Lingard argue in “Constructing a European Policy 
Space in Educational Governance: the Role of Transnational Policy Actors”, this space is 
“being shaped by constant interaction between small groups of linked professionals, 
managers and experts. This space does not have a constitutional position, a legislative legality,
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not clearly defined. One thing is certain though: we are confronting a 
major redesign of what research and teaching in the European public 
sector are supposed to be, of how public higher education 
institutions, including universities, are supposed to function and be 
financed (from EU funds), and what roles faculties are increasingly 
being pressed to assume in Europe’s converging higher education 
systems. At the moment, the European Higher Education Area is 
much more of a desired ideal to be achieved within the ongoing 
Bologna Process, with very limited funding available for its 
implementation in particular countries; the ideal of the European 
Research Area, by contrast, has already determined the shape of the 
6th Framework Programme of Research -  the biggest source of EU 
research funds, totaling 17.5 billion EUR for 2002-2006 (compared 
with the total of 175 billion EUR invested in research and de­
velopment in 2001 in the EU-15 though, EC 2003d: 19) -  and the way 
in which research activities in Europe are currently funded from EU 
sources. Thus while the effects of the ideal of the European Higher 
Education Area still remain largely at the level of governmental good 
will about the direction of changes to particular national higher 
education systems in the years to come, the effects of the ideal of the 
European Research Area are already visible on the practical level of 
where clusters of research funds are channeled and what new 
research-funding instruments are available.54 The European Research 
Area is at the same time an important operational component of a 
comprehensive Lisbon agenda which aims at redefining both the 
European economy, as well as its welfare and education systems.
a fixed place o f work or a regulated civic or business mission. Yet it is being formed between 
state and EU offices, between agencies and subcontractors, between academics and 
policy managers, between experts and officials, and between voluntary and public sector 
workers. It is a growing culture, which exists in the interstices of formal operations, in 
the immaterial world. It is shaped by the opportunities and fears of globalisation” (Lawn 
and Lingard 2002: 292, emphasis mine). Or as Ruth Keeling put it about the Bologna 
Process, its official discourse is not a directive “from above” but “an often confusing set 
of messages from transient policy communities assembled momentarily at Bologna, 
Graz, Berlin, Prague, Salamanca, Goteborg and Brussels” (Keeling 2004: 12).
54 As Ronald J. Pohoryles argues, though, “the cornerstones of a European 
Research Area with a commitment to excellence already exists” (Pohoryles 2002a: 395).
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Over the last couple of years, the vocabularies used in the processes 
for the integration of higher education systems and that of the 
integration of research and development in Europe have become 
increasingly similar; with the visions for the future of our public 
universities -  at a European level -  also becoming more convergent 
than ever before; however, a tacit agreement on the different speeds 
at which different parts of Europe will have to change their 
educational and research and development landscapes is becoming 
increasingly clear (with the major dividing line being between the 
EU-15 and the transition countries, in general).55
6.7. T ow ard s th e  E u ropean  R esearch  A rea
It is important to remember here that the first communiqué about the 
European Research Area published by the European Commission in 
2000 (Towards a European Research Area) hardly ever mentions 
universities (the term is actually used approximately three times in 
connection with the situation of research in North America). But also
55 Educational reforms in the European postcommunist transition countries have 
been embedded for well over a decade in wider social processes. These are, in general, the 
move away from communism and towards open, free and democratic societies; the move 
away from command economies towards market-driven ones; and the processes of a 
gradual adaptation to both global and European transformations. In different countries 
the above dimensions have played a differing role; in some the political dimension was 
more important than the economic; in others it is the long-lasting economic crises that 
plays a crucial role (Rado 2001: 13-16). In the new EU member countries, it has been the 
adjustment to European standards that has been the most important in recent years. In the 
most general terms, Central European countries have been doing best in reforming their 
educational systems: in the 1990s, the structures inherited from communism were 
changed, new laws were passed, enrollments were continuously increasing, and 
universities radically changed their educational curricula. Some countries witnessed the 
emergence of a booming private sector so that at the beginning of the 2000s enrollments in 
this sector went up by as much as 30 percent in some of them. Higher education became 
an affordable educational product there (to use a marketing term which has become quite 
common in some of these countries) of relatively good quality although available mainly 
at an undergraduate level. Education at the postgraduate and Ph.D. levels is mostly 
available only from traditional elite public institutions (i.e. universities).
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higher education is not mentioned at all in the document. On reading 
the document, it is clear that neither European universities nor 
European higher education in general have been significantly taken 
into account from the outset when thinking about a common research 
space in Europe. What figures prominently instead are dynamic 
private investments in research, intellectual property rights and 
effective tools to protect them, the creation of companies and risk 
capital investment houses, the research needed for political decision­
making, and more abundant and more mobile human resources or “a 
dynamic European landscape, open and attractive to researchers and 
investment” (EC 2000a: 18). It is symptomatic of the initial period for 
the development of a European Research Area that while describing 
the situation of research in Europe, its traditional location at 
universities is not commented on at all. Under closer scrutiny, this is 
understandable though: the most important sector in which research 
and development activities are performed is the private sector; 
however, the EU-15 is lagging behind both the US and Japan in 
relation to business expenditure on research and development as a 
share of total domestic research and development expenditure.56
The opening paragraph of the communication Towards a European 
Research Area from the European Commission states that
[E]ven more so than the century that has just finished, the 21st century we are 
now entering will be the century of science and technology. More than ever, 
investing in research and technological development offers the most promise
56 The BERD indicator (business expenditure on research and development) in 
Europe is still 66%, with Japan currently achieving 74% and the US achieving 73%. In 
other words, the business sector finances 66% of all research in the EU-15. But the 
question is not only who finances research -  but also in which sector the researchers 
are located. In the EU-15, on average, 50% of researchers are employed in business 
enterprises while only 34% are employed in higher education. In the US, by 
comparison, the difference between the two sectors is even bigger: 80% of researchers 
work in the private sector while only 15% are employed in higher education (in both 
cases, the remaining share of researchers is located in the government sector). In 
general, the higher education sector is the most important employer of researchers in 
only a few European countries, notably in Spain, Portugal, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Turkey (for more comparative data, see the section on “Investment in the 
Knowledge-Based Economy” of Key Figures 2003-2004, EC 2003d: 18-49).
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for the future. In Europe, however, the situation concerning research is worrying. 
Without concerted action to rectify this the current trend could lead to a loss 
of growth and competitiveness in an increasingly global economy. The 
leeway to be made up on the other technological powers in the world will 
grow still further. And Europe might not successfully achieve the transition 
to a knowledge-based economy. Why such a negative picture? (EC 2000a: 4, 
emphasis mine).
So the problem crudely stated is that the situation concerning 
research is “worrying”. What are the main reasons for this, according 
to the communique? The principal reference framework for research 
activities in Europe is still “national” and the static structure of “15+1” 
(Member States and the Union) leads to the “fragmentation, isolation 
and compartmentalisation of national research efforts and systems” 
(EC 2000a: 7; see also Agalianos 2003: 184ff). There is no “European” 
policy on research, and national research policies and Union policy 
overlap without forming a coherent whole. What is needed is a 
“genuinely European research agenda” that will go beyond filling the 
gaps of national research programmes to include concerns which are 
of a “Europewide relevance” (Agalianos 2003: 186). What is therefore 
needed is a “real European” research policy, a “more dynamic 
configuration” of research and development (EC 2000a: 7).57 As 
explained in 2003 in a communication on The Role o f Universities in the 
Europe o f Knowledge:
[T]he nature and scale of the challenges linked to the future of the 
universities mean that these issues have to be addressed at European [rather 
than national -  MK] level (EC 2003b: 10).
It should come as no surprise that the initial reaction by the 
Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conference (of May 2000) to the first 
communique about the European Research Area was more than 
reserved:
57 I am in full agreement with Dale and Robertson when they argue in “Changing 
Geographies of Power in Education; the Politics of Rescaling and its Contradictions” 
that “we should approach what is happening at the level of national education 
systems as neither incidental ‘effects on’ them, nor as some form of ‘collateral 
damage’, but as distinct emergent properties of the new functional, institutional and 
scalar divisions of labour” (Robertson and Dale 2003: 14).
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The Confederation finds it a source of concern that the central role of 
universities in research and training is not included in considerations 
concerning a European research area. Public research efforts which take place 
in universities are not recognized in the Communication. Not once are 
universities mentioned as places of research; not once are universities 
recognized as the institutions where the researchers of the future are being 
educated and trained; not once are universities represented as centres of 
national, regional or local acquisition and transfer of knowledge, nor is this 
function promoted (EU Rectors’ Conference 2000: 1).
The Confederation criticized the limited view of what constitutes 
“research” in the European Commission’s account -  a view that 
consequently led to the downplaying of the role of universities in 
research activities as presented in the initial communication. To put it 
in a nutshell, research was limited to mean technological devel­
opment only. European rectors stressed the fact that universities are 
places where most public research takes place and by far the most 
basic research.58 Leaving out universities in discussions means 
“cutting out a very large part of the innovative and creative facets of 
research, as it means leaving out almost all basic research; and it 
means ignoring the education and training of future researchers” (EU 
Rectors’ Conference 2000: 2). As evidenced by further documents, 
especially following the communiqué on the role of universities in the 
“Europe of Knowledge” in 2003, the reactions of the academic 
community, including the rectors of European universities, to the 
initiative of working towards a common European research space 
were much more favorable in subsequent years.
Documents from the European Commission devoted to the 
European Research Area rarely refer to the Bologna Process but if the
58 The share of basic research within total research and development expenditure 
shows considerable variation between the USA, Japan, the EU-15 and new EU 
member states. The highest share of basic research is in the Czech Republic (40%), 
Poland (38%) and Hungary (29%), with the range for the major EU-15 countries being 
22-28%, while in the USA the share is 20%, and in Japan it is very low, at 12%. The 
explanation for the situation in new EU member states is that the private research and 
development sector is not well developed and the whole R&D system is dominated by 
public universities and government laboratories (see EC 2003d: 25).
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they do, they do so approvingly.59 At the same time, while documents 
of the Bologna Process do refer to the European research area, the EU 
documents relating to the “Lisbon agenda” in general clearly refer to 
the Bologna Process.60 Finally, the 2003 Berlin communiqué from the 
ministers of education involved in the Bologna Process emphatically 
calls the European higher education area and the European research 
area the “two pillars of the knowledge based society”, mentioning 
“synergies” between them and sending a clear message to institutions 
of higher education: “to increase the role and relevance of research to 
technological, social and cultural evolution and to the needs of 
society” (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 7). Comparing the Berlin 
communiqué of the Bologna Process (2003) to the most recent EU 
documents about the European research area, apart from the 
necessary and unavoidable lip-service on both sides, a general 
convergence of views can easily be shown. A divergence in views is 
growing in respect of one issue in particular though: while the 
European Commission (following the Lisbon agenda) uses an 
increasingly economic perspective61, the Bologna Process in Berlin 
again confirmed the role of the “social dimension”: consequently, as 
the Berlin communiqué states it, the need to increase com­
petitiveness
59 To give an example, as European higher education institutions are very 
diversified, “the structural reforms inspired by the Bologna Process constitute an effort 
to organize that diversity within a more coherent and compatible European framework, 
which is a condition for the readability, and hence the competitiveness, of European 
universities both within Europe itself and in the whole world” (EC 2003b: 5, emphasis 
mine).
60 To give an example, Presidency Conclusions. Barcelona European Council: “The 
European Council calls for further action in this field: to introduce instruments to 
ensure the transparency of diplomas and qualifications (ECTS, diploma and certificate 
supplements, European CV) and closer cooperation with regard to university degrees 
in the context of the Sorbonne-Bologna-Prague process prior to the Berlin meeting in 
2003” (Barcelona European Council 2002: art. 44).
61 As Martin Lawn put it recently in “Borderless Education: Imagining a European 
Education Space in a Time of Brands and Networks”, “the market is the dominant 
European discourse ... Education has moved from the position of a sensitive area for 
cooperation ... into a crucial part of the new knowledge economy” (Lawn 2001: 174).
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must be balanced with the objective of improving the social characteristics of 
the European Higher Education Area, aiming at strengthening social 
cohesion and reducing social and gender inequalities both at national and at 
European level. In that context, Ministers reaffirm their position that higher 
education is a public good and a public responsibility (Berlin Communiqué 2003: 
1, emphasis mine; see also Kladis 2003).
Documents of the European Commission rarely refer to classical 
models of the university; if they do, they do not label them explicitly 
as outmoded but rather indicate trends undermining their 
significance.62 The communication on the role of universities, like 
other Commission documents on the future of higher education and 
research, takes a much more economic than cultural or social 
perspective towards universities (which in turn seems closer to the 
Bologna Process documents). Both the tone and the perspective of the 
documents relating to the higher education area on the one hand and 
to the common research area on the other differ here considerably.
6.8. A d ap tin g  and A d ju stin g  to P rofou n d  C hanges: 
C u rren t D eb ates
Another issue raised by the European Commission is the following: are 
the transformations facing European universities radical -  and if so, 
why? As a communication on Investing Efficiently in Education and 
Training: an Imperative for Europe argues, the challenge in education and 
training is likely to be even bigger than envisaged in Lisbon in 2000. 
The challenge is summarized there in the following way:
Providing an engine for the new knowledge-based European economy and 
society; overcoming accumulated delays and deficits in relation to key
62 On the Humboldt tradition, the communiqué about the role of universities 
states the following: “European universities have for long modeled themselves along 
the lines of some major models, particularly the ideal model of university envisaged 
nearly two centuries ago by Wilhelm von Humboldt in his reform of the German 
university, which sets research at the heart of university activity and indeed makes it 
the basis of teaching. Today the trend is away from these models, and toward greater 
differentiation” (EC 2003b: 5-6).
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competitors; accommodating a severe demographic constraint; and 
overcoming high regional issues that will be exacerbated by enlargement 
during the vital transition period. ... Simply maintaining the status quo or 
changing slowly would clearly be hugely inadequate in the face of such a massive 
challenge (EC 2003a: 11, emphasis mine).
Consequently, the European Union needs “a healthy and flourishing 
university world”; it needs “excellence” in its universities. At present, 
though, just as the situation of research is “worrying”, the situation of 
universities is bad because they are not “globally competitive ... even 
though they produce high quality scientific publications” (EC 2003b: 2). 
European universities generally have less to offer than their main 
competitors, the communication goes on to argue. Following the 
criticism of the first communications about the common European 
research space regarding the mission of universities (as expressed in the 
declaration of EU Rectors mentioned briefly above), this time the 
European Commission wanted to be as careful as possible about the role 
of universities, stating, inter alia, that universities -  although not in 
general but only “in many respects” -  still “hold the key to the 
knowledge economy and society” (EC 2003b: 5); universities are also “at 
the heart of the Europe of Knowledge” (EC 2003b: 4). At the same time 
the stakes are very high and universities in the form in which they are 
functioning now are not acceptable in the Commission’s view. Its 
largely economic perspective is quite clear here and the idea is conveyed 
in many passages of the communication in fairly strong formulations.
Consequently, universities face an imperative need to “adapt and 
adjust” to a series of profound changes (EC 2003b: 6). They must rise 
to a number of challenges. They can only release their potential by 
undergoing “the radical changes needed to make the European 
system a genuine world reference” (EC 2003b: 11). They have to 
increase and diversify their income in the face of the worsening 
underfunding. The great golden age of universities’ Ivory Tower 
ideal (not mentioned in the communication by name, though) is over:
[A]fter remaining a comparatively isolated universe for a long period, both in 
relation to society and to the rest of the world, with funding guaranteed and 
a status protected by respect for their autonomy, European universities have 
gone through the second half of the 20th century without really calling into
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question the role or the nature o f  what they should be contributing to society (EC 
2003b: 22, emphasis mine).
But it is clearly over now, the time for accountability has come, and 
none of us in academia should be surprised. Thus the fundamental 
question about European universities today is the following: “Can the 
European universities, as they are and are organised now, hope in the 
future to retain their place, in society and in the world?” (EC 2003b: 
22, emphasis in original).
It is a purely rhetorical question in the context of the whole 
communication: the universities in Europe -  as they are and as they 
are organized today -  will not be able to retain their place.63 
Restructuring is necessary, and a much wider idea of European social, 
economic and political integration applied to the higher education 
sector, expressed in the ideals of a common European higher 
education area, comes in handy. Let us recall the goal of the common 
research area in another formulation (from Strategy for a Real Research 
Policy in Europe) to see how far away it is from traditional views on 
the social role of the university: the university’s goal is the creation of 
an area for research where scientific resources are used “to create jobs 
and increase Europe’s competitiveness” (EC 2000c: 1).
Universities today are increasingly responsible to their 
stakeholders; university training does not only affect those who 
benefit directly from it, the inefficient use of resources by public 
universities affects society at large. Thus the objective, the European 
Commission goes on to argue, is to “maximise the social return of the 
investment” or “to optimise the social return on the investment 
represented by the studies it [society] pays for” (EC 2003b: 14).
The European Commission in discussing the future of higher 
education (except for the 2003 communiqué on The Role o f Universities 
in the Europe of Knowledge) prefers a much wider reference to 
“education and training”. In Investing Efficiently in Education and 
Training: an Imperative for Europe (2003), the role of higher education is
63 As echoed by Peter C. Magrath: “today’s university is not good enough for our 
new globalized, world. The leading universities of tomorrow will be linked 
transnationally and in diverse partnerships with businesses, governments, and other 
providers of education” (Magrath 2000: 258).
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relatively simple, and no different from that of education and 
training in general; as an introductory sentence puts it: “education 
and training are crucial to achieving the strategic goal set for the 
Member States at the Lisbon European Council to make the 
European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge- 
based economy (and society) in the world”.64 No mention of “more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion” is made this time (EC 
2003a: 4) which clearly shows that the second part of the Lisbon 
strategic goal is somehow inferior to the first. Consequently, it 
comes as no surprise that what provides the perspective for looking 
at higher education is the “relevance of education/ training to the 
Lisbon goal” rather than relevance to anything more general (EC 
2003a: 6). Making Europe a leading knowledge-based economy 
would be possible “only if education and training functioned as 
factors of economic growth, research and innovation, competitiveness, 
sustainable employment and social inclusion and active citizenship” 
(EC 2003a: 6). Thus what is needed today is a “new investment 
paradigm” in education and training -  what is going to change is 
not only the variables of the investment model but also the 
underlying parameters (EC 2003a: 9).
The communication mentions briefly the Bologna Process (and the 
Bruges-Copenhagen process in the European integration of vocational 
training) as examples of moves in the right direction, but hastens to add 
that “the pace of change does not yet match the pace of globalization, 
and we risk falling behind our competitors if it is not increased” (EC 
2003a: 10). Again, it is interesting to note the large extent to which the 
phenomenon of globalization is present in the documents relating to the 
common European research space, in contrast to being largely neglected 
in the Bologna Process documents.65
64 Incidentally, it is important to remember the crucial difference between the 
“knowledge economy” and the “knowledge society” -  as different from each other as 
the “economy” is different from “society”.
65 Without forgetting, at the same time, that “it is the ideas that actors hold about 
the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs 
the way in which actors behave. This is no less true of policy-makers and 
governments. Whether the globalization thesis is ‘true’ or not may matter far less than
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In terms of financing, generally, in several recent communiqués the 
issue of private investment in both research and higher education was 
raised. The communication on More Research for Europe. Towards 3% of 
GDP makes it clear that the increase in R&D investments in the EU (from 
the current 1.9% to 3% of GDP by 2010) is expected to come largely from 
private rather than public funds. Thus the main challenge is “to make 
R&D investment more attractive and profitable to business in the 
European Research Area” (EC 2002c: 5). There is a need for “boosting 
private investment in research” as another communiqué Towards a 
European Research Area calls one of its subsections (EC 2002a: 12-13). 
Investing Efficiently in Education and Training reminds us that
it is very important to realize that the largest share of this deficit stems from 
the low level of private investment in higher education and research and 
development in the EU compared with the USA. At the same time, private 
returns on investment in tertiary education remain high in most EU countries 
(EC 2003a: 13).
Consequently, if we take together the low private investment levels in 
higher education (low private share in the costs of studying) and the 
high private returns on university education (higher professional status 
combined with the higher salaries of graduates from European 
universities), the answer given is to add to public funding by “increasing 
and diversifying” investment in higher education (EC 2003a: 13). But as 
Henry and colleagues described the apparent paradox, “though 
education is now deemed more important than ever for the competitive 
advantage of nations, the commitment and capacity of governments to 
fund it have weakened considerably” (Henry et al. 2001: 30-31).
The idea conveyed to universities is that they should “do more 
(teaching and research) with less (public money)” but possibly with 
more private funds.66 From the perspective of transition countries,
whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it” 
(Hay and Rosamond 2002: 148).
66 The business sector is probably the most important sector in which research and 
development is performed. Business research and development is market-driven and 
accounts for most expenditure on innovation, as a recent Key Figures 2003-2004. 
Towards a European Research Area. Science, Technology and Innovation argues (EC 2003d: 
27). The business expenditure on R&D as a % of R&D intensity is 65.6 in the EU-15
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“boosting” private investment in research seems largely unrealistic 
today, as opposed to boosting private investment in studying which 
has already happened in hundreds of both public and private 
institutions with a considerable share of fee-paying students (see 
Tomusk 2003; Kwiek 2003a and 2003c). For most new EU member 
countries, though, to reach the EU goal -  a level of 3% of their GDP for 
research and development by 2010 -  is hardly conceivable, especially 
taking into account the current low levels of funding in most of them. It 
is also interesting to note that the policy for revenue diversification in 
higher education in less industrialized countries (including some parts 
of Central and Eastern Europe) may not be as effective as it was 
previously thought, as D. Bruce Johnstone shows (Johnstone 2003).67
6.9. C on clu sion s
To conclude, let us restate the major points: the recent EU discourse 
leaves no doubts about the direction of changes in the social and 
economic roles of the institution of the university in emergent
(with the highest level in Sweden and Switzerland, of 78 and 74, respectively) -  as 
opposed to Latvia and Hungary (40), Poland (35), Lithuania and Bulgaria (21).
67 How do the documents about the European Research Area refer to universities in 
Central and Eastern Europe? They emphasize “frequently difficult circumstances of 
universities in the accession countries as regards human and financial resources” (EC 
2003b: 3) and stress “a greater level of heterogeneity of the European university landscape” 
after enlargement (2003b: 10). Similarly, a communiqué on More Research for Europe 
reminds us that the share of business funding is very low in most accession countries and 
concludes: “the diversity of situations in Europe calls for differentiated but co-ordinated 
policies” (EC 2002c: 8). Even though we may not be especially fond of describing the 
catastrophic situation of both private and public funding of research activities in most 
transition countries by way of euphemisms like “difficult circumstances of universities”, 
“heterogeneity of the European university landscape”, and the “diversity of situations in 
Europe”, we must nevertheless acknowledge the fact that huge gaps between the EU-15 
and most of the transition countries are clearly recognized in EU documents. The Bologna 
Process documents, by contrast, do not even use euphemisms to describe the different 
points of departure in various countries in the integration project. Not a single document 
acknowledges the massive difference between universities in affluent countries of the West 
and universities in transition countries. What is widely acknowledged instead is a wide 
“linguistic” and “cultural” diversity among European institutions.
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“knowledge societies”. The institution of the university seems already 
to have found it legitimate, useful and necessary to evolve together 
with radical transformations of the social setting in which it functions. 
For in the new global order, against the odds, universities are striving 
to maintain their traditionally pivotal role in society. The role of 
universities as engines of economic growth, contributors to economic 
competitiveness and suppliers of well-trained workers for the new 
knowledge-driven economy is being widely acknowledged -  which is 
undoubtedly a radical reformulation of the traditional social roles of the 
university. The university in a European context seems to be entering a 
new era of its development (epitomized by the EU “Education and 
Training 2010” agenda of 2004). The main reasons for these 
transformations that are worth mentioning here include the 
globalization pressures on nation-states and its public services, the 
strengthening of the project for a “common Europe” through new 
education and research spaces, the end of the “Golden age” of the 
Keynesian welfare state as we have known it, and the emergence of 
knowledge-based societies and knowledge-driven economies. More 
generally, the processes affecting the university today are not any 
different from those affecting the outside world; under both external 
pressures (like globalization) and internal pressures (like changing 
demographics, the aging of societies, maturation of welfare states, post­
patriarchal family patterns etc); the processes in question being the 
individualization (and recommodification) of our societies and the 
denationalization (and desocialization) of our economies. On top of 
that, we are beginning to feel at universities the full effects of the 
universalization of higher education and the increasing 
commodification of research. For the project of European integration, 
the theme of the new “Europe of Knowledge” seems crucial; the 
emergent European educational and research space becomes a 
significant component of the “revitalization” of the Europeanization 
project. The foundations of the European knowledge society (and 
knowledge-economy) are constructed around such pivotal notions as 
“knowledge”, “innovation”, “research”, “education” and “training”. 
Education, and especially “lifelong learning”, becomes a new 
discursive space in which European dreams of common citizenship
368 Chapter 6. The University and the New European Policies
are currently being located. A new “knowledge-based Europe” is 
becoming individualized (individual learners rather than citizens of 
nation-states) and the construction of this new educational space can 
contribute to the forging of a new sense of European identity. It is 
possible even that the idea of Europe and its founding myths and 
symbols are being redefined; and it is this new education space (being 
constructed through the emergent European educational and research 
policies discussed in the present chapter), within which a new 
European identity is being forged, that is crucial in discussing 
transformations to European universities today.
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